Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

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With Reverence

to

Professor G.C. Pande

ABBREVIATIONS

BB	Bibliotheca Buddhica.
BDVI	Bauddha Dharma ke Vikāsa ka Itihāsa,
BST	Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series.
CHI	Cambridge History of India.
CII	Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum.
DPPN	Dictionary of the Pāli Proper Names.
EBM	Eary Buddhist Monachism.
EI	Epigraphia Indica.
EMB	Early Monastic Buddhism.
ERE	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
HOS	Harvard Oriental Series.
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly.
IA	Indian Archaeology—A Review.
Ind. Ant.	Indian Antiquary.
JA	Journal Asiatique.
JBBRAS	Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society.
JBORS	Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society.
JDL	Journal of the Department of Letters.
JPTS	Journal of the Pali Text Society.
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā	Kathāvatthu-ppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā.
MM	Mahāmahopādhyāya.
MSS	Manuscripts.
PHAI	Political History of Ancient India.
PTS	Pali Text Society.
RE	Rock Edict.
SBB	Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SBE	Sacred Books of the East.
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländichen Gesellschaft.

PREFACE

Buddhism, during the age of Aśoka, was characterised by a reassessment of the meaning, significance, implications and presuppositions of the traditional Buddhist ideas. Diverse hypotheses were advanced to elucidate and harmonise them internally within the context of Buddhist thought as also with the ideas which were then current in the general intellectual milieu of the times. The *Kathāvatthu* is the leading document of this age, an age when repeated schisms had rent the original unity of Buddhism and produced an atmosphere seething with many-sided reflections, doctrinal debates and controversies. It presents a broad cross-section of Buddhist thought in an age of critical transition when some of the conflicts and obscurities latent in the earlier doctrines emerged openly and when in the course of their discussion ground was prepared for future development. The *Kathāvatthu*, thus, presents a watershed in the development of Buddhist thought. Before the emergence of the controversies, recorded in this text, Buddhism still presented, more or less, an ecumenical aspect, but not long afterwards the beginnings of the Mahāyāna are clearly traceable. The *Kathāvatthu*, thus, is a *magnum opus* for any reconstruction of the history of early Buddhism, especially for understanding the figurative transition from the earlier historical forms to the later developed systems.

Despite the importance of *Kathāvatthu*, little work has, however, been done so far to understand and elucidate its admittedly difficult and often obscure, even enigmatic, contents. A.C. Taylor brought out the first Roman edition of the text as published by the Pali Text Society, London in two volumes. respectively in the years 1894 and 1897. The learned society, again, did great service to the Buddhist studies, by publishing the English translation of the text in the year 1915 completed by S.Z. Aung and Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids. In 1961, Bhiksu Jagdish Kashyap edited the text in Nāgarī characters,

published in the Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli Series. Buddhaghosa's commentary (*Aṭṭhakathā*) on the *Kathāvatthu*, was edited by J.P. Minayeff and was published in JPTS 1889. B.C. Law translated this commentary into English in the year 1940. Owing to the endeavour of the translators some welcome light has certainly been thrown on the difficult text. Still its obscurities continue to require explanation. In fact the translators have often rendered the original quite literally and have glossed over the obscurities many a times. Scholars like W. Wassilieff, Max Walleser, Louis de La Vallèe Poussin, J. Masuda, Andrè Bareau, Nalinaksha Dutt, etc., have brought to light similar controversies from other Buddhist texts not traceable in their originals. They, however, appear to have largely contented themselves with recording the theses professed by the different sects. Thus, although, some amount of material has been made available for the study of *Kathāvatthu* still no comprehensive attempt has been made to analyse the world of thought presented in it. The present work is a modest attempt to proceed in that direction.

The *Kathāvatthu* undoubtedly forms the *fons et origo* of our study, yet, with a view to presenting a fuller account of the cross currents in early Buddhism almost all relevant sources have been tapped *in extenso*, such as, other Pāli canonical and non-canonical works, treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva on eighteen Buddhist sects, Chinese travellers' accounts, extant works of the Buddhist sects etc. The present work seeks to elucidate the doctrines of the early Buddhist sects, as presented in the *Kathāvatthu* in the light of the historical development of Buddhist thought and its wider milieu. It not only seeks to analyse the original significance of the points discussed but to connect them historically with specific tendencies in the growth of the Buddhist faith, practice and organisation. It further seeks to correlate Buddhist develop ments with similar developments in other contemporary schools.

The work is substantially based on my Ph.D. thesis entitled, "Doctrinal Controversies in Early Buddhism" approved by the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur in 1968. The work is divided into three sections containing eleven chapters in all. Section A, "Genesis and Growth of Controversies" comprises

the first two chapters. Chapter I, "*Kathāvatthu* and its Controversies" deals with the nature and place of *Kathāvatthu* in the Buddhist Canon wherein it has been shown that the tenets and doctrines attributed to the different early Buddhist sects and doctrinal controversies arising therefrom, as recorded in this text, should be taken to belong generally to the age of Aśoka. We have also analysed the philosophical and religious issues that were under constant debate from pre-Buddhist times in the background of which the Buddha delivered his own gospel leaving some gaps pregnant with possibilities of disputes and controversies to arise in future. The chapter is appended with a brief account of the methodology of debate employed in the *Kathāvatthu* in particular and in that age in general. In Chapter II, "Growth and Ramification of the Early Buddhist Sects and Schools", an attempt has been made to analyse the origin, growth, stratification and affiliation of the different sects.

Section B, entitled "Controversies Reflecting Religious Development and the Mahāsaṁghika Impact" consists of the next five chapters. Chapter III, "The Ideal of Arahant: Challenge and Defence" discusses the ideal of Arahant (Arhat) as it was cherished and defended by the Theravādins. It seems that the liberal attitude of the Mahāsaṁghikas and their consequent impeachment by the Theravādins ushered in a movement in the opposite direction through which the Arahant ideal could become liable for the charge of soteriological egoism. Some interrelationship may be hypothecated between this and a parallel movement in the course of which the concept of Buddhahood was absolutised and the Buddha virtually deified along with the ideal of the Boddhisatta (Bodhisattva) which was also glorified and put almost at par with that of the Buddha. The *Kathāvatthu* presents the Theravāda polemics against the tenets elevating the Buddha and the Boddhisatta to a supernatural status which have been discussed in Chapters IV and V respectively. There are a number of issues under dispute relating to the Buddhist Path, spiritual stages and hierarchy which have been treated in Chapter VI. Chapter VII traces the historical growth of the Buddhist Saṁgha in the course of which there emerged a section of the monks which sought to affirm an idealized notion of the Saṁgha as nothing but an abstraction

identifiable with *magga* and *phala* and hence incapable of accepting or purifying gifts or paying back any rewards if a gift was at all made. The propounders seem to be more than indifferent to the disastrous effect the assertion would have had on the Buddhist community of monks in general and the authorities of the Saṁgha in particular who ran it, materially speaking.

Section C is devoted to the "Controversies Reflecting Philosophical Development and the Beginning of New Schools" and comprises the last four chapters of the present work. Chapter VIII deals with the controversy over the Soul theory (Pudgalavada). The Buddhist doctrine of *anattā* (no soul) seems to have implied apparently insurmountable difficulties with regard to *karman*, memory and spiritual acquisitions. It was in the light of such difficulties that the controversial sect of the Vātsīputrīya-Sammatīyas asserted the existence of *prajñaptisat Pudgala* (person or *jīva*). This tenet aroused condemnation from almost all Buddhist sects of which the relevant details, wherever available, have been analysed critically. Similarly the importance of the *anicca* (impermanence) doctrine presented some identical difficulties and thus came the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of '*sarvaṁ asti*', that is to say, the *dharmas* in their ideal or essential form exist always, past, present and future. Thus, the problem of existence and other modes of conditioned reality have been discussed in Chapter IX. The next chapter deals with the "Problem of the Unconditioned" wherein the nature of Nibbāna (Nirvāṇa) is sought to be redefined by certain sections of the Buddhist monks in the light of their own interpretations and reflections. Also a number of new items, e.g., "Assurance", "Causal Genesis", "Four Noble Truths", "Space", etc., are sought to be affirmed as unconditioned. This is a new development over older ideas. In the opinion of the Theravādins, however, there is only one unconditioned reality, which is Nibbāna. Chapter XI, the last, discusses a large number of psycho-ethical controversies recorded in the *Kathāvatthu*. Once again, we find here a conflict between, more or less, a common-sense view, on the one hand, and an idealistic tendency, on the other, to which certain sects of the Mahāsaṁghika groups were pulling powerfully.

I owe the deepest debt to my revered *guru* Prof. G.C. Pande,

formerly Tagore Professor of History and Indian Culture and Vice-Chancellor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur for the valuable guidance and kind supervision that I received from him all along the progress of this work. But for his keen interest and affectionate goading, all these years, this work may not have seen the light of the day.

I am also profoundly grateful to some of my eminent teachers from whom I always received inspiring encouragement and generous help during the course of the present study. Among them I must mention the names of Prof. G.R. Sharma and Prof. B.N.S. Yadava of the University of Allahabad.

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Jaipur S.N. Dube

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1

The Kathāvatthu and its Controversies

NATURE AND PLACE OF KATHĀVATTHU IN THE BUDDHIST CANON

Traditionally, the *Kathāvatthu* is believed to be the fifth of the seven books that form the third collection known as the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* of the Buddhist Canon.[1] Sometimes, however, it is also said to be the third of the seven books.[2] This discrepancy in the early traditions becomes confusing when we notice that, on the one hand, the *Kathāvatthu* quotes from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Paṭṭhāna*,[3] *i.e.*, the first two and the last books of the *Abhidhamma* and, on the other, it is given to understand that *Yamaka*, the sixth book of the *Abhidhamma* was compiled to clear up the difficulties left by the *Kathāvatthu*.[4] It is difficult to ascertain the reliability of these various traditions as also the exact chronological position of this text among the Abhidhamma works. However, in the light of their evidence, it may be assumed that the *Kathāvatthu* was compiled when at least some parts of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga* and *Paṭṭhāna* were already accepted as authoritative (orthodox doctrines) within the *Sāsana*.[5]

As regards the phrase '*Kathāvatthu*' the two terms *Kathā*

and *Vatthu* roughly denote 'discourse' and 'subject' respectively in the Buddhist context and hence the literal meaning should be 'subjects of discourse'.[6] In the light of its text, however, the name has been translated 'Points of Controversy or Debate',[7] which is in line with the usage of the term *Kathā* in Nyaya (*cf.* M. Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*).

The text of the *Kathāvatthu* consists of twenty-three chapters, each containing a number of discussions and refutations from the Theravāda standpoint of the heretical and unorthodox views belonging to various early Buddhist sects on matters connected with several problems of theology, philosophy, cosmology, psychology and so on. It may be aptly remarked that the *Kathāvatthu* is a treasure-house of the doctrines of different early Buddhist sects and schools which emerged in the course of schisms and dissensions growing after the death of Lord Buddha. In all there are 216-217 such doctrines discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*.[8] The work presents a lively cross-section of Buddhist thought in a period of critical change. The style of the discussion is that of formalized debate which is presented in a set manner. This elaborate and formal debating invests the work with a unique methodological significance in the development of Indian and Buddhist logic. In its contents as well as style, the *Kathāvatthu*, thus, appears as a highly important source for the reconstruction of the pattern and tendencies of Buddhist thought in the fourth and third centuries B.C. The controversies represent sensitive points along which Buddhism was restructured up to the time of Aśoka.

COMPILATION OF KATHĀVATTHU AND ITS DATE

The *Kathāvatthu* is the only individual compilation in the early Buddhist Canon, the date and authorship of which is traditionally recorded.[9] However, the authenticity of the traditional date of its compilation is disputed. Mrs. Rhys Davids characterizes the *Kathāvatthu* as a work of 'patch-work-quilt' appearance having grown slowly by accretions.[10] It is necessary, therefore, to examine critically the available evidence on the date of the *Kathāvatthu*.

According to the Simhalese traditional accounts, the con-

troversies embodied in the *Kathāvatthu* took place in the third Buddhist Council held at Pataliputra in the seventeenth regnal year of King Aśoka and that the compilation of this text was also completed in the Council by Moggaliputta Tissa, and was included in the Canon among the *Abhidhamma* treatises.[11] The traditions further maintain that the outlines or heads of these discussions were laid down by Buddha himself in anticipation of the disputes that would arise eventually within the Saṁgha and threaten it with disruption.[12]

So far as the laying down of the outlines of *Kathāvatthu* by the Buddha is concerned, it seems that by its very nature the authority of this text was unacceptable to other sects and they rejected it on the ground that it was set forth 218 years after the demise of the Buddha and was only the utterance of a disciple.[13] It was, thus, perhaps with a view to authenticating the text that the commentator Buddhaghosa laid down that the *mātikā* or the lists of subjects taught in the *Kathāvatthu* were drawn by the Buddha himself. The *Kathāvatthu* may be regarded as the utterance of the Buddha in the same sense as the *Madhu-Piṇḍika-Sutta* which was preached actually by Mahākaccāna but was considered as Buddha's teaching.[14] Thus, even the Buddhist tradition may be said to admit, in effect, that it is only in its essential and seminal principles that the *Kathāvatthu* may be said to hark back to the personal teachings of the Buddha.

Coming to the actual date of the compilation of the *Kathāvatthu*, the tradition, as noted, has it that Moggaliputta Tissa filled out in the third Council the full details of the outline heads devised by the Buddha. Mrs. Rhys Davids is not prepared to accept this as a historical fact for she thinks that 'no work put together for a special occasion, or to meet an entirely new need, could conceivably have assumed the 'patch-work-quilt' appearance of the *Kathāvatthu*.[15] Thus, in her opinion, the text grew slowly by accretions. The strongest argument against the traditional date, she maintains, lies in the asymmetry of the text and: "If we imagine that (1) each *Kathā* (or, at times, each two or more *Kathās*) was framed by, or by order of, the heads of the Saṁgha at the time when each seceding school newly systematized and taught this and

that heresy, or gave it occasional and special prominence, and that (2) such a new *Kathā*, or sub-group of them was added, by memorial or scriptural registration, to the existing stock of the *Kathās*, then the puzzle of *Kathāvatthu's* asymmetry resolves itself into a simple matter."[16]

Looking to the form of the *Kathāvatthu*, Mrs. Rhys Davids's surmises appear to be probable. But the suggestion that the wealth of ideas and views contained in it does not belong to any recognizable historical age such as the age of Aśoka seems to proceed too far in a sceptical direction. It may be pointed out that the entire evidence at our disposal suggests that the bulk of the theses and assertions discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* had emerged as thorns (*kanṭaka*) to the Saṁgha by the time of Aśoka. The internal evidence of the text, when scrutinized closely, would sustain this hypothesis.

The Ceylonese chronicles, as also, the *Aṭṭhakathās*[17] inform us that about 200 years after Buddha's death a large number of pseudo-Buddhists entered the Saṁgha. The result was that the most important *Uposatha* ceremony was held in abeyance and it could not be performed for seven years as the orthodox monks refused to participate in it in the company of those whom they considered as heretics and unorthodox. Aśoka is said to have deputed one of his ministers to persuade the monks of the monastery of Aśokārāma to perform the *Uposatha*. The minister, however, miscarried the orders and beheaded several monks. Aśoka was shocked to learn about it and remorsefully approached Moggaliputta Tissa, the oldest and the most learned monk of the time, for solace. The latter consoled and convinced Aśoka on the ground that he had harboured no deliberate intention to have the monks beheaded.[18] Next, the order was purged jointly by Aśoka and Moggaliputta Tissa of all those monks who did not subscribe to the Vibhajjavāda doctrine. Such monks were compelled to give up yellow robes and were clad in white clothes. After purging the order of the unorthodox and non-conformist elements, a Council was held at Pataliputra under the presidentship of Moggaliputta Tissa. The *Piṭakas* were recited as was done in the earlier Councils. However, the

most outstanding product of the deliberations of this synod was the composition of the *Kathāvatthu* with a view to refuting the various doctrinal views held by the non-Theravādins.[19] In a late Siṁhalese work, *viz.*, *Nikāya Saṅgraha*, we have the additional information that the monks who were expelled from the Saṁgha of the *Theriya Nikāya* (*i.e.*, the Theravādins) became members of non-Theravāda sects.[20]

The historicity of the Third Buddhist Council is now generally accepted by the scholars. It has been observed, for example, that the third Council did take place although it was a sectarian affair. Aśoka, it is true, does not directly refer to the Council, yet Dr. Bhandarkar seems to be right in thinking that some of his inscriptions appear to presuppose some such event. That Aśoka is not clearer over the Council may be explained by the supposition that he was not as intimately connected with the Council as the Pāli tradition would have us believe.[21] Thus, from the details of this Council it is fairly plausible to assume that during Aśoka's time, conditions were such that the compilation of a work like the *Kathāvātthu* had become a desideratum for the survival of true doctrine as the orthodox viewed it. Indeed, it is interesting to observe that the historical perspective in which the *Kathāvatthu* is said to have been compiled seems also to be preserved in some of the edicts of Aśoka. He issued some interesting orders to his officers which were engraved on pillars at three different places, Sarnath, Sanchi and Kausambi.[22] Through these orders, he sought to preserve the unity of the Buddhist Saṁgha by putting down all attempts tending to create schism. According to Aśoka's order : ... indeed that monk or nun who shall break up the Saṁgha be caused to put on white robes and to reside in a non-residence. Thus this edict must be submitted both to the Saṁgha of monks and to the Saṁgha of nuns....[23]

The contents of the Sarnath-Sanchi-Kausambi edict amply reflect that Aśoka was bent upon eradicating all apostasy and division in the Buddhist Order.[24] Aśoka is so apprehensive of the schismatics, as to fear that, having been removed from the Saṁgha, they might win over some lay-devotees; so he orders that a copy of this edict be so placed as to be accessi-

ble to the laity who may come and see it on every Fast day. The Sanchi edict sums up the wish of Aśoka in all these efforts which is that the Saṁgha should be united and lasting[25]: The earnest, almost severe tone of the edict and the fact that copies of it are found at places of important Buddhist monastic establishments presupposes that in his time the Buddhist Church was at least threatened with disruption, to prevent which he was straining every nerve.[26]

If we analyze the evidence gleaned from these Aśokan inscriptions, we notice three significant points which are extremely helpful in the dating of the *Kathāvatthu.* Firstly, it cannot be a mere incident that the punishment prescribed by Aśoka to the schismatics is the same that was given to them at the time of the third Council, *i.e.*, depriving them of the yellow robe and expelling them from the Order. Such an extreme step on the part of Aśoka presupposes an already set practice in the Order. Secondly, the above edict of Aśoka was issued only after the convention of the Council, *i.e.*, after the seventeenth regnal year of Aśoka. The edict has been ascribed to the period between the twenty-ninth and the thirty-eighth regnal years of Aśoka.[27] Now, the keenness of Aśoka to check the schismatic tendencies during this period becomes understandable if we suppose that although schismatic sects had been expelled on the occasion of the third Council, there was still some apprehension that they might threaten the unity of the Saṁgha.[28] The third point which emerges is as to what was to guide the royal officials in deciding whether any particular monk or nun was creating a schism in the Order. It may be suggested that the guiding authority perhaps lay in a compilation, such as the *Kathāvatthu,* which tradition reports to have been composed on the occasion of the third Council and which refutes all those views which were unorthodox, heretical and schismatic. It may be noted here that the hypothesis of the *Kathāvatthu* having been composed during the time of Aśoka is also indicated by the suggestion that this text seems to have influenced the IX R.E. of Aśoka.[29]

Now coming to the problem of the sects and schools, whose views and tenets are said to be contained in this text, Buddha-

ghosa, the commentator of the *Kathāvatthu*, informs us that the Buddhist Order in India had been, in the course of the second century after the Buddha's demise, divided into eighteen schools.[30] This is confirmed by the Ceylonese chronicles *Dīpavaṁsa* and *Mahāvaṁsa*.[31] Generally agreeing with this, the northern or Sanskrit traditions of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva serve to corroborate that a good number of these sects had originated in the second century of the Nirvāṇa era.[32] As would emerge from the following discussion most of the important early Buddhist sects and schools appear to have arisen within the second and the early third centuries of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. It may be observed that some of them may not have really crystallized as well-knit schools at the time of the third Council but there is nothing to contradict the hypothesis that they were in the formative stages of their evolution and such a hypothesis will easily square into the traditional assumption. When these tendencies became powerful enough to threaten to disrupt the Saṁgha completely, the orthodox Church, apparently helped by a favourable ruler, held the third Council somewhat like the Council of Trent and compiled the text of the *Kathāvatthu*, refuting all those doctrines which they considered as alien.

As regards the internal evidence of the text with regard to its compilation, attention has been drawn to the fact that it contains the views of some late schools such as the Vetulyakas and the Hetuvādins. For the Vetulyakas, it has been said that they cannot be pre-Christian.[33] Some of the tenets belonging to Vetulyakas undoubtedly remind us of the Mahāyāna doctrines. Nevertheless, it is in the very nature of these tenets which suggest that the Vetulyakas and similar other Mahāsaṁghika group of sects were precursors and forerunners of the Mahāyāna.[34] And if the evolution of Mahāyāna proper is to be placed in the first century B.C.[35], there is no reason why its essentials should not have originated in the third century B.C. The northern or Sanskrit tradition on the history of early Buddhist sects and schools informs us that one of the sub-sects that emerged in the second century of the Nirvāṇa era within the Mahāsaṁghika group was the Lokottaravāda sect.[36] The proto-Mahāyānic tenets of the Vetulyakas are nothing but their postu-

lations about the supernatural (*lokottara*) aspect of the Buddha. In fact, it has been shown subsequently that a number of early Buddhist controversies are in the nature of a conflict between two tendencies of evolution which crystallized as Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna in Buddhist thought. It follows, as a natural corollary, that some prominent so-called un-orthodox doctrines disputed in the *Kathāvatthu* should reflect a 'half-way house' and a transitional stage from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna.[37] As regards the Hetuvādins, Mrs. Rhys Davids does not specify as to why they should be regarded as late. In fact, the origin of this sect is extremely obscure. Bhavya has identified the Hetuvādins with the Sarvāstivādins,[38] which is rendered doubtful in the light of the fact that out of the ten theses belonging to them in the *Kathāvatthu*, two are certainly contrary to the views of the Sarvāstivādins, *viz*., (1) insight is not for those in the world[39] and (2) that five spiritual faculties do not function in worldly matters.[40] However, as we analyze the various theses attributed to them, we find that they do not represent any break from the general range of controverted theses in the text. To cite an example, their assertion that all, save the Path, is pain and sorrow[41] seems to form a connected group with such theses as 'the fruit of recluseship is unconditioned'[42] or 'attainment (*patti*) is unconditioned'.[43]

In his commentary on the *Kathāvatthu*, Buddhaghosa uses a significant term *etarahi* while attributing a number of theses. Buddhaghosa often mentions that such and such a thesis is held *etarahi*, *i.e.*, 'at present' or 'now' by this or that school. The theses attributed in this manner belong to such sects as the Sammatīyas,[44] the Sarvāstivādins,[45] the Andhakas,[46] the Gokulikas,[47] the Bhadrayānikas,[48] the Uttarāpathakas[49] and the Vetulyakas.[50] Similarly, there are two other terms *icchanti*, *i.e*., 'accept' or 'incline to' this or that belief used in case of sects such as the Vātsiputrīyas and the Mahāsaṁghikas[51] and *maññanti*, *i.e.*, 'imagine' or 'deem' applied in the case of the Kāśyapīyas.[52] All these three terms are in the present tense, by using which, Buddhaghosa seems to be suggesting that the theses in question were living doctrines during his time. He does not use these terms uniformly for each and every thesis discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*, which may also mean that certain theses were no more current doctrines. By implication, this means that the sects

holding the second type of theses were either amalgamated with more powerful units or had disappeared completely by the time of Buddhaghosa. The most significant phrase, however, out of these is *etarahi*, by affxing which in certain cases, the commentator wants to affirm that this or that opinion is at present held by such and such a sect.

All these factors clearly lead to the hypothesis that the theses and doctrines discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* generally belong to an age to which the compilation of the *Kathāvatthu* is ascribed by the tradition, *i.e.*, roughly about the middle of the third century B.C. It is likely that in the beginning, a number of theses constituted only the minor tenets of the earlier sects, but in the course of time, when further dissensions arose within the larger units, they became divided into different sub-sects. As the case with the early sects, the new sects also seem to have developed mainly owing to interpretative difficulties regarding the original teachings of the Buddha. The result was that different sections of monks within a larger unit happened to lay emphasis on some tenets more than others so much so that in the course of time they became almost completely identified with the same views and grew as independent sects.

As regards the problem of asymmetry in the *Kathāvatthu*, one may point out that this feature of the text would in fact sustain its antiquity as given in the traditional accounts. Supposing that different *Kathās* were inserted into the existing stock, in course of time, in different stages, one might expect that at the time of the final compilation the person or persons doing it would adopt some system in presenting the controversies, *e.g.*, they may be classified according to their themes or sects. As to the idea of the sanctity of the text obstructing its proper systematization,[53] such an idea would arise only if the text were taken to have been compiled at some sacred congregation as was the case with the *Sutta* and the *Vinaya Piṭakas*. Alteration in such texts was regarded as an heretical act by the orthodox monks as were Mahāsaṁghikas impeached by them for such alterations in the Canon.[54] Thus, the asymmetry of the *Kathāvatthu* seems, in fact, to support the presumption of its early growth. The controversies are haphazardly strung together for the simple reason that some sections of the Buddhist

monks had not, perhaps, as yet formulated all their views in a clear-cut sequence and their views had not so far crystallized into well-knit doctrines. Otherwise, they might have, like the Mahāsaṁghikas, parted company earlier instead of continuing in the Saṁgha to be expelled only in the Third Council.[55] It seems that once the doctrinal disputes began openly in the Saṁgha, these sections came out with their assertions one after another, even as the orthodox Theravādins claimed to have refuted the earlier ones already.

The textual evidence of the *Kathāvatthu* goes in favour of its traditional antiquity. Attention may be drawn to a particular controversy where a Mahāsaṁghika thesis, *viz*., 'generally speaking the Ariyan Path is Five-fold only',[56] is disputed by the Theravādins. It may be observed that the Mahāsaṁghika assertion reflects an early state of the Buddhist history when its doctrines had not yet been systematized and crystallized under detailed formulae.[57] It was a stage of Buddhist history when the idea of the Eight-fold Path had not yet become institutionalized and a certain section still entertained the doubt that the Path could be Five-fold only.

The antiquity of the *Kathāvatthu* is also sustained by a certain reference where Therī Khemā, chief of the Buddha's women disciples, is described as being *Kathāvatthu-Visārada*.[58] Although this reference occurs in the *Aṭṭhakathā*, it probably embodies an ancient tradition. And lastly, it may be observed that the *Kathāvatthu* is the only one of the several early Buddhist scriptural texts, of the individual compilation of which, the date and authorship are specifically mentioned in the tradition. There is hardly anything convincing to disbelieve this tradition. It seems thus that the controversies recorded in the *Kathāvatthu* should be taken to have flourished about the time of the Third Buddhist Council held in the age of Aśoka and there is reason to believe that its text was composed by Moggaliputta Tissa in the course of these deliberations.

THE ISSUES DEBATED

As early as the Ṛigvedic times, spiritual quest had to face the challenge of religious scepticism such as is evidenced when

it is asked: 'where is Indra?'[59] Similarly, there are sceptical remarks about the efficacy of sacrifices and rituals.[60] Beginning with the conception of many deities indwelling natural and human phenomena, Vedic religion gradually evolved to a sublime and rarified monotheism, pantheism and monism.[61] This development was made possible by a rational and tolerant outlook which took account of doubts and misgivings and encouraged discussion—*Vākovākya*,[62] *Brahmodya*.[63]

During the Upaniṣadic period, this tendency of seeking to know more through discussion and debate becomes increasingly prominent. We have many instances of discussion and debates on philosophical and religious issues recorded in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*. The famous 'symposium' in the time of Janaka recorded in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is the most celebrated instance of these.[64] The result is that the *Upaniṣads* evince a series of expositions of a number of problems related to the cosmical and psychical aspects of reality. Some of the problems discussed in the Upaniṣadic texts deserve notice. In the sphere of cosmology, the thinkers from ancient times in India, as in Greece, were trying to discover the source of visible nature; whether it is one or many, that is to say, whether this source lies in the unity of many gods or in one Person (*puruṣa*) or one substance such as *asat*, *viz.*, undifferentiated matter. Speculations over this problem are frequently encountered in the *Upaniṣads*.[65] The *Bṛahadāranyaka*[66] and the *Chāndogya*[67] *Upaniṣads* discuss the nature of sacrifice and its significance as symbolizing the central process of the universe. Its culmination is reached when it is said that life itself is a sacrifice.[68] The cosmological enquiries culminate in the concept of the *Puruṣa* or *Ātman* as the immanent as well as the transcendent ground of the universe. The Upaniṣadic doctrine tracing the universe to a spiritual source came to be sharply distinguished from other doctrines which sought to trace it to some insentient or dependent principle.[69] At the same time, eschatological enquiries lead to the concept of *Karman*, rebirth and the two different ways—*Devayāna* (way of gods) and *Pitṛyāna* (way of the fathers)—for the ascent of the souls of the dead.[70] In fact the doctrine of *Karman* still has the aspect of a novel mystery.[71] Psychological problems too are dis-

cussed at some length. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* speculates over the mind (*citta*) and the states of consciousness.[72] The Upaniṣadic thinkers also seek to establish the relationship between *manas* and *prāṇa*. In fact, the emphasis that came to be laid on self as the divine principle of knowledge (*jñāna*) and *karman*, necessitated enquiring into its nature more closely and attempts were made to locate it in the *manas* or *prāṇa*. A significant transcendental problem is posed when it is asked as to what is the power behind the *manas* (mind).[73] The *Kena Upaniṣad* focuses the epistemological quest when it seeks the difference between *Vidita* and *Avidita*.[74] Also, we have the famous dialogue of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* on epistemology occurring between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī.[75] Ethical enquiry is contained in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* where the difference between *śreyas* and *preyas* is brought out.[76] Death and the life beyond are the central problems of this *Upaniṣad*. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the importance of *dayā*, *dāna*, *dharma*, *brahmacarya*, *satya*, etc., is laid down.[77] Mystical enquiry is intimated in the expositions about supernatural experiences such as in the *Muṇḍaka*,[78] the *Kāṭha*[79] and the *Śvetāśvatara*[80] *Upaniṣads*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* contains theological enquiry in the form of such problems as the number of gods.[81] These are roughly the various facets of enquiry which draw the attention of the Upaniṣadic thinkers who appear to be seeking to discover the real and the ultimate along all possible avenues.

The basic problem of the Upaniṣadic enquiry is, thus, the age-old enigma of cosmology which they seek to unravel. This quest ultimately finds its fulfilment in the conceptualization of the cosmical reality, *i.e.*, *Brahman*, which is identical with the psychical reality *i.e. Ātman*,[82] the divine principle in man, the source of *karman* as also of knowledge. The enquiry about the self is, thus, by and large, the most absorbing subject of the Upaniṣadic philosophy, in the process of which cosmological, epistemological and psychological problems are ultimately combined. The Upaniṣadic approach seeks the universal and the permanent and its notion of reality may be most aptly expressed in a later phrase '*yat sat tannityaṁ*.[83] The real is an infinite spiritual principle (*satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ, ātmarūpa*). It can be approached only through

dedication,[84] knowledge[85] and devotion.[86]

Apart from self, another important problem of enquiry is the principle of *karman*, although this doctrine, as it is set forth in the *Upaniṣads*, appears to be in its nascent stage.[87] As noted previously, the self was characterized also as the principle of *karman* and hence the importance of the doctrine was bound to come up. Thus, the *Upaniṣads* do not totally reject *karman* and maintain an optimistic view of life and nature.[88]

Another problem, with which the *Upaniṣads* are frequently concerned, consists in the growth of doubt and scepticism regarding the various solutions and hypotheses that are offered by the thinkers of the age. This tendency is evident from the various dialogues contained in the Upaniṣadic texts in the course of which the enquirer keeps putting one question after another and the interlocutor goes on revealing the subtler aspects of the reality in the same order.

Epistemological problems form another important set in the *Upaniṣads*. In the *Kena* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads* we come across certain dialogues wherein the problem of knowing the knower has been raised.[89]

In contrast to the Vedic view were many other doctrines which the *Sramaṇas* and the *Parivrājakas* are reported to have held in Buddha's time.[90] The age of Buddha has been aptly described as an age of thought-ferment in the religious history of India.[91] The religious leaders and thinkers of the age speculate over such problems as the nature of the soul and the world and the ultimate mission of man's life. Their views, though preserved but briefly in scattered reference in the Buddhist and Jain Canons, reflect, nevertheless, a remarkable variety of religious and philosophical formulations. The galaxy of thinkers which emerges in this age definitely shows a departure from the past, a transition from the winding highway of Vedic tradition into the new byways of heterodoxy essaying intellectual and spiritual adventure. These thinkers are sometimes compared with the Greek Sophists.[92] In point of intellectual vigour and variety, the parallel is apt. The first two *suttas* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*[93] throw a welcome light on the various theories and doctrines prevalent about the age of Buddha and occasionally they also enlighten us about the names of certain contemporary

thinkers of which the most famous were the six heretical teachers (*Tiṭṭhiyas*), *viz*., Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakamblī, Pakkuda Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta and Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. Also, there is a reference to sixty-two doctrinal views current about this time. In the Jain Canon, however, the number of these cults is raised to 363.[94] Among these teachers, as reported in the Buddhist *suttas*, there were materialists, sceptics, agnostics, atheists, fatalists, pessimists and so on. The accounts preserved in Jain literature also speak of a number of contemporary philosophical dogmas,[95] *viz*., (1) Kālavāda, (2) Svabhāvavāda, (3) Niyativāda, (4) Yadṛcchāvāda, (5) Īśvaravāda, etc.

A number of modern writers have sought to explain these views and doctrines by extensively tapping the information availing in the Jain and Buddhist sources.[96] We would, therefore, merely indicate here the principal tendencies of the age which produced and furthered controversies affecting future development.

The first category of views that we come across in this age concerns the ancient problem of cosmology and cosmogony wherein the thinkers seek to discover the origin of the world and the soul as also the nature of the two. An interesting variety of views was held over these problems. Some of the thinkers subscribed to eternalism (*sassatvāda*) upholding the eternal existence of the world and the soul.[97] Others were semi-eternalists (*ekaccasassatavāda*), advocating both the eternalist and non-eternalist views.[98] In their opinion, the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly non-eternal. Further, there were extentionalists or limitists and unlimitists (*Antānantika*). They held the view that the world is neither finite nor infinite.[99] Also there were fortuitous originists (*Abhiccasamuppannika*) holding that the world and the soul arise without a cause.[100]

Regarding the views of the second category, it may be mentioned that, apart from discussions on the soul as a part of cosmogony, there was a tendency to speculate over the nature of the self exclusively. There was a doctrine of conscious soul after death (*Uddhamāghātanikasaññivāda*) wherein belief in the existence of a conscious soul after death was subscribed in sixteen different ways.[101] Contrary to this, there was also a theory

of unconscious soul after death (*Uddhamāghātanikasaññivāda*)[102]. Another doctrine upheld a nihilistic view on soul (*uccedavāda*) which sought to establish a nihilistic end for the living being.[103]

The third category consists of views which speculated on the possibility of liberation in this life (*Diṭṭhadhammanibhāna-vāda*). This type of speculation led to the formulation of five different ways conceiving the possibility of liberation.[104]

There was another category which consisted of agnostic and sceptic thinkers. Such thinkers took to equivocation when they were confronted with a situation requiring them to draw a distinction between good and evil actions, and they refused to give their own verdict.[105]

Thus, Makkhali Gosāla is said to have been the most prominent heretic and Akriyāvādins who upheld the doctrine of Saṁsāra but rejected altogether the possibility of individual initiative in gaining final liberation.[106] Pūraṇa Kassapa[107] and Pakudha Kaccāyana[108] were the other Akriyāvādins. As against this Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta was the most rigorous teacher of Kriyāvāda.[109] Sañjaya Beliṭṭhiputta, according to the Buddhist accounts, was an agnostic teacher, who did not really try to find out the truth and declared it to be undiscoverable.[110] Similarly, Ajita Kesakamblī was a materialistic thinker of the time.[111]

The age of Buddha, thus, seems to have been a period of vigorous mental exercise in theosophy and philosophy. The phenomenon of a great variety and diversity in religious speculation and philosophical disputation features no doubt as a marked characteristic throughout the various phases of Indian thought—true to this are the *Vedas*, the *Brāhmanas*, the *Upaniṣads*—yet this passion for knowledge seems to have been writ large during the period under review. It was against this background that the Buddha embarked his own religious movement. His originality lay in the fact that he did away with cosmological and epistemological enquiries, *i.e.*, *purvānta* and *aparānta*, and also eschewed speculations on theosophy. As the supreme healer of suffering humanity, he concentrated mainly on the psychological and ethical enquiries which were directly concerned with the beings of this world.

Buddha distinguishes himself from his forerunners, as well as contemporary thinkers insofar as his teachings do not

encourage the metaphysical hankering for the conceptualization of the transcendent, nor encourage the fear of some supernatural being, who may be supposed to be the cause and controller of all things. The gospel of Buddha avoids all hypotheses regarding the unknown and concerns itself only with the facts of life in the present work-a-day world, and seeks to transmute it by a moral and spiritual alchemy. Buddhism has always been marked by its intensely practical attitude. Brushing aside ritualism, theology and metaphysics, Buddha shifted the emphasis in religion to man's inner life. He had a system of thought by which this inner life could be purified and its powers cultivated so that it would be immune from all *dukkha*, from all sorrows, that outer life, the life of flesh and the world, inflict upon it.[112]

Buddha repeatedly expressed himself against dogma or belief. He holds that dogma does not make men pure nor does it end the ill existing in the world. It is the Path that brings purity.[113] He declares in the *Sutta-Nipāta*: 'I preach no dogmas drawn from all the divers views.[114] He is reported to have once told a *Brāhmana* that there are many *Śramanas* and *Brāhmanas* who maintain that night is day and day is night, but he maintains that night is night and day is day. Theories, according to him, bring controversies and strife amongst the saints and thinkers but it does not harm those who have withdrawn from the world and have been cleansed.[115] Buddha's aversion for theories is asserted in clear terms in the *Majjhima-Nikāya*. Vacchagotta is said to have asked him as to whe ther the Buddha has any theory of his own or not? The Buddha affirmed that he is free from all theories. The predecessors and contemporaries of the Buddha claimed to possess knowledge through a variety of means. A list of ten such ways of knowing is referred to in the Pāli texts and is criticized and rejected as unsatisfactory.[116] In the said list, six of the items are such which claim knowledge on the basis of some sort of authority and the remaining four base their claim on some kind of reasoning.[117] There are other references in the *Nikāyas* to show that Buddha vehemently condemned speculative views. For instance, in the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* while dealing with indeterminate questions, he said, the

Tathāgata does not indulge in such unwarranted extensions, he does not spin speculative theories.[118] Buddha's disapproval of dogma and theory appears to have been caused by the clear perception of the fact that the Truth is essentially one and surpasses the intellect. Besides, dogmas and theories are bound to be accompanied by wrangles and strife. The wise, therefore, do not engage themselves in vulgar theories.[119] The Buddha's antipathy to cosmological and metaphysical speculation differentiates him from the Upanisadic as well as the contemporary thinkers. This, in effect, implied two things. Firstly, no attempt was made to discover any substance, person or God. Therefore, instead of a quest for the underlying substance as real, the Buddha formulated the three marks of phenomenal actuality, *viz.*, *dukkha*, *anicca* and *anatta*. And secondly, the search for a law governing phenomena replaced the search for the substance itself. The Buddha, thus, sought to emphasize psychological, moral and spiritual rather than logical, metaphysical and cosmological problems.

Steering his way clear of all dogmas, the Buddha laid down the doctrine of *madhyamā pratipad*. The starting point of the Buddha is universal suffering, *i.e.*, not merely the suffering of the poor and the lowly but also of those who seem to live a life of luxury and affluence. It was his reasoning that, if a man was struck by an arrow, he would not refuse to have it extricated before he knew who shot the arrow, whether that man was married or not, tall or short. All he would want is to be rid the arrow.[120]

The *Dhamma* which flashed into the mind of Buddha at the time of his enlightenment (*Sambodhi*), consisted of Pratītyasamutpāda and Nirvāṇa.[121] The principle of Pratītyasamutpāda has been called the 'Middle Way' and its discovery has been likened to that of an ancient city.[122] In the *Jātakas* also, the *Dhamma* has been characterized as the 'good old rule'.[123] The comparison is remarkable, since it points out Buddha's objective and impersonal attitude towards his *Dhamma*. Unlike the Vedic seers, Christianity and Islam, Buddha did not consider the *Dhamma* to have been revealed to him by some supramundane power. Rather, he took it as an ancient highway of higher life continuing from the hoary past. That there

was nothing obscurantist in the thought of the Buddha is amply clear from one of the statements made in his last moments. He is said to have told Ānanda that he preached the Truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine, for, in respect of *Dhamma*, there is no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher.[124]

Centuries later, the Mādhyamikas are said to preserve exquisitely the essential features of the original gospel of the Buddha, although a subtle and sophisticated philosophical tinge has been added. The Mādhyamika standpoint of criticism and rejection of all theory as constituting the highest wisdom is in fullest accord with the Buddha's rejection of all speculative philosophies as dogmatism. It seems that the rejection of theories is itself the means by which the Buddha is led to the non-conceptual knowledge of the absolute.[125] Buddha is supposed to have specified four possible *siddhānta*, *i.e.*, standpoints for knowing anything, *viz.*, (1) *laukika siddhānta*, (2) *pratipauruṣika siddhānta*, (3) *pratipāksika siddhānta* and (4) *paramārthika siddhāntu*.[126] While explaining the *paramārthika siddhānta*, *i.e.*, transcendental standpoint, comparison has been drawn in three verses of the *Aṭṭhavargīya sūtra* and five verses of the *Aṭṭhaka vagga* of the *Sutta-Nipāta* (*i.e.*, 878-882).[127] The central idea of these verses is that a view is plausible because we prize it, we are enamoured of its externals. We hold fast to it as the truth and consider others as fools. This is actually the starting point of dogmatism and the Mādhyamikas make it a point to deal a severe blow to all such dogmatizations on the basis of their dialectic. The Mādhyamikas use only one weapon. By drawing out the implications of any view, they show its self-contradictory character. The dialectic removes the constrictions which our concepts, with their practical or sentimental bias, put on reality. The Mādhyamika dialectic, however, was vigorously criticized and it was pointed out that *śūnyatā* which criticizes all theories is but another theory. Equally prompt came the reply from the Mādhyamikas and they observed, *śūnyatā* (the awareness of the hollowness) of all views is preached by the Jinas (Buddhas) as the way of deliverance; incurable indeed are they who take *śūnyatā* itself as a view.[128]

Thus, the attitude that Buddha appears to have adopted implied a complete rejection of metaphysical speculation, since, in his opinion it was absolutely unhelpful in the spiritual growth and salvation of man. It seems that, if Buddha's advice had been followed strictly by his disciples, some of the controversies which emerged in Buddhism may not have arisen at all. They emerged ultimately on account of an attempt to reconcile Buddha's salient teachings with some of the fundamental metaphysical problems which continued to persist as living issues of enquiry and speculation. Thus, in spite of Buddha's injunction to the contrary, efforts were made to probe and search the nature and reality of the substance. Attempts were also made to interpret the intricacies of the problems on which the Buddha chose to be slient. It was also sought to logically elaborate and systematize his teachings. Some of the controversies discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* go to indicate that such tendencies contributed in a considerable measure to the growth of doctrinal disputes in early Buddhism.

The development of Buddhist thought in India may be described in two phases—original Buddhism and scholastic Buddhism with three distinct sub-phases in the latter, *viz.*, (1) Abhidhamma, (2) Mahāyāna and (3) Buddhism after Dignāga. It may be observed that it is the original doctrine of the Buddha which is really the fountainhead of all the later thought.[129] The Abhidhamma seems to have developed from the *mātikās* and the beginnings of analysis.[130] The later Buddhist tradition would have us believe that Lord Buddha had set into motion the wheel of the law thrice, first at Banaras, next at Gṛdhrkūṭa hill and finally at Dhanyakaṭaka.[131] According to these traditions, the *Prajñāpāramitāśāstra* and Vajrayāna doctrines were preached respectively at Gṛdhrakūta and Dhānyakaṭaka. This is more an esoteric than a historical tradition but there have always been some claimants for whom such intimations are at times revealed in spiritual and mystical experiences.[132] It seems that it is the Mādhyamika scholars who have discovered the true perspective in which to understand Buddha's teachings. According to them, Buddha had discoursed on two Truths—the Empirical and the Ultimate or *Samvṛti satya* and *Paramārtha satya*. While the *Paramārṭha* is the ultimate objective, the

former is the way or the means for its realization. It may be observed that the doctrine of *Upayā Kauśalya*,[133] which was elaborated later, appears to have had an early origin.[134] It is granted even by the Pāli tradition that Buddha's teaching differed according to the intellectual level of his listeners.[135] While the traditional account of the differentiation of Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna appeals to a common original inspiration, the emergence of the eighteen Hīnayāna sects is attributed by the tradition itself to the labours of individual monks. A complex of many factors appears to underly the latter development of which the *Kathāvatthu* presents a final conspectus.

There is a group of problems over which the Buddha refrained from expressing any opinion, *viz.*, the ten points not determined.[136] When he was asked to explain his silence over these issues, he pointed out that they were not only non-conducive to enlightenment, but were potent with the possibilities of anguish and misery.[137] The silence of the Buddha has puzzled modern scholars and has led some to ascribe agnosticism to the Buddha.[138] It must have appeared equally enigmatic to the early interpreters and may have led them to various interpretations. We know that the Buddha had laid down, as a basic tenet, the unsubstantial and transitory nature of all things in his doctrines of *anatta* and *anicca*. He had also barred discussion on some other questions:

1. Is the world permanent or impermanent?

2. Is the world finite or infinite?

3. Are the body and the soul indentical or different?

4. Does the *Tathāgata* survive death, or not, or both or neither?[139]

In spite of this attempt, on the part of the Buddha, to contain metaphysical speculation, there emerged in Buddhism sects of the Puggalavādins and Sarvāstivādins. This is hardly surprising since the 'indeterminate problems' were of such a fundamental import as to have captured the attention of the philosophically minded Buddhists even while the Master was alive and more so after he had passed away. They continued, therefore, as live

metaphysical issues even after the decease of the Buddha and, in spite of his injunctions to the contrary. As such, they naturally tended to receive different interpretations and thus help the growth of controversies. One of the major sets of *Kathāvatthu* controversies centres round the nature of the Buddha, a problem the Buddha had refused to discuss fully and had partly included among the indeterminates.[140] Similarly, the nature of the soul is the principal theme with the Puggalavādins while the Sarvāstivādins essay to resolve the issue between permanence and impermanence.

The Buddha made it clear to his disciples that his teachings should not be accepted just because they were his words. He insisted that his teachings must be thoroughly analyzed and understood before they were accepted.[141] After the passing away of the Buddha, when his followers were left with the *Dhamma* as their *sāstā*, there were attempts to systematize and elaborate his teachings. The first major attempt of such a systematization was made in the course of the First Buddhist Council. Although the deliberations of the Council were approved by a majority of the monks present, still there were some, who refused to recognize it.[142] There seem to have been similar attempts by the dissenting groups to systematize the teachings in their own way. The Mahāsaṁghikas, for example, were impeached by the Theravādins just on this count. We also notice that some of the early Buddhist sects compiled their own individual *Vinaya* as also other works.[143] The process of systematization also implies interpretation and development. The brevity as also the variety of Buddha's sermons, delivered from time to time, opened avenues for interpretation and development in the course of which new concepts were likely to emerge.[144] It may be noted that most of the controversies discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* arise owing to a difference of opinion over the interpretation of the Buddha's own words.

Another factor leading to differences was the scholastic specialization among the monks. As was the case with the Vedic literature, the early Buddhists also relied on memory and recitation for preserving the words of the Buddha. This made it necessary for different groups of monks to specialize

in specific fields of Buddhist studies, a process which was helped further by the growth of particular traditions. In the Pāli Canon, we very often come across such classes of monks as *Dhammadharas*, *Vinayadharas*,[145] *Mātikadharas*, *Dhamma-Kaṭhikas*,[146] *Dīghabhānakas*, *Majjhimabhānakas*,[147] *Abhidhammikas* etc. These phrases denote a kind of specialization in different branches of the Buddhist literature, *e.g.*, *Sutta*, *Vinaya*, *Mātikā* and the sub-branches thereof. Upāli and Ānanda seem to have been the recognized masters of *Vinaya* and *Dhamma* of their age as indicated by the account of the First Buddhist Council.[148] We find mention of the differences between the *Dhammadhara* and *Vinayadhara* monks of Kausambi assuming sectarian postures even in the lifetime of the Buddha. It is likely that these separate bodies, which existed for a particular function necessary for the whole Buddhist community, *e.g.*, the preservation of a particular portion of the *Piṭaka* by regular recitation, imbibed, in course of time, doctrines which could be looked upon as peculiar to the body holding them and in this way the body developed into a separate religious school of Buddhism.[149] According to a tradition of Paramārtha, Gokulikas were experts in the *Abhidharma*, Sautrāntikas in the *Sūtra*, Sarvāstivādins in the *Abhidharma*, Haimavatas in the *Sūtra* and Sammatīyas in the *Vinaya*.[150]

The most significant injunction laid down by the Buddha that eventually proved to be instrumental in the development of ecclesiastical cleavages in Buddhism was the absence of a central authority unlike the system of Papacy in Christianity or the Khalifate in Islam. Before he passed away, the Buddha laid down finally : "*Yo mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto, so vo mam' accayena Satthā.*[151] But it also appears from some other Nikāyic references that Buddha was perhaps not absolutely decisive on this point since the beginning. At some stage he seems to have been inclined to think that Sāriputta or Moggallāna could lead the Order.[152] Finally, however, he did not nominate any one as his successor to head the Order. Buddhism, in fact, tended to repudiate the force of mere authority in the quest of knowledge. For want of a supreme authority, it was possible for the monks to interpret

the terse expressions of the Teacher in different ways, introduce additional material and pass them in the name of the Buddha.

Some scholars have discussed some of the external and circumstantial factors that contributed to the rise of sectarianism and new doctrines in Buddhism. While Przyluski and Hofinger have dealt mainly with the sociological and geographical factors, N. Dutt and Dèmieville have emphasized the religious causes.[153] We may briefly note some of other factors which helped the process of proliferation of new doctrines.

The expansion of Buddhism was a remarkably swift process and after Aśoka started taking an active interest in Buddhism, it took still faster strides. On the contrary, due to the difficulties of communication, it was hardly possible to maintain any constant intercourse between the various communities stationed at far-off places. In fact, since the very beginning, Buddhist monks were required to stay at one place during the rainy season, which gradually gave rise to monastic communities.[154] Thus, there was a growing trend towards geographical dispersion which also increased due to economic causes.[155] There was circumstantial variety in these places as reflected in the social, traditional, cultural and religious temperament and behaviour of the people. This favoured the manifestation of local particularism which sometimes became a ground for more pronounced divisions. Sometimes, the hostile attitude of certain sections and kings such as Puṣyamitra necessitated localisation of the various communities.[156] It seems most likely that this localisation of the communities, due to various reasons, ultimately started bearing fruit in the form of varied manifestations of the Buddhist doctrines in the upholding of which various sects and schools came to the surface. Frauwallner, however, maintains that the Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Kāśyapīya, Mahīśāsaka and Theravāda sects owe their origin to the communities established by the missions of Aśoka. He has made two important observations in the support of his hypothesis.[157] : (1) except for the Kāśyapīyas, all these sects preserve their own *Vinayas*, and, although these works have been handed down quite independently, they are closely related; (2) the rise of various schools, thus, seems to be due to differences of opinion on points of dogma. Frauwallner's suggestion

that the process of localization started with the missions sent by Aśoka seems to be untenable on the testimony of the *Kathāvatthu*. If we accept his suggestion it would be difficult to explain how the tenets of most of the sects mentioned by him were disputed in the time of Aśoka and were included in the *Kathāvatthu*. Even the process of localization on which he seeks to lay so much emphasis seems to have started earlier with the spread of Buddhism to distant places. Sometimes, individual masters of Buddhism seem to have played a major role in contributing to new doctrinal directions and this appears to be valid, particularly, in the case of most of the schools illustrated by Frauwallner. In schools such as Vātsīputrīya, Dharmaguptaka, Kāśyapīya, it seems that Vātsīputra, Dharmagupta and Kāśyapa were the respective teachers who played the key role so much so that these sects came to be named after them.[158] Similarly, the amount of influence exerted by Mahādeva, Kātyāyanīputra, Mudgalyāyana in the development of Mahāsaṁghika, Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajyavāda, respectively, is well-known. It is also difficult to sustain too far the observation of Frauwallner that differences in dogma were the chief dividing lines between the sects, and that *Vinaya* rules were almost uniform in them. In fact, we come across, from a very early stage of the Buddhist history, a powerful confrontation between the champions of laxity on the one hand, and the advocates of rigorism, on the other, in the sphere of discipline.[159] Buddha allowed a certain amount of latitude in the observance of *Vinaya* rules which was opposed by Devadatta. The Council of Vaiśālī appears to have deliberated solely on the *Vinaya* confrontation, which, instead of being reconciled, proved to be the background of the first schism in Buddhism. Even later, if we analyze the minute details of the disciplinary code prescribed by the various sects, we find that there was a considerable amount of difference. For example, I-tsing refers to the differences of dress among the schools.[160]

Another important factor providing a congenial atmosphere towards the development of a diversity of views in Buddhism appears to be the influx of all sorts of people into the order, particularly, a large number of disciples of heretical teachers of the age of Buddha.[161] Although we have no direct evidence

about the interchange of thought between the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists at this early age, some cantact may be surmised from certain parallelisms which can be noticed in some of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist developments. The close resemblance between Puggalavāda and Ātmavāda, Sarvāstivāda and the Sāṁkhya, especially, its Pariṇāmavāda, Lokottaravāda and Avatāravāda,[162] suggests that there was undoubtedly some influence of non-Buddhistic thought on the growth of Buddhist sects and controversies in this age. It may be noted that the *Arthaśāstra* of Kautilya notices the philosophical schools of the time and Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Lokāyata are included among the schools of ānvīksakī.[163]

METHODOLOGY OF DEBATE IN THE KATHĀVATTHU

The *Upaniṣads* present many examples of discussions and debates on theosophical and philosophical issues. Most of them are in the form of earnest enquiries made by those desirous to know from those who are held to know, *i.e.*, in most cases the discussion takes the form of a philosophical dialogue between a student or students and their teacher. The *Praśnopanisad*, for example, tells us that Sukeśa Bhāradvāja, Śaibya Satyakāma, Sauryāyaṇī Gārgya, Kauśalya Āsvalāyana, Bhārgava Vaidarbhī and Kabandhī Kātyāyana approached the revered Pippaláda seeking to know the highest *Brahman*.[164] The *Upaniṣad* records their questions and answers.[165] The *Kathopaniṣad* records a dialogue between Naciketā and Yama.[166] The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* records several such dialogues, for example, that between Jānaśruti and Raivaka,[167] Satyakāma and Gautama,[168] Śvetaketu and Uddālaka,[169] Sanatakumāra and Nārada, etc.[170]

In these dialogues the teacher reveals a profound truth and seeks to explain it with the help of analogies and parables. The disciple listens with faith and earnestness. The method of this type of enquiry is best summarized in the words of the Gīta:

तद्‌ विद्धि प्रणिपातेन परिप्रश्नेन सेवया।
उपदेश्यन्ति ते ज्ञानं ज्ञानि न स्तत्वदर्शिन : ।। [171]

On the other hand, there are examples in the *Upaniṣads* of debates between rival claimants to philosophical knowledge. The most famous example of this is the symposium organised by Janaka which is referred to in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.*[172] The king wishes to know as to who was the most learned among the assembled Brāhmaṇas of Kuru and Pañcāla. Even here, in the course of the many debates recorded between Yājñavalkya and his interlocutors, the method adopted is that of simple questions and answers as if the issues were all factual and the truth of the answers discernible on inspection. No logical issues appear to be debated; at least no logical argumentation has been resorted to. It is only very rarely, such as in the debate between Yājñavalkya and Gārgī,[173] that an appeal is made to what is basically a logical principle, *viz.*, *regressus ad infinitum.* Similarly, in the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī,[174] an apparently transcendental argument is used at the end, *viz.*, '*Vijñātāraṁ vā are kena vijānīyāt*' *i.e.*, how to know the knower? Thus, despite the prevalence of discussions and debate and the fact that we have reference even to a discipline called *Vīkovākya* in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the general method followed in the *Upaniṣads* is essentially pedagogic and dialectical in the original sense of the word, rather than that of logical argumentation between rival disputants. The atmosphere is one of seeking the truth with earnest humility rather than that of defending a thesis or opinion with scholastic ingenuity and logical subtlety.

A considerable difference of atmosphere is visible in this respect in the age of the Buddha. We meet here with wandering ascetics and teachers who are comparable to Greek Sophists in their debating skill and sophistries. They have neither humility nor simple earnestness. They hold specific opinions on diverse questions and defend them by argumentation. The oppositions of faith and reason, the positive and the transcendent, the decidable and the undecidable have clearly emerged in the course of this debating. We have, thus, materialists, atheists, sceptics and agnostics.[175] The commonest kind of reason given is an appeal to observation,[176] while counter-examples are used for verification. An attempt is also made to tie the opponent in a knot of contradictions.[177]

The most important development in logical argumentation occurs through the formulation of the four-valued logic of the sceptics. This was adopted with more elaboration by the Nigaṇṭhas and with a difference by the Buddha himself.[178]

Buddha's own dialogues and expositions, while reminiscent of the *Upaniṣads* are somewhat more developed in their logical aspect. They evince an attempt not merely to express and illustrate a deep truth but also to persuade and disarm a neutral or even hostile audience. The Buddha had the capacity to preach his doctrines persuasively.[179] Still, on the whole, the Buddha gives the impression not of a logician but of a seer who is seeking to communicate beyond the oppositions and dilemmas generated by more logical argumentation. The Buddha thus condemns contentious opinions (*diṭṭhi*)[180] and indicates that truth lies beyond perennial antinomies such as of existence and non-existence.[181] This is the true *Madhyamā-pratipad* or *Pratītyasamutpāda*, the original dialectical method of the Buddha, which was grasped and developed by the Mādhyamikas.[182] Buddha, thus, (1) appeals to experience in contradistinction to any appeal to mere tradition or faith in the transcendent, (2) he subjects experience to analysis seeking to show that experiences stand for contingentphe nomena subject to a Law, (3) he declares spiritual truth to be beyond logical antinomies, (4) on certain metaphysical issues he declares speculative reasoning futile.

It is clear, however, that speculative reasoning and logical debating grew apace among the followers of the Buddha after his passing away. The very effort to interpret the words of the Master was a fertile source of debate and controversy. The effort to carry further the analysis of phenomena initiated by the Buddha was another source of the growth of divergent opinions. Some of the controversies suggest that the effort to include or exclude non-Buddhist doctrines was still another source of controversy.

The method of debate in the *Kathāvatthu* shows considerable formal development.[183] Here the thesis is stated, reasons advanced, refutations and counter-refutations presented, examples and counter-examples given, the conversion of propositions is regularly done in an effort made, in effect, to test the distribu-

tion of the middle term.[184] Instead of any direct appeal to experience, here reason functions by appealing to commonly accepted premises and to principles affecting the formal validity of conclusions. The typical structure of a debate in the *Kathāvatthu* is developed in the form of a defence and attack.[185] The style of debate runs as follows, as may be illustrated from the example of the first *Kathā* or controversy.

First of all, the thesis is presented for discussion by the disputant, *i.e.*, the Theravādins in the direct order (*anuloma*)—'Is 'Puggala'[186] known in the sense of a real and ultimate thing?' This is called *thāpanā* or formulation of the issue. The Puggalavādins affirm the Puggala thus questioned. The Theravādins ask further, 'Is the puggala known in the same way as a real and ultimate thing?' This is called *pāpanā* which raises a crucial implication that would really take the form of a hypothetical syllogism. The dential of the Puggalavādins as regards this identity leads the Theravādins to affirm that the former's thesis is refuted, for, if they maintain the first premise they must also accept the implication as put forth in the second question. This is called *ropanā*.[187]

Now the advocates of the thesis come forward with a rejoinder (*paṭikamma*), 'Is the puggala not known in the sense of a real and ultimate thing?' The Theravādins affirm that it is not so known. The Puggalavādins argue further, 'Is it unknown in the same way as a real and ultimate thing is known?' The Theravāda refusal to accept this leads the Puggalavādins to affirm that if the disputants admit the first premise they must also accept the second.[188]

Next follows the third phase of the debate called *niggaha* in which the Puggalavādins claim the defeat of the disputants on the basis of their rejoinder.[189]

Then follows an application of the reasoning of the disputant to his own case (*upanaya*), *i.e.*, the Puggalavādins observed that (1) the *puggala* is known in the sense of a real and ultimate thing, but (2) unknown in the same way as a real and ultimate thing is known. At this, the Theravāda objection was that if the statement (2) is not admitted then statement (1) cannot be admitted either. And now they maintain that (1) the puggala is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate thing but not

(2) unknown in the same way as a real and ultimate thing is known. Following the same logic as applied by the Theravādins the Puggalavādins also point out that if they do not admit the statement (2) they cannot admit (1) either.[190]

Thus, the Puggalavādins draw the conclusion (*niggamana*) that refutation of their thesis as proposed by the Theravādins is not sound whereas their own rejoinder is sound.[191]

This is the first defeat on refutation (*niggaha*) followed by four more. In the second defeat which is in the adverse manner (*paccanīka-niggaho*), the respondents being the Theravādins, the argument of the preceding one is accordingly repeated. In the third, fourth and fifth defeats we have the modification of the first *niggaha* by insertion of the words, 'everywhere', 'always', and 'in all cases'. In the sixth, seventh and eighth defeats 'not known' replaces 'known' in the question.[192] Thus, these eight *niggahas* seem to comprise a dialectical whole wherein we 'find a five-fold argument pro, a five-fold argument contra, three modes of the pro argument, and three modes of the contra argument'.[193] It has been pointed out that the use of the word *niggaha* only up to the number eight is arbitrary, since the subsequent discussion also constitutes refutations.[194]

The preceding is, in short, the stereotyped style of debate in the *Kathāvatthu*. However, the mention of such technical terms as *anuyoga* (enquiry), *āharaṇa* (illustration), *paṭiññā* (proposition), *upanaya* (application of reason), *niggaha* (defeat or refutation), presupposes a science of logic in the middle of the third century B.C.[195]

REFERENCES

1. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, pp. 3-6, *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 1, 7; *Milindapañho*, pp. 13-14; *Samantapāsādikā*, I, p. 53; *Mahāvaṁsa*, V, 279; *Dīpavaṁsa*, VII, 41, 56-58.
2. *Mahābodhivaṁsa*, (PTS. Ed.), 94.
3. G.C. Pande, ***Studies in the Origins of Buddhism***, p. 13.
4. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, Prefatory Notes, p. xxix.
5. *Points of Controversy*, Prefatory Notes, p.xxx; Malalasekera, *DPPN*, Vol. I, s.v. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 505. (It may be noted that *sāsana* and such other words are here generally used in their Pāli form.)
6. Cf. T.W, Rhys Davids & W. Stede, *Pali English Dictionary*, s.v. *Kathā* and *Vatthu*, pp. 184, 598. In the ordinary usage, the compound term *Kathāvatthu* means themes of conversation. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 266; II, pp. 47, 356; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, IV, p. 202; *Milindapañho*, p 13, etc. But the term *Kathāvatthu* is generally employed to mean subject of discourse or discussion or argument. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, p. 47. (It may be noted that for the Pāli *Tripiṭaka*, the Nālandā Devanāgari Pāli series edited by J. Kashyapa, published by the Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra, Nālandā has been utilized here except where stated otherwise.)
7. The English translation of the *Kathāvatthu* has been captioned *Points of Controversy* by C.A.F. Rhys Davids and S.Z. Aung and the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā* has been rendered as *Debates Commentary* by B.C. Law.
8. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 7.
9. T.W. Rhys Davids, *History and Literature of Buddhism*, p. 44.
10. *Points of Controversy*, Prefatory Notes, p. xxxi.
11. *Mahāvaṁsa*, Chapter V; *Mahābodhivaṁsa*, (PTS. Ed.) 94; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 7.
12. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 6; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 1, 7.
13. Malalasekera, *DPPN*, Vol. I, s.v. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 505.
14. Ibid., p. 505. It may be noted that the Chinese *Mahābibhāṣā śāstra* begins with a similar questioning about the relationship of Mahākātyāyanīputra to Buddha over the authorship of the śāstra.
15. *Points of Controversy*, Prefatory Notes, p. xxxi.
16. Ibid., p. xxxii.
17. See *Dīpavaṁsa*, Chapter VII; *Mahāvaṁsa*, Chapter V; *Samantapāsādikā*, 31, 46; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 5f.
18. *Mahāvaṁsa*, Chapter V.
19. See N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. II, p. 268; see also H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 110.
20. Cf. N. Dutt, *Ibid*. p. 268.

21. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 14-15, see also, D R. Bhandarkar, *Aśoka*, pp. 69ff; author's article on 'Religious Conviction of Aśoka' in *University of Rajasthan Studies (History)* 1965-66; Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, p. 270.
22. Cf. A. Cunningham, *Inscriptions of Asoka*, p. 39.
23. Hultzsch, *Inscriptions of Asoka*, CII, Vol. I, pp. 162-63; see also, R.B. Pandey, *Aśoka ke Abhilekha*, pp. 183, 185, 187.
24. Cf. Hultzsch, op. cit., pp. 159-64; R.B. Pandey, op. cit., pp. 183-87 see also B.M. Barua, *Aśoka and his Inscriptions*, p. 333; R.G. Basak, *Aśokan Inscriptions*, pp. 146-49.
25. '*Ichā hime kiṁti saṁgha samage cilathitīka siyāti*'. See R.B Pandey, op. cit., p. 183.
26. D.R. Bhandarkar, *Aśoka*, op. cit., p. 85.
27. See R.B. Pandey, op. cit., p. 15.
28. Aśoka is the jealous guardian of the unity of the Buddhist Saṁgha and yet the tolerant helper of all the sects. He discouraged the criticism of other sects as also the attempts to disrupt ones own; Cf. R.B. Pandey, op. cit., R.E. VII, XII and Schism Edicts i.e., Sanchi, Sarnath and Kausambi Minor Pillar Edicts.
29. Cf. JRAS, 1915, pp. 805ff; See also Malalasekera, *DPPN*, Vol. I, s.v. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 505; B.M. Barua, op. cit., p. 337.
30. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 3.
31. *Dīpavaṁsa* Chapter V; *Mahāvaṁsa* Chapter V.
32. See J. Masuda, *Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools*, *Asia Major*, II, pp. 14-17; A. Bareau, *Trois Traités Sur Les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 167-72, 192.
33. J.P. Minayeff, *Recherches sur le Bouddhisme*, p. 82.
34. Cf. Chapters II, IV and V.
35. See G. C. Pande, '*Origin of Mahāyāna*', *M. M. Gopinath, Kaviraja Abhinandana Grantha, pp.* 166-74; See also N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 34-35; D.T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*; B.L Suzuki, *Mahāyāna Buddhism;* W. M. McGovern, *An Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism*; R. Kimura, *A Historical Study of the Terms Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and the Origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism;* La Vallee Poussin on Mahāyāna, ERE, VIII, s.v. Philosophy (Buddhist)'; Rahula Sankrtyayana on '*Mahāyāna Buddha Dharma ki Utpatti*' in *Purātattva Nibandhāvali*, Ch. 8; M. Winternitz, *History af Indian Literature*, II, pp. 295ff; L.M. Joshi, *Studie in the Buddhistic Culture of India*, pp. 3-4.
36. J. Masuda, op. cit., p. 15; A. Bareau, *Toris Traités Sur Les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, op. cit., pp. 168, 192.
37. See *infra*, Chapters II, IV and V.
38. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 21, 245.
39. *Kathāvatthu*, XIX, 8.
40. Ibid., XX, 2.
41. Ibid., XIX, 5

42. *Kathāvatthu*, XIX, 3.
43. Ibid., XIX, 4.
44. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 42, 60.
45. Ibid., pp. 43, 58.
46. Ibid., pp. 52-8, 60, 62-5, 67-8, 71-2, 78-9.
47. Ibid., pp. 57-8.
48. Ibid., pp. 58.
49. Ibid., pp. 73-7.
50. Ibid., pp. 167, 171.
51. Ibid., p. 35.
52. Ibid., p. 50.
53. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, Prefatory Notes, pp. xxxii.
54. See *Dīpavaṁsa*, Chapter V.
55. Cf. later picture preserved in the Chinese traditions wherein it is given to understand that Buddhist monks of different denominations lived together in the same monastery.
56. See *Kathāvatthu*, XX, 5.
57. Cf. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 397-8; See also C.A.F. Rhys Davids in *JRAS*, 1935, p. 723, *What was the Original Gospel?* Appendix.
58. See *Therīgāthā Commentary*, 135; Cf. also *Udāna Commentary*, 94.
59. *Ṛgveda*, II, 12.
60. Cf. '*na tatra dakṣiṇā yanti nāvidvāmsastapasvinaḥ*', *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, II, 1111, see also II. 1473; *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 1,2.7ff, III, 1,8; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VIII. 1.6; *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad*, VI. 4.
61. Cf. e.g., *Ṛgveda*, X. 90; X. 129.
62. Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VII. 1. 2.
63. Cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XI. 5, 6, 8; See also *SBE*, XLIV, p. 98.
64. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. III, lff.
65. e.g., *Praśna Upaniṣad*, I. 3; *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, I. 3; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. 2. 1; *Taittarīya Upaniṣad*, III, 1. 1; *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, I. 1. 7.
66. Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I. 1.
67 Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. 16. 17.
68. Cf. Ibid., III. 16.
69. Cf. *Kālaḥ Svabhāvoniyatiryadṛcchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyā*, *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, I. 2.
70. Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, V. 10. 2; VIII. 2. 1; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I. 5. 16.
71. See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 286-7; Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III. 2. lff; IV. 4. 1-5.
72. *Taittarīya Upaniṣad*, II. 3-4; III. 4.
73. *Kena Upaniṣad*, I. 1.
74. *Ibid.*, I. 4.
75. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II. 1. lff.

76. *Katha Upaniṣad.* I. 2. 1ff.
77. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* II. 23. 1.
78. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad,* I, 1.6ff; II. 1.2; III. 2.5ff.
79. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad,* I.2. 12-15.
80. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.* I.1; II.8, 14-17; III. 1, 10,11; IV. 1. 11 etc.
81. *Bṛhadāraṇyka Upaniṣad,* III. 9.1.
82. Cf. e.g.; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* I.4-10; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* III 13.7; III, 14, 2-4; See also P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads,* pp. 38ff; S. Radharishnan, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads,* pp. 45-49.
83. Śankarācārya, *Commentary on the Gitā,* II. 16.
84. See *Īśa Upaniṣad,* 15-18.
85. See *Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* IV. 14. 2-3; V. 24. 1-4; *Bṛhadaraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* II; 3-5; III. 5. 1.
86. See *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad,* II. 14, 16-17; *Kaṭha Upaniṣad,* II 3.9; II. 3. 12ff.
87. Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* III. 2. 1ff; IV. 4. 1-5; *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad,* I, 1ff.
88. *Īśa Upaniṣad,* 3; *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad,* II. 2, 2ff.
89. *Kena Upaniṣad,* I-IV, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* III. 4. 1.
90. Cf. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism,* Chapters VIII-IX.
91. S.K. Belvalkar and R.D. Ranade, *The Creative Period of Indian Philosophy,* pp. 443ff; T.W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India,* p. 159; G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism,* p. 337; S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism,* p. 47, etc.
92. T.W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India,* pp, 110-11; Cf. K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,* pp. 207-8.
93. *Brahmajāla* and *Sāmaññaphala.*
94. Cf. N. Dutt and K.D. Bajpai, *Development of Buddhism in Uttar Pradesh,* p. 25.
95. O. Schrader has utilized the Jain sources fully in discussing these views in his valuable work, *Uber den Stand der Indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahaviras und Buddhas*; See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism,* pp. 338ff for a brief outline of these systems as known from the Jain sources.
96. Cf. B.M. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy,* Chapter XIII, ff; G.C. Pande. *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism,* pp. 327ff; Also *BDVI,* pp. 31-40; N. Dutt, *EMB,* Vol. I. pp, 34ff; see also B.C. Law, *Historical Gleanings,* pp. 21ff, *Buddhistic Studies,* pp. 73ff. K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., Chapters II-III.
97. *Digha Nīkāya,* I, pp. 13-16.
98. Ibid., I, 17-21.
99. Ibid., I, 21-3.
100, Ibid., I, 27.
101. Cf. Ibid., I, p. 28.

102. *Digha Nikāya*, I, p. 29.
103. Cf. Ibid., I, pp. 30-2.
104. Ibid., I, pp. 32-4.
105. Ibid., I. pp. 23-6; Cf. N. Dutt, EMB, Vol. I, p. 43n.
106. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 46-8; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 34, 267; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 248, 292, 308; See also A. L. Basham, *History and Doctrine of the Ajivakas*, pp. 123-7.
107. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 45-6; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 248, 308.
108. Cf. *Digha Nikāya*, I, pp. 49-59; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 248, 308.
109. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 50-1.
110. Ibid.. I, pp. 51-2.
111. Ibid., I, pp. 48-9.
112. S. Dutt, *The Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 95.
113. Cf. L. Chalmers, *Buddha's Teachings*, pp. 191, 201.
114. *Sutta Nipatā*, p. 398.
115. Ibid., pp. 309ff.
116. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 174ff; II, pp. 204-7.
117. Cf. K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 172.
118. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III, pp. 322ff.
119. *Sutta Nipāta*, pp. 403-4.
120. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 107-13.
121. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 105-6.
122. Cf. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 414.
123. Cf. B.M. Barua, op. cit., pp. 228-9.
124. *Mahāparinibbāna sutta*, p. 80.
125. Cf. T.R.V. Murti, *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, pp. 49-52.
126. Etienne Lamotte. *Le Traité De La Grande Vertu De Sagesse De Nagarjune*, I, p. 27.
127. Ibid., pp. 39-41.
128. *Mādhyamika Kārikā*, XIII, 8.
129. Cf. O. Rosenberg, *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie*, Vorwort, p. xiii.
130. *Mātikās* are the list of dhammas which we find sometime enumerated in the *Vinaya Pitaka* (Cf. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 120, 324, 368; *Cullavagga*, pp. 421-423). It may be noted that three *Abhidhamma* texts, viz., *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Puggalapaññatti* and *Dhātukathā* start with a *mātikā*.
131. See S. Beal, Si-yu-ki, pp. 371-2; Obermilier, (Buston), *History of Buddhism*, Vol. II, pp. 46-52; see also Rahula Samkrtyayan, *Purātattva Nibandhāvalī*, p. 113n.
132. G.N. Kaviraj quoted G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 63.
133. The ability to adjust sermons to suit the temperament of the listners or skill to convert people. Cf. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, s.v. *Upāyakauśalya*.
134. *Upāya-Kosallam*, Cf. K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 406.
135. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 99; II, pp. 72-4.
136. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 426-32, 483ff. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III,

pp. 257ff; IV, pp 374-403.

137. See *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 112-13, See also T.R.V. Murti, op. cit., pp. 36-50; K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 242ff.
138. A.B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 63; see also Poussin, *ERE*, s.v. Nirvāṇa.
139. See e.g. *Majjhima Nikāya, Aggivacchagotta sutta.*
140. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, p. 186; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III, pp. 322ff.
141. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 438-9.
142. Cf. *Cullavagga*, Chapter XI.
143. See Frauwallrer, *The Earliest Vinaya*, pp. 1-2.
144. See e.g., *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 147-8.
145. Cf, *Mahāvagga*, Chapter X; *Mjjhima Nikāya, Kosambisutta.*
146. See *Mahāvagga*, pp. 120, 324, 368; *Cullavagga*, pp. 421-3; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, p. 38; II, p. 145.
147. *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, I, p. 15; *Papañcasūdāni*, p. 79.
148. Cf. *Cullavagga*, Chapter XI; J. Przyluski, *Le Concile de Rājgṛha*.
149. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 16.
150. Cf. A. *Bareau*, op. cit., p. 50.
151. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II. p. 118.
152. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, p. 141ff.
153. Cf. Przyluski, op. cit., pp. 307-33; Hofinger, *Etude sur le Concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 22-148; 183-196; N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, pp. 14ff; Demieville, *L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'aprés Paramārtha*, pp. 259-60.
154. S. Dutt *Early Buddhist Monachism*, op. cit., p. 102; see also infra. Chapter VII.
155. A. Bareau, op. cit., p. 46.
156. Cf. A. Bareau, op. cit., p. 44. The attitude of Pusyamitra towards Buddhism is a controversial problem of Indian history.
157. Frauwallner, op. cit., pp. 12ff.
158. See infra, Chapter II.
159. Cf. Ibid., See also N. Dutt, *EMB*. II, pp. 18-20; Demiéville, *L'origin des Sectes bouddhiques daprés Paramartha*, op. cit., pp. 259-60.
160. Takakusu; *I-tsing*, pp. 66-76.
161. Cf. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 22, 55.
162. See *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 9. See also *Mahābhārata-Nārāyanīya section of the Śāntiparva*.
163. *Arthrśāstra*, I. 2
164. *Praśna Upaniṣad*, 1. 1
165. Cf. Ibid., I. 3ff
166. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, I, 1. 9ff
167. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, IV, 1. 1ff
168. Ibid., IV, 4. 1ff.
169. Ibid., VI, 1. 1ff.
170. Ibid., VII, 1. 1ff.
171. *Bhagavadgītā*, 4. 34.
172. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III, 1. 1ff.

173. Ibid., III, 8. 1ff.
174. Ibid., IV, 5. 2ff.
175. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya, Brahmajāla* and *Sāmaññaphala suttas;* See also supra.
176. Cf. K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 72ff.
177. Cf. e.g., *Majjhima Nikāya*, the dialogue between Dīghanakha and Buddha.
178. Cf. K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 304, 344ff
179. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 24ff. Cf. C.A. F. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Brethren*, pp. 69, 388, 402, 390n.
180. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, p. 179.
181. *Sutta Nipata*, p. 405.
182. See supra.
183. Cf. H.N. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, pp. 13ff.
184. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 3ff; see also K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 412ff; S.C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, pp. 234ff.
185. Cf. *Sādhana* and *Upālaṁbha* referred to in the *Nyāyasūtra*, I. 2. 1
186. 'Soul' or 'person' Cf. infra, Chapter VIII.
187. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 3.
188. See Ibid., p. 4.
189. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
190. Ibid., pp. 4. 8.
191. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
192. Ibid., pp. 9ff.
193. See H.N. Randle, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
194. K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 415.
195. Cf. S.C. Vidyabhusana, op. cit., p. 234.

2

Growth and Ramification of the Early Buddhist Sects and Schools

INTRODUCTION

Referring to Buddhist sects and schools it is difficult to always distinguish the precise extension of the two terms, *viz.*, sects and schools. They seem generally to denote the same sets or groups since different sectarian communities can be distinguished doctrinally also. Andreau Bareau has, however, tried to draw some distinction in their connotation. In obvious semblance to sect and school we have two terms in Buddhism, *viz.*, *nikāya* and *ācariyakula* or *ācariyavāda*.[1] In the opinion of Bareau, while *Nihāya* stands for *sect*, *ācariyavāda* comes nearest to school. He would explain *ācariyavāda* as the oral (*vāda*) teaching of a master (*ācariya*).[2] It is difficult, however, to accept this interpretation. *Ācariyavāda* literally means teachers' exposition. In the post-Canonical commentarial literature, the term is frequently employed to mean the body of expositions, interpretations and opinions of the well-known teachers of the past, *i.e.*, orthodox and traditional commentarial matter.[3] Curiously enough, it later came to denote varieties of teachings and interpretations of the Buddhist

doctrine considered heterodox from the Theravāda, point of view. This emerges from the fact that in the Pāli commentaries and Ceylon chronicles, which uphold the Theravāda tradition, all the Buddhist schools, except Theravāda, are called *ācariyavāda*.[4] It seems likely that sometimes a prominent master of the Law was able to impose his interpretations over a certain community or section of monks so much so that they gradually drifted away to form a body or sect of their own. It is tacitly assumed in the *Dīpavaṁsa* that a seceding group ought to have an *ācariya* or leader.[5] Later, we know for certain that some of the Buddhist sects owe their names to individual teachers of different times.[6] It is difficult, therefore, to hold that *ācariyavāda* exclusively denoted school as being something other than sect. A *Nikāya* is a group of persons holding the same beliefs and regulations. It is also a collection of objects like the *sūtras* which is called *Nikāya*. Thus, though '*Nikāya*' and '*ācariyavāda*' seem to correspond somewhat in connotation to the terms sect and school respectively, it is difficult to accept that by using two distinct terms the Buddhist implied the kind of practical distinction between them as suggested by Bareau.

The Ceylonese chroniclers inform us that within a couple of centuries of the Buddha's demise the Buddhist community was split into eighteen sects or schools.[7] As older works do not make a mention of these sects, scholars, like T.W. Rhys Davids, are led to observe that: Suddenly in the 4th and 5th centuries we have the famous lists of 18 sects supposed to have arisen and to have flourished before the Canon was closed . . If we take all the evidence together, it is possible to draw only one conclusion. There were no sects in India in any proper use of that term.... The number eighteen is fictitious and may very probably be derived from the eighteen causes of division set out in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*.[8] Poussin has, similarly, observed that "the Buddhist schools work on a common literary stock made up from mutual borrowings and they arrive at divergent conclusions even when they do not start from divergent dogmatical tenets. As a rule doctrinal contradictions do not disrupt the saṁgha. Thus if we consider the mutual relation of sects and their legal position as branches of the universal

saṁgha leaving out of account doctrinal divergences which are not as such of paramount importance—sects are not to be contrasted as hostile body, with closed tradition".[9]

In making these remarks, these scholars seem to have arrived at hasty conclusions without, pherhaps, a sufficient analysis of the available material. They have mainly three contentions in their observations: (1) Older works do not mention the sects. (2) The so-called Buddhist sects are not so in the proper sense of the term. (3) They are branches of the universal Saṁgha without distinctive organisations and without doctrinal divergences of any paramount importance.

As regards the lateness of the evidence, T.W. Rhys Davids has based his observation only on the literary evidence and that too merely of the Ceylonese chronicles and other later works. The texts of the *Vinaya* and the *Sutta Piṭakas* are, however, replete with terms and phrases which seem to imply an early tendency towards sectarian division in the Order. But we have, in fact more than a plausibility here. Rhys Davids has also overlooked those epigraphic sources which have an early bearing on the Buddhist sects. Curiously enough, we have direct inscriptional evidence datable to the early centuries of the Christian era where several early Buddhist sects are mentioned,[10] and more indirect evidence going back to the second century B.C. In the Sāñchī ralic casket inscription there is reference to the *Hemavatācariya Gotiputa Kassapa- gota*.[11] It is probable that we have here an early glimpse of the Haimavatas and perhaps the *Kāśyapīyas*. There is, therefore, no inherent implausibility in the traditional assumption that, by the time the Canon came to be closed, various sects emerged and provided an occasion for the compilation of the *Kathāvatthu*. It should also be remarked that there is common ground in the traditions of the different sects in holding that the differentiation of the sects had arisen early, mostly within the first two centuries of the Nirvāṇa era.[12]

Regarding the second and the third observations, the position of the Buddhist sects cannot be said to be so arbitrary as these scholars would have us believe. It was owing primarily to the proliferation of a number of sects that Buddhist thought

was enriched to such a remarkable extent. Granting that some of the sects did not have outstanding differences with some others and were, consequently, absorbed into larger units, it has to be borne in mind that certain sects which became prominent in course of time stood steadfastly on the basis of their own specific traits. They formulated propositions which had a sharply individual character. Even in the sphere of rules and regulations, though there was sufficient homogeneity, one should not assume that they were same in all the sects. In fact, sometimes minor points of dispute over discipline divided the community in certain regions.[13] Doctrinal controversies in which the various sectaries indulge in the *Kathāvatthu* is proof positive of the remarkable distinction in the points of view of the different Buddhist sects. C.A.F. Rhys Davids also calls the non-Theravāda schools dummies and asserts that the ancient treatises on them by Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinītadeva offer us only the dry disintegrated bones of doctrine. Yet the dummies appear to have been once alive and the dry bones clothed with flesh and blood. The records, doubtless, present a dry conspectus because they are the products of scholastic activity.

The subsequent emegrence of Buddhist sects is in conformity with the picture we have in the early Canonical literature where there are interesting details about the definition, causes and consequences of schism (*saṁghabheda*) which sound like an intimation of the impending growth of the sects. Added to this, there are apprehensive remarks of the Buddha and some of the elders about the possibilities of schism as also some actual incidents referring to disruptive forces set into motion at an early date.

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF SCHISM AND ITS INFLUENCE

In the *Dīpavaṁsa*, where occurs the first complete list of the Buddhist sects, the key-words are *saṁghabheda* (schism) and *vāda* (school or system).[14] Earlier evidences of the term are, however, available in the Canon itself. Apart from some stray references in the *Nikāyas*,[15] in the *Cullavagga* of the *Vinaya*

Piṭaka there is one full chapter[16] devoted to the problem of schism dealing with the various details. In the words of the Buddha, schism is the most hateful crime in punishment of which an aeon (*kappa*) of suffering is inadequate.[17] In some cases he goes so far as to forbid the reordination of such monks who indulged in schism or followed the schismatics.[18] Disputes over *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* were technically called *vivāda*.[19] It was a specific type of *vivāda*, fulfilling certain pre-conditions that could cause a schism. A schism is properly initiated if at least nine or more than nine qualified monks are involved in it; a lesser number of monks can bring about only what is called dissension (*saṁgharāji*).[20] Difference of interpretation over *Dhamma, Vinaya* and *Prātimokṣa*—in all eighteen points of difference of opinion,—provide valid grounds for the occurrence of schism.[21] When the schism has occurred, the original Order would be divided into two *sāṁghas* or communities, each holding its congregational ceremony in separate assemblies.[22]

This, however, seems to be a strictly orthodox view of the Theravādins that every schism is initiated with an evil intention to disrupt the unity of the Order and false doctrines are deliberately propounded by the schismatics.[23] In fact, the mere entertainment of a dissident view, which, in its turn, arises due to various reasons such as a difference of understanding or interpretation, was sufficient for a dispute to arise and thus give rise to a schism and doctrinal confrontation. Schism was perhaps rarely intended to be caused. It followed automatically if the confrontation was irreconcilable. Buddha's own verdict on this point seems to have been that initiating a schism in the Order is not condemnable in itself. What is to be condemned is the evil intention, the mere wilfulness to produce a schism without an adequate reason for it.[24] It is only a dishonest and intentional schismatic who cannot be saved from the torture of the '*Niraya*' (Hell) and not all schismatics. The desirability of unity in the Order is repeatedly emphasized in the Canon but the tacit assumption there is always that it should not be at the cost of the liberty of personal faith and conviction of the monks. Obviously, the restriction on the right to schism is only a moral, not a legal one.[25]

EARLY NOTICES OF DISCORDANT NOTES IN THE ORDER

The Buddha seems to have taken a keen personal interest in the harmonious faring of the Order. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*, for instance, he asks Anuruddha as to whether or not the monks are living on friendly terms and as harmoniously as milk and water blend with each other.[26] This statement, on the part of Buddha, tends to assume some extra significance if we take into account various other apprehensive remarks made both by him and his senior disciples. It would then give the impression of some intimations of dissensions.

APPREHENSIVE REMARKS

The *Saṁyutta Nikāya* records the Buddha to have said that in the course of time his followers would fail to understand the subtle points of his teaching, such as Void and would rather take as authoritative the simplified version of his followers and thus his own utterances would disappear.[27] To stem this tide, he exhorted the disciples to learn and grasp the doctrine as he had put before them.[28] With his keen insight, he could foresee the specfic realms where two monks might differ and give rise to a controversy. He had the apprehension that there might arise some differences of opinion on *abhidhamma*, *ajjhājiva andadhi-pātimokkha*. However, these would not be very significant. But in case there arose any dispute over the fruits (magga), path (*paṭipadā*) or the congregation (*saṁgha*) it would be a matter of regret and harm.[29] Should there arise such an occasion, he recommended the guidance of senior monks.[30] Similarly, he once explained to Ānanda that he taught *Dhamma* according to classification,[31] which, obviously, points to his analytical (*vibhajjavādī*) method of approach. He added in the same context that those of his followers who would not approve and agree with this would ultimately indulge in controversies and disputations. In an anticipation of such developments he seems to have devised certain measures for dealing with them.[32] For verifying the correctness of his own teaching, when studied subsequently, he had suggested that it should be compared

with the *Suttas* and the *Vinaya* learnt by heart by the monks.[33] A little before his passing away, he is said to have recommended abolishing the minor precepts and to have given an opportunity to the monks present to clarify their doubts if there were any about the Buddha, the Doctrine, the Path or the method, so that they might not have to repent afterwards.[34] It was also perhaps in the light of this that he finally decided not to appoint any successor after him and laid down that the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* ought to be taken as the teacher thenceforth.[35]

The apprehensive remarks of some of the senior disciples of Buddha are still more suggestive. Sāriputta pointed out at one place how there were several points which aroused jealousy among the monks and how things of this sort reflected upon the imperfection of those monks.[36] The death of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta and the subsequent dissensions in his Order seem to have evoked much concern among the senior Buddhist monks.[37] Sāriputta related the whole story before the Order and added that there was, however, no possibility of such developments in their Order for the simple reason that the Norm had been very well laid down by the Buddha.[38] In the opinion of Mrs. Rhys Davids, this episode seems to have urged the elders to draw a summary of the kernel of the doctrine without losing much time.[39] For want of any evidence to the effect that the Canon was compiled in an abridged form also, it is difficult to suppose that this was actually done during the lifetime of the Buddha. The Buddhist Canon is supposed to have been compiled for the first time after the death of the Buddha during the deliberations of the first Council.[40] When Buddha was informed about the developments in the Jain Order he is said to have warned Ānanda to see to it that no such developments take place in the Order lest they should result in the woe of many.[41]

DEVIATIONS AND PERNICIOUS VIEWS

There was a certain monk named Sunakkhatta who once approached the Buddha and informed him that he was going to leave the Order.[42] Buddha allowed Sunakkhatta to go but

not before he personally tried to persuade him to change his mind. After leaving the Order, Sunakkhatta is said to have openly criticized the Buddha, which the latter, however, took as praise and not criticism.[43] Similarly, thirty young disciples of Ānanda left the Order and turned to low things.[44] The Buddha may have had such instances in mind when he observed that turning hostile to the teacher consisted in not listening to him, not lending a ready ear to what he says, not preparing the mind for profound knowledge but moving away from the teacher's instruction.[45] At a certain stage, the Buddha noted a tendency towards deviation even among the senior monks as they were not observing the ascetic life in the proper manner.[46] There were occasions when certain monks came to hold pernicious views. Ariṭṭha, for instance, is reported to have said that: 'So far as I understand the *Dhamma*, taught by the Lord, it is that following the stumbling-blocks there is no stumbling-block at all'.[47] Other monks were naturally alarmed at this and tried to dissuade him from his view. Another monk Sāti similarly took it for granted that this consciousness itself runs on, and not another.[48] By consciousness, Sāti meant that which speaks and feels everywhere, the fruition of deeds that are lovely and that are depraved.[49] It is rather curious that the Buddha's point of view should have been misunderstood and misrepresented in his own lifetime. King Prasenajit of Kośala sought the approval of the Buddha on a certain point which the former was given to understand to be the Buddha's view, and the Buddha clearly pointed out that this was a misrepresentation of his contention.[50]

DISSENSION AT KAUŚĀMBĪ

At Kauśāmbī, a very serious dissension is recorded to have ensued from a simple dispute amongst the monks. The story goes[51] that there were two teachers at Kauśāmbī, *viz.*, Dhammadhara and Vinayadhara, both expert in their respective fields, *i.e.*, *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*. Dhammadhara once inadvertently committed a minor offence for which he expressed regret. This, however, was talked about much by Vinayadhara and his followers, which offended the Dhammadharas. As a result

of this, there developed a great rift not only between the two groups of monks but also between the lay-devotees of the two teachers. The Buddha, who was informed about it, tried to resolve the controversy but could not succeed. It was only when the Buddha retired to the forest, saying that he would better like to be served by elephants than by those quarrelling monks and lay-devotees, that the two warring groups realized their mistake and ressolved the controversy.[52] It appears from the *Nikāya* evidence that there were other occasions when such confrontations between the monks took place ; and their occurrence was reported to the Buddha without much delay.[53]

DEVADATTA EPISODE

A more serious dissension in the early history of the Buddhist Order was due to Devadatta. He was opposed to the lenient rules in the Buddhist Order and pleaded strongly for a more stringent life for the monks The Buddha refused to accept the suggestions of Devadatta. Thereupon Devadatta is said to have left for Gayāsīsa, perhaps, with a good following. It is added, however, that, at the instance of Buddha, Sāriputta and Mogallāna subsequently won the other monks over to the Buddha's side.[54] N. Dutt has rightly observed that 'the episode of Devadatta is almost a *Saṅghabheda* though it is not recognised as such in the *Vinaya*'.[55] That it was as good as a *Saṅghabheda* is indicated by the fact that the followers of Devadatta appear to have survived in later times. *Gotamaka* seems to be a class of such ascetics. In the opinion of Rhys Davids, *Gotamaka* monks were almost certainly the followers of some other member of the Sākyan clan, as distinct from the Buddha, and it is quite likely that they were the followers of Devadatta.[56] Fa-hsien noticed the existence of the followers of Devadatta in Śrāvastī. These monks made offerings to three past Buddhas except Śākyamuni.[57] Thus, it is quite probable that Devadatta and some of his disciples did not return to the Buddha's Order once they had deserted t.

SUBHADRA'S REMARKS

When the news of the Buddha's passing away was communi-

cated to his disciples, some of them were grief-stricken and others who were passionless and mindful bore the calamity and reflected on the impermanence of all things. But a certain monk Subhadra expressed a sigh of relief at the Buddha's demise. He remarked that it is not a matter to grieve and lament. The monks, according to him, were now free to do as they wished since the Buddha would not be there to dictate to them.[58] This expression on the part of Subhadra was alarming to others so much so that the First Buddhist Council appears to have been organized by Mahākāśyapa on this count.[59]

FIRST BUDDHIST COUNCIL AND THE DISSENTING NOTES

The historicity of the first Buddhist Council[60] has been a keenly debated issue among the scholars. Oldenberg, followed by Franke, have doubted its historicity.[61] Their objections had, however, been ruled out by Jacobi.[62] Consequently, the scholars have since tended to agree that a Council did take place at Rājagṛha soon after the Mahāparinirvāṇa of the Buddha, though its transactions might not have been so comprehensive as to include the compilation of the *Sutta* and the *Vinaya Piṭakas* in their entirety. It seems, however, that the elders must certainly have tried to recite together the whole of the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* at the earliest opportunity in view of the Buddha's last verdict that *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* would henceforth be their teacher.[63]

According to the *Cullavagga*, the Council was held at *Rājagṛha* in the second month of the rainy season. Mahākāśyapa questioned Upāli on the *Vinaya*. It has been suggested that from the various details of the *Vinaya* recital it would appear that questions were mainly asked concerning the *Prātimokṣa*.[64] Similarly, Ānanda was questioned by Mahākāśyapa about the *Dhamma* and in this process the five *Nikāyas* of the *Suttapiṭaka* were recited.[65]

The subsequent course of the first Buddhist Council seems to be permeated by controversial notes and dissenting tendencies. When Ānanda informed the councillors about the Buddha's

instruction that minor rules of discipline could be abolished by the Order, there was a stirring controversy as to which rules should be taken as the minor ones.[66] This controversy was, however, resolved by Mahākāśyapa who proposed that no unknown rule should be laid down and no known one should be abrogated, lest they incur the disrespect of the outside people.[67] Then there was some rift among the members about the admission of Ānanda to the Council.[68]

A greater disagreement about the deliberations of the Council was still in store. At the end of the Council Mahākāśyapa and others sought the approval of senior monks such as Gavāmpati and Purāṇa over the texts settled at the Council as *Buddhavacana.*[69] Gavāmpati preferred to remain neutral,[70] which is interpreted as his hestitation to accept the Canon recited by the members of the Council.[71] Purāṇa, on the other hand, straight forwardly refused to accept the recited text as the word of the Buddha. He, instead, expressed himself in favour of believing as the word of the Buddha what he himself had heard and learnt from the Buddha's own mouth.[72] This dissent on the part of Purāṇa must have deepened further as a result of his insistence that eight rules relating to food be incorporated into the *Vinaya*, which was, however, not done. As pointed out by Przyluski and N. Dutt, these rules were not only upheld by the *Vinaya* of the Mahīśāsakas but they also recognized Purāṇa as a distinguished teacher of his time.[73]

SECOND BUDDHIST COUNCIL AND THE GREAT SCHISM

Unlike the preceding Council, there seems to be hardly any doubt left about the historicity of the second Buddhist Council.[74] The essential details are also almost fairly known. But there is a central controversy involved in this Council about the problem of the first schism in Buddhism, that is to say—did the great schism in Buddhism take place in this Council itself or was it a subsequent development to be associated with some other Council? The controversy arises owing to the two sets of mutually disagreeing traditions which we have at our disposal. The earliest notices about this Council are available

in the *Cullavagga* of the Pāli *Vinaya* and *Vinayakṣudrakavastu*, the Tibetan translation of the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*. While the subsequent Pāli tradition about the Council is derived from the *Cullavagga*, Bu-ston and Tārānātha owe their information to the *Vinayakṣudrakavastu*. The Pāli tradition seems to imply that the first schism as also the rise of the Mahāsaṁghikas occurred in the second Council held at Vaiśālī. There are scholars who take this tradition at its face value and suggest that the Mahāsaṁghikas arose in the second Council itself.[75] Contrary to the Pāli tradition, however, we have a second set of tradition consisting of the treatises of Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinītadeva who also refer to a Council in their respective works and give an entirely different account of the first schism and the rise of the Mahāsaṁghikas. Amongst other sources, Yuan Chwang's comments on this Council are also important in the sense that they are based upon the Chinese version of the *Vinayas* of Mahāsaṁghika and other schools.[76] Apart from the works mentioned, some later works of the Buddhists, which make a mention of the Council, are *Mahāvastu*, *Samādhirāja*, *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, etc.[77] The origin of first schism and the rise of the Mahāsaṁghikas is thus caught up in an inextricable tangle of traditions. It would be in the fitness of things to outline briefly the main traditions and analyse them for tracing the probable course and the origin of the great schism.

FIRST SET OF TRADITIONS

According to the Pāli tradition, a senior monk from Kauśāmbī named Yaśa noted at Vaiśālī that the Vajjian monks allowed as lawful ten rules which were against the *Vinaya*. On the *Uposatha* day he found them asking the lay-disciples to give *Kārṣāpaṇa*, *Ardhakārṣāpaṇa*, *Pādakārṣāpaṇa*, etc., to the *Saṁgha*.[78] Yaśa protested strongly against this on which the Vajjian monks were so infuriated that they expelled Yaśa from the Saṁgha.[79] Failing to find any support at Vaiśālī, Yaśa left for Kauśāmbī and from there he started mobilizing opinion against the un-Vinayic acts of the Vajjians. He sent messages to the monks staying at Pāvā and Avanti that unlawful activities were being practised at Vaiśālī. Yaśa himself went to

Ahogaṅga to acquaint Sambhūta Sāṇavāsī about it. The latter consented to participate in the settling of the dispute. Yaśa was then joined by sixty *theras* from Pāvā, eighty-eight from Avanti and various others from different places.[80] It was decided to approch and win over to their side Revata of Soreyya who was the chief of the Saṁgha there. Yaśa requested Revata to participate in the dispute and the latter agreed.[81] In the meantime the Vajjian monks, apprehending the moves of Yaśa, unsuccessfully attempted to win over the support of Revata by trying to appease and gratify him with various monkish presents.[82] They, however, succeeded only in persuading Uttara, a young monk attendant of Revata to accept one robe and declare before the Saṁgha that the Buddhas are born in the eastern countries whose monks conform to *Dharma* while that of Pāvā do not do so.[83] Uttara tried to make Revata say the same, but he refused. The Vajjians are also supposed to have attempted to convince King Kālāsoka of Pushpapura that the monks of the western couutries were making a sinister move to get possession of the Teacher's Gandhakurī Mahāvīhara at Vaiśālī. The king is said to have given up the idea of supporting them due to the intervention of his sister who was a bhikkhuṇī.[84] On the other hand, Sāḷha of Sahajāti and *thera* Sarvakāmī of Vaiśālī, a disciple of Ānanda, also seem to have decided to support Yaśa.[85]

They all assembled at Vaiśālī to hold a Council for settling the points under dispute. As the deliberations of the Council started there was unusual uproar. It was decided to refer the issue to a select body of referees, in all eight in number, out of which four were selected from the orthodox party of the west and four from the unorthodox party of the east.[86] Elder Ajita was requested to preside.[87] This was done in accordance with the *Ubbāhikā* process as enjoined in the *Pātimokkha*.[88] The ten points of the Vajjians were all found to be against the principles of *Vinaya*, save for the sixth which was sometimes permittcd and sometimes not.[89] The unanimous resolution of the select body was put to the larger body of the Council and was confirmed.[90]

The Ceylonese chronicle *Dīpavaṁsa* carries the story further.[91] The Vajjian monks of Vaiśālī did not accept the resolution

passed by the Council. They held a separate Council, called *Mahāsaṁgīti*, without making any discrimination of Arahants and non-Arahants. In view of the high number of attendence at the *Mahāsaṁgīti*, which is given as 10,000,[92] it seems likely that no such discrimination was really made. In this Council, the Vaijian monks are supposed to have carried out things according to their own wishes. They altered the course of the sūtras in the *Vinaya* and the five *Nikāyas*, removed some of them and interpolated new ones.[93] It is also added that they refused to accept the authenticity of *Parivāra*, *Paṭisaṁbidāmagga*, *Niddesa*, certain *Jātakas* and six texts of the *Abhidhamma*.[94] But it is difficult to assume that these texts had really been compiled by that time.[95]

SECOND SET OF TRADITIONS

The second set of traditions, preserved by Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinītadeva, gives an entirely different account of the first schism in Buddhism and the rise of the Mahāsaṁghikas. Bhavya has recorded two traditions on the issue. According to the first, which is supposed to represent the Sammatīya viewpoint, an assembly was held at Pāṭaliputra 137 years after the decease of Buddha in the reign Nanda or Mahāpadmananda to settle a controversy over the five points of Mahādeva and it resulted into the rise of the Mahāsaṁghika school.[96] The second tradition, supposed to be that of the Sthaviras, asserts that the assembly was held 160 years after the Lord's decease at Pāṭaliputra under Aśoka and the controversial issues involved in this Council gave rise to the Mahāsaṁghikas.[97]

Vasumitra, almost corroborating Bhavya, says that an assembly was held at Pāṭaliputra under the patronage of Aśoka a 100 years after the demise of Buddha to discuss the five points of Mahādeva. As a sequel to this controversy, the schism took place and the Mahāsaṁghika school originated.[98] Vinītadeva also associates the great schism as well as the rise of the Mahāsaṁghikas with the controversy created by the five propositions of Mahādeva.[99] The mention of Aśoka as the ruling king of Pāṭaliputra at the time of this controversy seems to be

due to some confusion as indicated also by the record of Yuan Chwang.

According to Yuan Chwang, Aśoka convened an assembly which was represented by 500 Arahants and 500 followers of Mahādeva.[100] The five points of Mahādeva were voted out by the Arahants, but a large body of ordinary ordained members supported these propositions. Elsewhere, Yaun Chwang mentions that the 10,000 ousted monks of the Council of Kāśyapa held a *Mahāsaṁgha* where they recited *Saṁyutta Piṭaka* and *Dhāraṇī Piṭaka* beside the *Tripiṭaka*.[101] He refers to both the controversies, the one created by the ten un-Vinayic acts of the Vajjians and the other created by the five points of Mahādeva. Yuan Chwang obviously seems to have mixed up the episodes of the three Councils as we know that the 10,000 monks who later held a *Mahāsaṁgha* were ousted from the second Council of Vaiśālī and not the first organized by Kāśyapa at Rājagṛha. Similarly, he seems to have mistaken Aśoka for Kālāśoka and altered the details of the second Council of Vaiśālī and the subsequent *Mahāsaṁgha* that was held at Pāṭaliputra.[102]

It is gathered from the *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāsālun* (Chapter 99)[103] that Mahādeva was a brāhmin from Mathurā and he received his ordination at Kukkutārāma in Pāṭaliputra. His zeal and abilities crowned him with the headship of the Saṁgha there. With the help of the ruling king who was his friend and patron, Mahādeva succeeded in ousting the senior monks from that monastery. And thereupon he started propagating his five propositions which are given as follows:[104]

1. The Arahants are subject to temptation.[105]
2. The Arahants may have residue of ignorance.[106]
3. The Arahants may have doubts regarding certain things.[107]
4. The Arahants gain knowledge through others' help.[108]
5. The Path is attained by an exclamation (as aho).[109]

These five points of Mahādeva, according to the second set of traditions, gave rise to a serious dispute leading, ultimately, to the first schism in Buddhism and the division of the Order into two schools, *i.e.*, the Mahāsaṁghika and the Theravāda. In the opinion of Lamotte, the tradition, which holds the five points of Mahādeva as responsible for the schism, is evidently suggestive of a critical attitude of the emerging sect towards the elders who claimed Arahantship to be the highest attainment.[110]

Thus, we get two mutually disagreeing traditions about the great schism and the secession of the Mahāsaṁghikas. A close scrutiny of the traditions, however, brings to light some remarkable points which help us reconcile the two traditions. As regards the first tradition, the *Vinaya* does not make any mention of the schism or the rise of the Mahāsaṁghikas. This significant development is alluded to only by the Ceylonese chronicle *Dīpavaṁsa* which would have us believe that discontented Vajjians, the upholders of the ten un-Vinayic points, proceeded to hold another convention of their own known as the *Mahāsaṁgha*.[111] Even this statement of the *Dīpavaṁsa* implies that the great schism and the rise of the Mahāsaṁghikas took place only after the second Council.[112] If we take the Council of Vaiśālī merely as the background of the great schism, the account of the other Ceylonese chronicle also becomes tangible. According to the Mahāvaṁsa, Kālāśoka was the Magadhan king at the time of the second Council, whose support the Vajjians had tried to enlist. Their move was foiled due to the intervention of the sister of king Kālāśoka.[113]

On the basis of the preceding it seems to follow that there were two Councils held in the second century of Buddha's Nirvāṇa. The first was the Vaiśālī Council attended by 700 monks held during the reign of Kālāśoka to discuss the ten un-Vinayic practices of the Vajjian monks. It was followed after some time by another Council known as the *Mahāsaṁgha* or *Mahāsaṁgīti* attended by 10,000 monks. The great schism as also the rise of the Mahāsaṁghika school seem to have occurred here. It appears that it was in this subsequent Council or the *Mahāsaṁgha* that the first doctrinal controversy arose

in the Buddhist Order, due to the five propositions of Mahādeva resulting in the great schism and the birth of the Mahāsaṁghikas. This will be in agreement with the traditions of Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinītadeva that the original schism arose due to the five points of Mahādeva and not because of the ten un-Vinayic acts of the Vajjians. It may be noted that the mutual discrepancy of the two sets of traditions is reconciled if we accept the above hypothesis.

It may be recalled that the second Buddhist Council was held at Vaiśālī to discuss the ten practices of the Vajjian monks for which not only recognition was categorically refused but these acts were unanimously declared to be un-Vinayic.[114] From the metaphysical point of view, the acts of the Vajjians hardly appear significant. But they do indicate the more liberal attitude of the eastern monks. The Vajjians were a people thoroughly imbued with the democratic traditions and were unlikely to submit to the exclusive powers and privileges claimed by the Arahants.[115] Mrs. Rhys Davids remarks that the real point at issue was the rights of the individual, as well as, those of the provincial communities as against the prescriptions of a centralized hierarchy.[116] Undoubted as the Vajjian monks' liberal views were not acceptable to the orthodox majority, they must have been severely impeached by the latter as indicated by the details of the second Council. Naturally the liberal minded eastern monks were likely to drift away from the orthodox group and their conservative tradition. In Mahādeva they seem to have found an able leader and champion of their viewpoint. Discomfitured, thus, in the second Council, the eastern monks seem to have started, as a reaction, their campaign against the very same Arahants by calling in question their claims and authority and seeking to prove their fallibility.[117] In order to assert their views, it was in the fithess of things for the Vajjian monks to convene a *Mahāsaṁgha* at Pāṭaliputra where they could uphold their innovations with regard to the *Vinaya* and the *Dhamma*.[118] This was most likely to give rise to a major controversy and to originate a schism in the Order.[119] As a result of this, the Order became divided into two sections. On the one hand was the large bulk of the eastern monks

with its stronghold at Vaiśālī and Pāṭaliputra and, on the other, was the section of the western monks stationed at Kauśāmbī, Mathurā and Avanti, a group in which the influence of the old Sthaviras was predominant. These two sections respectively became known as the Mahāsaṁghika and the Theravāda sects of Buddhism. Thus, the eclesiastical cleavage that started in the Council of Vaiśālī due to the *Vinaya* controversy of the Vajjians was ultimately completed after some years in the Council of Pāṭaliputra over the doctrinal controversy initiated by Mahādeva. The Council of Pāṭaliputra was in all probability the same as the *Mahāsaṁgha* of the *Dīpavaṁsa* tradition[120] or the assembly, held some hundred and odd years after the *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, as borne out by the testimony of Bhavya,[121] Vasumitra,[122] Vinītadeva[123] and Yuan Chwang.[124] It is perhaps due to some confusion and discrepancy that the name of the ruling king is sometimes given as Aśoka; otherwise as the first tradition of Bhavya informs us, Nanda or Mahāpadmananda should have been the ruling king of Pāṭaliputra at that time.[125]

EVOLUTION OF THE EARLY BUDDHIST SECTS

The century that rolled in between the second and the third Councils seems to represent one of the most significant phases in the development of Buddhism. In the evolution of the Buddhist sects and schools it is noticed that the 'great schism' in the Saṁgha resulting in the rise of two sects, *i.e.*, Theravāda and Mahāsaṁghika, was followed by a series of schisms leading to the formation of various new sects. The traditional accounts would have us believe that eleven sects originated from the Theravāda and seven sects from the Mahāsaṁghika.[126]

The genesis of these sects as also their inter-relationship has always posed a problem to the scholars. That is so because, 'inset in miscellaneous undated Buddhist works, there are traditional lists of schools and sects, each school supposed to have its own Canon'.[127] These traditions are confused and, at times, contradictory. Some attempts have been made to ascertain the stratification and affiliation of these sects but the problem still seems to be far from clear.[128] It is desirable, therefore, to

analyze the various traditions and attempt an outline of the stratification and affiliation of the early Buddhist sects with the help of other sources, literary or epigraphic, wherever available.

A STUDY OF THE TRADITIONS

On the sects and schools of the Buddhists, different traditions are preserved in the literature of the Theravādins the Sammatīyas, and the Mahāsaṁghikas as also in the subsequent Chinese and Tibetan works and translations. They give divergent accounts about the origin, name and the order of secession of these schools.

The traditional lists, referring to the early Buddhists sects and schools, may be classified into four groups on the basis of two things: (1) generic identity among the concerned sects and (2) general conformity in their traditions : (Group A) *Theravāda traditions* consisting of (*i*) *Dīpavaṁsa* tradition; (*ii*) Sammatīya tradition as preserved by Bhavya in his third list; and (*iii*) Buddhaghosa's tradition as found in the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*. (Group B) *Mahāsaṁghika traditions* consisting of (*i*) *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* and (*ii*) the tradition preserved in the second list of Bhavya. (Group C) *Sarvāstivāda traditions* consisting of (*i*) Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* and (*ii*) the tradition preserved in the first list of Bhavya. (Group D) *Mūla-Sarvāstivāda traditions* consisting of (*i*) I-tsing's and (*ii*) Vinītadeva's traditions.

GROUP A—THERAVĀDA TRADITIONS

According to *Dīpavaṁsa*,[129] the first schism divided the Order into two schools, *viz*., Mahāsaṁghika and Theravāda. The Mahāsaṁghika school was subsequently divided into Gokulikas and Ekabyohārikas. From the Gokulikas emerged the Bahusuttikas and the Paññattis, *i.e*., Bahusuttikas and Paññattivādins respectively.

Another school named Cetiya emerged from the Mahāsaṁghika line. From the line of the elders, *i.e*., the Theravāda school, arose the Mahīśāsakas and the Vajjiputtakas. Fourfold

dissension arose among the Vajjiputtakas resulting in the rise of the Dhammuttarikas, Bhaddayānikas, Channagarikas and Sammitis. The Mahīśāsakas were subsequently divided into the Sabbatthivādins and the Dhammaguttakas. From the Sabbatthivādins originated the Kassapikas, the Saṁkrāntivādins and the Suttavādins. Thus, seventeen schools originated from the original order, six of the Mahāsaṁghika line and eleven from the Theravāda. All these seventeen schools are described as schismatics while the Theravāda is said to be the orthodox school.[130]

The third list of Bhavya, which is said to constitute the Sammatīya tradition[131], agrees fully with the *Dīpavaṁsa* as regards the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools.[132] So far as the Theravāda or Sthaviravāda school is concerned, it was divided, according to the Sammatīya tradition, into two schools, *viz.*, Mūlasthavira and Haimavata. The Mūlasthavira gave rise to the Sarvāstivāda and the Vātsīputrīya. From the Sarvāstivāda emerged the Vibhajjavāda and the Saṅkrāntivāda. The Vibhajjavāda further became divided into the Mahīśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka, the Tāmrasatīya and the Kāśyapīya. The Vātsīputriya, on the other hand, gave rise to the Mahāgirika and the Sammatīya. From the Mahāgirika three other sects originated, *viz.*, the Dharmottara, the Bhadrayānīya and the Sannagarika.[133]

In the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā* of Buddhaghosa, beside the eighteen names enumerated in the *Dīpavaṁsa*, we have reference to certain new sects, *viz.*, the Rājagirika, the Siddhatthika, the Pubbaseliya, the Aparaseliya, the Hemavata, the Vajjariya, the Uttarāpathaka, the Hetuvāda and the Vetullaka.[134] The first four of the above appear to have been the sects of the Andhakas whose names occur in the inscriptions found from the region round about Amarāvatī. The names of the first six sects occur in the *Mahāvaṁsa* as well.[135] The *Dīpavaṁsa* also informs us that six sects, *viz.*, the Hemavatikas, the Rājagirikas, the Siddhatthas, the Pubba and the Aparaselikas and a new Rājagirika arose successively.[136]

GROUP B—MAHĀSAMGHIKA TRADITION

The Mahāsaṁghika tradition about the early Buddhist sects

seems to be partly represented in the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*. This text was translated into Chinese in between A.D. 317 and 420.[137] According to Tārānātha, the Mahāsaṁghika tradition is also preserved in the second list of Bhavya.[138]

According to *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*, the first division resulted in the rise of the Mahāsaṁghika and the Theravāda. Whereas from the Mahāsaṁghika emerged four sects, *viz.*, the Ekavyavahārika, the Lokottaravāda, the Bahuśrutika and the Prajñaptivāda, the Theravāda gave rise to the Vātsīputrīya, the Kāśyapīya, the Sūtravāda or the Saṅkrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda. From the Vātsīputrīyas further emerged four sects, *viz.*, the Dharmopaka, the Bhadrayānika, the Sammatīya and the Sannagarika. Similarly from the Sarvāstivāda there emerged three other, *i.e.*, the Mahīśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka and the Suvarsaka.[139]

According to the second list of Bhavya, the original Order became divided into three schools, *viz.*, the Sthaviravāda, the Mahāsaṁghika and the Vibhajjavāda. From the Sthaviravāda emerged the Sarvāstivāda and the Vātsīputrīya. Whereas the Sarvāstivāda gave rise to the Sautrāntika, the Vātsīputrīya divided into four sects, *i.e.*, the Sammatīya, the Dharmottarīya, the Bhadrayānīya and the Sannagarika. The Mahāsaṁghikas, in their turn, gave rise to the Pūrvaśaila, the Aparaśaila, the Rājagirika, the Haimavata, the Chaitika, the Saddharthika and the Gokulika. From the Vibhajjavāda originated the Mahīśāsaka, the Kāśyapīya, the Dharmaguptaka and the Tāmraśatīya.[140]

A comparison of the two lists would show that, while, according to *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*, there were two initial divisions, the second list of Bhavya suggests three divisions. Apart from this, there is substantial agreement between the two lists regarding other Theravāda sects, save for the insertion of some new names. So far as the Mahāsaṁghika sects are concerned, the tradition of Bhavya mentions some more names which are conspicuous by their absence in the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*.[141] These additional sects of Bhavya tradition, however, reflect its completeness as also its lateness. This also might be true in the case of new names of the Theravāda line. The mention of

Sautrāntika instead of Sūtravādin or Saṅkrāntika seems to re-enforce the suggestion.

GROUP C--SARVĀSTIVĀDA TRADITION

The *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* of Vasumitra preserves the Sarvāstivāda tradition on the evolution of Buddhist sects, which is very well-indicated by the fact that champion as Vasumitra was of the Sarvāstivāda sect, he assigns it a significant position and derives from it all the subsequent sects of the Theravāda line.[142] The texts is available in the Tibetan and Chinese translations, the oldest of which may be assigned to sometime between A.D. 351-431.[143] Bhavya has preserved three lists out of which we have already discussed the second and the third. His first list seems to conform with the Sarvāstivāda tradition as preserved in the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*.[144]

According to the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, the first schools to originate from the Order were the Mahāsaṁghika and the Sthaviravāda. The Mahāsaṁghika school gave rise to the Ekavyāvahārika, the Lokottaravāda, the Kukkutika, the Bahuśrutīya, the Prajñaptivāda, the Caitika, the Aparaśaila and the Uttaraśaila. From the Sthaviravāda arose the Sarvāstivāda and the Haimavata. The Sarvāstivāda became divided into the Vātsīputrīya, the Mahīśāsaka, the Suvarsaka, *i.e.*, the Kāśyapīya and the Sautrāntika or the Saṅkrāntika or the Uttarīya. The Vātsīputrīya school further gave rise to four others, *i.e.*, the Dharmottarīya, the Bhadrayānīya, the Ṡammatīya and the Sannagarika.[145] It is interesting to remark that the tradition of Vasumitra is in substantial agreement with the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā-sūtra* and Bareau has actually grouped it within the Kashmir tradition.[146]

The first list of Bhavya also makes the earliest division into the Mahāsaṁghika and the Sthaviravāda. The Mahāsaṁghika gave rise to the Ekavyavāharika, the Lokottaravāda, the Bahuśrutīya, the Prajñapativāda, the Caitika, the Purvaśaila and the Aparaśaila. And the Sthaviravāda in their turn became divided into the Sarvāstivāda, the Vātsiputrīya, the Dharmottarīya, the Bhadrayānīya, the Sammatīya (*i.e.*, the Avantaka or the Kurukullaka), the Mahīśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka, the Dharmasuvar-

saka and the Uttarīya or the Saṅkrāntivāda.[147] Bhavya omits the Gokulika sect of the Mahāsaṁghika line which seems to have been referred to by Vasumitra as the Kukkuṭika. Bhavya has instead mentioned some new sects of the Theravāda line such as the Muruntaka, the Avantika and the Kurukullaka.

GROUP D—MŪLA-SARVĀSTIVĀDA TRADITION

I-tsing and Vinītadeva are said to represent the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda tradition.[148]

According to I-tsing, the first division resulted in the rise of four schools, *viz.*, the Ārya-Mahāsaṁghika, the Ārya-Sthavira, the Ārya-Mūla-Sarvāstivāda and the Ārya-Sammatīya. From the Ārya-Mūla-Sarvāstivāda school emerged four schools, *viz.*, the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda, the Dharmaguptaka, the Mahīśāsaka and the Kāśyapīya.[149]

Vinītadeva also divides the original order into four schools, *i.e.*, the Mahāsaṁghika, the Sarvāstivāda, the Sthavira and the Sammatīya. The Mahāsaṁghika school gave rise to the Purvaśaila, the Aparaśaila, the Haimavata, the Lokottaravāda and the Prajñaptivāda. The Sarvāstivāda gave rise to the Mūla-Sarvastivāda, the Kāśyapīya, the Mahīśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka, the Bahuśrutīya the Tāmraśatīya and the Vibhajyavāda. The Sthaviravāda gave rise to the Jetavanīya, the Abhayagirivāsin and the Mahāvihāravāsin. And the last one, *i.e.*, the Sammatīya gave rise to the Kurukullaka, the Āvantaka and the Vātsiputrīya.[150]

With the help of the list furnished by Vinītadeva, it is possible to complete the list of I-tsing which does not mention the sub-sects of others except the Mūla-Sarvāstivādins. In Vinītadeva's tradition, however, Haimavata has been included in the Mahāsaṁghika line as we find in the tradition of the Mahāsaṁghikas themselves.

The tradition of the *Mahāvyutpatti* seems to be almost the same as that of Vinītadeva, though there is some difference of opinion about the reading of certain names in the *Mahāvyutpatti*.[151] In the eleventh century Tibetan recension of the *Varsāgrapṛcchāsūtra*, we have a similar tradition about the evolution of various sects, except for the minor alteration in the

cases of the Tāmraśatīya and the Bahuśrutīya which are place under the Sammatīyas instead of the Sarvāstivāda.[152]

STRATIFICATION AND AFFILIATION OF SECTS

The stratification and affiliation of Buddhist sects is rendered obscure due to divergent traditions recorded above. There have been attempts, both early and late, to group and stratify the various sects. An early attempt was made by Tārānātha[153] who would have us believe that (1) the Kāśyapīya and the Suvarsaka were two names of the same sect, (2) the Saṅkrāntivādin, the Uttarīya and the Tāmraśatīya were identical, (3) Mahādeva's followers, the Pūrvaśailas and the Caitikas were also identical, (4) the Lokottaravādin and the Koukkuṭika represent two names of the same sect, (5) the Ekavyāvaharika was nothing but the Mahāsaṁghika, (6) the Kourukullaka, the Vātsīputrīya, the Dharmottarīya, the Bhadrayānīya and the Channagrıka all represent almost identical doctrines. These groupings, as suggested by Tāranatha appear to be arbitrary. He has generally identified those sects which emerged from a common source. But the fact that they emerged from a common source does not imply that they were identical among themselves. Their mention as specific sects speaks of their individuality which is substantiated by their theses and tenets discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*. Among the recent researches, the work of A. Bareau deserves special mention[154] There is, however, some difficulty in commending all his groupings. According to him, (1) the Mahīśāsakas, the Mahāsaṁghikas, the Vibhajavādins (described in the Vibhāṣā), the Dharmaguptakas and the Andhrakas appear to be mutually affiliated, (2) the Theravāda of Ceylon and the Sarvāstivāda of Kashmir form another group, (3) the Vātsīputrīyas and the Sammatīyas have great similarities, (4) Dṛṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas are mutually affiliated as also with the sects of group one.[155] In fact Bareau's affiliation of various sects is based upon his defective methodology in the analysis of the doctrines of various sects ; otherwise he would have hardly suggested a relationship between the Mahāsaṁghikas and the Mahīśāsakas.[156] We know it for certain that the Mahīśāsakas

arose from the Sthaviravāda or the Theravāda and their doctrines differ from that of the Mahāsaṁghikas, although there are one or two theses in the *Kathāvatthu* which, according to Buddhaghosa, were shared by the two sects.[157]

Similarly the Japanese scholar Yamakami Sogen, who has attempted a classification of the systems of Buddhist thought, appears to be arbitrary in his conclusions. It may be observed that all his methods of classification lead to two divisions, *i.e.*, the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna, although he calls them by different names. Even in his classifications, he makes the matter more confusing by dividing the Mahāyāna into partially developed and fully developed groups placing the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins in the first and the Avataṁsaka, the Dhyāna and the Mantra Schools as well as the *Tien-Tai* School of China in the second.[158] However, Sogen's defence lies in the fact that he deals with the developed and later stage of Buddhism identifying the Sarvāstivāda as the sole representative of early Buddhism.

THE MAHĀSAṀGHIKAS AND THEIR SUB-SECTS

From the account of the great schism and the genesis of Buddhist sects, as presented here, it may be concluded that dissensions over the ten points of the *Vinaya*, which shook the Order at the time of Second Council of Vaiśāli, found fulfilment ultimately at the Mahāsaṅgīti of Pāṭaliputra. The Saṁgha became divided into two groups, *viz.*, the Mahāsaṁghikas and the Theravādins.[159] Emerging as a sect, the Mahāsaṁghikas carved out a significant place for themselves by their zeal and enthusiasm. They made alterations in the arrangement and interpretation of the *Sūtra* and *Vinaya* texts.[160] They refused to recognize some portions of the Canon as the Buddha's word *viz.*, *Parivāra*, *Abhidharma*, *Patisambidā*, *Niddesa* and parts of the *Jātaka*.[161] Historically, these adjustments were, perhaps, necessary in view of the new interpretations they sought to make in matters of doctrine and discipline. We gather from Yuan Chwang that the Mahāsaṁghikas had a complete Canon of their own which they divided into five parts, *viz.*, *Sūtra*, *Vinaya*, *Abhidharma*, *Dhārani* and Miscellaneous.[162]

In the beginning, the Mahāsaṁghikas appear to have established centres at Pāṭaliputra and Vaiśālī and from there they spread towards the north and the south. I-tsing found the Mahāsaṁghikas in Magadha and a small number of them in Lāṭa and Sindha (western India) so also in northern, southern and eastern India.[163] The earliest epigraphic evidence about this sect is found in the Mathurā Lion Capital inscription of the time of Śaka Kshatrapa Sodāsa which records that a teacher named Budhila was given a gift so that he might teach the Mahāsaṁghikas.[164] Some other inscriptions of a later date, recovered from the area of the Mathurā, make a mention of this sect.[165] Inscriptions recovered from Nāgārjunikoṇḍa and the cave temples of Karle in Maharashtra suggest these places to be Mahāsaṁghika strongholds.[166] The Mahāsaṁghikas differed widely from other sects on doctrinal matters as also in their rules of discipline,[167] *e.g.*, they wore a yellow robe, the lower part of which was pulled tightly to the left.[168]

However, as the Mahāsaṁghikas were the first seceders from the Order, this tendency appears to have operated further among them and they seem to have soon divided into two sects, *viz.*, the Ekavyāvahārikas and the Gokulikas or the Kukkuṭikas. According to the northern traditions, this happened within the second century of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha.[169]

EKAVYĀVAHĀRIKA

According to Paramārtha, the Ekavyāvahārika sect originated due to a dispute over the Mahāyāna-sūtras.[170] It is, difficult, however, to accept the existence of Mahāyāna-sūtras within the second or the third century of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. Bhavya informs us that the Ekavyāvahārikas were thus known because they believed that the Buddha understands all things (*dharmas*) with a moments mind.[171] It has been suggested that the term vyavahāra in the *Vyāvahārika* is, in fact, speech-oriented (*vāk-paraka*) and it implies those who believed in the comprehensibility of *Dharma* or all *Dharmas* by one or one word alone or by each word.[172] The *Kathāvatthu*-

Aṭṭhakathā does not attribute any views to this sect out of the *Kathāvatthu* theses.

GOKULIKAS OR KUKKUṬIKAS

The Gokulikas of the Theravāda tradition and the Kukkulikas of the northern tradition appear to be the same sect. It seems likely that this sect acquired the denomination Kukkulika or Kukkuṭika owing to the Kukkuṭārāma monastery of Pāṭaliputra which was an early centre of the Mahsaṁghikas.[173] Gradually, the term appears to have been distorted from Kaukkuṭika, Kaukkulika, Kukkulika to Gokulika. It is gathered from the testimony of Tārānātha that the Gokulikas disappeared in between the fourth and the ninth centuries.[174] It is possible that this sect was assimilated completely in the Mahāyāna.[175] The Gokulikas are attributed only one thesis in the *Kathāvatthu* by the commentator, *i.e.*, all conditioned things are like an 'inferno of ashes' (*anodhikatvākukkuḷā*).[176]

LOKOTTARAVĀDA

The *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* and *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* suggest that the Lokottaravāda also had its rise with the Ekavyāvahārikas and the Gokulikas, *i.e.*, within the second century of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa. The Theravāda tradition, however, while it does refer to the last two sects, is silent about the Lokottaravāda. The Sammatīya tradition does not distinguish between the doctrines of the Lokottaravāda and the Ekavyāvahārikas. It is, in fact, difficult to distinguish the main tenets of the Lokottaravāda from the doctrines of other Mahāsaṁghikas.[177] It is probable, therefore, that instead of any doctrinal distinction from other Mahāsaṁghika sects, the Lokottaravādins acquired a separate denomination due to geographical reasons. While the Mahāsaṁghikas originated in the region of Magadha, the Lokottaravādins are known to havē flourished in the north-west.[178] In the tradition of Vasumitra and Vinītadeva, the doctrines of the Lokottaravāda, the Mahāsaṁghika and the Ekavyāvahārika appear to be mutually associated.[179] This appears to strengthen Tārānātha's

view that the Lokottaravāda was identical with the Kaukkuṭika and the Ekavyāvahārika.[180] Bareau[181] and Dutt[182] have identified the Lokottaravāda with the Ekavyāvahārika and the Caityaka respectively. It is likely, therefore, that the Mahāsaṁghikas themselves came to be known subsequently as the Ekavyāvaharika and the Lokottaravādin. Although the *Kathāvatthu* discusses certain theses, which lay down a supernatural conception of the Buddha, the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā* attributes them to different Mahāsaṁghika schools and does not refer to the Lokottaravādins.

BAHUŚRUTĪYAS AND PRAJÑAPTIVĀDINS

The Mahāsaṁghika school vigorously advocated the supramundane nature of the Buddha[183] and the Bodhisattvas and propounded the fallibility of the Arahants.[184] It was logical to ask then for an explanation for such statements in the *Sūtras* which stood against the conception of a supramundane Buddha. In view of this, a distinction between *nītārtha* (profound) and *neyārtha* (superficial) was drawn which laid the basis of the doctrine of a duality of Truth, *i.e.*, relative and Absolute[185] According to Paramārtha, thus, emerged a controversy among the Mahāsaṁghikas which gave rise to two new sects, *i.e.*, the Bahuśrutīyas and the Prajñapativādins.[186] According to the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* and *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, this division took place in the second century of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha,[187] which, however, appears too early a date for their origin. The Bahuśrutīyas are referred to in the inscriptions recovered from the regions of Gandhāra and Andhra.[188] The *Kathāvatthu* does not contain any doctrines of the two schools. According to Paramārtha, the Bahuśrutīyas attempted a syncretism between the doctrines of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna, whereas the Prajñapativādins, in order to distinguish themselves from the Bahuśrutīyas, preferred to be known as the Bahuśrutīya-Vibhajyavādins.[189]

CAITIKA

According to the northern tradition, this sect emerged about

the end of the second century or in the beginning of the third century of the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha.[190] It has been suggested, however, that the origin of Caitikas should be placed in the second century B.C.[191] We owe it to the tradition of Paramārtha that a certain Mahādeva, who was different from the famous Mahādeva, the champion of five points, noted some new tendencies among the Mahāsaṁghikas and retired to the hills along with his followers.[192] Buddhaghosa includes them among the Andhakas or Andhrakas which name seems to have gained currency owing to their stronghold at Amarāvatī in Andhra. The lay-followers of Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunīkoṇḍa were hospitable enough to provide them a large number of *caityas* of which the *Mahācaitya* of Amarāvatī was the foremost. It seems that these Buddhists, the followers of a second Mahādeva, acquired the designation of Caitika due to their association with these *caityas*. Although the *Kathāvatthu* contains the doctrines of the Pūrva and Aparaśailas, as also that of the Andhakas, no thesis is attributed to the Caitikas as such. The school, however, finds mention in several inscriptions.[193]

PŪRVAŚAILA AND APARAŚAILA

The Pūrvaśaila and Aparaśaila sects are known from sufficiently old tradtional references.[194] As in the case of the Caitikas, the inscriptional reference to the Pūrvaśailas has also been found at Nagārjunīkoṇḍa.[195] N. Dutt is inclined to identify the Caitikas and the Pūrvaśailas, on the one hand, with the Caityaśailas and the Uttaraśailas, on the other.[196] It may be observed, however, that apart from the Caitika, the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila sects, the very supposition of the existence of the Caityaśailas and the Uttaraśailas seems to be doubtful. It is only the tradition of Vasumitra which refers to the Uttaraśailas, but then it identifies the Aparaśailas with the Pūrvaśailas.[197] This seems to be a mistake arising out of some confusion as Bhavya took no time in correcting it by distinguishing the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila sects.[198] So far as a separate Caityaśaila sect is concerned, it is not mentioned by any other tradition. What appears to be most

plausible in this case is that the Caitikas themselves became known after some time by these two names, *i.e.*, Pūrvaśaila and Aparaśaila due to their geographical location.[199]

Among the Mahāsaṁghikas of Andhra also emerged the champions of the Vetulyaka, the Rājagirika and the Siddharthika sects, the last two sometime in the third or the fourth century A.D.[200] Thus, the Mahāsaṁghika school and its doctrines initiated by the eastern monks at Pāṭaliputra in the fourth century B.C., reached the country of Aṅdhra by the end of the third century B.C., and flourished there subsequently in the form of various sects. In the course of this evolution, the famous Mahāyāna originated from the Mahāsaṁghika line in about the first century B.C. The Pūrvaśailas, the Aparaśailas, the Rājagirikas, the Siddharthikas and the Vetulyakas appear to have been important sects of their time as would be evident from the fact that the doctrines of all of them are discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*.[201]

THE THERAVĀDA SECTS

Different traditions, as noted here, disagree more over the development of this group of setcs as compared to the Mahāsaṁghikas. They differ over the names, genealogy and affiliations of the various sects that branched off from time to time off the Theravāda mainstream. The Theravāda school was the earliest opponent of the unorthodox Mahāsaṁghikas. Subsequently, while from the Mahāsaṁghika group of school evolved such doctrines as the supramundane concept of Buddha and Bodhisattvas as also the doctrine of Śūnyatā of the Mahāyāna, the Theravāda schools became absorbed into the explication and upholding of the existence of *saṁskṛta* and *asaṁskṛta Dharmas* and thus kept on developing the cardinal points of the *Abhidharma*.

VĀTSĪPUTRĪYA

The first schism in the Theravāda school, giving rise to the Vātsīputrīyas, seems to have occurred at a place not very far from Kauśāmbī. It appears from the confrontation of

the *Dharmadhara* and *Vinayadhara* monks of Kauśāmbī, which came to pass during the lifetime of the Buddha, that the monkish community of that region was prone to schismatic tendencies.[202]

The name Vajjiputtaka of the Pāli tradition is still obscure. It is likely, however, that the Vātsīputrīya may be a mis-sanskritization from the Pāli Vajjiputtaka, or else, the process may have been the other way round. Thus, the sect arose either among the Vajjis or in the Vatsa territory. Their secession from the Theravāda school marks the first schism in this line. The Vātsīputrīyas' central thesis consisted in their upholding the temporary existence of a self (*prajñapatisat-pudgala*) apart from the five *skandhas*.[203] The first cotroversy about the *pudgala* discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* may be the earliest controversy on *pudgala* and the main concern of Moggaliputta Tissa seems to have been to criticize and refute the Vātsīputrīya standpoint at the third Buddhist Council. It would follow logically that Vātsīputrīya sect originated sometime before the third Council which finds support also from the traditional accounts as they establish the rise of this sect within the second century of the demise of the Buddha.[204]

BHADRAYĀNĪYA, DHARMOTTARĪYA AND SANNAGARIKA

Different traditions, noted previously, are almost unanimous on the point that from the Vatsīputrīyas arose four sects, *viz.*, the Bhadrayānīya, the Dharmottariya, the Sammatīya and the Sannagarika. Out of these, the Sammatīya appears to have achieved special distinctions. References to the Bhadrayānīya and Dharmottarīya sects occur in the inscriptions, datable to the second and third centuries A.D., recovered from places like Karle, Sopāraka, Junnār Nāsika and Kanherī.[205] The *Tarkjvāla* of Bhavaviveka makes a combined reference to these sects and says that the Vātsīputrīya Bhadrayānīya, the Dharma-guptas and the Saṁkrāntivādins admitted the reality of the individual.[206] Vasumitra informs us that Dharmottarīya, Bhadrayānīya and Channagarika differed regarding the attainments of an an Arahant and consequently also on the chances of his fall from

Arahanthood.[207] *The Kathāvatthu*, records only one doctrine of the Bhadrayānikas and is silent about the others.[208] The geographical location of these sects strengthens the supposition that the Vātsīputrīya school developed and evolved in the process of the spread of Buddhism from Kauśāmbī towards the Aparānta.[209]

SAMMATĪYAS

Most of the traditions hold that this was the third sect to originate from the Vātsīputrīyas. Bareau attributes the rise of the Sammatīyas to the schism that occurred on account of a dissension over the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* of the Vātsīputrīyas and dates this development somewhere in the first century B.C. or A.D.[210] The followers of this sect regarded Mahākātyāyana to be its propounder. This seems to be the same Mahākātyāyana, who had established the first Buddhist Order in Avanti (*Dakṣiṇāpatha*) and had considered changes in the *Vinaya* to be inevitable in view of the differences in the discipline and behaviour of the local monks.[211] The spread of the Sammatīyas, however, was not localized. Two inscriptions referring to it have been recovered from Mathurā and Sārnāth respectively.[212] The second one, which is a Gupta inscription, states that this school replaced the Sarvāstivādins at Sarnath, who had established themselves there supplanting the Theravādins.[213] According to Yuan Chwang,[214] I-tsing[215] and Vinītadeva,[216] this was the most prominent sect in the Vātsīputrīya group about the seventh century. It is also gathered from Bhavya and Vinītadeva that about this time the sect became divided into two sub-sects *viz.*, Avantaka and Kurukullaka.[217]

MAHĪŚĀSAKAS

This is a disputed issue as to which of the two, *viz.*, the Sarvāstivāda and the Mahīśāsaka, was the older sect that subsequently gave rise to the other. While the *Dīpavaṁsa* affirms the Mahīśāsaka to be the original sect the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* and *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* put it the other way round[218] N. Dutt has pointed out that there were in fact two Mahīśasaka

schools, one earlier and the other later.[219] According to Przyluski, the early Mahīśāsaka sect followed Purāṇa, which seems to find support from the fact that special importance was attached to Purāṇa in the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya.[220] N. Dutt also suggests that the earlier Mahīśāsakas had emerged as a distinct sect soon after the first Council and hence were anterior to even the Mahāsaṁghika sect.[221] There is, however, no basis to believe that the dissent of Purāṇa about the recital of the Canon in the First Council[222] originated a sect. In fact, the silence of *Śariputraparipṛcchasūtra and Samayabhedoparacanacakra* about early Mahīśāsakas would be contrary to this supposition. The Mahīśāsakas seem to have got this name due to their geographical location in Mahisamaṇḍal or Mahismatī, *i.e.*, modern Maheswara on the bank of Narmada[223]. Their reference occurs in the inscriptions found at Nāgarjunīkoṇḍa and Vanavāsi.[224] Fa-hsien discovered their *Vinaya Piṭaka* at Ceylon.[225] I-tsing did not notice them anywhere in the proper sense of the term.[226] It is gathered from the traditions that the Dharmaguptikas originated from the Mahīśāsakas. The commentator of the *Kathāvatthu* has attributed one of its theses to the Mahīśāsaka school and has associated it with several others.[227] Curiously enough, *Kathāvatthu* is silent about this sect.[228]

SARVĀSTIVĀDA

The origin and rise of the Sarvāstivāda is a disputed subject. There seems to be reason in the hypothesis of Przyluski that the groups of monks, belonging to Kauśāmbī, Avanti and Mathurā, who joined Yaśa during the second Council probably project the basis of the subsequent evolution of the Theravāda, the Mahīśāsaka and the Sarvāstivāda sects.[229] It may be noted that these places eventually turned out to be the centres of the three sects respectively. Mathurā seems to have become the first seat of the Sarvāstivādins not long after the second Council and it was from Mathurā that its influence spread over northern India, particularly in Gāndhāra and Kashmir. During the reign of Aśoka, the famous monk Upagupta was the chief of the Saṁgha at Mathurā, and in Kashmir it was Madhyāntika who had introduced and propagated Buddhism in that region.[230]

The geographical expansion of Sarvāstivāda was not limited towards the north only. There is inscriptional testimony to show that it had its centres as far east as Sārnāth and Śrāvastī. The Sarvāstivāda sect finds mention in the Kamasi[231] and Set-Mahet Image[232] inscriptions as also in the inscriptions on the Mathurā Lion Capital.[233] In the Sārnāth inscription, it is stated that the Sarvāstivādins ousted the Theravādins there and that they in turn were replaced by the Sammatīyas in A.D. 300.[234] Fa-hsien noted the existence of this sect at Paṭaliputra and Yuan Chwang discovered them at far-off places such as Kashgar, Koucha, Tamavāsana (Sialkot) and several other places on the northern frontier, in Matipur, Kanauj, a place near Rājagṛha, etc.[235] I-tsing found them in Lāta, Sindha, southern and eastern India, Sumatra, Java China, Central Asia and Cochin-China.[236] It is interesting to note that early traditions are silent about the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda sect and that I-tsing is our first informant about it. This seems to suggest that this sect acquired a status only after the seventh century. The fundamental assertion of the Sarvāstivāda school, *viz*., '*sarvaṁ asti*' has been discussed at a great length in the *Kathāvatthu* [237]

VIBHAJYAVĀDA

About the Vibhajyavādins it is noteworthy that they are not uniformly recorded by the traditions as a distinct sect for any considerable period of time. The *Kathāvatthu* is silent about the Vibhajyavāda school. Some important traditions which refer to them are those of the Sammatīyas and the Mahāsaṁghikas, *i.e.*, the third and second lists of Bhavya. While, according to the Sammatīya tradition, Vibhajyavāda like Saṅkrāntivāda, developed from the Sarvāstivāda sect, the Mahāsaṁghika tradition (second list of Bhavya) would truncate early Buddhism into three schools *i.e.*, the Sthavira, the Mahāsaṁghika and the Vibhajyavāda and would trace the origins of the Mahīśāsaka, the Kāśyapīya, the Dharmaguptaka and the Tāmraśatīya from the last school. It is well-known that at the time of the third Buddhist Council, all true Buddhists are described as Vibhajyavādins.[238] On the contrary, the *Vibhāṣā* of the Sarvāstivādins informs us that the Vibhajyavādins

were heretics opposed to the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas.[239] It is given to understand that they rejected the *Sarvaṁ asti* thesis of the Sarvāstivāda and instead held the view that the past which has not yet produced its fruits and the future do not exist.[240] It was possibly due to their analytical attitude within the general framework of the Sarvāstivādā doctrine that they got the name of Vibhajyavādins or Sarvāstivāda-Vibhajyavādins.

KĀŚYAPĪYAS

It appears from the traditional list that the Kāśyapīya sect arose about the third century of the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha from the Sthavira line precisely from the Sarvāstivāda sect.[241] The tradition of the Sarvāstivādins identifies the Kāśyapīyas with Suvarsaka (Vasumitra) and Dharmasuvarsaka (Bhavya's first list). Inscriptional evidence suggests their existence at Taxila and Bedali, *i.e.*, about 200 kilometres north-west of Taxila during the third century A.D. and at Pālātu-Dherī-Jars near Peshawar during the fifth century.[242] In the seventh century, however, Yuan Chwang and I-tsing noted their fragmentary survival in Uddiyāna, Kharachara and Khotān,[243] which suggests that they had perhaps degenerated and passed into the Mahāyāna school. The *Kathāvatthu* (1.8) discusses their basic assertion that some of the past and future exist.

SANKRĀNTIKA OR SAUTRĀNTIKA OR SŪTRAVĀDIN

Almost all traditions in their final analysis derive the Saṅkrāntikas from the Sarvāstivāda, though there is some discrepancy about the order of their rise as also about their identity with the Sautrāntikas and the Sūtravādins.[244] Vasumitra informs us that in the fourth century of the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha originated the Sautrāntika school which also became known as Saṅkrāntika and Uttarīya.[245] Poussin is inclined to identify the Saṅkrāntikas and the Dārstāntikas,[246] but A. Bareau has cited the references of Vasubandhu and Vibhāṣā where the two sects have been placed distinctly.[247] The *Kathavātthu* is silent about this school. The *Abhidharmakośa* and the treatise of Vasumitra, however, record a number

of doctrines of this school.[248] As the name of the sect suggests, they believed in the transmigration (*Saṅkrānti*) of a substance from one life to another. According to them, out of the five *skandhas* of an individual, there is only one subtle *skandha* which transmigrates, as against the whole of the Pudgala of the Vātsiputrīyas and the Sammatīyas.[249]

TĀMRAŚATĪYAS

The Sammatīyas (third list of Bhavya) and the Mahāsaṁghikas (second list of Bhavya) traditions classify this sect along with three others, *viz.*, the Mahīśāsakas, the Dharmaguptas and the Kāśyapīyas and derive it from Vibhajyavāda. Thus, according to Bhavya, the Tāmraśatīya was a sect distinct from the Sautrāntika. Vinītadeva, however, places it with the Sarvāstivāda group of sects along with the Mahīśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka etc., and says that the Tāmraśatīya was identical with the Sautrāntika. The former classification seems to be untenable. In fact, it is doubtful to assume that Vibhajyavāda developed as a full-fledged school like the Mahāsaṁghika and Theravāda at an early date. It may be added that Tārānātha considered the Tāmraśatīyas as identical with the Saṅkrāntivādins, the Uttarīya, the Sautrāntikas and the Dārṣṭāntikas.[250]

DHARMAGUPTAKAS

All traditions noted here agree that the Dharmaguptakas branched off from the Mahīśāsakas, possibly in the third century of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. It seems that they originated due to a controversy about the nature of the gift given to the Buddha and the Saṁgha.[251] According to Paramārtha, they revered Dharmagupta, a disciple of Mudgalyāyana as their propounder. They also maintained a Canon that had four to five *Piṭakas* including a Bodhisattva *Piṭaka* and a Dhāraṇī *Piṭaka*.[252] We gather from the *Abhidharmakośa* that Dharmaguptakas did not accept the Prātimokṣa rules of the Sarvāstivāda as authoritative on the contention that the original teachings of the Buddha were lost.[253] Przyluski has located this sect in the north-west.[254] Yuan Chwang and

I-tsing noted their existence in Uḍḍiyāna and Central Asia but not on the mainland of India.[255] The *Kathāvatthu* does not notice any doctrine of this school.

THERAVĀDA

It seems from the traditional lists that one of the two earliest schools of Buddhism was known by the name of Thera or Sthaviravāda from which seceded the various sects and schools. Pāli tradition would go as far as to assert that Theravāda was not schismatic.[256] An alternative name that is sometimes given to Theravāda is Vibhajyavāda. Moggaliputta Tissa, the key-figure of the third Council, seems to have been instrumental in the development of this school. His compilation *Kathāvatthu* represents the Theravāda point of view wherein it sought to refute the tenets of other schools.

Theravāda is still a living sect in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Cambodia and Laos. As regards the Ceylonese Theravāda some of the sects of which are referred to in the traditional lists enumerated here, it is difficult to agree with the opinion that the Ceylonese Theravāda was a late derivative from the original Theravāda.[257] In fact, the Ceylonese Theravāda appears to be a very ancient school and reflects the Mūla-Sthaviravāda tradition to a remarkable degree.[258] They reckon their history from the time of Aśoka which is supposed to be the period of the introduction of Buddhism in Ceylon.

It is in the list of Vinītadeva that three sects of the Ceylonese Theravāda, *viz.*, the Jetavanīya, the Abhayagirivāsī and the Mahāvihāravāsī have been enumerated.[259] Yuan Chwang designated the Mahāvihāravāsins as the Hīnayāna Sthaviras and the Abhayagirivāsins as the Mahāyāna Sthaviras.[260] It is likely that the monastery of Abhayagiri remained for some time a centre of the Vetulyakas, the immediate forerunners of the Mahāyāna.[261]

OTHER SECTS MENTIONED BY BUDDHAGHOSA

Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the *Kathāvatthu* refers to certain sects which are conspicuous by their absence in other traditional lists. Beside the eighteen sects mentioned in

the *Dīpavaṁsa*, Buddhaghosa has also mentioned the Rājagirika, the Siddhatthika, the Pubbaseliya, the Aparaseliya, the Haimavata, the Vajjiriya, the Uttarāpathaka, the Hetuvāda and the Vetullaka.[262] He has assigned the first four in the group of Andhaka sects, which is corroborated by the inscriptional evidence suggesting their existence in the region of Amarāvatī in the Andhra.[263] Of these, we have already discussed the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila sects. The rest may be discussed here excepting, however, the Vajjiriya about whom nothing is known beyond their name. It is probable that Vajjiriya stands for a compendious reference to '*Vajra*' sects.

RĀJAGIRIKA AND SIDDHATTHIKA OR SIDDHARTHIKA

Buddhaghosa has put them under the four Andhaka sects. In the Mahāsaṁghika tradition the Rājagirika and the Siddharthika, along with certain others, form the group of sects which is said to originate from the Mahāsaṁghikas.[264] The Rājagirika sect seems to have derived its name from the monastery of Rājagiri which may have been situated somewhere close to Amarāvatī.[265] Siddharthika, on the other hand, possibly denotes Lord Buddha's personal name Siddhārtha. Buddhaghosa has attributed to the Rājagirika and the Siddharthika certain doctrines discussed in the seventh part of the *Kathāvatthu*.[266]

UTTARĀPATHAKA

Save for its name, Buddhaghosa does not enlighten us with any other detail about this sect. In the opinion of Bareau, the Uttarāpathaka region should be taken to signify the areas of Thaneswara and the whole of the Indus basin, *i.e.*, the mountainous tract of the north-west.[267] N. Dutt[268] and B.C. Law[269] would suggest that Uttarāpathaka denoted originally the high road running from Magadha to the north-west but that later on it implied the area west of Pṛthūḍaka (Peoha near Thaneswara) and Punjab including the regions of Kashmir and adjoining hill states beyond the Indus. The Uttarāpathaka appears

to have been an eclectic school upholding doctrines taken from both the Mahāsaṁghika and the Theravāda groups.[270] An analysis of the tenets of this school, as contained in the *Kāthavatthu*, would show that a number of these tenets reflect a tendency towards the Mahāyānic concept of the Buddhist doctrine. On the one hand, the school seeks to elevate the nature of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva,[271] and, on the other, it affirms the shortcomings of the Arahant[272] ideal. It is this school which raises the problem of the nature of 'thusness', *i.e.*, *tathatā* in the *Kathāvatthu.*[273] It seems to us that Buddhaghosa has given the name Uttarāpathaka to the same school that was earlier known as the Lokottaravāda which propounded the transcendental conception of the Buddha. Yuan Chwang noticed the Lokottaravāda school in Bāmiyān[274], which fact also strenghthens the hypothesis that they should have got an alternative name, *i.e.*, Uttarāpathaka in the course of time.

HETUVĀDA

Bhavya (first list) has identified the Hetuvāda with the Sarvāstivada.[275] Buddhaghosa, who refers to this sect in his commentary, attributes to them several theses recorded in the *Kathāvatthu.*[276] Though it is not possible to make out their origin clearly, it seems, however, from their tenets that the Hetuvāda was a sect different from the Sarvāstivāda.

VETULLAKA

Buddhaghosa mentions this sect as the Mahāsuññavādins. He has attributed a docetic thesis to this school as found in the *Kathāvatthu.*[277] The Ceylonese chronicles make mention of the Vetullakas as heretics whom the chroniclers noted at the Abhayagiri monastery of Ceylon.[278] Their name Vetulyaka may be derived from 'Vaipulya' which seems to associate them with the Mahāyāna.[279] The docetic theses of this school essentially tend to the Mahāyānic point of view.

HAIMAVATA

The name of this sect is conspicuous by its absence in some of the traditions such as *Dīpavaṁsa* and *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra.*

Vasumitra identifies Haimavata with the rest of the Sthaviravāda after the secession of the Sarvāstivāda. Sammatīya tradition, however, believes that this was the first sect to have separated from the Sthaviravāda. A little later, Mahāsaṁghika tradition, preserved by Bhavya, as also the tradition of Vinītadeva place the Haimavata with the Mahāsaṁghikas. Buddhaghosa also puts them with the Andhaka sects.[280] Although Vasumitra thinks that the Haimavata doctrine was very much akin to that of the Sarvāstivāda, he attributes to the former, five propositions of Mahādeva which formed the basis of the Mahāsaṃghikas.[281] An interesting reference occurs on a relic casket inscription recovered from Sāñchī wherein it has been said (1) *sapurisasa Kāsapagotasa savahemavatācariyasa* and (2) *sapurisasa gotiputasa Kāsapagotasa savahemavatācariyasa.*[282] This speaks of a certain Gotiput Kāsapagota as the ācariya of the Himalayan countries. Thus, the monks of Kāssapa-gotta seem to have been responsible for the propagation of Buddhism in Himavanta. The preceding inscription appears to imply an early reference to the Haimavatas and perhaps to the Kāśyapīyas also.

On the basis of this, Przyluski has identified the Kāśyapīya and the Haimavata sects.[283] Other scholars also support this identification on the ground that monks of the Kāśyapagotra were the teachers of the Haimavatas.[284] As we analyze the doctrines of this school, as found in the treatise of Vasumitra, it seems, however, that the Haimavata was an eclectic school which upheld certain doctrines both of the Theravāda as well as the Mahāsaṁghika line.[285]

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion over the growth and ramification of the early Buddhist sects and schools, some important conclusions that appear to follow, may be summarized here.

The first remarkable point about the Buddhist sects and schools is that there is an early growth of sectarianism in the community of monks (Saṁgha). In fact, the seeds of these sectarian tendencies clearly go back to the lifetime of the Buddha himself. The episode of Devadatta is an event exem-

plifying this tendency. As may be gleaned from the details of that episode, it seems to reflect the earliest confrontation of rigour *versus* laxity or latitude in matters of discipline which, as we know, subsequently developed into a consistent point of controversy among the different sects of Buddhism. Besides, the existence of the Devadattakas in later times seems to imply that the first actual schism in the Buddhist Order occurred due to Devadatta, *i e*, in the lifetime of the Buddha himself. The Canonical account, though, it furnishes the details of the episode, does not, however, recognize it as a schism in order.

Similarly, if we scrutinize the details of the first Buddhist Council which followed soon after the demise of the Buddha, we observe that the attitudes of Mahākassapa and Purāṇa regarding the authentictiy of the Canon reflect the conflict of personal opinion against Conciliar authority. The issue of dispute again relates to the points of *Vinaya* and perhaps foreshadows the later growth of the Mahīśāsakas, though not their explicit emergence at this time. It has been stated here that Purāṇa, who upheld a dissenting opinion over the recitation of the Canon in the first Council, is later accorded an eminent position in the Mahīśāsaka sect.

The happenings of the second Buddhist Council of Vaiśālī and the *Mahāsaṅgīti* of Pāṭaliputra appear to have ultimately resulted in the great schism in the Buddhist Order leading to its clear-cut division into the Theravāda and the Mahāsaṁgika schools. Thus, roughly about 150 years after the passing away of the Buddha, the first two of the Buddhist sects originated and set into motion a process in the course of which as many as eighteen sects emerged in Buddhism. It seems to us, on the testimony of the *Kathāvatthu*, that most of the early Buddhist sects emerged by the second and third centuries of the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha.

The third Buddhist Council was occasioned by the growth of divergent views and tenets as also a great deal of diversity in the interpretation of the Buddhist doctrines, a development totally unacceptable to the orthodox sections of the monks, especially because it had deleterious repercussions over the actual functioning and organization of the Order which was virtually split up into many discordant elements. In view of

this, the Theravādins proceeded to dispute all those doctrines and tenets which they considered to be non-Buddhistic and alien. They sought to refute all such doctrines by compiling the famous book of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka* called the *Kathāvatthu*. How far the Theravādins succeeded in their venture it is difficult to assess, although, according to their own claims, no doctrine was perhaps left unrefuted. However, it appears from the text of the *Kathāvatthu* that most of the so-called alien views, instead of accepting defeat, claim to have vindicated their own genuineness. Thus, the third Buddhist Council seems to have finally resulted in a parting of ways and to have helped the process of the crystallization of various early Buddhist sects and schools. It is interesting to note that the key sects appear to have arisen and established their strongholds at important Buddhist centres of that age. The Vātsīputrīyas appear to have developed in the Vatsa country and the areas round about it, with Kauśāmbī as its main centre. The Sarvāstivādins found their growing centre at Mathurā and from there they spread to the northern and north-western regions. In the development of Buddhism from Mathurā to the northern and north-western regions, there emerged quite a few sub-sects such as the Kāśyapīyas, the Uttarāpathakas, the Haimavatas, etc., in the evolution of which geographical factors seem to have played a considerable role, as the names of some of these sects suggest. The Mahāsaṁghikas had their growth in the eastern region of Vaiśālī among the Vajjian monks and at Pāṭaliputra and appear to have later spread towards Andhra and Dakṣiṇāpatha. One of their sects found a location in Bāmiyān. The Theravādins appear to have flourished in the region of Avanti and moved southwards to Ceylon. The nearness of Pāli to the Girnar dialect of Aśoka may be recalled in this connection.

It is interesting to observe at this juncture that some of the theses discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* are attributed in the fifth century by Buddhaghosa to some such sects which seem to have emerged later than the time of the compilation of the *Kathāvatthu*. The Vetulyakas, the Hetuvādins, the Pubbaseliyas, the Aparaseliyas, the Rājagirikas, the Siddharthikas, etc., are generally held to belong to a later date. In fact, Buddhaghosa

himself points out that the Andhaka, the Pubbaseliya, the Aparaseliya, the Rājagirika and the Siddharthika schools emerged later.[286] Buddhaghosa in his own time found the Pubbaseliyas, the Aparaseliyas. etc., as derived from the Andhakas. Elsewhere, he again says that six schools arose subsequently, *viz.*, the Hemavatika, the Rājagirika, the Siddhatthika, the Pubbaseliya, the Aparaseliya and the Vajjiriya.[287] It is significant to note that he does not include these sects among the eighteen sects mentioned earlier.[288] Similarly, he does not include the Vetullakas among the eighteen sects. It may, however, be observed that these sects may very well have acquired specific names at a stage later than the emergence of the basic conceptions which were adumbrated by more comprehensive sects earlier. There is nothing to warrant against the hypothesis that the basic doctrines with which they became associated should belong to the actual time of the compilation of the *Kathāvatthu*. The most significant point about these sects lies in their being sub-sects and not principal sects as their parent bodies were. In all probability, the doctrines associated with these so-called late sects were in the beginning, *i.e.*, about the time of the compilation of the *Kathāvatthu*, perhaps in an undifferentiated stage and were thus held by the main sects. Slowly, however, sections within these sects crystallized round the specific doctrines and paved the way for their separation from the parent body. Their existence as specific sects in the time of Buddhaghosa is, therefore, quite likely. It must be remembered in this connection that the *Kathāvatthu* was in any case compiled long before Buddhaghosa and the probable date of the emergence of the late sects named by him. Our hypothesis would reconcile the validity of Buddhaghosa's attribution with the fact that the whole Canon was written down in Ceylon in the first century B.C. It would also, at the same time, go to validate the tradition about the composition of the *Kathāvatthu*.

As regards the problem of affiliation among the different sects, basically, two lines of development may be observed, *viz.*, the Theravāda and the Mahāsaṁghika. The essential homogeneity in the basic tenets of the Theravāda sects seems to sustain the hypothesis that the seeds of some of them had be-

come manifest prior to the division of the Buddhist Order into the Theravāda and the Mahāsaṁghika sects. And the fact that they still happened to differ mutually owes its development to the inherent possibilities of difference in the interpretation of the Buddha's gospel in the process of which they propagated cardinal doctrines of their own.

As regards the basic conformity in the attitude of the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools. it may be pointed out that they were tending towards the evolution of a new phase of Buddhism, *viz.*, Mahāyāna, and thus a considerable number of their major doctrines are found to reflect a transitional stage from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna. The basic motivation behind this tendency was the apotheosis of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva and the corresponding abasement of the Arahant. This tendency has some parallel, emotive rather than conceptual, to the doctrine of *Avatāra* growing up in the Bhakti cults.

The doctrinal differentiation of the more orthodox sects appears to have occurred in the course of the effort to evolve more precise definitions and classification of 'phenomena' (*'dharmas'*). Such 'analysis' is the central task of *Abhidharma* of which the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda Canons give us perfected examples. The main cleavage between these two occurred over the ancient and inevitable problem of the relationship of change to permanence. It may be noted that the Mahāyāna (arising from the Mahāsaṁghikas) avoids this dilemma by refusing to concede the reality of the Dharmas themselves. The Mahāsamghikas already evidence their idealistic tendency by emphasizing *Dharmatā* more than the *Dharmas*, thus multiplying the number of *asaṁkhatas*.

While accepting the more realistic tendency of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, the Vātsīputrīyas departed from this by seeking to be more consistent to the facts of experience on the subject of the Person (*Puggala*) without jettisoning the principle of impermanence as applied to 'spiritual substance' or psychic reality.

REFERENCES

1. The two terms i.e., *nikāya* and *ācariyakula* or *ācariyavāda* occur both in the literature as well as inscriptions. Cf. Malalasekera, *Encyclopadia of Buddhism*, Fas. 2, p. 163. s. v. *Mcariyavāda*; *PTS. Dictionary*, s. v. *ācariya.*
2. A. Bareau, *Les Sectes Boudhiques du Pitit Vehicule*, Introduction, p, 7.
3. See Malalasekera, *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, Fas. 2, p. 163. s.v. *Mcariyavāda.*
4. Malalasekara, *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, Cf *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭha kathā*, pp. 2ff ; *Samantapāsādikā*, I, pp. 223-234 ; *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 51 ; *Mahāvaṁsa*, V.3ff , see also Eng. Trans. by W.Geiger, p. 26n.
5. After describing the secession of the different sects the *Dīpavaṁsa* closes the account (V. 54) with the remark— *ācaariyavādaṁ nitthitaṁ*, i.e., 'here ends the section on the schools founded by the teachers' ; see also *Mahāvaṁsa*, the comment at the end of V. 13.
6. Vasumitra and Bhavya have traced several sects from the personal names of the teachers such as Bahuśrutīyas, Dharmottarīyas, etc. ; See *Points of Controversy*, Prefatory Notes, p. XLIV.
7. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 51-53; *Mahāvaṁsa*, V. 1-13.
8. T.W. Rhys Davids, *ERE*, Vol. XI, pp. 307-8, s.v. Sects (Buddhist).
9. Poussin, *ERE*, Vol. IV, p. 182, s.v. Councils. Cf. Frauwallner, op. cit., pp. 7ff.
10. The following sects are specifically mentioned in the inscriptions, Mahāsaṁghikas Bahuśrūtiyas, Caitaka, Aparaśaila Pūrvaśaila, Rājagirika, Siddharthika, Sarvāstivādin, Mahīśāsaka, Kāśyapīya. Vātśīputrīya, Sammatīya, Dharmottarīya, Bhadrayānīya; for details see infra where individual sects have been discussed ; see also Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* pp. 34-40 ; E. Lamotte, *Historie du Buddhisme Indien*, pp. 578-84.
11. See Sāñchī relic casket inscription in *Luders List* Nos. 156, 158 ; Cf. Marshall, *Monuments of Sānchī*. p. 295 ; *JRAS*, 1905, p. 691 ; D.R. Bhandarkar, *Aśoka* pp. 144-145 ; see also infra.
12. Cf. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 39ff; *Mahāvaṁsa*, V, Masuda, op. cit., pp. 14-18 ; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, 167f, 172f, 192.
13. I-tsing refers to differences in clothing among the sects ; see Takakusu, *I-tsing*, pp. 66-7.
14. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V.
15. Cf. e.g., *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, p. p. 9, 58, ; *Majjhimo Niākya*, II, p. 47.
16. *Cullavagga*, chapter VII.
17. *Cullavagga*, pp. 299, 307 ; Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, IV, p. 157.
18. see *Cullavagga*, p. 307ff.
19. *Cullavagga*, pp. 170-2.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 305-6.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
22. Such functions as *Uposatha*, *Parivāsa* and *Samghakamma* would be held independently; Cf. *Cullavagga*, p. 306; see aiso, *Mahāvagga*, p. 370.
23. Cf. *Vinaya Texts* (SBE), Pt. III, p. 271n.
24. *Cullavagha*, p. 299ff, of *Milindapañho*, p. 111.
25. S. Dutt, *The Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 125.
26. *Majjhiṁa Nikāya*, I. p. 256.
27. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 222.
28. Ibid., p. 222.
29. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, pp. 38ff.
30. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 32.
31. Ibid., II, p. 73.
32. Ibid., III. pp. 44-5.
33. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, pp. 96-7.
34. Ibid., II, pp. 118-19.
35. Ibid., II, p. 118.
36. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 36ff.
37. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, pp. 37-38 ; *Dīgha Nīkāya*, III, pp. 167-8.
38. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, pp. 168-9.
39. See *Dialogues of Buddha*, Vol. III, *Saṅgīti Sutta*, Intro., p. 200.
40. *Cullavagga*, pp. 408-409 ; see also *Mahāvaṁsa*, III, 30-6.
41. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 38
42. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, pp. 4-5.
43. *Majjhima Nikāya* I, pp. 96-7.
44. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 182ff.
45. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, pp. 181-2.
46. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 174ff.
47. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*. I. P. 174 ; see *Middle Length Sayings*, I. p. 167.
48. Ibid., I, p. 315.
49. *Majjhima Nikāva*, I. p. 317.
50. Ibid., II, pp. 374-5.
51. See *Mahāvagga*, pp. 368ff ; *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Kosāmbīsutta*, pp. 393-8 ; *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā-Kosāmbīvatthu*.
52. Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 6n.
53. Cf. e.g., *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, pp. 46-47.
54. *Cullavagga*, pp. 300-2.
55. N.Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 6.
56. Malalasekera, *DPPM*, Vol. I. p. 810, s.v. *Gotamaka*.
57. H.A. Giles. *The Travells of Fa-hsien* (*399-414 A.D.*) *or Records of the Buddhistic Kingdoms*, p. 35-36.
58. *Cullavagga*, p. 406.
59. Ibid.
60. On the first Buddhist Council see *Cullavagga* p. 411-12 ; *Mahāvaṁsa*, III ; *Dīpavaṁsa*, IV ; W.W. Rockhill, *Life of Buddha*, pp. 148ff ; Thomas Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, II, pp. 159-161 ;

S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki*, op. cit., pp. 379ff ; Minayeff, *Recherches sur le Bouddhisme* ; Oldenberg, *ZDMG*. pp. 613-94 ; Franke, *JPTS*, 1908, pp. 1.80 ; Poussin, *ERE*, Vol IV, pp. 180ff ; *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 37, 1908, pp, 1-18 ; G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, pp. 155-59 ; N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. I, pp. 324-40 ; Prazyluski, *Le Concile de Rājagṛha* ; Frauwallner, op. cit.

61. Cf. Oldenberg, *ZDMG*, 1898, 613-32 ; Franke, op. cit.
62. Cf. *ZDMC*, 1880, pp. 184ff.
63. *Dīgh Nikāya*, II, p. 118.
64. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 156.
65. *Cullavagga*, p. 409.
66. Ibid., pp. 409-11.
67. *Cullavagga*, p. 410.
68. Ibid., pp 410-11.
69. Ibid., p. 412.
70. Cf. Przyluski, op. cit., pp. 144-8.
71. N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. II, p. 11.
72. *Cullavagga*, p. 412.
73. Prazyluski, op. cit. ; N. Dutt, *EMB*. Vol. II, p. 11.
74. On second Buddhist Council see G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 169-175 ; N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, 31-46 ; Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, op. cit., pp. 171-80, Obermiller, *IHQ*, 1932, (Bu-ston), *History of Buddhism*, Vol. II, pp. 96ff ; Masuda, op. cit., pp. 14ff ; Walleser. *Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus*; Wassilijew, *Der Buddhismus*, Vol. I; Frauwallner, op. cit ; Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* ; Poussin, *ERE*, Vol. IV. ; s.v. Councils ; *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 37. p. 86ff.
75. P.V. Bapat, (*2500 years of Buddhism*, pp. 41-4.
76. See Watters, op. cit., I. pp. 20-1.
77. Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. II, p. 32,
78. See *Cullavagga*, p. 416; *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV. 9ff. *Dīpavaṁsa*, IV. 52; V 18.
79. Cf, *Cullavagga*, pp. 416-17 ; *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV, 16-17.
80. Ibid. p. 420 ; *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV. 18.
81. *Cullavagga*, p. 423 ; Cf. *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV. 21ff.
82. *Cullavagga*. p. 424.
83. Ibid., pp. 424-5.
84. Cf. *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV, 37ff.
85. *Cullauagga*, p. 424.
86. *Cullavagga*, p. 427 ; *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV. 46-7.
87. Ibid., pp. 427-8 ; See also *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV. 48ff ; *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 21ff.
88. The process of *Ubbāhikā* or refrendum is explained in the *Cullavagga*, pp. 180 see also *Books of the Discipline*, Pt. V, pp. 128-129.
89. *Cullavagga*, p. 429 ; Cf. *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV. 53-5.
90. Ibid., p. 430.
91. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 30ff.

92. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 30ff.
93. Cf. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V, 33-6.
94. Ibid., V. 37-8.
95. Cf. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 174.
96. See Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 172.
97. Ibid., Pt. II, pp. 167-8.
98. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 14.
99. Cf. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Boudhiques*, Pt. II, p. 192.
100. See Watters, op. cit., I, p. 267.
101. Ibid., II, pp. 159-60; see also S. Beal, op. cit., pp. 190, 380-1.
102. See author's article on '*Religious Conviction of Asoka*' in the *University of Rajasthan Studies* (*History*) 1965-66, pp. 12-13.
103. Cf. Watters, op. cit., pp. 267-8.
104. Cf. Poussin, *The Five Points of Mahādeva*, *JRAS*, 1910, pp. 414ff; E. Lemotte, *Buddhist Controversy over the Five Propositions*, *IHQ*, Vol. 32, 1956, pp. 148-62.
105. Cf. *Atthi arahato rāgo ti?*, *Kathāvatthu*, II. 1.
106. Cf. *Atthi arahato aññānantic*? Ibid., II. 2.
107. Cf. *Atthi arahato kaṅkhā ti* ? *Kathāvattha*, II. 3.
108. Cf. *Atthi arahato paravitāraṇāti* ? Ibid., II. 4.
109. See Ibid., II, 5. 6; XI. 4.
110. See Lamotte, *Buddhist Controversy over the Five Propositions*, *IHQ*, Vol. 32, 1956, p. 161.
111. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 30-1.
112. See also Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 7.
113. *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV. 31ff.
114. See *Cullavagga*, pp. 428-30.
115. N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. II, pp. 43-4.
116. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Sākya*, p. 355; Cf. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 559-60.
117. Cf. *Parihāyati arahā arahattā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, p. 77 ; see infra.
118. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V, 33-7.
119. See Yamakami Sogen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, op. cit., p. 5.
120. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 30-31.
121. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, pp. 168, 172.
122. Masuda, op. cit., p. 14.
123. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, p. 192.
124. Cf. Watters, I, p. 267.
125. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, p. 172.
126. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 39-54; See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 14-17; Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 27-29. Cf. Takakusu, *I-tsing*, Introduction, pp. xiii-xiv.
127. S. Dutt, *The Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 137.
128. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, Sogen, op. cit., N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. II.
129. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 39-48, Cf. Oldenberg, *Dīpavaṁsa*, Introduction, pp. 8-9.

130. *Dīpavaṁsa* V. 51.
131. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 17; Cf. Poussin, *JRAS*, 1910, p. 413.
132. The only minor alteration we notice is that instead of Cetiya, Bhavya refers to Caitika as the last seceder from the Mahāsaṁghika line.
133. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, op. cit., p. 17.
134. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 2-5.
135. *Mahāvaṁsa*, V. 12-13.
136. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 54.
137. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 17.
138. Tārānātā (trans. Schiefner), p. 49.
139. See Bareau, *Les Sectes Buoddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, ibid., p. 117; see aslo Walleser, *Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus*, pp. 49-50. see also G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 177.
140. See Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 17.
141. The *Śāriputraparipṛccahāsutra* tradition is also described as the Kashmir tradition. We have another Kashmir tradition in the *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsutra*, See Bareau *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, ibid. pp. 17-19.
142. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 18.
143. See G. C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 179; see also Masuda, op. cit., pp. 1-8.
144. See Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 167. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 20- 21.
145. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 15-17.
146. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 17-18.
147. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
148. Cf. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
149. See Takakusu, *I-tsing*, General Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxiv.
150. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 192.
151. See Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 20; see also G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 180; E.J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, Appendix II, p. 289.
152. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 26-7.
153. See Tārānātha, op. cit., pp. 270-71.
154. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*,
155. Ibid., Appendix II, pp. 290-95.
156. Ibid, pp. 291-92.
157. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 123; Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. xxiv.
158. Y. Sogen, op. cit., pp. 1ff.
159. *Dīpavaṁsa*, IV. 39-40.
160. See *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 36.
161. Cf. *Dīpavaṁsa*, V. 32-38.
162. Watters, II, p. 160; see also Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 4.
163. Takakusu *I-tsing*, pp. xxiii-xxiv, 7; Cf. Watters, op. cit., Vol.I, p. 269.

164. *CII*, II, i, p. 48.
165. Cf. *CII*, II, i, p. 170; *EI*, XXX, pp. 183-84.
166. Cf. *EI*, VIII, p. 71; Luders List No. 1106.
167. Cf. R. Kimura, '*Introduction to the History of Early Buddhist School*', in *Sir Ashutosh Mookerji Silver Jubilee Volume* III, pp. 3, 126.
168. Takakusu, *I-tsing*, pp. 66-7.
169. Masuda, op. cit., p. 15; Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhique du Petit Véhicule*, p. 32.
170. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhioule*, pp. 32, 78.
171. Cf. Ibid., p. 78; see also Masuda, op. cit., p. 20; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, p. 193.
172. G.C. Pande, *BDVI* pp. 182-83.
173. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 79.
174. Tārānātha op. cit., pp. 175, 274.
175. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 80.
176. *Kathāvatthu*, II. 8; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 57-8.
177. Cf. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 182.
178. Watters, op. cit., Vol. I, 116-20.
179. Cf. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 18ff; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhique*, pt. II, pp. 192ff.
180. Tārānātha, op. cit., p. 273.
181. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhjques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 75.
182. N. Dutt, *EMB* Vol. II, p. 105.
184. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 35; Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, I. 2.
185. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 183.
186. See Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 84.
187. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 32.
188. See Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, p. 580; Cf. *EI*, Vol. XX, 1929-1930, p. 24; Vol. XXI, 1931, pp. 62-63.
189. Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II. p. 108.
190. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicules*, pp. 32, 87.
191. Cf. Lamotte, *Historic du Bouddhiques Indien*, pp. 309-10.
192. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 32-3. 87; Cf. Demieville, *L.'orgine des Sectes Bouddhiques d'aprés Parmārtha*, pp. 22, 51-2.
193. Cf. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, pp. 580-81.
194. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 87ff; Walleser, op. c t., p. 31; Masuda, op. cit., p. 15.
195. See Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, pp. 580-81; see also *EI*, Vol. XX, 1929-1930, pp. 214-15.
196. N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. II, pp. 105-6.
197. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 15; see supra.
198. See Bareau, *Trois Traités Sur les Sectes Bouddhiqus*, Pt. II, p. 168; see also supra.
199. Cf. Watters, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 214.

200. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 184.
201. See infra.
202. See supra.
203. See infra chapter VIII.
204. See supra.
205. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 127-8.
206. See Obermiller, *Analysis*, III, p. 380.
207. Cf. Masuda, op. cit., p. 57.
208. See *Kathāvatthu*, II. 9; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 58.
209. Cf. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 185.
210. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 121.
211. Cf. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 185.
212. See *EI*, Vol. VIII, 1905-6, p. 172, Vol. XIX, 1927-8, p. 67.
213. *EI*, Vol. VIII, 1905-6, p. 172.
214. Watters, op. cit., I, pp. 227, 331, 333, 359, 373; II, pp. 1, 47, 191, 242, 247, 252, 256, 258-9.
215. Takakusu, *I-tsing*, p. xxivn.
216. Cf. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*. Pt. II, p. 200.
217. See Ibid., Pt. II, p. 168.
218. See supra.
219. N. Dutt, *EMB;* Vol. II, p. 111.
220. Przyluski, op. cit., pp. 319ff.
221. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 112.
222. Cf. *Cullavagga*, pp. 411-12; see also supra.
223. Przyluski, op. cit., pp. 322.
224. See *EI*. Vol. XX, 1929-30, p. 25.
225. Legge, *A record of the Buddhistic Kingdoms*, p. 111.
226. See Takakusu, *I-tsing*, pp. xxiv. 7.
227. See *Kāthāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 60, 90, 92, 111, 123. 1(0, 173, 181, 186.
228. N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. II, p. 114.
229. Przyluski, op. cit., p. 302.
230. *Mahāvaṁsa*, V. 206-207 ; see also Watters, op. cit., I, p. 269.
231. *EI*, Vol. II, p. 212.
232. *EI*, Vol. VIII, p. 111 ; IX, p. 29.
233. *EI*, Vol. IX, p. 135.
234. *EI*, Vol. VIII, p. 172.
235. See Takakusu in *JPTS*, 1904-05, p. 71 ; Legge, op. cit., p. 99; see also *JRAS*. 1891, p. 420.
236. Takakusu, *I-tsing*, pp. xxi, xxiv.
237. See infra.
238. *Mahāvaṁsa*, V. 272.
239. See Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 167-8.
240. N. Dutt, *EMB*, Vol. II, p. 196 ; Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, I. 3.
241. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
242. See Sten Konow. *CII*. Vol. II, Pt. I, *Kharoṣṭī Inscriptions*, pp. 88 ff.

243. Cf. Watters, op. cit. I, p. 226 ; Takakusu, *I-tsing*, pp, xxiv, 20; Tārānātha, op. cit., p. 175.
244. See supra.
245. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
246. Poussin, *Abhidharmakośa*, Introduction, pp, lii-lv; see also Tārānātha, op. cit., p. 274.
247. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 160.
248. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter II, IV, VIII ; Masuda, pp. 67-6,9
249. Cf. N. Dutt, EMB, pp. 166-67.
250. Tārānātha, op. cit., pp. 273-74.
251. See Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 190; Cf. Przyluski, op. cit., pp. 325-36.
252. Demieville, op. cit., pp. 32, 61-62.
253. See *Abhidharmakośa*, IV. 39.
254. Przyluski, op. cit. p. 236.
255. See Watters, op. cit.; I, p, 226 ; Takakusu, *I-tsing*, pp. xxiv, 7.
256. See *Dīpavaṁsa*, V, 51 ; *Mahāvaṁsa*, V. 3ff ; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 2ff.
257. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 205.
258. See G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 187.
259. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 192 ; Cf. *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 241-42.
260. Watters, op. cit., II, pp. 234-5.
261. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, pp. 200-201.
262. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 5.
263. See Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 16.
264. See Supra.
265. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 106,
266. See *Kathāvatthu*. VII, 1-6, XVII. 2-3.
267. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 247.
268. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 171.
269. B.C. Law, *Geography of Early Buddhism*, p. 85.
270. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p, 172.
271. See *Kathāvatthu*, IV. 6-7; XVIII. 3; XXIII. 3, etc.
272. See *Ibid.*, XXIII-2.
273. *Kathāvatthu*, XIX. 5.
274. Watters, op-cit., I, p. 116.
275. Bareau, *Trois Traites sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 168.
276. See *Kathāvatthu*, XV. 5, 7, 10; XVI. 3, XVII. 4-5, XIX. 8, XX; 2, XXIII. 5.
277. Cf, *Ibid.*, XVII. 6-10, XVIII. 1.
278. *Dīpavaṁsa*, XXII. 45, *Mahāvaṁsa*, XXXVI. 46.
279. See G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 297n.
280. See supra for different traditional accounts.
281. Masuda, op. cit., p. 52.

282. See Sañchi Relic Casket inscription in *Luders List*, Nos, 156, 158, Cr. Marshall, *Monuments of Sañchi*. p. 295, *JRAS*, 1805, p. 691, D.R. Bhandarkar, op. cit., pp. 144-5.
283. Przyluski, op. cit., pp. 317-18.
284. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 187.
285. Cf. Masuda, op. cit., p. 52.
286. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhahathā*, p. 52.
287. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
288. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

3

The Ideal of Arahant: Challenge and Defence

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The concept of Arahanthood forms a significant issue of debate in the *Kathāvatthu.* The text discusses several theses propounded by different sects. A close scrutiny would show that a remarkable number of these theses were in the nature of an impeachment of the Arahants. It seems that through these theses some of the early Buddhist sects were seeking to establish the possibilities of imperfection of an Arahant. It is interesting to go through the various misgivings that came to be woven round the ideal man of early Buddhism. Arahant is the title given to the perfect man in Buddhism. As regards the etymology of the term Arahant or Arhat (Sanskrit) the Buddhists seem to derive it from two words, *viz.*, '*Ari*', *i.e.*, 'enemy' and '*han*', *i.e.*, 'to kill' and thus the term stands for 'a slayer of the enemy', the enemy obviously being the passions.[1] Some modern scholars, however, prefer to derive this term from '*Arhati*', *i.e.*, 'to be worthy of' or deserving and worthy of worship and gifts.[2] It seems that originally Arahant was a popular appellation given to the ascetics.[3] In Buddhism, it assumed a technical significance as denoting only the fully and finally emancipated saints.[4] The Buddha is generally called an Arahant. In the earliest Buddhist usage,

Buddhahood and Arahanthood were so closely allied that it is difficult to draw any significant distinction between the two.[5]

The Canonical texts lay down in various formulae the qualities which go to make Arahantship. An Arahant is described as one who is in possession of the excellent goal, free from attachment, hatred and delusion, in short all impurities, relieved of burden of *khandhas*, accomplished in all that is to be accomplished and devoid of any future existence.[6] The Arahant is one in whom the intoxicants or outflows, *i.e.*, sense desire, becoming, ignorance, wrong views are destroyed, who has lived the life, who has done his task, who has laid down his burden, who has attained salvation, etc.[7] Similarly, it is said that an Arahant is 'alone, secluded, earnest, zealous, master of himself'.[8] He exerted himself and realized that the circle of 'Birth-and-Death' (*jarā-maraṇa*), with its 'Five Constituents' (*skandhas*) is in constant flux. He abandoned all the defilements and won Arahantship. On becoming an Arahant he lost all his attachment to the World. He has obtained 'Gnosis' the 'super-knowledge' and the 'Powers of Analytical Insight'.[9] Thus, he is supposed to be possessed of both *Kṣayajñāna*, *i.e.*, the knowledge that he has no more *kleśas* and *anutpādajñāna*, i.e., the knowledge that he will have no more rebirth.[10]

This is, in short, the image of an Arahant as preserved in the early Canonical texts. It is this image of the Arahant which the Theravāda section of Buddhists cherished and commended. According to them, an Arahant has acquired the clear vision about the origin and destruction of things, got rid of all doubts (*kaṅkhā*) about the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, non-existence of soul and the theory of causation.[11] He has seen things for himself unaided by others[12], and has attained *bodhi* which is, however, *catumaggañāna* (knowledge of the Four Paths) and not *sabbaññutañāna* (omniscience)—the *bodhi* of the Buddhas.[13]

Gradually, however, there emerged several outstanding disputes over the concept of Arahant and the quality of perfection achieved in Arahanthood. It is borne out by the account of *Kathāvatthu* that a variety of such views came to be held by a section of Buddhists which postulated the possibilities of imperfection in the personality of the Arahants. This new movement was bound to tarnish the image of the ideal saint of the orthodox Buddhists for whom he was a perfect being with no

chance whatsoever of a fall from Arahanthood. It is in this strain that the orthodox Theravāda Buddhists take up the different theses about the Arahant for discussion and dispute in the *Kathāvatthu.* Some of these so-called heterodox views are recorded also in the treatises of Vasumitra,[14] Bhavya[15] and Vinītadeva.[16] Occasionally, the *Abhidharmakośa*[17] provides valuable insights into some of them.

The impact of the five points of Mahādeva on the early Buddhist Order has been discussed previously.[18] It may be recalled that the very same points of Mahādeva as enumerated in the accounts of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva gave rise to the first doctrinal controversy among the Buddhists and occasioned the great schism in the Order resulting in its division into two, *i.e.*, the Mahāsaṁghika and the Theravāda. Four out of the five points advocated by Mahādeva rendered a stunning blow to the orthodox concept of Arahant as it appears in the *Nikāyas* and other Pāli texts. Mahādeva, through these points, formulated the significant failings of the Arahant. Vasumitra's treatise enumerates the failings thus:[19]

1. Arahant can be tempted by others.
2. They still have ignorance.
3. They still have doubt.
4. They gain knowledge through the help of others.

Curiously enough, the *Kathāvatthu* picks up all these theses for debate and discusses them in considerable detail. They are recorded in the *Kathāvatthu* thus:

1. Arahant has impure discharge, *i.e.*, he may be subject to unconscious temptations.[20]
2. Arahant may lack knowledge, that is to say, one may be an Arahant and not know it.[21]
3. Arahant may have doubts on matters of doctrine.[22]
4. Arahant is excelled by others, *i.e.*, one cannot attain Arahanthood without the help of others.[23]

The *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā* attributes these views to the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas.[24] In the treatise of Vasumitra, however, these views are attributed to almost all the Mahāsaṁ-

ghikas as also some of the Theravāda sects.[25] Bhavya and Vinītadeva also corroborate the tradition of Vasumitra [26] It is tempting to deduce that the cause of Mahādeva's movement may have subsequently become identified with the Mahāsaṁghikas in direct antagonism to the Theravāda upholding an authoritarian cult of Arahants

This unorthodox movement was criticized and opposed with equal vehemence by the Theravādins who defended their notion of the perfection and supremacy of the Arahant ideal. It was not long after the heresy of Mahādeva that the disputes on Arahanthood assumed greater proportions and gave rise to certain deeper controversies of paramount importance. There emerged some central issues of debate, *viz.*, whether or not an Arahant is liable to fall from Arahanthood? Again, is Arahanthood identical with lasting emancipation or not?[27] Similarly, there arose some other vital controversies on Arahant, such as the comparison between the perfection of an Arahant and the omniscience of the Buddha[28] and so on. We may discuss the basic arguments in the controversies on Arahant as they appear in the *Kathāvatthu.*

THESES AND ARGUMENTS

FALLIBILITY OF AN ARAHANT

The first Arahant controversy in the *Kathāvatthu* rests over a significant assertion that an Arahant can fall away from Arahanthood.[29] According to Buddhaghosa, this assertion was shared by the Sammitīyas, Vajjiputtiyas, Sabbatthivādins and some of the Mahāsaṁghikas.[30]

As regards the identification of the fourth, *viz.*, a section of the Mahāsaṁghikas there seems to be some confusion owing to different traditions at our disposal. In the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva the theses about the four failings of the Arahant, as noted here, are attributed to the Mahāsaṁghikas as well as their sub-sects.[31] But when it amounts to a more vital issue, *viz.*, whether an Arahant can fall from Arahanthood, these treatises point out that the Mahāsaṁghikas and some of their sub-sects such as the Ekavyāvaharikas, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkuṭikas

did not subscribe to this view. Instead, according to Vasumitra, they held the opposite view that a *Śrotāpanna* has a chance to retrogress while an Arahant has not.[32] Vasumitra however attributes the thesis about the fallibility of Arahants to the Sarvāstivādins and some other sects.[33] It is likely that this general reference to some other sects denotes the Śaila schools of the Mahāsaṁghika group.[34] This surmise is strengthened by the argument that Śaila schools broke away from the Mahāsaṁghikas owing to a second Mahādeva.[35] This second Mahādeva seems to have carried the implication of the theses of first Mahādeva to their logical conclusion that the Arahant, who is subject to such basic failings, is ultimately liable to fall away from Arahanthood. As other Mahāsaṁghikas may not have assented to this vital assertion, the followers of second Mahādeva had to part company and move to the Śaila hills. It is not unlikely that their leader became known as the second Mahādeva just because he carried out a campaign against the ideal of the Arahant as had been done by an earlier Mahādeva.[36] It is probable, therefore, that Buddhaghosa had in mind this Śaila group of sects when he refers to a section of the Mahāsaṁghikas.

In the *Kathāvatthu*, the Theravādins initiate the debate on the present issue and point out that the thesis that an Arahant may fall away must also imply the following: (1) that he may fall away everywhere; (2) at all times; (3) that all Arahants are liable to fall away and (4) that an Arahant is liable to fall away not only from Arahantship, but from all the four Path-fruitions.[37] According to Buddhaghosa, the proponents make some discrimination in replying to these points. As regards the first point, they would not admit that an Arahant, who having gradually fallen, stands on the fruition of stream-winner, can fall away.[38] But they would admit it with regard to one who stands on sensuous existence, because, his taking pleasure in worldly activity, and so on are of the nature of decay.[39] The second point refers to time. The proponents do not admit the possibility of falling away when there is proper attention. But there may be falling away owing to distracted attention.[40] Referring to the third question, they reject it because there can be no falling away unless the conditions thereof are combined,.

but once the conditions are created, there may be a falling away.[41] Similarly, with regard to the fourth point, they reject it in respect of acute faculties (*tikhindriya*) but admit it in respect of dull faculties (*mudindriya*).[42] In short, the proponents do not hold the possibility of universal retrogression. They admit that the Arahant retrogresses only up to the *Sotāpattiphala* and that the retrogression occurs only in the sphere of *Kāmaloka* and not in the two higher spheres, *viz.*, *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*. And this retrogression too is confined only to the *mudindriya* or *samayavimutta* Arahants.[43]

The *Theravādins* next point out that if an Arahant can fall away, then other three Ariyans (*Ariya puggalas*) belonging to the lower stages, *viz.*, the Never-Returner (*Anāgāmī*), Once-Returner (*Sakadāgāmī*) and Stream-Winner (*Sotāpanna*), must also be held liable to fall away. And if they all fall away, it would mean that the Once-Returner after falling from his state is rendered as an ordinary man in society. And if an Arahant after falling away is established in the first stage, does he after regaining Arahantship spring from the first stage directly to the Arahantship?[44] This last argument is rejected by the proponents.[45] According to them, a *Sotāpanna* is *niyato sambodhiparāyano* and hence he is not subject to retrogression. But a *Sakadāgāmī* or *Anāgāmī* may retrogress but not farther than the *Sotāpanna* stage.

This position, as taken by the proponents, is untenable, according to the *Theravādins*. They point out that if an Arahant, who, as compared to the other three *Ariya puggalas* is supposed to have put away more corruptions (*kilesa*),[46] who has cultivated more Path culture[47] and who has seen each and all of the Four Noble Truths no less than the other three can fall away, then the other three *Ariya Puggalas* belonging to the lower stages may surely fall from their respective states.[48]

Next, the Theravādins proceed to recount in detail the accomplishments of all the four stages and on that basis contend that one cannot maintain the fallibility of Arahants alone without maintaining the same about the three lower stages.[49]

The Theravādins remind the proponents about their concurrence over the various accomplishments of Arahanthood and ask as to how could they then maintain that an Arahant is

liable to decline from the state of his attainment which is identical with perfection?[50]

At this, the proponents concede that only *samayavimutta* Arahant, *i.e.*, one who is intermittently emancipated, is liable to fall away, but not those Arahants who are *asamayavimutta*, *i.e.*, emancipated for all time. According to the Theravādins, however, as there is no difference in their accomplishments, the question of occasional or constant emancipation does not affect the argument.[51]

Finally, the Theravādins put the crucial argument as to whether the proponents could cite any example where the Arahant may be supposed to have fallen from his state?[52]

The last thing that the Theravādins do to refute the proposition is to quote some Canonical passages[53] which highlight the state of Arahantship and suggest thereby that the Arahants cannot have a fall from their state. Also, these passages clearly assert that for an Arahant there is no necessity for treading the same path again.[54]

The proponents also take recourse to a similar device and bring in the reference of such passages which seem to lend support to their hypothesis.[55] They quote from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[56] where the Buddha is reported to have said that there are five things which conduce to the retrogression of a *bhikkhu* who is intermittently emancipated. These five things are (1) delight in business (*kammārāmatā*), (2) in talk (*bhassārāmatā*), (3) in sleep (*niddārāmatā*), (4) in society (*saṁgaṇikārāmatā*) and (5) the absence of reflection on how his heart is emancipated.[57] But the Theravāda argument is whether the Arahants really take delight in any of these things? The denial of the proponents would be inconsistent with their thesis and if they admit it, it would imply that an Arahant is subject to the trap of worldly desires which of course they cannot maintain. On similar other grounds, the Theravādins emphatically argue that the fallibility of Arahants from Arahanthood cannot be upheld.

It is interesting to note that Vasubandhu incidentally remarks that an adept, who has attained the *nirodha-samāpatti*, *i.e.*, the state of meditation in which perception ceases almost completely, cannot have a fall from the state.[58] It would appear

from the preceding controversy that the Theravādins undoubtedly admit the loss of merit[59] acquired by such adepts who have attained only to the meditation limited to the worldly sphere.[60] They are not prepared to concede this, however, with regard to the higher fruits of sanctification.[61] On the contrary, the proponents conceive the possibilities of retrogression for the latter, but restrict it only to those Arahants who are *samayavimuttas*, i.e., temporarily released.[62]

According to Buddhaghosa 'falling away' (*parihāna*) is twofold—(1) from what is won and (2) from what is not yet won.[63] He illustrates the first type by citing the example of Godhika who is said to have fallen away twice from his emancipation which was, however, intermittent only.[64] It is this type of falling away which is meant by the proponents when they propose the above thesis. The story goes about Godhika that he attained temporary emancipation six times, but fell away. On attaining it the seventh time he cut his throat. According to the commentators, Godhika could not maintain the state of trance owing to sickness.[65] The case of Godhika is also referred to by Vasubandhu who observes that although he fell from his state of temporary release, he did not fall from his state of Arahanthood.[66] This particular reference in the *Abhidharmakośa* makes it highly doubtful to accept the attribution of the Arahant's *parihāni* thesis to the Sarvāstivādins also as mentioned by Buddhaghosa.[67]

The *Kathāvatthu* refers to another thesis about the falling away of Arahants. It was held by the Pubbaseliyas and Sammatīyas that the fall of the Arahant is sometimes due to the deeds of his previous lives, *e.g.*, having calumniated an Arahant.[68] Theravādins, however, reject this and point out that sometimes impostors pass as Arahants and commit *abrahamacariya* offences.[69]

DEFILEMENT OF ARAHANTS

The next thesis about the Arahant disputed in the *Kathāvatthu* seeks to lay down the possibility of his defilement. It has been noted previously that a certain Mahādeva advocated the thesis of four possible imperfections in an Arahant. All

the four points have been debated in the *Kathāvatthu*. Thus, the first debate relates to the assertion that an Arahant has impure discharge.[70] According to Buddhaghosa, this thesis was upheld by the *Pubbaseliyas* and *Aparaseliyas* who noticed incidents of impure discharge among those who claimed Arahantship.[71] Vasumitra agrees with Buddhaghosa insofar as he also attributes this thesis to all the Mahāsaṁghikas, the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila included.[72] Bhavya and Vinītadeva corroborate the attribution of Vasumitra.[73]

To begin the argument, the Theravādins note the all-important denial by the proponents of there remaining any lust (*kāmarāga*), sensuous desire (*kāmarāgapariyuṭṭhāna*), etc., in the Arahant and point out the obvious contradiction between this and the stand taken by them that an Arahant has impure discharge. In the case of an average man, one may find both the desire and its physical manifestation (*pariyuṭṭhāna*). But in case of an Arahant, if it does not result from any such desire, what is then the source of his physical impurity?[74]

The proponents point out that such an impurity is conveyed to the Arahant by the *Devas* of the *Māra* group who in their turn do not, however, have any such physical impurity.[75]

This is unacceptable to the Theravādins for the reason that it is neither conveyed from any outside person nor is it there in the Arahants themselves.[76]

The proponents suggest that the *Devas* do this motivated by their reflection: 'We shall cause doubt as to his attainment to be laid hold of it'.[77]

The Theravādins now ask a direct question as to whether an Arahant has doubt?[78] The proponents deny the possibility of doubt in an Arahant with regard to eight points such as the Teacher (*satthā*), the Doctrine (*Dhamma*), the Order (Saṁgha), etc. Instead, they believe that there can be no definite conclusion on certain points, *viz.*, about the name, family, etc., of a given man or woman[79] and the like and hence on such matters there can be doubt in an Arahant.[80]

According to the Theravādins an Arahant is said to have put away passion and cultivated the means for putting away the passions, etc., and realized the goal but the thesis in

question seeks to establish an opposite course of action.[81]

On this observation of the Theravādins, the proponents make a distinction between two types of Arahants, *viz.*, (1) *Sadhamma-kusala Arahant*, *i.e.*, one who is 'proficient in his own field' and (2) *Paradhamma-kusala Arahant*, *i.e.*, one who is 'proficient in other things'. They point out that their assertion is made only with reference to the first type of Arahants.[82] According to Buddhaghosa, a *Sadhamma-kusala Arahant* is *paññāvimutta*, *i.e.*, his knowledge is confined to his own personal attainments whereas a *Paradhamma-kusala Arahant* is *ubhatobhāgavimutta*, *i.e.*, his knowledge is extended to others' attainments also besides his own.[83] It is interesting to note that in the *Milindapañho* also it is said that there are Arahants who may not be aware of the name and gotra of any and every person, the various roads and so forth but there may be some conversant with *vimuttis*.[84] It has been suggested, however, that in the Pāli works the *Ubhatobhāgavimutta* is not regarded as superior to the *Paññāvimutta*, and the only difference between the two is that the former has *samathābhinivesa*[85] and realization of eight *vimokkhas*[86] while the latter has *vippassanābhinivesa*[87] and realization of only four *jhānas*, but so far as the question of *rāga* or *āsavas* is concerned, both the classes of Arahants must be regarded as completely free from them and hence the subtle distinction drawn by the proponents is of no avail.[88] The proponents, however, have a real point here because *āsavakkhaya* requires *Paññā* and mere practice of quiescence without insight into *Āryadhamma* cannot produce it. Such practice may, however, well produce supernormal knowledge or *iddhi*.

Lastly, the Theravādins quote a passage which lays down that it is anomalous and unnatural that an Arahant should have impure discharge.[89]

The proponents, however, stick to their view and contend that if it is possible for others to convey things like clothing, alms, bedding, etc., to the Arahants, then the conveyance of defilements is also possible.[90]

The Theravādins enquire if the fruition of other stages of higher life can also be conveyed to an Arahant? If not, then the thesis cannot be maintained.[91] Thus, the Theravādins

emphatically deny that an Arahant who is free from attachment (*vītarāga*) can be subject to any temptation.

KNOWLEDGE OF ARAHANTS

The next two points that are in dispute about the Arahant relate to his knowledge. The two theses respectively are: (1) That an Arahant is liable to have ignorance, *i.e.*, *aññāṇa*[92] and (2) that he is liable to get perplexed and hence can have doubt, *i.e.*, *kaṅkhā* or *vimati*.[93] Buddhaghosa attributes these theses to the Pubbaseliyas.[94] Vasumitra, however, associates the theses with the Mahāsaṁghikas as such[95] and so do Bhavya and Vinītadeva.[96] It may be noted here that although the two theses are discussed in two different sections of the *Kathāvatthu*, the arguments and counter-arguments adduced in both are substantially the same. In fact, either hypothesis would follow from the other logically if one were to be accepted as such.

The Theravādins argue as to whether an Arahant has ignorance about everything for example such facts as 'flood', 'bond', *anusaya* (inclination), etc., just like an average person? If this ignorance be denied, then the possibility of none other can be maintained in the case of the Arahants. Further, an average person, owing to the lack of knowledge, kills living beings, commits theft, speaks lies and so on. The proponents, however, suggest that an Arahant would do the opposite of what an average person does from the lack of knowledge.[97]

The proponents also deny that an Arahant lacks knowledge with regard to the Teacher, Doctrine, Order, etc. But an average man, who lacks knowledge, lacks in both respects, *i.e.*, about the Teacher, Doctrine, etc., as well as those common things of life about which an Arahant is said to be ignorant.[98]

The Theravādins next recount various accomplishments of the Arahant such as his victory over the 'passion, hate, ignorance, conceit, error, doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, indiscretion', his cultivation of the 'means of putting away passions and the development of the factors of enlightenment' and so on and argue as to how such a being can lack in knowledge?[99]

The Theravādins quote passages which preserve the description of the Arahant as one in whom the 'intoxicants' (*āsavas*) have been extinguished and who knows the nature of the *rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṁkhāra*, their arising and perishing.[100] He also knows 'the nature of Ill, the cause of Ill, the cessation of Ill and the course leading to the cessation of Ill'.[101] 'He has renounced the faith in a living soul, rules and rites'.[102] The Theravādins doubt thereby that an Arahant, who is characterized by all these accomplishment, may be said to lack knowledge.

The proponents, however, argue that an Arahant may be ignorant about the 'name and lineage' (*nāmagottaṁ*) of a certain man or woman, about a 'right or wrong road' (*maggāmagga*) and such other ordinary things.[103]

At this, the Theravādins emphasize that an Arahant should be then said to lack knowledge about the fruition of earlier stages of the Path and if this has to be rejected then it cannot be said that he lacks knowledge.[104] It may be suggested that this last argument of the Theravādins emerges from the idea that an Arahant, prior to his initiation, was an ordinary human being and hence in the know of the common things of life. And if it has to be taken for granted that he may have forgotten about those things after conversion and subsequent attainment of the Arahanthood, then it is equally likely that he may have forgotten about those path-stages which he trod early in his career and from where he proceeded further to be stalled at the pedastal of Arahanthood.

Almost the same arguments and counter-arguments as these are put forward by the two debating groups on the next issue, that is, the possibility of doubt existing in an Arahant.[105] Some additional passages are, however, referred to by the Theravādins to dispute the thesis. In these passages it has been explained as to how ardent meditation leads to the removal of doubts.[106]

It may be recalled that *vicikicchā* (doubt) is one of the seven *anusayas*. The Arahant is thus being attributed one of the *anusayas*. In this context the Andhaka view on the *anusayas* is worth noticing (XIV. 5). It makes a radical difference in kind between latent bias and its patent outbreak. It is apparent

from the preceding discussion that the Theravādins oppose the two theses on the basis of their own notion about Arahanthood. According to them, no one can be said to be an Arahant unless and until he gets rid of ignorance, *i.e.*, *avijjā* and *vicikicchā*, and develops perfect vision free from impurities (*virajaṁ*, *vītamalaṁ dhammacakkhuṁ*) after having removed all his doubts (*kaṅkhā vapayanti sabhā*).

The proponents, however, distinguish between a *Sadhamma-kusala Arahant* and a *Paradhamma-kusala Arahant*.[107] According to them, although both types of Arahants do not have *avijjā* in regard to the truths, the theory of causation, etc., or *vicikicchā* about the Buddha, *Dhamma* and Saṁgha or absence of soul, yet the former may suffer from ignorance and doubt about the name and family of an unknown man or woman or of a tree, etc. It has been observed that the proponents do not mean here *sabbaññutañaṇa* (omniscience) but just *paradhamm-aññāṇa*, an intellectual power attained by *Ubhatobhāgavimutta-Arahants*, owing to which they might know many things outside themselves.[108] Thus, the proponents suggest that a section of the Arahants, *i.e.*, the *Paññāvimuttas* or *Sadhamma-kusala Arahant* may have ignorance (*aññāna*) relating to things or qualities other than those belonging to himself.

ARAHANTS EXCELLED BY OTHERS

The next thesis also belongs to the Pubbaseliyas who affirm that an Arahant is excelled (*parvitārāṇā*)[109] by others.[110] However, Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva as usual assign it to the Mahāsaṁghikas in general.[111] It may be recalled that this also was one of the propositions of Mahādeva which had stirred the Buddhist community then.

Once again, the same argumentation is put forth in this discussion. The only new point that is raised by the Theravādins is that if this proposition be accepted, one must also admit that an Arahant is guided by others and acquires his attainments through others. Its denial would be inconsistent with the proposed thesis.[112] They quote from the Canon[113] to substantiate their argument.

As the argument goes in the text, the Theravādins take the

same stand on this thesis that an Arahant is *vītamoha* and is possessed of *dhammacakkhu* and hence does not require any help or guidance (*paravitāraṇā*) from others. Contrary to this, the proponents hold that an Arahant develops faith in *Triratna* or acquires knowledge of the truths, etc., not by himself but through his preceptor. Thus, a *Sadhamma-kusala Arahant* does require *paravitāraṇā* while a *paradhamma-kusala Arahant* does not require it.

THE EMANCIPATION OF THE ARAHANTS

Another important issue of debate about the Arahant is concerned with the quality of his emancipation. The thesis in question is that 'Arahantship is won without a certain "Fetter" —quantity being cast off.'[114] In other words, it is affirmed that Arahants are not fully emancipated. It may be noted that this thesis is closely allied with the one which sought to establish the fallibility of the Arahants. With all the doubt and scepticism having emerged about the claims of the Arahant, it was only natural to lay down ultimately the thesis of their imperfect emancipation as compared to the Buddha. According to Buddhaghosa, some, *e.g.*, the Mahāsaṁghikas, hold that with reference to the Fetters of ignorance and doubt, even an Arahant does not know the whole range of Buddha-knowledge.[115]

The Theravādins argue that an Arahant is one who has acquired the clear vision about the origin and destruction of things, who has got rid of all doubts about the Buddha, *Dhamma* and Saṁgha, non-existence of soul, rule and ritual and has conquered lust, hate, etc. He has seen things for himself without the help of others and attained *bodhi* which, however, is *catumaggañāṇa*[116] and not *sabbaññutañāṇa*—the *bodhi* of the Buddhas.[117]

It is this last point which is actually the basis of the proponents' thesis. They point out that since an Arahant does not know with the complete purview of a Buddha, their thesis stands.[118]

This thesis may also be compared with a more general one where the casting off of conceptions is described as a piecemeal

process.[119] It is attributed to the Sammitīyas.[120] The Theravādins criticize it on the score that it would make one a partial *sotāpanna*, etc. But it might well mean that *sotāpatti*, etc., are stages in the gradual perfection on the Path. Similar is the import of another thesis[121] attributed to the Andhakas, the Sabbatthivādins, the Sammatīyas, and the Bhadrayānikas.[122] The thesis seeks to establish that in realizing the Four Paths, the corruptions were put away little by little as the Four Truths were realized. Apart from these significant controversies, there are some others of smaller range as follows:

A LAYMAN BECOMING AN ARAHANT

This is an *Uttarāpathaka* thesis that a layman may be an *Arahant.*[123]

The central argument of the Theravādins is that a layman, bound with layman's fetters cannot be an Arahant. They refer to a dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta where the Buddha is said to have laid down that a layman cannot be an Arahant, unless he has renounced the layman's fetters.[124] Moreover, how can an Arahant continue to be a house-dweller and enjoy the life therein?[125]

The proponents, however, cite the examples of Yasa, Uttiya and Setu who became Arahant under all the circumstances of a laity.[126] It may be observed that this controversy is merely a Buddhist echo of a larger issue which may be found in Brahmanical Thought. Kapila is stated to have insisted on *sanyāsa* before teaching Pañcaśikha.[127] *Bhagavadgītā* seeks to elaborately establish the possibility of inner *sanyāsa* with the outward life of a layman.[128] It may also be noted that Mahāynāa and Vajrayāna see no contradiction in the emancipation of the laity.

BIRTH AS AN ARAHANT

The Uttarāpathakas again upheld a thesis that one may become Arahant the moment he is reborn.[129] They believed that, at the very outset of reborn consciousness, one might be an Arahant.

The Theravāda argument is that because reborn consciousness is wordly and one does not become with it even a stream-winner, etc., let alone an Arahant, it is not possible to sustain this view proposed by the Uttarāpathakas. Further, regarding the greatest of the Arahants, *viz.*, Sāriputta, Moggalāna, Kassapa, Kaccāyana, etc., one may ask—were they born as Arahant?[130]

According to Buddhaghosa, the proponents uphold this thesis by carelessly interpreting passages in their own way.[131] The Uttarāpathaka doctrine may be compared with the Yoga conception of *Prakṛtilaya*.[132] So seems to be the import of the Vedāntic controversy between *Sadyomukti* and *Kramamukti*.[133]

ARAHANT AS 'DEVOID OF CANKERS' (*ANĀSAVA*)

The Uttarāpathakas also believed that all that belongs to the Arahant is devoid of intoxicants.[134]

The Theravādins argue that all dharmas of the Arahants are not *anāsava*, *i.e.*, free from 'intoxicants' or 'cankers', *e.g.*, their physical body, robe, etc.[135]

The Uttarāpathakas, however, observe that since the Arahant himself is *anāsava* (free from *āsavas*, *i e.*, intoxicants), therefore, everything connected with him must be held *anāsava*.[136]

RETAINING THE 'ENDOWMENTS'

Another thesis of the Uttarāpathakas was that one who realizes a fruition retains the attributes thereof after realising a higher fruition.[137]

According to the Theravādins, there is no such quality as the retention of 'distinctive endowments'. Only personal 'endowments' are held, as distinct acquisitions, until they are cancelled by other acquisitions. Thus, in the Arahant stage, only *Arahattaphala* is acquired.[138]

Uttarāpathakas, however, argue that a past acquisition is a permanent acquisition[139] in some *Rūpa* or *Arūpa* heaven and hence all the *phalas* are possessed by the Arahants.

Buddhaghosa points out that there are two kinds of spiritual acquisitions, *viz.*, acquisition at the present moment and acquisition accruing at rebirth hereafter. But the Uttarāpa-

thakas believe in a third also, *viz.*, holding of past acquisition as permanent acquisition.[140]

ARAHANT'S 'INDIFFERENCE IN SENSE-COGNITION'

The Uttarāpathakas affirmed that an Arahant is endowed with a six-fold indifference with reference to each of the six gates of sense-knowledge.[141]

According to the Theravādins, an Arahant is *chalupekkho* but he is not in a state of calling up indifference with respect to all six at the same time.[142] Theravādins believed that sensations, however, shift in succession and are never simultaneous.[143]

ATTAINING TO ARAHANTSHIP

The Andhakas proposed the thesis that the putting away of all the Fetters is Arahantship. They implied thereby that Arahantship means the simultaneous putting away of all the Fetters (*saññojanas*).[144]

On the contrary, the Theravādins held that all *saññojanas* are gradually destroyed and not within the *Arahattamagga* alone.[145]

'ARAHANT HAVING ACCUMULATING MERIT'

According to the Andhakas there is accumulation of merit in the case of an Arahant.[146] They argue that an Arahant performs many good deeds, for instance, he is found making gifts, saluting shrines and so on and remains always self-possessed (*sati saṁpajāno*) even at the time of his *parinibbāna* and so he does collect merits and passes away with *kusalacitta*. The Theravādins, however, observe that the *citta* of the Arahant goes beyond *pāpa* and *puñña*, *kusala* and *akusala*, *kriyā* and *vipāka*. Hence to speak of them as acquiring merits or demerits is incorrect.[147]

It seems that the Mahāsaṁghikas also agree with the Theravādins on this point and hold a position contrary to the Andhakas. It is interesting to note a tenet of the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools relating to the Arahant, recorded by Vasumitra,

viz., 'One who is *kṛtakṛtyaḥ* (*katakaraṇiyo*), *i.e.*, accom-plished in all that is to be done', does not take any *dharma* to himself, *i.e.*, has no attachment for worldly things.[148] According to N. Dutt, this statement of Vasumitra is echoed in two of the *Kathāvatthu* theses:[149] (1) 'There is accumulation of merit in the case of an Arahant'[150] and (2) 'The Arahant is ethically conscious when completing existence at final death.'[151] It may be observed, however, that the statement of Vasumitra is the opposite of the first thesis cited by Dutt. It is relevant only with the second one.

The thesis of the Andhakas contradicts the general and logical belief about the transcendence of good and evil by the emancipated whether *jīvanmukta* in Brāhmanical thought or the Arahant in Jainism. If there is a *kusalacitta* even at the time of *Parinbbāna*, how would *Parinibbāna* be possible since a *kusalacitta* must produce a finite *vipāka*. Perhaps the Andhaka predilection for shrine worship may have conditioned this strange thesis.[152]

'ARAHANT AND UNTIMELY DEATH'

The Rājagirikas and Sidharthikas upheld the thesis that there cannot be any untimely death for an Arahant.[153] They quote the words of the Buddha who had laid down that 'there is no annulment of intentional deeds without their result having been experienced.'[154] On the basis of this, they contend that, since an Arahant has to experience the result of his karma before he completes existence, he cannot have an untimely death.[155] This thesis seems to emanate from their general doctrine that all is derived from action.[156]

As against this, the Theravādins hold that an Arahant may have an untimely death as there are references to *arahatghātakas*, *i.e.*, the murderers of Arahant. Further, the body of an Arahant is as much subject to poison, weapons or fire as any one else's.[157]

The real issue is the effect of *Arahatta* on past *karma*, which is to be assessed in the light of the belief that the Arahant will not be reborn. Logically, therefore, he should not die with any *kamma* left unexhausted.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ARAHANT AT DEATH

The *Kathāvatthu* records two debates about the consciousness of an Arahant at the time of death.

The first thesis was upheld by some like the Andhakas, who believed that the Arahant is ethically conscious when completing existence at final death. It is their central argument that the Arahant is ever lucidly conscious, mindful and aware, even at the time of final death.[158]

According to the Theravādins, the contention of the proponents 'merely points to the Arahant's lucidity and awareness while dying, to his ethically neutral and, therefore, inoperative presence of mind and reflection at the last moment of his cognitive process (*javana*). But it was not intended to show the arising of morally good thoughts.[159]

Another thesis, *viz.*, the Arahant 'completes existence (dies) in imperturbable absorption (*āneñja*)' was upheld by some of the Uttarāpathakas.[160] They argued that since the Buddha is said to have passed away immediately after arising from the 'Fourth *Jhāna*', therefore, an Arahant, when passing away, is in a 'sustained "Fourth *Jhāna*" (of the immaterial plane)'.

The Theravādins reject this as Arahants, according to them, do not die when in an imperturbable condition and devoid of *kriyācitta*. They pass out of meditation before death. In Buddhism, consciousness, under the specific aspect of causality, is regarded as either (1) karmic, *i.e.*, able to function causally as *karma*; (2) resultant (*vipāka*), or due to *karma*; (3) non-causal (*kiriyā*) called 'in-opertive'.[161]

'BOGUS ARAHANTS'

Some of the Uttarāpathakas also affirmed that 'infra-human beings, taking the shape of Arahants, follow sexual desires'. They drew attention to the 'dress and deportment of evil-minded' monks to support their thesis.[162]

The Theravādins, however, observe that since they are not known to indulge in other crimes, they cannot be said to do what the proponents contend.[163]

MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

The ideal of early Buddhism may be justifiably dichotomized into Arahattva (*Arahatta*) and Nirvāṇa (*Nibbāna*). With the attainment of Arahantship, one reaches the climax of his career. The Buddha himself was described as an Arahant and so were his disciples known as Arahants. The first disciples of the Buddha converted at Sārnāth, became Arahants within a very short time.[164] One might say that early Buddhism was a process and system of training in perfectibility of which the culmination was a spiritual status technically termed Arahantship, exemplified by the personality of the Buddha himself.[165] The earliest usage does not distinguish Arahant from the Buddha just as the Jainas did not distinguish Arahant from Jina. This earliest usage is not distinctively Buddhistic either. Within Buddhism, however, a distinction between mere Arahant and Buddha emerged quite early. The doctrine that leads to Arahantship is designed as 'the doctrine of Arahant'.[166] The Pāli Canon is full of the description of Arahant.[167] To sum up, it may be said that an Arahant is one who is freed from passions and desires, has no further task to perform and has become immune from the cycle of rebirth occurring from the grouping of *khandhas*. Accordingly, there is utter extinction of sorrow and suffering for him.[168]

The concept of Arahantship was, however, gradually diluted and delimited. During the centuries immediately succeeding the *Mahāparinirvāṇa* of the Buddha, the Arahant ideal of the original teaching tended to give rise, within a monastic system, to a kind of soteriological individualism. At the hands of some orthodox sects, particularly the Theravādins, the Arahant ideal received an individualistic twist, rather, it became completely identified with an extreme sort of spiritual individualism.[169] The Theravādins strenuously emphasized the Arahant ideal as the only goal of salvation and freedom from suffering. It seems that the Theraādins tried to faithfully adhere to the moral, monastic and disciplinary life of early Buddhism. We do not, however, mean to suggest that the Theravāda standpoint thoroughly represents the spirit of original Buddhism or that the

entire Buddhism is comprised in the Pāli Canon as was the accepted belief of the older generation of Buddhist scholars.[170] The purely individualistic attempts of the Theravāda to pursue the three-fold development of *Sīla*, *Samādhi* and *Paññā* with the consequent attainment of Arahantship could well be deemed inadequate from the point of view of the average mass of mankind. On the other hand, for the spiritually more ambitious, the ideal of Arahantship would appear pale beside the glory of Buddha and may well lead them, through this comparison, to look at Arahantship with critical eyes. This tendency of the Theravāda, therefore, provoked protests from others in the Buddhist community. The panorama of sectarian antagonism reached its final culmination with the emergence of Mahāyāna which styled itself as the very anti-thesis of Hīnayāna, *i.e.*, the old Buddhism, so to say. It may be observed that the Theravāda tendency contributed by way of a reaction in a significant measure towards the growth of heretical and unwholesome notions about Arahant and Arahantship. Should we believe the traditions of Vasumitra, Bhavya, Vinītadeva and Tāranātha, it has to be affirmed that the very same tendency of Theravāda of an individualistic and narrow Arahant idealism provoked a revolt from a fairly large section of the monks and laymen who finally departed from the former and emerged as a new sect in the name of the Mahāsaṁghikas.[171]

That they were basically opposed to the Arahants and their authoritarian cult is obvious from the fact that their first thesis was formulated to inflict a direct blow to the Arahant ideal as cherished by the orthodox Theravādins. They seem to have carried on a ceaseless propaganda against the halo that had been attached to the figure of the Arahant. The process of anti-Arahant movement gave rise to several theses which sought to draw attention to their failings and imperfections.

It was hardly possible, however, for the Theravādins to overlook the attack that was being made upon their ideal of Arahantship. It is against this background that they categorically reject the thesis about the possibility of the falling away of an emancipated one, even such, who attained this only occasionally in meditation. Still less can he fall away from Arahantship because, as suggested by some, he might have calumniated a

saint in some previous birth. They also deny that the gods of the *Māra* group can impose physical impurities upon the Arahant. He has acquired complete knowledge and hence cannot have any doubt or be surpassed by others in knowledge. He has cast aside every fetter of ignorance and doubt in attaining his end. Nevertheless, he is human and hence the thesis that he is entirely free in every regard from any association with the four 'intoxicants' cannot be sustained for the simple reason that his body and sense organs cannot be considered absolutely uncontaminated by these intoxicants. The only things which are really free from any connection with the intoxicants are the Paths, their Fruits, *Nirvāṇa* and the factors leading to Insight. Similarly. though an Arahant is indifferent to sense impressions, his indifference is manifested under human conditions; he cannot attend to more than one sense impression or idea at the same time, for his consciousness is essentially momentary. Moreover, the progress to Arahanthood must be carried out in strict accordance with the stages laid down. It is, therefore, wrong to assume that the attainment of Arahantship means the simultaneous destruction of all fetters. In the first three stages, five of the fetters are cast away; in the last, the aspirant rids himself of the desire for rebirth either in the *Rūpa-loka* or *Arūpa-loka*, conceit, distraction and ignorance. It is also wrong to associate an Arahant's insight to a learner. Similarly, no one can attain to Arahantship unless he has laid aside the life of a layman. It is also impossible for any embryo to become an Arahant at the moment of rebirth. Nor by offering gifts, paying homage to the shrines and so on does an Arahant become subject to a process of accumulating merit. If he could win merit, he could also win demerit, which is absurd. Nor is it true to say that he cannot have an untimely death for he has to experience the results of all his former actions as was opined by some, since the liability to accidents cannot be wholly ruled out. It is also denied that he possesses consciousness subject to moral distinctions at the time of his death. Nor is it right to say that an Arahant attains the completion of existence while in the imperturbable absorption of meditation.[172]

Some of these suggest observed failings, *e.g.*, (1) the ideal of

the individualistic Arahant may not be so attractive as that of the compassionate Buddha. This comparison would highlight the limitations of the former. (2) There is some reason to postulate a psychological hostility arising from institutional and historical reasons. (3) Some of the theses suggest actually observed failings and limitations. (4) There is also room for divergent interpretation in the Canonical statements on the Arahants.

Apart from this, however, there was something inherent in the early literature itself which, widely open to interpretation as it was, seems to have given way to scepticism and doubt about the exuberant claims of an Arahant. There was already some lacuna in the oldest tradition itself which underlies the growth of alien views and subsequent controversies on Arahantship. This necessitates an enquiry into the relationship between the conceptions of Buddhahood and Arahanthood.

There are some enigmatic passages in the Canonical literature, the testimony of which makes it difficult to draw any distinction between the conceptions of Buddha and Arahant.[173] 'Every "Buddha" (awakened one) was an Arahant. Every Arahant was "*Buddha*" (awakened).[174] The Buddha himself is habitually called an Arahant.' At one place it is said: "Let us ask Gotama, the awakened one who has passed beyond anger and fear...",[175] but the very same adjectives as we find here are used elsewhere for an Arahant.[176] Similarly, in a long description of Gotama,[177] all the epithets used are generally found applied to one or other of his disciples. The teacher never called himself a Buddha as distinct from Arahant. When addressed as Buddha or spoken of as such by his disciples, it is always doubtful whether anything more is meant than an enlightened Arahant. In the oldest documents, thus, the two conceptions seem to be still in a state of fusion.

However, in the light of the Canonical literature itself, it is extremely doubtful to maintain that the ideal of Arahant was synonymous with Buddhahood and that no distinction was made between the two. This view inevitably implies the equality between the teacher and his disciples which we think would have been difficult to sustain for a community like the Buddhists with such an exalted figure as Buddha before them.

We come across such references in the *Nikāyas* where the difference between the conception of Arahant and Buddha may be brought out clearly. Attention may be drawn to a dialogue between Sāriputta and Buddha.[178] Sāriputta here confesses that he has no knowledge about the able and 'awakened ones' that have been and are to come, as also, of the present times. Sāriputta was perhaps one of the greatest elders of the Buddhist community and yet his figure, as compared to the Buddha, is completely dwarfed by his statement and confession. It was logical to assume that a Buddha would possess a number of additional perfections as compared with an Arahant.[179] There is an illuminating incident referred to in the *Sphutārthā* on the *Abhidharmakośa* where it is shown that the Buddha surpasses all his disciples by his omniscience which enables him to become the universal teacher or saviour.[180] Further, the theory of a number of successive Buddhas[181] presupposes the conception of a Buddha as a different and more exalted personage than Arahant. In a famous dialogue, Lord Buddha is reported to have said that he is neither a man nor a *yakkha* but a Buddha.[182] It is interesting to observe that the Theravādins, though they desperately try to defend the cherished image of the Arahant, have to grant at last that the *bodhi* attained by an Arahant is *catumaggaññāṇa* and not *sabbaññutañāṇa, the bodhi* of the Buddhas.[183] It is plausible, therefore, that this basic disparity in the two conceptions inherent in the *Nikāyas* was brought to the fore in the course of time, and led to two parallel developments in a new direction in the history of Buddhism. One led to the gradual decline in the Arahant ideal and the other towards the eventual deification of the Buddha.

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2. See Rhys Davids and Stede, *Pāli English Dictionary*, Pt. I, p. 76; s.v. *Arahati;* see also *Pss. of the Sisters*, p. 130; *Dhammapada Commentary*, I. 400.
3. See Ibid., Pt. I, p. 77; s. v. *Arahant*.
4. E. Conze, *Buddhism*, p. 93.
5. See *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. III, *Pathika Sutta*, Introduction, p. 6; Cf. Infra.
6. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, pp. 65, 76; *Majjhima, Nikāya*, I, pp. 7, 94; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 70; IV, pp. 142-143, 258; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, p. 133; *Itivuttaka*, p. 208, etc.
7. Cf. *Cullavagga*, pp. 18, 34-5, 202; *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 149, 168; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 184; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 141; II, pp. 44, 70, 81-2, 103, 204; III, pp. 20, 41, 52; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, p. 152; II, p. 225, etc.
8. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, p. 149: II, p. 118; Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, pp. 141, 161; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, p. 263.
9. *Avadāna Śataka*, II, 348.
10. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 204; Cf. Masuda, op. cit., p. 42.
11. Ibid., p. 84.
12. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 174ff; See infra.
13. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 76.
14. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 24, 36, 38, 52
15. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 174, 179.
16. Ibid., Pt. II, p. 194.
17. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, II, p. 210.
18. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 24, 36, 38, 52; Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, II, 1-4; Poussin, *The Five Points of Mahādeva, JRAS*, 1910, pp. 413-23; E. Lamotte, *Buddhist Contıoversy Over the Five Propositions, IHQ*, Vol. 32, pp. 148-62; Watters, op. cit., I, pp. 267-8.
19. See Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 172.
20. *Aṭṭhi arahato asucisukkavisaṭṭhī ti*; *Kathāvatthu*, II, 1.
21. *Atthi arahato aññāṇan ti?* Ibid., II. 2.
22. *Atthi arahato kaṅkhā ti?* Ibid., II. 3.
23. *Atthi arahato paravitāranā ti*? Ibid., II. 4.
24. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 54-5.
25. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 24, 36, 38, 52.
26. See Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 174, 179, 194.
27. *Katthāvatthu*, I. 2.
28. Ibid., XXI. 3.

29. *Parihāyati arahā arahattā ti? Kathāvatthu*, I. 2.
30. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 35.
31. Masuda, op. cit., p. 24; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 172ff.
32. Masuda, Ibid., p. 26.
33. Ibid., p. 42.
34. See Ibid., p. 27; *Abhidharmakośa*, VI, p. 255n.
35. Masuda, op. cit., p. 15; *Bareau, Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 176-7; Demiéville, op. cit., pp. 22, 51-2.
36. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 14; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 172; see also supra.
37. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 71f.
38. Cf. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 25-6, 28.
39. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 36.
40. Ibid., p. 36.
41. Ibid., p. 36.
42. Ibid., p. 36.
43. Cf. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
44. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 72ff.
45. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 37-8.
46. On the ten vices causing ferment (*kilesa*), Cf. *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, pp. 270, 324.
47. *Bojjhaṅgabhāvanā*, i.e., *Bodhipakkhiya Dhammas*, Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 94.
48. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 74-8.
49. Ibid., pp. 78-86.
50. Ibid., pp. 86-8.
51. Ibid., pp. 88-90; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 38.
52. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 90-1.
53. *Suttasādhana-parihāni, Kathāvatthu*, pp. 91-2.
54. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, p. 89; *Theragāthā*, Trans, p. 193; see *Points of Controversy*, p. 69n.
55. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 92.
56. See *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, p. 424.
57. *Yathā vimuttaṁ cittaṁ na paccavekkhati, Kathāvatthu*, p. 92.
58. *Abhidharmakośa*, II, p. 210.
59. *Pattaparihāni*.
60. *Lokiya-samāpatti*.
61. *Arahattādisāmaññaphala*.
62. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 8ff.; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 38.
63. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 35.
64. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, loc. cit., Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, pp. 119ff.
65. See Thomas, *Buddhist Thought*, p. 131n.

66. *Abhidharmakośa*. VI. 58.
67. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 35.
68. *Kammahetu Arahā Arahattā parihāyatī ti? Kathāvatthu*, VIII. 11.
69. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 349-50.
70. *Atthi Arahato asucisukkhavisaṭṭhīti? Katthāvatthu*, II. 1.
71. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 54.
72. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 24ff.
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74. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 154.
75. Ibid., pp. 154-5; Cf. Ibid., XIV. 6.
76. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 155.
77. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 112; see also *Kathāvatthu*, p. 155.
78. *Atthi Arahato Vimatīti ? Kathāvatthu*, pp. 155-9.
79. *Puthujjana*, see *Kathāvatthu*, p. 156.
80. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 54.
81. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 156-9.
82. Ibid., pp. 159-61.
83. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 54-5.
84. Cf. *Milindapañho*, pp. 260-1, 331f.
85. *Samatha* means calmness or quietude of heart, i.e., cessation of the *Saṁkhāras*. Cf. *rāgāvirāga cetovimutti*, see *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I. 58.
86. *Vimokkha* means the eight stages of emancipation.
87. *Vipassanā* means inward vision, insight, intuition or introspection, *avijjāvirāgāpaññāvimutti*, see *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I. 58.
88. N. Dutt, *EMB*. II, p. 86.
89. *Cullavagga*, pp. 310-11.
90. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 161.
91. Ibid., p. 161.
92. *Atthi Arahato aññānaṁti? Kathāvatthu*, II. 2; cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 86.
93. *Atthi Arahato Kaṅkhati? Kathāvatthu*, II. 3.
94. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 55.
95. Cf. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 24ff.
96. Cf. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 174, 194.
97. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 162-3.
98. Ibid., pp. 163-4.
99. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 164-5.
100. See *Saṁyutta, Nikāya*, II, p. 27.
101. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV, pp. 16-7, 371-2.
102. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 117n.
103. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 168.
104. Ibid., p. 168.
105. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 168-74.

106. See *Cullavagga*, p. 21; *Udāna*, p. 133; *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 205; see also *Points of Controversy*, pp. 118-9n.
107. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 165-6, 170-1; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 54-5.
108. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 87.
109. Mrs. Rhys Davids and S.Z. Aung render the term *paravitāraṅā* as excelled by others, see *Points of Controversy*, p. 119. Masuda, op. cit., p. 24f, however, explains it as gaining spiritual perception by the help of others, i.e., enlightenment through others.
110. *Aṭṭhi Arahato paravitāraṇāti?* *Kathāvatthu*, II, 4; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhākathā*, p. 55.
111. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 24ff. See also Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 174, 194.
112. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 174.
113. Cf. *Sutta Nipāta*, pp. 422-3.
114. *Atthi kiñci saññojanaṁ appahāya Arahattappattīti? Kathāvatthu*, XXI. 3.
115. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 189.
116. *Sotāpatti, sakadāgāmī, anāgāmī,* and *Arahatta.*
117. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 520-1; see also *Kathāvatthu,-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 76-7.
118. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 521.
119. *Odhisodhiso Kilese jahatīti? Kathāvatthu*, I. 4.
120. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 42.
121. *Anupubbābhisamayoti? Kathāvatthu*, II. 9.
122. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 58.
123. *Gihissa Arahā ti? Kathāvatthu*, IV. 1; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 73.
124. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 181f.
125. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 240-1.
126. Ibid., p. 241.
127. *Commentary on Sāṁkhyakārikā*, (*Matharavṛthi*); cf. Udaivira Shastri, *Sankhya Darśana Ka Itihasa*, p. 475, New Delhi, 1950.
128. Cf. *Devībhāgavata*, I. 16. 50ff; especially,

    सन्देहोऽयं महांस्तात विदेहंपरिवर्तते। मोक्षः किं वदतां श्रेष्ठ सौगतानाभिवापरः ॥

    (Ibid., 1. 16. 53).
129. *Saha uppattiyā Arahā ti? Kathāvatthu*, IV. 2; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 73.
130. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 241-2.
131. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 73.
132. *Yogasūtra*, I. 19.
133. Cf. *Vedāntasūtra*, IV. 3. 10.
134. *Arahato sabbe dhammā anāsavā ti?* *Kathāvatthu*, IV. 3; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 74.

135. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 243ff.
136. Ibid., p. 246.
137. *Arahā catūhi phalehi samannāgato ti? Kathāvatthu*, IV. 4; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 74-75.
138. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 246ff.
139. *Pattidhammo*, Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 161n.
140. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 75.
141. *Kathāvatthu*, IV. 5, See also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 75-6.
142. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 251.
143. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 163n.
144. *Sabbasaññojanānaṁ pahānaṁ arahattaṁ ti? Kathāvatthu*, IV. 10; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 79.
145. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 267-8.
146. *Atthi Arahato Puññūpacayo ti? Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 1; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 163.
147. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 469-70.
148. Masuda, op. cit., p. 23; see also Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, p. 242.
149. See N. Dutt, *EMB*, II. pp. 87-8.
150. *Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 1.
151. See Ibid., XXII. 2.
152. See Ibid., p. 470; Masuda, op. cit., p. 38.
153. *Natthi Arahato akālamaccūti? Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 2; See also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 163f.
154. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, IV, pp. 340-1; see also *Points of Controversy* p. 313n.
155. Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 89.
156. See A.B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 213.
157. *Katthāvatthu*, pp. 470-1.
158. *Arahā kusalacitto parinibbāyatīti? Kathāvatthu*. XXII. 2; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 193.
159. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 358.
160. *Arahā āneñje thito parinibbāyatīti? Kathāvatthu*, XXII. 3; see also *Katthāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 193.
161. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 360n.
162. *Arahantānaṁ vaṇṇena amanussā methunaṁ dhammaṁ paṭisevantīti? Kathāvatthu*, XXIII.2; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197; *Points of Controversy*, p. 366.
163. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 535.
164. See *Cullavagga*, p. 18.
165. Cf. S. Dutt., *Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 85.
166. *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 296.
167. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 149, 168; III, pp. 65-76; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 7, 94, 184, III, pp. 20, 41, 52; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 70, 141; II,

pp. 44, 70, 81-2, 103, 204; III, pp. 20, 41, 52; IV, pp. 142-3, 258; *Aṅguttara, Nikāya*, I, pp. 133, 152; II, p. 225; *Dhammapada*, pp. 25-6; *Itivuttaka*, p. 208; *Sutta Nipāta*, pp. 283, 351, 367.

168. Cf. "*Khināsavo katakaraṇiyo nāparaṁ itthatāyā; Khīṇajāti vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ nāparaṁ ihatāyāti*, see supra.
169. Cf. Sangharakshita, *A Survey of Buddhism*, pp. 45, 184, 442.
170. Cf. Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 72; see also S. Dutt, *Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 145.
171. See supra, chapter II.
172. For the discussions and debates involved on these points see supra.
173. See, G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 457f.
174. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 309ff.
175. *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 309.
176. Cf. *Itivuttaka*, p. 228.
177. Cf. *Sutta Nikāta*, pp. 353ff.
178. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, pp. 65ff.
179. See *Dīgha Nikaya*, II, pp. 8ff.
180. *Sphuṭārthā*, p. 5.
181. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, *Mahāpadānasutta*, 3, *Khuddaka Nikāya, Buddhavaṁsa*.
182. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, p. 41.
183. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 76.

4

The Apotheosis of the Buddha

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

An important and connected set of controversies in the *Kathāvatthu* centres round the figure of Buddha himself and the concept of Buddhahood. In the wake of sectarian developments, great importance came to be attached to the issue about the real nature of the Buddha. Some of the keenly contested problems that emerged may be summarised as follows: (1) Whether the Buddha is transcendental?[1] (2) Whether the Buddha personally visited this earth and preached the *Dhamma*?[2] (3) Whether every word of the Buddha could free the hearer from *Saṁsara*?[3]

It seems that with the gradual eclipse of the ideal of Arahanthood there emerged *pari passu* a strong tendency to elevate the concepts of the Buddha and *Bodhisattva.*[4] There appears to have been, as suggested earlier, a definite inter-relationship between the two tendencies. Generally, the same group of sects, which carried on the anti-Arahant campaign, led a parallel movement seeking to establish the transcendentality and virtual divinity of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva.[5] Quite ostensibly, for those, who were not enamoured of the personality of the Arahant but upheld theses postulating his

imperfections instead, it would be only natural to seek to concentrate their faith and reverence somewhere else. It hardly needs to be explained in too many words that for such persons there could not be a more befitting figure than the Buddha himself.

The earliest conception of the Buddha seems to have been different from that which emerged later owing to sectarian and scholastic encrustations. The original Buddha-nature, as it appeared to his immediate disciples, may aptly be described as essentially human.[6] It is fairly sound to assume that, in the beginning, his disciples paid less attention to his life than to his teaching. This emerges most clearly from the fact that they preserved his teachings more carefully than his biography.[7] Buddha himself disparaged attention to his 'corruptible body' (*pūtikāya*), holding his true body to be the *Dhamma*.[8] This may be because they were inclined to regard him essentially as a human being who, having undergone the normal experiences of life through his own efforts and exertions, became enlightened and finally at his death entered a mysterious state beyond common comprehension. They revered him as a Great Ascetic, a Great Sage; nevertheless, he was supposed to have been born and to have died just as everyone else does on this earth. The physical body is born of *karman* (*karmajanya*) and it is impregnated with *karman* (*karmamaya*).[9] This is the belief about human body upheld in the *Upaniṣads*, among the Buddhists as well as among many of the Buddha's contempórary *parivrājakas*.[10] Thus, granting the theory of rebirth or reincarnation, it was assumed that Gautama did not come into the world for the first time in the sixth century B.C. He, like others, had undergone many births, had experienced the world as an animal and as a man.[11] The spiritual perfection attained in Buddhahood could not have been the result of just one life. It matured slowly during all these previous births before it was perfected as Sākya Gautama.

The Buddha is described as 'the Lord, the Arahant, the fully enlightened, endowed with knowledge and conduct, the Sugata (he who has well gone), knower of the world, the supreme charioteer of men to be tamed, the Buddha, the Lord'.[12] This is not the humanized portrait of a divine being, but a clear

expression of the belief in an historical person.[13] The *Majjhima* preserves the details about the knowledge and powers attained by Buddha at the time of his enlightenment.[14] They are briefly the four trances (*jhānas*) and three knowledges (*vijjās*). Buddha held that a correct description of him would ascribe to him the three knowledges.[15] He explicitly disclaimed omniscience[16] in the sense in which it was claimed by the Jainas for their Master that he was omniscient, all-seeing and possessed of complete knowledge and insight, and that whether he was walking, standing, asleep or awake, knowledge and insight were continually present.[17] Later, it came to be assumed, however, that the Buddha can so extend the 'net of his knowledge'[18] that anything may come within the range of his knowledge. In short, whatever the merits and powers of the Buddha, his earthly life was believed to have been as real as that of any other human being. This was the strictly orthodox point of view upheld by the Theravādins.

However, in the Three Jewels[19] that constitute the focus of Buddhism, Buddha undoubtedly was the most luminous and central for his followers. And not long after the physical disappearance of the Buddha from the scene, this became the foremost consideration for a large section of the Buddhist community, particularly those who had been led to nurture a resentment against the aloof and authoritarian Arahants.[20] The 'easterners' (*pācinaka*) thus claimed in their opposition to the *theras* that the Buddha was born in their territory in the east.[21] As against the early tendency of little attention to Buddha's biography, it was taken up with great interest.[22] There emerged in the religion a strong tendency of docetism towards the personality of the Buddha.[23] A process was set moving under which the 'life of the Master formed the edifice and the rival sects provided the material for superstructure'.[24] Consequently, while the orthodox Theravādins adhered strictly to the realistic view of the person of their Teacher, the heterodox radicals proceeded boldly to idealize him. They were motivated by a natural instinct to glorify the personality of the Buddha and superimpose on it a variety of mythical fancies.[25] Superhuman qualities and attributes were discovered in his person.

Thus, in the course of these developments, it came to be assumed that a single utterance of the Tathāgata implied the revelation of all truths at once.[26] The physical body (*rūpakāya*) of a Tathāgata has no limit in space,[27] his virtues and powers are infinite,[28] and his life has immeasurable duration.[29] As envisaged fundamentally in Buddhism, all life in this world is characterized by evil and suffering. Obviously, therefore, the Buddha never lived as a human being. He appeared to do so out of compassion for the ignorant.[30] He, being perfect in every respect, could not have been subject to the limitations of ordinary life on earth.[31] He neither has sleep nor dream.[32] He is at all times in a complete union with all truths, in a deep contemplation, i.e., Yoga.[33] He is omniscient, comprehending all things at once, in the thought of one single moment, because in his mind is always present the mystic store of *prajñā* i.e., wisdom.[34] In his thought are constantly, at the same time, the wisdom of extinction (*Ksayaprajñā*) and the wisdom of non-origination (*anutpāda-prajñā*).[35] The above reflects a process seeking to idealize and identify the Buddha's person with a universal Buddhahood. With the growth of such notions, it was natural to derive the illusoriness of the physical life of a Buddha.[36]

Both the Pāli and Sanskrit traditions agree substantially as regards the identification of the section that pleaded new theses about the supramundane (*lokottara*) nature of the Buddha. In the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā* these theses are attributed to the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools, viz., the Mahāsaṁghikas, Andhakas, Vetulyakas and Uttarāpathakas.[37] The treatises of Vasumitra,[38] Bhavya[39] and Vinītadeva[40] go to substantiate this tradition. According to Vasumitra, the results of the idealization of Buddha manifested themselves clearly in the schism of the schools, orthodox and heterodox.[41]

The strictly orthodox Theravādins, on the other hand, continued to adhere to the practical moral teachings of the Master and to limit themselves to a pious obedience to the rules and traditions of the community. They believed the earthly life of the Buddha to have been real beyond any doubt or suspicion. Thus the two opposite camps were drawn into a series of interesting controversies preserved in minute details in the *Kathāvatthu*.

THESES AND ARGUMENTS

'ORDINARY SPEECH' (VOHĀRA) OF THE BUDDHA

In the *Kathāvatthu*, the first issue of debate about the Buddha rests over the thesis that the Exalted Buddha's ordinary speech (vohāra) was supra-mundane.[42] According to Buddhaghosa, Andhakas held the present thesis.[43] Mrs. Rhys Davids and S. Z. Aung have preferred to render the term 'vohāro' into speech obviously for the reason that its reference is confined throughout the debate to speech, otherwise, the term stands for common worldly matters in general.[44] It may be observed that the term *Vohāro* also means behaviour or action and it is perhaps in this sense that it has been used here to signify the pattern of behaviour of the Buddha, which a certain section takes to be supramundane. For illustration, however, the debators take only one aspect of Buddha's behaviour, *i.e.*, speech, which is representative in the entire discussion that follows. The debators use *Vohāra* as if it stood for Sanskrit *Vyāhāra*.

The Theravādins argue that the Andhaka assertion should also imply that Buddha's speech was meant only for the spiritual and not for the mundane ear, and that the spiritual not the mundane intelligence, i.e., the average person (*puthujjana*) responded to it. The proponents would not admit this for they know that his speech worked on the mundane hearing and was responded to by the common man also.[45] According to Buddhaghosa, the sense of the Theravāda query is that when Buddha's speech worked on mundane objects, it cannot be supramundane.[46]

Similarly, the Theravādins enquire whether the terms, *e.g.*, Path (*magga*), Fruit (*Phala*), *Nibbāna*, etc., have been used by the Buddha in the supramundane sense? Further, were there people who were ravished (*rajjeyyuṁ*) by his speech? It is pointed out that there were such people.[47] In that case, a supramundane object would be an occasion for sensuous desire (*rāga*), etc., whereas the case ought to be opposite. Similarly, there were some who were offended (*dusseyyuṁ*) by his habitual speech[48] and some who were baffled (*muyheyyuṁ*) by it,[49] which

should not be expected from a speech that was supramundane. Next, they ask a crucial question: Did all the listeners of the Buddha 'develop the Paths'? The Theravādins point out that his speeches were heard by the foolish, average people (*bāla-puthujjana*), matricides (*mātughātaka*), parricides (*pitughātaka*), slayers of Arahants (*Arahantghātaka*), etc., and the proponents' assertion would mean thereby that all these people developed the Paths.[50]

Now, the proponents take up the issue and make a significant point. They observe that just as one can 'with one golden wand point out both a heap of paddy and a heap of gold', similarly the Buddha 'with his supramundane habitual speech spoke about both mundane and supramundane doctrine'.[51] According to the Theravādins, however, such a view implies that the speech of the Buddha worked upon mundane ears when he spoke of worldly things and on supramundane ears when he spoke of supramundane things; also that his hearers understood with their mundane intelligence in the former case and with their supramundane intelligence in the latter case.[52] The Theravādins, thus, refuse to accept the thesis that 'if you speak of Path, your word becomes Path and so on'.

It is interesting to note that in the *Mahāvastu* also it is affirmed that Buddha's acquisitions are all supramundane (*lokottara*) and cannot be compared to anything worldly.[53] His spiritual practices are supramundane. His bodily movements, *e.g.*, walking, standing, sitting and lying are supramundane. His eating, his putting on robes and other acts are also supramundane.[54]

Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva also make a mention of similar tenets in their respective works. According to Vasumitra, the Mahāsaṁghikas upheld the view that the *sūtras* or discourses preached by the Buddha are perfect in themselves (*nītārtha*). Buddhas speak only of dharma (doctrines), as such their teaching is concerned only with *paramārthasatya* and not with *saṁvṛtisatya*.[55] Also they affirmed that 'the Buddha can expound all the doctrines with a single utterance. There is nothing which is not in conformity with the truth in what has been preached by the world-honoured one'.[56] It may be pointed out, however, that so far as the first proposition of the

Mahāsaṁghikas is concerned, *viz.*, 'all the speeches of the Tathāgata are concerned with the preaching of the righteous law' it was a well-known phrase generally applied for the first sermon of the Buddha delivered at Banaras. But the Mahāsaṁghikas adopted this for all the utterances of the Buddha.[57] Bhavya and Vinītadeva also notice the *lokottara* theses about the Buddha affirmed by the Mahāsaṁghikas.[58]

Vasumitra's treatise also preserves the information that the Sarvāstivādins repudiated the Mahāsaṁghika contention. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the sūtras (or discourses) delivered by the Buddha are not all perfect in themselves (*nītārtha*). The Buddha himself said that there were certain imperfect sutras (*anitārtha-sūtra*).[59] Also the Bahuśrutīyas, another offshoot of the Mahāsaṁghika group, upheld a modified thesis in this respect. They believed that teachings of the Buddha on five themes *viz.*, (1) transitoriness (*anityatā*) (2) suffering (*dukkha*), (3) void (*śūnya*), (4) non-ego (*anātman*) and (5) *Nirvāṇa* are supramundane teachings (*lokottara-śāsana*), because, they lead a man to the attainment of the path of emancipation. The teachings of the Tathāgata on the themes other than the above (literally the remaining sounds of the Tathāgata) are mundane (*laukika-śāsana*).[60]

It is thus affirmed by the Andhakas in the present thesis that the Buddhas are superhuman (*lokottara*) in all their actions, even during the earthly lives. Undoubted as it is that the Buddha had attained perfection in every respect, it would follow, as a natural corollary, that he could not have been subject to the limitation of ordinary life on earth. All life on earth is characterized by evil and suffering. Obviously, therefore, Buddha never lived as a human being. Curiously enough, even the early traditions sometime contain such ideas as this—'from the moment of his enlightenment to the day of his passing away the Buddha said nothing false'[61] Similarly, the phrase, 'all the speeches of the Tathāgata are concerned with the preaching of the righteous law', was commonly applied for the first sermon of Buddha delivered at Banaras,[62] but it could be understood more generally. It is not unlikely that the Andhakas had these suggestions in their mind when they formulated their views.

We know that the Pubbaseliyas held the thesis that speech and action do not necessarily conform to thought,[63] which would be a triviality normally but becomes significant if it were used to cast doubt of the common-sense inference of human thoughts, motives and desires in the Buddha from his overt speech and action.

The Andhakas were led to assert that there are states of the mind which may appear like the passions without really being so. Thus *mettā, karuṇā* and *muditā* are not *rāga,* though they are *rāgapaṭirūpaka.* Similarly, the Buddha's use of apparently opprobrious terms must be held to indicate not *kilesa* but *kilesapaṭirūpaka.*[64]

We have an interesting Mahāsaṁghika thesis which holds the decay and death of supramundane things to be supramundane.[65] The Mahāsaṁghikas argued that, since the decay and death of supramundane things cannot be called mundane it must be called supramundane. The thesis would have significance in relation to the attainments and characteristics of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva as conceived by some of the Mahāsaṁghikas.

POWERS OF THE BUDDHA

The next two controversies on Buddha relate to his Powers. The first deals with yet another Andhaka proposition, *viz.*, the powers of Buddha are common to disciples.[66] According to Buddhaghosa,[67] this is an opinion among the Andhakas derived from a thoughtless consideration of the ten suttas in the *Anuruddha-Saṁyutta,* wherein the Buddha claims to know the causal occasion as such and distinguish it from that which is not the causal occasion.[68] Buddhaghosa offers the explanation that as regards the 'ten powers' of a Tathāgata, some are sharable by his disciples, some not, and some are partly sharable by both. All can share insight into the extinction of *'āsava'*; Buddha alone discerns the degrees of development in the controlling powers (*indriyāni*). But the Andhakas, however, hold that the whole range of his powers was sharable by his leading disciples.[69]

The Theravādins point out that the thesis in question should

imply either that the power of the Tathāgatha is the same as the power of the disciple or else there is difference in the types of power. Similarly, the disciples' previous application (*pubbayoga*), previous line of conduct (*pubbacariyā*), instruction in the Doctrine (*dhammakhānaṁ*), teaching of the Doctrine (*Dhammadesanā*),[70] ought to be of the same type as those of the Tathāgata. All these implications are rejected by the proponents. Similarly, they would not grant that all the adjectives applicable to Buddha are equally applicable to the disciples or that the disciples, like the Buddha, can produce and propound a Path.[71]

The proponents recount those spheres where the powers of the two seem to be equal. In all, ten such examples are illustrated by them.[72] The Theravādins, on the other hand, bring about such facets of the Buddha's power which cannot be shared by the disciples.[73]

In the next debate, it is disputed that 'the power of a Tathāgata, *e.g.*, in discerning as it really is the causal occasion of anything, and its contradictory, is Ariyan'.[74] It is gathered from the Commentary that the Andhakas held that 'of the ten points of discernment or insight, not only the last (insight into extinction of intoxicants), but also the preceding nine were Ariyan'.[75] The Theravādins observe that the Andhakas must also affirm the same about Path (*magga*), Fruit (*phala*), Nibbāna, etc., if they have to maintain their hypothesis. The proponents deny these implications.[76]

In disputing the first issue, the Theravādins take a stand which is more in consonance with the Mahāsaṁghikas and the Lokottaravāda point of view than their own orthodox tradition.[77] They would insist and impress upon the Andhakas that there is need to draw a distinction between the powers of a Buddha and his disciples. It is somewhat difficult to explain as to how the Andhakas came to uphold this thesis in the light of the fact that they believed in the supramundane nature of the Buddha. Curiouly enough, they affirm in the immediately following thesis that all the ten powers of the Buddha are Ariyan. The *Mahāvastu* also mentions the five eyes (*cakṣus*) of the Tathāgata as uncommon and excelling those of the Pratyekabuddhas, Arahants and others.[78] Similarly, Vasumitra attributes to the Mahāsaṁghikas the view that the divine powers of the

Tathāgata are limitless.[79]

THE BUDDHA AND HIS ENLIGHTENMENT (BODHI)

The next controversy rests over the assertion that 'through enlightenment one becomes "the Enlightened".'[80] According to Buddhaghosa, the thesis is held by some, like the Uttarāpathakas, at present.[81]

The Theravādins observe that if it is by virtue of enlightenment that one becomes 'The Enlightened', then it follows that, by virtue of the cessation (*niruddhi*), suspension (*vigati*), subsidence of enlightenment (*paṭisaddhā*), he ceases to be Buddha. The proponents deny this but their thesis implies it. The Theravādins enquire further—'or is one the Enlightened only by virtue of past enlightenment?' The proponents again deny this, but then the previous objection of the Theravādins holds good. And if they assent, it would mean that one who is Enlightened exercises *bodhi* only by the past enlightenment (*bodhi*). The proponents' admittance of this would imply that he understands ill, puts away its cause and so on, by that past enlightenment. In the opinion of the Theravādins, such a proposition would be absurd.[82] Substituting future for the past and then present for future enlightenment, the debating groups enter into a similar argumentation.[83]

Thus, according to the Theravādins, the present thesis ought to imply that one is said to be Enlightened through past, present and future enlightenment.[84] It would mean that there are three enlightenments. If the proponents deny this, their thesis cannot stand and if they assent, they imply that if such a person is being continually gifted with three enlightenments, they are all simultaneously present in him.[85]

The Uttarāpathakas finally lay down that one who is said to be Enlightened (Buddha) is so called as he has acquired enlightenment (*bodhi*) and hence their thesis as presented.[86]

According to Buddhaghosa, *Bodhi* stands for two things : (1) 'insight into the Four Paths', i.e., *catumagañāna*, (2) 'insight into all things', i.e., *sabbaññutañāna* or the omniscience of a Buddha. But some like the Uttarāpathakas fail to differentiate between the two and hold that 'just as a thing is called

white by white-coloured surface so a person is called "Buddha" because of this or that aspect of *bodhi*'.[87] The Theravādins, however, distinguish between the two. There is still a sect in Burma who identify the Buddha with *bodhi* itself, ignoring his distinctive personality.[88] This, in effect, appears to be the intention of the thesis under question. The orthodox point of view, on the other hand, takes the common-sense view of Buddha as a person who experiences Enlightenment.

GIFTS TO THE BUDDHA AND THEIR REWARD

The next point under dispute is that 'it should not be said that anything given to Buddha brings great reward'.[89] According to Buddhaghosa, the Vetulyakas or the Mahāsuññatavādins disputed the idea that 'anything given to Buddha brought great reward'. They maintained this view because the Buddha, according to them, did not really enjoy anything, but only seemed to be doing so out of conformity to life in this world, therefore, nothing given to him was really helpful to him.[90]

According to the Theravādins, the Buddha was a matchless and unique person, unequalled and unrivalled on the earth. How can anyone then maintain that a gift given to him did not bring great reward?[91] There were perhaps none equal to him in virtue (*sīla*), will (*samādhi*) or intellect (*pañña*).[92] The Theravādins quote a certain passage attributed to the Buddha in which it is said that no one in this world or, for that matter in any other world, is better suited for gifts than the Buddha himself.[93] The passage has not, however, been traced so far.[94] Thus, the Theravādins seek to emphasize that the gifts given to Buddha do bring reward. It may be noted here that the Vetulyakas made a similar assertion with regard to the 'Order'. In this thesis, they affirmed that it should not be said that anything given to the Order brings great reward.[95]

BUDDHA'S APPEARANCE IN THE HUMAN WORLD

The next point disputed by the Theravādins in the *Kathāvatthu* is one of the most significant issues of debate over the Buddha. It was affirmed by a certain section of the Buddhists that it is

not right to say that the Buddha lived in this world.[96] Buddhaghosa informs us that some, like the Vetulyakas, owing to a careless interpretation of the *Sutta* passage, 'born in the world, grew up in the world, dwelt having overcome the world, undefiled by the world',[97] hold that the Buddha took birth and lived in the *Tuṣita* heaven; and visited this world only in a specifically created shape. He observes, however, that their citation of the *Sutta* proves nothing, since, the Master was undefiled, not by being born out of the world, but for being untouched by the things of the world.[98]

As goes the discussion, the Theravādins argue, as to whether there are not such shrines, parks, villages, towns, etc., which the Buddha has mentioned? Was he not born at Lumbinī and enlightened under the *Bodhi* tree? Was not the wheel of Norm set rolling by him at Banaras?, and so on.[99] The Theravādins cite such references where the Buddha had mentioned places he was living at the time of particular happenings.[100] On the basis of this, the Theravādins maintain that the Buddha surely lived among men. At this, the proponents refer to the same phrase as noted by Buddhaghosa and observe that it is incorrect to say that the Buddha lived in the human world.[101]

BUDDHA AS ALL-PERVADING

The next thesis, appears to be closely allied to the preceding one. It was affirmed by a certain section that the Buddhas persist in all directions.[102] Buddhaghosa has vaguely attributed the thesis to some, like the Mahāsaṁghikas, who believed that a Buddha exists in the four quarters of the firmament, below, above and around, causing his change of habit to come to pass in any sphere of being.[103]

The Theravādins argue whether the Buddha persists (*tiṭṭhantiti*) in the eastern quarter? If the proponents deny this, it would be a contradiction of the proposed thesis. In case they assent, the question would be as to how this eastern Buddha is named? What is his family, clan and so on?[104]

This thesis also finds a mention in the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Vyākhyā*. It has been said there that the Mahāsaṁghikas believed that Buddhas appear at the same time in more than

one world, and that they are omniscient in the sense that they know all *dharmas* at the same time.[105] Vasumitra, though he does not record the central point of this thesis, nevertheless, attributes to the Mahāsaṁghikas, etc., the latter half of the same, i.e., the Buddhas know all the dharmas at the same time.[106] Curiously enough, the Sarvāstivādins also allowed that several Buddhas may co-exist, though in different universes or fields of Buddha.[107]

BUDDHA'S TEACHING OF THE NORM

In continuation of their distinct views on Buddhology, the Vetulyakas upheld another interesting thesis that it is not right to say that the Buddha himself taught the Norm.[108] According to Buddhaghosa, the Vetulyakas were of the view that the created shape of the Buddha taught the Norm on earth to the venerable Ananda, while the Exalted one himself lived in the Tuṣita city. He created and sent forth that shape.[109]

As the argument goes in the *Kathāvatthu*, the Theravādins question the proponents as to who taught the Norm in case their proposition were to be accepted. According to the Vetulyaka, it was taught by the special creation. Then, according to the Theravādins, this created thing must have been the same as the Master, the Buddha Supreme, etc.[110]

When the Theravādins repeat their question a second time as to who taught the Norm, the Vetulyakas affirm that Ananda taught the Norm. The Theravādins again repeat that in that case he too must have been the conqueror, the Master, etc.[111] Lastly, the Theravādins quote certain utterance of the Buddha. He had once said that 'he may teach the Norm concisely; he may teach it in detail; he may teach it both ways. It is only they, who understand, that are hard to find.'[112] Similarly, the Buddha had said that it is by the higher knowledge that he teaches the Norm and so on.[113] Thus, the Theravādins lay down that the Buddha himself taught the Norm.[114]

Apparently, the Mahāsaṁghikas and the Vetulyakas consider the Buddhas as omnipresent and as such beyond the possibility of location in any particular direction or sphere and they pervade throughout the different directions. The Vetulyakas

specifically seek to lay down two significant tenets in this respect: (1) that the Buddha does not live in the human world, and (2) that it was his created form (*abhinimittojino*) that delivered the doctrine. Vasumitra also attributes to the Mahāsaṁghikas the view that material bodies (*rūpakāyas*), powers (*balas*) length of life (*āyu*), etc., of the Buddha are unlimited.[115] Buddhaghosa points out, that according to the Vetulyakas, the Buddha remained always in the Tuṣita heaven, where he was before his coming to this world. Obviously, the Mahâsaṁghikas and, more so, their offshoot the Vetulyakas upheld a transcendental (*lokottarvāda*) conception of the Buddha.[116] One may easily suggest that the *saṁbhogakāya* conception of the Buddha is preserved in the preceding two theses of the Vetulyakas.[117]

BUDDHA'S 'SUPERNORMAL POWER' (*IDDHI*)

The next debate deals with the thesis that either a Buddha or his disciples have the power to perform anything supernormally.[118] The theory of the Andhakas,[119] as mentioned previously, was unacceptable to the Theravādins and they claim to refute it in the *Kathāvatthu*.

The Theravādins argue as to whether or not one could effect such wishes as 'Let trees be ever green (*niccapaṇṇā*)! ever blossoming (*niccapupphā*)! ever in fruit (*niccaphalikā*)! Let there be perpetual moonlight (*niccamjuṇhaṁ*) and so on.[120] According to the Theravādins, since all this is denied by the proponents, they cannot maintain the proposed thesis. At this, the proponents draw attention to a passage wherein Pilindavaccha is said to have resolved to effect the conversion of the palace of Bimbisāra into an all-gold palace and it did become so converted.[121] Thus, they contend that their thesis holds good.

Buddhaghosa remarks on the proposed thesis that *iddhi* is only possible in certain directions. One cannot contravene by *iddhi* such laws as that of Impermanence, Ill, No-soul and other natural laws. But it is possible to effect the transformation of one character into another or to prolong it in its own character. This is, according to Buddhaghosa, the orthodox doct-

rine to which he adheres. But some, like the Andhakas, hold that *iddhi* may always be wrought by will.[122]

It may be noted here that the Mahāsaṁghikas also claimed that by *iddhi* one may live for a *kappa* on the earth.[123] They claim this on the basis of a *sutta* passage attributed to the Buddha in which it is said that any one, who has cultivated *iddhi*, can live the same life for a *kappa*.[124] The Theravādins, however, reject this on the ground that since one cannot acquire his life-span, destiny or individuality with the help of *iddhi* so one cannot be said to live for a *kappa* by resorting to *iddhi*.[125]

BUDDHA AND PITY

The following controversy rests over the thesis that the Exalted Buddha felt no pity (*karuṇā*).[126] According to Buddhaghosa, some like the Uttarāpathakas, maintain that the 'passionless' Buddha felt no *karuṇā*.[127]

The Theravādins argue that the thesis ought to imply that the Buddha did not feel either love (*mettā*), or sympathetic joy (*karuṇā*), or equanimity (*muditā*). This is, however, denied by the proponents. In the opinion of the Theravādins, then, how was the Buddha to be considered lacking in pity although he possessed these mentioned virtues? Further, the proponents' proposition would imply that the Buddha was ruthless (*akāruṇiko*), though they concede that he was pitiful, kindly towards the world, compassionate towards the world (*lokānukaṁpako*) and went about to do it good.[128] The Theravādins lay down finally that the Exalted Buddha is said to have won the attainment of universal pity. The proponents, however, observe that if it is to be maintained that the Buddha had no passion (*rāga*), then it is similarly true to say that he had no compassion.[129]

It seems that the Uttrāpathaka thesis, *viz*., Buddhas can have no compassion (*karuṇā*) conforms with the basic assumption of the Mahāsaṁghikas that their body is made of *anāśrava dharmas*.[130] How can such a being be supposed to have been accessible to a mere mundane emotion like pity. It is stated in the *Abhidharmakośa* that Buddha's compassion is transcen-

dental, being an aspect of his insight into *Dharmas*.[131] As against the *karuṇā* of a śrāvaka which is mere *karuṇā*, the Buddha is said to possess *mahākaruṇā which is dharmā-lambana*.

DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE BUDDHA

The Theravādins next dispute the thesis that everything of the Buddha was fragrant. Through this thesis, it was sought to be affirmed that even the excreta (*uccārapassāvo*) of the Exalted Buddha excelled all other odorous things.[132] According to Buddhaghoṣa, certain of the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas held this view.[133]

The Theravādins argue in this connection that, should this statement be accepted as true, it would mean that the Buddha was fed on perfumes (*gandhabhojī*). But the proponents concede on the contrary that the Buddha was fed on rice gruel (*odanakummāsan*). Further, if this fantastic situation were real, some would have used the excreta of the Buddha for the purposes of toilet, gathering and saving them in baskets and exposing them in the market and making cosmetics with them. But there is nothing to suggest that anything of this sort was really done.[134]

Buddhaghosa offers the explanation that such a view was entertained owing to an indiscriminate affection for the Buddha.[135] It may be observed that the Lokottaravādins also affirmed that the Buddha washes his body, though there is no dirt to wash; he cleans his teeth though his mouth smells like a lotus.[136]

DISTINCTION AMONG THE BUDDHAS

Lastly, we have a debate on the problem whether or not the Buddhas differ mutually.[137] According to Buddhaghosa, his school holds that except for the differences in body, age and radiance, at any given time, Buddhas differ mutually in no other respect. But there are some like the Andhakas who maintain that they differ in other qualities also.[138] The Theravādins point out that if we accept the proposed thesis, it should be taken to mean that the Buddhas also differ in matters of Enlightenment (*sammappadhānato*), self-mastery (*indriyato*), omniscient insight and vision

(*sabbaññutañāṇa-dassanato*).[139]

Buddhaghosa makes the comment that the Andhakas seek to lay down that the Buddhas differ from one another in some qualities other than attainments like *satipaṭṭhāna, sammappadhāna*, etc., as against which the orthodox school believes that the Buddhas may differ in respect of body (*sarīra*), length of life (*āyu*) and radiance (*pabhāva*), but not in regard to the attainments mentioned here.[140]

However, the present thesis of the Vetulyakas is in consonance with their basic assumption that the Buddha ought to be regarded as a transcendental being whose *nirmāṇakāya* alone visited the earth and preached the doctrine. Obviously, they could not assume that there was any conceivable utility in offering gifts to the Buddha. It may be noted that they made a similar point with regard to the Order. They affirmed that it should not be said that anything given to the Order brings great reward.[141] On the contrary, the Theravādins with their simple belief in a human Buddha were naturally opposed to any such notion as entertained by the Vetulyakas. It is interesting to mention that the problem of the efficacy of gifts to the Buddha is also taken up in the *Milindapañho*. The difficult problem that poses itself is that 'the Buddha is absolutely departed; neither in life, nor yet more in death can he accept gifts; if there be no receipient, how can homage to him avail?' Nāgasena, however, insists on the merit of acts of homage. He lays down that 'men by erecting a shrine do homage to the supreme god under the form of the jewel treasure of his wisdom and win rebirth as a man or god. Diseases come to men without their consent from former evil deeds; it would follow, therefore, that good deed must bear fruit apart from consent.'[142]

MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

Notwithstanding the Theravāda-Vibhajjavāda polemic, as detailed here, it is apparent that different philosophical schools of the Mahāsaṁghika group came out with distinctive theses regarding Buddhahood. Through these theses, they seek to instal the conception of the Buddhahood on a higher pedestal than was

granted in the orthodox Theravāda tradition. To state the new tenets briefly, it was affirmed by the Andhakas that the *vohāra* (i.e., the 'ordinary speech') of the Buddha on this earth was supramundane. In other words, even during the earthly career, the actions of the Buddha were *lokattaro*. All the ten powers (*balas*) of the Tathāgata were Ariyan. Buddha, as also his disciples have the power to perform supernormal feats. The Buddha pervade the firmament. In other words, they are omnipresent and hence beyond the possibility of location in any particular direction or sphere. The Buddha did not really live in the world of mankind and it was only his *nirmāṇakāya* that visited the earth. It was this *nirmāṇakāya* (*abhinimitto jino*) who delivered the doctrine on this earth. To provide gifts to such a Buddha may not be of any use and thus the possibility of the efficacy of gifts to the Buddha has to be ruled out. The Buddha whose body is made of *anāśrava-dharmas* cannot obviously be moved by mere mundane emotions such as pity. In a bid to elevate the personality of the Buddha, a fantastic proposition was made that even his excreta excelled all odorous things. It was also laid down that one who is said to be enlightened is so called solely because he has acquired enlightenment. And lastly there is the Andhaka thesis that Buddhas differ mutually.[143]

It is evidently clear that almost all these theses are in the nature of elevating the concept of Buddha and making it far more sublime than the early belief in a human Buddha. The consensus of these views consists in making the person of the Buddha superhuman (*lokottara*). Philosophically, this involves the two crucial conceptions of *Anāśrava rūpa*[144] and *Nirmāṇakāya*.[145] The former is anaolgous to the *suddhasattva* referred to in the *Yogabhāṣya* to explain the yogic concept of *Īśvara*.[146] The later concepts of *Mahāmāyā*, *Bindu* or *Aprākṛta sattva* are similar.[147] Basically, any concept of a supernatural person presupposes the concept of a supernatural matter, stuff or matrix through which the Person acts in the natural world without being subject to its corruptibility. It was this logic of the situation which later led the Christians to postulate an immaculate birth for Jesus and a transfigured or glorious body for Him when risen from the grave, and which led to Gnostic

and Docetic[148] ideas among some of them. The doctrine of *Nimmita* Buddha is analogous to the Yogic doctrine of *Nirmāṇakāya or Nirmāṇacitta.*[149] What appears as a body from outside is really mind within, being nothing but a thought projection of the Buddha or Yogī. The advantage of acting through such a body is that it does not lead to the accumulation of *Karman.* These two doctrines thus make it possible for the Buddha to remain wholly pure and yet more in the world.

It is generally agreed that a truly transcendental conception of the Buddha emerged fully with the development of Mahāyāna. Therein the Buddha came to be regarded as a quasi-eternal god sending illusory images down to this earth to preach the norm. The Mahāyānists see in him one of the Buddhas residing in various Buddha-lands and influencing believers.[150] Thus developed the *Trikāya* doctrine[151] under the formulation of which the transcendental conception of Buddha was carried to its farthest limits. The Buddha was ascribed complete omniscience. The most outstanding feature of a Buddha, according to them, is his *mahākaruṇā,* that is, the spontaneous activity which is dovetailed with *Prajñā.* Thus the Mahāyānists were almost complete docetists.[152] Obviously, this remarkable idea was developed very gradually by the Buddhist philosophers for the reason that the earliest notions of the Buddha were of a simple mortal, Gautama being the sole Tathāgata. In the old Pāli tradition, Gautama Sākyamuni, after his demise, was regarded as departed though under the shadow of an insoluble mystery. He could not be seen by gods and men, and honour paid to him after his death had only symbolic spiritual significance.[153] In short, the historicity of the Buddha was indispensable for his earliest disciples, whereas 'Mahāyāna escapes the predicament of having to depend on any particular historical person as the founder of that religion'.[154] It is hardly deniable, however, that the primary source of inspiration which sustained the development of Mahāyāna was drawn from the life of the Buddha, its superhuman impression, loving adoration and speculations over it. The growth of his 'biography' and its miraculous exaggerations illustrate the point.

But the conception of Buddha that emerged in the Mahāyāna poses an enigmatic problem if it is to be taken to have developed

suddenly and without antecedents. It is so widely removed in its nature as also from the chronological point of view from the early conception of the Buddha that one cannot perhaps explain it merely as a sudden and new development. Apparently, such an apotheosis of the Buddha could not have flashed upon the minds of monks of the first century B.C. overnight.[155] In all probability it was an outcome of a slow and gradual process that seems to have commenced quite early culminating finally into the almost virtual deification of the Buddha. It seems that the clue to this problem lies in the development of some of the early Buddhist sects mainly belonging to the Mahāsaṁghika group. One might venture to say that most of the theses enumerated here come out with a distinctive conception of the Buddha that may aptly be described as a half-way-house representing a transition between two well-defined phases of Buddhism, viz., Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

Some of the suggestions of the Mahāsaṁghikas appear to be especially important from the point of view of the development of Mahāyāna. Such are the following—that the Buddha does not live in the human world, remaining always in the *Tuṣita* heaven where he was before his coming to this world, and that it was his *nirmāṇakāya* only that visited the earth. This *nirmāṇakāya* (*abhinimitto jino*) delivered the doctrine on this earth. Thus, the entire preaching was done by the apparitional image of the Buddha. Masuda is tempted to perceive a *Saṁbogakāya* conception of the Buddha in these theses.[156] According to N. Dutt, however, though this suggestion may be supported by the fact that in the *Mahāvastu* (I. p. 169) Buddha's *kāya* is equated to *niṣyandakāya* rendered into Chinese by *pao sheng* which is also the rendering of *saṁbogakāyā*, yet the time of the emergence of the *saṁbhogakāya* conception is still a matter of controversy.[157] He has, however, to concede that another thesis viz., 'Buddhas mutually differ', concerns its advocates with nothing but the *saṁbhogakāya* conception.[158] It may be pointed out that in the early orthodox tradition, including the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, the Buddha was conceived in two forms: (1) *Rūpakāya* i.e., the perfected human form in which he lived on this earth after his enlightenment and (2) *Dharmakāya*, i.e., the

doctrinal aspect of the Buddha and his pure qualities..[159] The Mahāsaṁghikas made a distinct departure from this point of view. According to them, the form that appeared on this earth was illusory or *nirmāṇakāya*. But the real form of the Buddha, *i.e.*, his *rūpakāya* should be taken to be infinite and eternal like the Mahāyānika *saṁbhogakāya*. This *rūpakāya* is the result of past good deeds. It is utterly pure and extremely radiant and is capable of assuming a proper shape at a suitable place owing to *ādhiṣṭhānika ṛddhi*. This conception is in fact a prototype of the *Saṁbhogakāya* of the Mahāyāna.[160]

Some of the Sanskrit texts, belonging to the northern tradition, preserve corroborative evidence regarding the elevation of Buddhahood. The treatise of Vasumitra preserves in considerable detail the views upheld by the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools. According to him, the Mahāsaṁghika, the Ekavyāvahārikas, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkuṭikas originally shared the following views with regard to the Buddha. The Buddhas are all supramundane (*lokottara*).[161] There are no *sāśrava* dharmas or defiled elements in all the Tathāgatas.[162] 'All the speeches of the Tathāgata are concerned with the preaching of the righteous law'.[163] 'The Buddha can expound all the doctrines with a single utterance'.[164] 'There is nothing which is not in conformity with the truth in what has been preached by the World-honoured-one.'[165] 'The *rūpakāya* of the Tathāgata is indeed limitless.'[166] 'The divine power of the Tathāgata is also limitless.'[167] The length of life of the Buddha is also limitless.'[168] 'The Buddha is never tired of enlightening the sentient beings and awakening pure faith (*śraddhā*) in them.'[169] 'The Buddha has neither sleep nor dream.'[170] 'The Tathāgata does not pause in answering a question.'[171] 'At no time does the Buddha preach after the arrangement of nouns (*nāma*) and so on, because he is always in *Samādhi*, but the sentient brings rejoice, considering that the Buddha preaches after the arrangement of nouns and so on.'[172] 'The Blessed one understands all things (*dharma*) with a moment's mind (*ekakṣaṇacitta*).'[173] 'He knows all things (*dharma*) with the wisdom befitting a "moment's mind" (*ekakṣaṇikacitta-saṁprayukta prajñā*).'[174] 'The *Kṣīṇajñāna* or "knowledge of exitinc-

tion" and the *anutpādajñāna* or "knowledge of the non-rebirth" are always present in Buddhas, and they continue to be so till their *parinirvāṇa*.'[175] Bhavya has attributed some of these Lokottaravāda views to Ekavyāvahārikas exclusively.[176] Vīnitadeva, on the other hand, associates the Lokottaravādins with these views.[177] The *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Vyākhyā* also preserve the information that the Mahāsaṁghikas upheld the simultaneous existence of several Buddhas in different directions.[178]

The *Mahāvastu*, or the *Vinaya* of the Lokottaravādins, also contains relevant tenets. There is some disagreement among the scholars regarding the date and value of its contents.[179] The work, however, seems to be sufficiently old[180] though its compilation may have been completed in the Gupta Age as the references to the Hūṇas, etc., would suggest.[181] Apart from the close proximity of this work with the Pāli Tradition,[182] there is still much in it of a Mahāyānic character. The intimations of Mahāyānic ideas such as *dharmaśūnyatā*, *trikāya*, the two *āvaraṇas* (*klesa* and *jñeya*) are available in the text.[183] There is also reference to four *caryās*[184] ten *bhumis*,[185] countless Buddhas and their *kṣetras* (spheres). The *lokottara* conception of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas is clearly developed in the text.[186] It is, therefore, aptly described as forming the bridge between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.[187]

The Buddha of the *Mahāvastu* is a superman.[188] All his acquisition are supramundane and cannot be compared to anything in the mundane world.[189] His spiritual practices and merits are supramundane. Even his physical actions, *e.g.*, walking, standing, sitting, eating, etc., are supramundane. He does not feel hunger or thirst; 'he lives in ignorance of carnal desires; his wife remained a virgin. It is from owing to the considerations for humanity, in order to conform to the ways of the world (*lokānuvartana*), that he shows his *iriyāpathas* or behaves as a man or merely gives to men the false impression that he is behaving as a man.[190] His feet are clean, still he washes them; his mouth smells like the lotus, still he cleans the teeth. His body is not touched by the sun or wind or rain, still he puts on garments and lives under a roof. He cannot have any disease and still he takes medicine to cure himself. All this is due to his being an embodiment of the effects of good actions.[191] There

is nothing in common between him and the beings of the world. Everything of the great *ṛsi* is transcendental, including his advent into the world.[192]

THE PLACE OF THE MIRACULOUS IN THE EARLY BUDDHIST TRADITIONS

The Buddha himself appears to have condemned the display of miraculous powers and disclaimed the teaching of the way of their acquisition. In the *Mahālisuttanta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, Sunakhatta Licchaviputta complains that although he spent three years with the Lord he did not hear any celestical sound.[193] Buddha told him that *samādhi* was intended for Nirvāṇa, not for supernormal psychic experiences. In the *Kevatta sutta* he explicitly condemns the display of miracles saying that even hypnosis (*gāndhārī vidyā*) and crystal-gazing can produce such powers.[194] Nevertheless, the practice of the holy path was itself supposed to lead to the six supernormal powers or *abhiññās*. More particularly, Buddha claimed the three *vijjās*. In the *Kathāvatthu* we find an attempt to discuss some of the problems involved in the beliefs in supernormal powers of the mind. Thus, it is suggested by some that the psychic control of another's mind may be possible.[195] The next thesis suggests the possibility of psychically helping another.[196] Also there is a discussion about the relationship of *dibbacakkhu* and *dibbasota* to their corporeal counterparts.[197] 'The "Celestial eye" amounts to insight into destiny according to deeds'.[198] There is another debate about the exact object in *cetopariyāyeñāṇa*.[199] Some held that it was the bare citta or *viññāṇa*, others that it included the *saṁprayukta dharmas* also.[200] Another controversy records two views about the knowledge of the future; one asserting its possibility unconditionally and appealing to the Buddha's own predictions about the fate of Pāṭaliputra.[201]

A critical analysis of the views preserved in the *Kathāvatthu*, the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva and *Mahāvastu* would show that they sustain the twin tendencies ascribed to the development of Buddhist docetism. One is the way of mythical fancies about the superhuman nature of the Buddha and the other that of metaphysical speculation on his person-

ality as a Tathāgata and on its relation with the truth (*dharma*) which he revealed.[202] Mahāyāna marks the meeting point of the two streams and the culmination of Buddhist docetism. The theses we have discussed are characterized by both types of speculations. It may be remarked, however, that, whereas ideas preserved in the *Kathāvatthu* and *Mahāvastu* are mostly of the first type i.e., mythical fancies about the supramundane nature of the Buddha, those enumerated by Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva contain many such theses as seek to explain the Buddha in the latter aspect, i.e., as a metaphysical principle and in relation to the doctrine preached by him. The philosophical principles have been indicated here. The other side grew as part of a developing religious sentiment which is comparable to *Bhakti*. In fact, the *Bhagavadgītā* with its emphasis on the concepts of supernatural God (*Bhagavān*), *Avatāra*, the supernatural birth and deeds of Kṛṣna[203] and the doctrine of Grace presents a parallel development out of Upaniṣadic ideas. We do not know what direct contact there was between the Buddhist monks and the Bhāgavatas but they do appear as parallel, though, different lines of thought between which interaction was certainly possible. One may, however, point out that the similarity here is more in the sentiment than in the conceptions because the Buddha is never conceived as a God for he is never the creator or ordainer of the universe. Nor, on the other hand, is the *Avatarā* merely an appearance.

It may, thus, be suggested that these views, that came to be held about the Buddha and his nature by the Mahāsaṁghika group of school, show a distinct departure from the notions of a human Buddha and affirm such propositions which are in very close proximity with the Mahāyāna docetism. Quite a few of these new reflections are reminiscent of the conception of the Buddha that emerged in the Mahāyāna. It seems that the process of mythologizing began soon after the passing away of the Master and found many adherants outside the pale of strictly orthodox teachers. Basically, they seem to have been

motivated by a devotional attitude towards the Master and developed philosophical speculations in the same direction The Mahāsaṁghikas were evidently the earliest school of the Hīnayānists to show a tendency for conceiving the Buddha docetically which was brought to completion by some of their sub-sects, *viz.*, Vetulyakas, Andhakas, Uttrāpathakas and above all the Lokottaravādins. One might aptly describe the Mahāsaṁghikas and their sub-sects as the precursors of Mahāyāna.[204]

REFERENCES

1. See *Kathāvatthu*, II, 10; see also Wassiljew, *Der Buddhismus*, Vol. I, p. 105.
2. See *Kathāvatthu*, XVIII, 1,2; Cf. Wassiljew, op. cit.
3. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 19ff; Cf. Wassiljew, op. cit.
4. Wassiljew, op. cit., I, p. 107.
5. Bodhisattva controversies have been treated separately in the following chapter.
6. Cf. those sections of the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* in which the Buddha appears as a human being, e.g., the illness of the Buddha at Beluvāgrāma; the grief of Ānanda in the fifth section.
7. Frauwallner, op. cit., pp. 42ff.
8. Cf. अलं वक्कलि किं ते पूतिकायेन दिट्ठेन । यो खो वक्कलि धम्मं पस्सति सो मं पस्सति *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 341.
9. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 341.
10. Cf. अगुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये संनिविट *Katha Upaniṣad*, 2. 6. 17; इहैवान्तः शरीरे सौम्य स पुरुषो *Praśna Upanisād*, 6. 2. य एषोऽक्षिणी पुरुषो दृश्यत एष आत्मेति *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 4. 15. 1. see also *Brahmajāla* and *Pāvāsi* suttas of the *Dīgha Nikāya.*
11. Cf. Benjamin Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India*, pp. 33, 56, 65.
12. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 42-3.
13. E.J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 148.
14. See *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 217ff; II. pp. 331ff.
15. Ibid., II, p. 174.
16. Cf. *na me te vutta-vādino*, etc., Ibid., II, p. 174.
17. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Tevijjavacchagotta suttanta*, p. 173ff.
18. '*Ñāṇajāla*', Cf. *Mahāniddesa*, pp. 301ff.
19. *Triratna.*
20. See supra chapter III.
21. *Cullavagga*, p. 425.
22. Cf. Frauwallner, op. cit., pp. 42ff.
23. See Anesaki, *ERE*, IV, pp. 835-40; s.v. *Buddhist Docetism.*
24. See Hardayal, *The Bodhisāttva Doctrine*, p. 29.
25. Cf. e.g., *Dīgha Nikāya*, suttas 14-16. See also Kern, op. cit.
26. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, op. cit., I, p. 239.
27. Ibid.
28. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, p. 240.
29. Ibid.
30. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 25.

31. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 357.
32. Masuda, op. cit., p. 20; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, I, p. 240.
33. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 21.
34. Ibid., pp. 20-1.
35. Masuda, op. cit., p. 20; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, I, p. 240.
36. See Anesaki, *ERE*, IV, p. 837, s.v. Buddhist Docetism.
37. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 59, 62, 63, 76, 169, etc.
38. Cf. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 19ff.
39. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, II, pp. 173, 193.
40. Ibid., II, p. 193.
41. See Wassiljew, op. cit., pp. 258-62.
42. *Buddhassa Bhagavato Vohāro lokuttaro ti? Kathāvatthu*, II, 10.
43. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 59.
44. *Points of Controversy*, p. 134n.
45. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 201-2.
46. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 59-60.
47. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 135; *Psalms of the Brethren*, verse, 1270; *Dialogues of the Buddha*; II, 16.
48. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 160; *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, *Pathika Suttanta*, pp. 4ff.
49. *Majjhima Nikāya* I, pp. 147-8.
50. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 203-4.
51. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 204.
52. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 204-5.
53. *Mahāvastu*, I, pp. 48, 159; see also Masuda, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
54. See Ibid., I, pp. 167-70.
55. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 19; see also Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, pp. 238-9.
56. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19.
57. Ibid., p. 19n.
58. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, II, pp. 173, 193.
59. Masuda, op. cit., p. 52.
60. Ibid., pp. 35-6.
61. See Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 204.
62. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 19n.
63. *Kathāvatthu*, IX, 10-11; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 120-121.
64. See *Kathāvatthu*, XXIII, 4; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 198.
65. *Lokuttarānaṅ dhammānaṁ jarāmaranaṅ lokuttaraṅ ti? Kathāvatthu*, XV. 6; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhākathā*, p. 154.
66. *Tathāgatabalaṁ sāvakasādhāraṇaṁ ti? Kathāvatthu*, III, 1.
67. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 62.
68. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV, p. 260.
69. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 62.
70. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*. p. 62.

71. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 207-8.
72. Ibid., pp. 208-9.
73. Ibid., pp. 207ff.
74. *Thanāthāne yathābhutaṁ ñānaṁ Tathāgatabalaṁ ariyaṁ ti?*, *Kathāvatthu*, III, 2, see also *Points of Controversy*, p. 142.
75. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 63.
76. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 210ff.
77. Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 80.
78. See *Mahāvastu*, I, pp. 159-60.
79. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19.
80. *Bodhiyā Buddho ti? Kathāvatthu*, IV. 6.
81. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 76.
82. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 251-2.
83. Ibid , pp. 252-3.
84. Ibid., p. 252.
85. Ibid., p. 253; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 76-7.
86. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 253; see also *Points of Controversy*,] p. 165n. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 77.
87. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 76.
88. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 164n.
89. *Na Vattabbaṁ Buddhassa dinnaṁ mahapphalaṁ ti? Kathāvatthu*, XVII, 10.
90. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 169.
91. *Kathāvatthu*, XVIII, 1.
92. Ibid., p. 479.
93. Cf. Ibid., p. 479.
94. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 321n.
95. See *Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 9.
96. *Na vattabbaṁ Buddho Bhagavā manussaloke aṭṭhāsīti? Kathāvatthu*, XVIII, 1.
97. See *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 357; see also *Debates Commentary*, p. 211.
98. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 171.
99. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 482.
100. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, 326; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, V, 185; see also *Kathāvatthu*, p. 482.
101. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 483.
102. *Sabbā disā Buddho tiṭṭhantīti? Kathāvatthu*, XXI. 6.
103. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 190.
104. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 523.
105. *Abhidharmakośa*, III, p. 200; IX, p. 254; see also *Sphutārthā*, p. 103.
106. Masuda, op. cit., p. 20; see also Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, p. 240.
107. See Poussin, *ERE*, VIII, p. 329, s.v. *Buddhology*.
108. *Na vattabbaṁ Buddhena Bhagavatā dhammo desito ti? Kathāvatthu*, XVIII, 2.
109. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 171.

110. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 483; see also *Points of Controversy*, p. 325n.
111. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 483.
112. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 123-4.
113. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 325n.
114. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 484.
115. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
116. Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 255.
117. Masuda, op. cit., p. 18n.
118. *Atthi adhippāya iddhi Buddhānaṁ vā sāvakānaṁ vā ti? Kathāvatthu*, XXI. 4.
119. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 189.
120. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 521-2.
121. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 522.
122. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 189.
123. *Iddhibalena samannāgato kappaṁ tiṭṭheyyāti, Kathāvatthu*, XI. 7; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 131.
124. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 398.
125. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 396ff.
126. *Natthi Buddhassa Bhagavato Karuṇā ti? Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 3.
127. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 172.
128. *'Bhagavā Kāruṇiko lokahito lokānukampako lokatthacaro'*, *Kathāvatthu*, p. 484.
129. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 485.
130. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19.
131. See *Abhidharmakośa*, VII, pp. 77ff.
132. *Buddhassa Bhagavato uccārapassāvo ativiya aññe gandhajāte adhigaṇhātīti? Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 4.
133. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*; p. 172.
134. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 485.
135. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 172.
136. *Mahāvastu*.
137. *Atthi Buddhānaṁ Buddhehī hīnātirekatā ti, Kathāvatthu*, XXI. 5.
138. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 190.
139. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 522.
140. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 190.
141. *Na Vattabbaṁ Saṁghassa dinnaṁ mahāphalaṁ ti? Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 9.
142. Cf. *Milindapañha*, p. 15f.
143. For the details of the controversies on these issues see supra.
144. Cf. Masuda, op. cit., p. 18.
145. Cf. Ibid., p. 18n.
146. See *Yogabhāsya, ad Yogasutras*, I. 24.
147. See G.N. Kaviraja, *Tāntrik Vāṅgamaya me Śāktadrisṭi*, pp. 7, 245; *Bhārtīya Sanskriti Aur Sādhanā*, I, pp. 24, 200.
148. See *ERE*, IV, s.v. Docetism.
149. *Yogasūtra*, IV.4 ; Cf. G.N. Kaviraja, *Nirmāṇakāya*, in *Saraswati Bhawan Studies*, Vol. I.

150. See T.R.V. Murti, op. cit., pp. 6, 284ff; see also Poussin, *ERE*, VIII, p. 329, s.v. *Buddhology*; E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 232-4.
151. On the Development of *Trikāya* Doctrine see G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, pp. 341-50; N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*; Cf. T.R.V. Murti, op. cit., pp. 284ff; see also Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Vol. II, pp. 696ff; Cf. *svabhāvāvikaḥ sāmbhogiko nairmāṇiko paras tathā; dharmakāyaḥ sakāritaś caturdhā samudiritaḥ*, *Abhisamaya Ālaṁkāra Aloka of Haribhadra*, p. 26.
152. Cf. Anesaki, *ERE*, IV, p. 835, s.v. *Buddhist Docetism*.
153. Hardayal, op. cit., p. 25.
154. T.R.V. Murti, op. cit., p. 287.
155. Cf. *M.M. G.N. Kaviraja Abhinandana Grantha*, pp. 166-74.
156. Masuda, op. cit., p. 18n.
157. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 76n.
158. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 76.
159. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 341; *Visuddhimaggo*, *Saddhammasaṅgaho*; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 11; see also Anesaki, *ERE*, XII, pp. 202-4, s.v. *Tathāgata*; N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 101-2.
160. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 18-19; G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 350.
161. Masuda, op. cit., p. 18; see Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, p. 238.
162. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19; Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 74n; see Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, p. 238.
163. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19.
164. Ibid., p. 19; see Bareau, ibid., p. 139.
165. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19.
166. Ibid., p. 19.
167. Ibid. p. 19.
168. Ibid., p. 20.
169. Ibid., p. 20.
170. Ibid., p. 20.
171. Ibid., p. 20.
172. Ibid., p. 20.
173. Ibid., p. 20.
174. Ibid., p. 20.
175. Ibid., p. 20.
176. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 173.
177. Ibid., Pt. II, p. 193.
178. *Abhidharmakośa*, VII, p. 254; *Sphutārthā*, p. 103.
179. Cf. Windisch, *Composition des Mahāvastu*; Poussin, *ERE*, VIII, p. 329.
180. See Poussin, *ERE*, VIII, p. 329, s.v. *Buddhology*.
181. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 326.
182. Cf. *Mahāvastu*, II, p. 363; III, pp. 65-6, 331-7, 345, 363, 448-9, etc.
183. Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 62.
184. *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 145, 153-4.

185. *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 144: Cf. *Lalitavistara*, p. 65.
186. Jones, *Mahāvastu*, (Trans.,) I, pp. 112-51 ; Senart, *Mahāvastu*, I, pp. 142-93.
187. Poussin, *ERE*, VIII, p. 329, s.v. *Buddhology*.
188. Cf. *Mahāvastu*. , pp. 148, 167-8.
189. नहि किंचित सम्यक्संबुधानां लोकेन समं । अथ खलु सर्वमेव महर्षिणां लोकोत्तरम् ।
     तथाहि सम्यक् संबुद्धानां समुदागमः सोऽपि लोकोत्तरः ।
     Mahāvastu, I, p. 159.
190. लोकानुवर्तनां बुद्धा अनुवर्तन्ति लौकिकीं । प्रज्ञप्तिमनुवर्तन्ति यथा लोकोत्तरामपि ।। *Mahāvastu*, I, 168.
191. बुदानां शुभनिष्यदानां एषा लोकानुवर्तना । *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 169.
192. *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 159.
193. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, *Mahālisutta*, pp. 129ff.
194. Ibid., I, *Kevattha sutta*, pp. 183ff.
195. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, XVI, 1.
196. Cf. Ibid., XVI. 2.
197. Cf. Ibid., III. 7-8.
198. Cf. Ibid., III. 9.
199. Cf. Ibid., V. 7.
200. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 84-5.
201. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, V. 8.
202. Cf. Anesaki, *ERE*, IV., pp. 835-40, s.v. *Buddhist Docetism*.
203. जन्म कर्मंच मे दिव्यमेवं यो वेत्ति तत्वतः ।
     त्यक्त्वा देहं पुर्नजन्म नैति मामेति सोऽर्जन ।।
     Bhagavadgītā. IV. 9.
204. Cf. N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, op. cit., p. 32.

5

The Ideal of the Bodhisatta

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Bodhisatta[1] controversies recorded in the *Kathāvatthu* are part of a larger complex of ideas and problems which include those relating to the Arahant and the Buddha. With an assertion of the failings and imperfections of the Arahant[2] there was an extraordinary change in the conceptions about the Buddhahood.[3] As such, it was laid down that the Buddha never visited this world personally, but instead his illusory form appeared on the earth and delivered the doctrine. He was thus placed on the way to be ultimately absolutized and deified in the Mahāyāna. It was, perhaps, quite natural to evolve a Bodhisatta stage for the Buddha in the process of such mythical fancies. If the Buddha is transcendental (*lokottara*) and his body is made of *anāśrava* dharmas, the Bodhisatta should also not be taken as an average human being. He must also be supramundane. In the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva, several such views are expounded by the Mahāsaṁghikas and their sub-sects.[4] The *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara* also contain such reflections on the nature of Bodhisatta.[5]

Curiously enough, we find in the *Kathāvatthu* that, whereas there are numerous points for the Theravādins to refute about the Buddha, the new theses about the Bodhisatta are comparatively few in number. The problems raised therein may be summarized as follows: (1) Is one gifted with the thirty-two characteristic marks, necessarily a Bodhisatta or not?[6] (2) whether or not a Bodhisatta takes rebirth into a state of woe and undertakes a difficult course of life out of his own accord and-free will?[7] (3) whether or not he is destined or assured prior to his last birth?[8] The Bodhisatta controversies discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* seem to suggest two things: (1) that, the previous lives of Gautama Buddha began to excite interest, speculation and discussion and (2) that, although a systematic Bodhisatta doctrine as of Mahāyāna was yet to come, some of the points affirmed were already heading in that direction as the one about the Bodhisatta taking rebirth into the states of suffering and hardships. By implication it means that there was a gradual growth of the Bodhisatta doctrine before it finally assumed in the Mahāyāna the concept of a '*bodhi*-being', 'spiritual-warrior', 'saviour' and so on.[9]

The growth of new theses about the Bodhisatta, it seems, is closely linked with the growth of new conceptions about the Buddha. As with the Buddha, so in the case of the Bodhisatta, the Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins as also the old *Āgamas* entertained some notions of an extraordinary superior being (*manusuttara*) though they took both the Buddha and the Bodhisatta as strictly historical personages. However, some of the new sects deviated from the current notions and started elevating their concepts about the Buddha and the Bodhisatta by adorning them with superhuman qualities. The Mahāsaṁghikas, the Lokottaravādins, the Ekavyāvahārikas, the Vetulyakas, etc., were primarily instrumental in the growth of this process.[10] The Mahāsaṁghikas and the Lokottaravādins came to believe that the Bodhisattas are self-born; they appear as human beings for the sake of conformity to the world (*lokānuvartana*), although their form is only mental (*manomaya*).[11] The Ekavyāvahārikas added that the Bodhisattas, in fact, have no form.[12] The Vetulyakas went to the extent of saying that from the *Tuṣitaloka* there descended only a *nirmāṇakāya* of the Buddha on this earth.[13]

The *Mahāvastu* dwells at some length on the Lokottaravāda notion of the Bodhisattahood. *Mahāvastu*, like the *Nidānakathā*[14] divides the account of Gautama Buddha's life into three parts. The first part relates the story of his Bodhisatta career during the time of Dīpaṅkara Buddha. The second deals with the account of *Tuṣitaloka*, his conception and attainment of *bodhi*. The third part describes the details of *Dharmacakrapravartana*, *i.e.*, the starting of the wheel of *Dharma* or preaching the *Dharma* (*Dharmadeśanā*), and the commencement of the Order (*Saṁgha*) This last phase is also comparable to the Pāli account preserved in the *Mahāvagga*.[15] According to the *Mahāvastu*, the Bodhisattas are self-born (*upapāduka*) and not born of parents.[16] A Bodhisatta sits cross-legged in the womb and preaches therefrom to the gods.[17] During his stay in the womb, he remains untouched by the phlegm and the dirt of the womb. He issues from the right side of the womb without piercing it.[18] He cannot have *Kāma*, his wife remained a virgin and thus *Rāhula* also was self-born.[19]

The Mahāsaṁghikas and their sub-sects were not alone engaged in elevating the concept of the Bodhisatta. The Sarvāstivādins also contributed in a certain measure towards the development of the Bodhisatta ideal. *Lalitavistara*,[20] the text containing the Sarvastivāda version of the life of Buddha, bears testimony to this. Although the text of *Lalitavistara* closely resembles the *Pāli Tripiṭaka*,[21] yet its initial portions as also the end are clearly Mahāyānic. The Sarvāstivādins upheld the existence of numerous Buddhas and countless Bodhisattas as also the contemporaneity of the former in different areas (*kṣetra*).[22] According to the *Lalitavistara*, the Bodhisatta is not only placed in a crystal casket put within the womb but, while in that state, he is said to preach the *dharma* to the heavenly beings who flock around him.[23]

The treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva also depict an elevated picture of the life and career of the Bodhisattas as subscribed by the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools. To sum up some of the important theses in the accounts of Vasumitra, it is said that the Bodhisattas do not pass through the embryonic stages.[24] They assume the form of a white elephant

as they enter their mother's womb and come out of the same by the right side.[25] We are reminded here of the white elephant seen by Māyādevī in a dream at the time of her conception and the birth of the Bodhisatta by bursting through the right side of the mother's womb.[26] Further, it is said that the Bodhisattas do not entertain the thoughts of greed (*kāmasaṁjñā*), anger (*vyāpādasaṁjñā*) or harming others (*vihiṁsāsaṁjñā*).[27] They even enter into the bad states of existence for helping the beings of the world.[28] Bhavya and Vinītadeva also make a mention of some of these theses.[29]

This is the outline of the Bodhisatta concept as it was emerging during the time of *Kathāvatthu.* Contemporary accounts preserved in other works fill up the gaps left by the *Kathāvatthu* which discusses only a few tenets about the Bodhisattahood. However, the Bodhisatta theses summarized here make it amply clear that their growth is closely linked with the growth of new conceptions about the nature of the Buddha. The movement manifested itself in a process of idealization and spiritualization of the figure of the Buddha and his nature (*svabhāva*) and the growth of devotion or faith (*bhakti*) towards the Master. Scholars like Winternitz,[30] Kern,[31] Senart,[32] Saunders,[33] Poussin,[34] etc., have suggested that the element of *bhakti* was adopted in Buddhism from Hinduism mainly from *Bhagavadgītā*. Hardayal has argued that Buddhism had its own genius of origination and innovation.[35] We have noted the parallelism as well as the conceptual difference between the Buddhistic and the Bhāgavata developments. On account of the uncertain chronology of the *Gīta*,[36] it is difficult to assert that it was definitely anterior to the Mahāsaṁghika ideas, which emerged between Kālāśoka and Aśoka or even to the emergence of Mahāyāna, which has to be placed in the first century B.C.[37] The basic ideas of the *Gītā*, however, were most probably earlier than the second century B.C., but it is difficult to pinpoint the exact epoch of their emergence.[38]

The Buddhist feeling of reverence and adoration for the Buddha and the Bodhisatta is not *bhakti* in the sense of love for an indwelling deity who assumes a human form so that he may enter into a personal human relation with his disciples. The attitude of the Buddhists is essentially that of '*gurubhakti*',

seeking to transcend human life with the help of the Buddha. The goal for the Buddhists is utter transcendence while the *Bhakti* religion culminated in the doctrine of participation in divine immanence or *Līlā*.

It is, however, plausible that, at the popular level, the universal religious feeling of devotion should have found an outlet among the Buddhists through the adaptation of the new ideal of Bodhisatta in the light of current methods of worship and adoration of the gods and *yakṣas*.[39] The process of mythical conceptions about the life of Bodhisatta and the nature of Bodhisattahood led ultimately to his conversion into the ideal spiritual pilgrim of Mahāyāna, on the one hand, and a popular figure receiving adoration and worship like a deity, on the other. The process seems to have started with the emergence of the Mahāsaṁghikas and its sub-sects in the history of Buddhist thought.

THESES AND ARGUMENTS

THE SELF-GOVERNED DESTINY[40] OF THE BODHISATTA

The first controversy about the Bodhisatta rests over his 'self-governed destiny'. It is affirmed by the Andhakas[41] that the Bodhisatta undertakes difficulties and hardships, such as, he goes to an 'evil doom', enters a womb, performs hard tasks and works penance under alien teachers of his own accord and free-will.[42]

The Theravādins take up the issue with the Andhakas and enquire as to whether they imply thereby that the Bodhisatta so went and endured purgatory (*nirayaṁ*) the *sañjīva*, *kālasutta*, etc.[43] In case the proponents deny this, they cannot maintain their thesis. Since, according to the proponents, the Bodhisatta does so owing to free-will, should the said free-will of the Bodhisatta be taken to imply that he could select to be reborn in purgatory or as an animal also, that is to say, does he possess magic potency (*iddhi*)?[44] According to Buddhaghosa, 'free-will, as liberty to do what one pleases through a specific power or gift, is practically a denial of *karma*'.[45] The Theravādins further question as to whether the Bodhisatta practised

the different steps to that potency (*chhandiddhipādo*), viz., will, effort (*viriyiddhipādo*), thought (*cittiddhipādo*) and investigation (*vīmaṁsiddhipādo*). Again, as to the third point of the proponents that the Bodhisatta, of his own free-will, performed hard and painful tasks, the Theravādins ask: 'Does it mean that he fell back on wrong views such as "the world is eternal" (*sassatoloko*), etc., or "the world is finite" (*antavāloko*) etc., "soul and body are the same or different", etc.?' Lastly, did the Bodhisatta, while making a series of penances following alien teachers, also subscribe to the view held by these teachers?[46]

According to Buddhaghosa, the Andhakas were led to this belief on the basis of the six-toothed *Jātaka* (*Chadantajātaka*) and similar others.[47]

Vasumitra also preserves information about some theses relevant to the preceding one. According to him, the Mahāsaṁghikas and some of their sub-sects like the Ekavyāvahārika, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkuṭikas, upheld the view that 'for the benefit of sentient beings (*sattva*), Bodhisattas are born into bad states (*durgati*) at will and can be born into any of them as they like'.[48] The destinies mentioned are that of the condemned (*nārakīya*), famished ghosts (*preta*) and that of the animals.[49] Bhavya has also recorded this view but he attributes it to the Ekavyāvahārikas exclusively.[50]

Thus, a section of the Buddhists believed that the Bodhisattas are born into the bad states out of their own free-will. And this they do owing to the predominantly altruistic consideration for other beings, a feature that characterizes the very nature of a Bodhisatta's personality as developed in the Mahāyāna.[51] The thesis obviously implies a negation of the factor of *karman*, that is to say, that such births of the Bodhisattas are not caused by their *karman* and that they are so born by the power of their will.[52] Buddhaghosa also notes that the problem of *iddhi* is raised in the controversy only in order to assert the fact that free-will, as liberty to do what one pleases through a specific power or gift, is practically a denial of *karman*.[53]

We owe the information again to Vasumitra that the sects of Caityaśaila, the Aparaśaila and the Uttaraśaila also contributed to the subject under dispute. They shared the belief that the

Bodhisattas do not escape from metempsychosis into the bad states of existence (*durgati*).[54] Similarly, Vinītadeva has also noted that the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila schools upheld the view that the Bodhisattas are not free (*vimukta*) from being born into the bad states of existence (*durgati*).[55] This second set of opinion shared by the Śaila schools obviously harbours a certain amount of contradiction and discrepancy. The *Kathāvatthu* associates with the Andhakas the view that the Bodhisattas take birth into the bad states of existence (*durgati*) out of their own free-will.[56] Vasumitra and Bhavya attribute the same thesis to the Mahāsaṁghikas, the Ekavyāvahārikas, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkuṭikas.[57] But Vasumitra and Vinītadeva further attribute to the Caityāśaila, the Aparaśaila and the Uttaraśaila the view that the Bodhisattas are not free from metempsychosis into the bad states. The latter view sounds as an anti-thesis of the position held by the Andhakas in the Pāli tradition and the Mahāsaṁghikas, etc., in the tradition of Vasumitra and Bhavya. There is, however, some clue to solve this riddle which appears to have arisen due to some discrepancy. The discrepancy is evident, from different Chinese renderings of Vasumitra's work.[58] According to Yuan-chwang's rendering, the Caityaśaila, the Aparaśaila and the Uttaraśaila sects believed that the Bodhisattas are free from rebirth into the bad states of existence.[59] But Tsin's Chinese translation of the same work completely reverses the theory in question. According to this work, the Bodhisattas escape from bad states of existence (*durgati*).[60] These two, entirely contradictory versions of the same thesis, suggest that there was some confusion about this view. One might suggest that the original thesis was perhaps the same as that recorded in the *Kathāvatthu*, i.e., the Bodhisattas take rebirth into the bad states of existence (*durgati*) out of their own free-will for helping the beings of this universe. This thesis might have been advocated, in the beginning, by the Mahāsaṁghikas, the Ekavyāvahārikas, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkuṭikas as the traditions of Vasumitra and Bhavya testify. These sects are likely to have done so in their enthusiasm for elevating the ideal of the Bodhisatta. Later on, it seems, however, that the Andhakas got struck to this thesis more than other offshoots of the Mahāsaṁghikas as

Buddhaghosa attributes it to the Andhakas exclusively. It is, perhaps, due to this development that Vasumitra has been led to attribute the original thesis to the Mahāsaṁghikas, etc., and a part of it, rather a distorted one, to the Caityaśaila, the Aparaśaila and the Uttaraśaila. Vinitadeva also gives the name as the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila.[61] We know that Andhaka was a general appellation given to these sects due to their geographical location.[62] As regards the distortion of the original thesis, as given by Vasumitra and Vinītadeva, that the Bodhisattas are not free from the metempsychosis into the bad states, of which the opposite version is also preserved in Tsin's translation of the former's work, it appears that it is due to the brevity of expression that the view has been misstated. Otherwise, it hardly makes any sense to say that the Bodhisattas do not escape the bad states of existence a position quite unbecoming for the Bodhisatta.

BODHISATTA AND HIS CHARACTERISTIC MARKS

Another point discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* about the Bodhisattas arises from the thesis that one who is gifted with the marks (*lakkhaṇas*) is a Bodhisatta.[63] According to Buddhaghosa, this belief was upheld by the Uttarāpathakas.[64]

The Theravādins observe that by proposing this thesis the proponents must also admit the following: (1) That any one who is gifted with the marks to a limited extent is, in the same manner, a limited Bodhisatta. (2) That a universal emperor (*cakkavattisatto*),[65] gifted with the same marks, is a Bodhisatta, and that the 'previous study' (*pubbayogo*) and 'conduct' (*pubbacariyā*) 'declaring and teaching the Norm' (*dhammākhānaṁ dhammadesanā*) in the careers of the Bodhisatta and the universal emperor are identical. (3) That when a universal emperor is born, he is received by the *devas* first and the human beings later as in the case of a new-born Bodhisatta.[66] (4) That the 'four sons of the *devas*' receive the new-born imperial babe, place it before the mother and speak to her thus: "Rejoice O, queen! to thee is born a mighty son",[67] just as they do for the new-born Bodhisatta. The Theravādins insist upon drawing similar other implications.[68]

All these points are denied by the proponents. Buddhaghosa explains that the proponents assent with regard to a Bodhisatta but reject with regard to one who is not a Bodhisatta.[69] It is argued by the Uttarāpathakas that their proposition cannot be wrong in the light of the fact that the Buddha himself said that for one endowed with the thirty-two marks of a superman, only two careers lie open. If he lives the household life he becomes a *chakravarti* ruler, but if he chooses to renounce the household life he becomes an Arahant, Buddha Supreme.[70]

It has been noted above[71] that the name of the Uttarāpathaka sect is conspicuous by its absence in other works except the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā* of Buddhaghosa. In conformity with this, the thesis of the Uttarāpathakas in question is not met with anywhere else except the *Kathāvatthu.* This is not, however, denying a basis for their thesis or suggesting that it was not grounded in some authoritative texts. Perhaps the Uttarāpathakas are the same as the Lokottaravādins of Bamiyan.[72] In fact, the idea of thirty-two principal marks is as old as the concept of Bodhisatta itself. It is enumerated both in the Pāli as well as Sanskrit works.[73] What is particular about the Uttarāpathakas in this regard is that, on the basis of such references as mentioned, they formulated the view that one who is gifted with the marks is a Bodhisatta.[74]

It is interesting to note here the Sarvāstivāda observation on this point. According to this school, one acquires the name Bodhisatta from the moment one manifests the thirty-two marks of the great man. From then onwards, one is always born as a man and in a noble clan.[75]

The Theravādins try to refute the Uttarāpathaka thesis on the basis of Canonical statements that the imperial babe is also endowed with the thirty-two marks but does not become a Bodhisatta. Buddhaghosa also observes that the Uttarāpathakas are led to assume such a view owing to their careless and incorrect interpretation of the *sutta* which they quote to support their argument. It may, however, be observed that the Uttarāpathakas do not suggest that everyone endowed with these marks becomes a Bodhisatta as they make very clear in the course of the discussion. But, for one to become a Bodhisatta, it is necessary to be endowed with these marks.

ASSURANCE (NIYĀMA) OF THE BODHISATTA

Another controversy in the *Kathāvatthu* over Bodhisatta is given as *niyāmokkantikathā* (i.e., the debate about stepping into the path destined to reach Nibbāna or Assurance)[76] of the Bodhisatta prior to their last birth. The subject of the present dispute is whether or not the Bodhisattas are assured prior to their last birth? The controversy arises owing to the contention of a certain section of the Buddhists that the Bodhisatta had entered the Path of Assurance and conformed to the life therein during the dispensation (*pavacana*) of Kassapa Buddha.[77] According to Buddhaghosa, the Uttarāpathakas and the Andhakas upheld this view.[78]

In connection with the present thesis, the Theravādins argue that if the Bodhisatta had entered the Path of Assurance and conformed to the life therein during the teaching of Kassapa Buddha, it would mean that he must have been a disciple of Kassapa Buddha.[79] The proponents deny this because such an admission would be tantamount to the fact that he became a Buddha after his career as a disciple. This would be against the general belief that a disciple is one who learns through information from others, while a Buddha is self-developed (*sayam-bhū*).[80] Further, the Theravādins point out that, if the Bodhisatta became Kassapa's disciple, it follows that there were only three stages of fruition for him to know under the *bodhi* tree. But it is generally understood that all the four were realized there.[81] Moreover, for one who had entered the Path of Assurance, was it necessary to undergo the austerities as done by the Bodhisatta in his last life as Gautama?[82] And was it necessary for him to practise the austerities of other teachers? Further, did the Buddha live in the discipleship of Kassapa Buddha just as Ānanda, and the householders Citta Hatthaka the Ālavaka entered into Assurance and lived as disciples under the Buddha himself? The proponents deny this because they cannot affirm that the Bodhisatta entered the Path of Assurance and lived its higher life under Kassapa Buddha without being his disciple.[83]

The Uttarāpathakas and the Andhakas come out with a counter-argument that their thesis is sustained by textual

evidence where the Buddha has said, 'Under the Exalted one Kassapa, I lived the higher life for supreme enlightenment in future.'[84] The Theravādins also quote from the Canon to reiterate their position where the Buddha is reported to have affirmed the attainment of enlightenment as also the fact that there is no teacher for him and that he is unrivalled on earth and heaven.[85] The Theravādins further quote a passage in which Buddha explains how the insight and wisdom of four truths were realized and developed by him.[86] In the light of this, they finally lay down that the thesis in question cannot be sustained.[87]

Buddhaghosa observes that the Andhakas, in view of the account of *Ghaṭikāra Sutta*,[88] upheld the view that Bodhisatta, i.e., Buddha in his former birth as Jotipāla had entered the Path of Assurance under Kassapa Buddha.[89] The idea is fully developed in the Mahāyāna that by the development of *bodhicitta* one becomes a *niyata* Bodhisatta. It is also accepted there that Jotipāla developed *bodhicitta* at the time of Kassapa Buddha and then, after several births, he ultimately attained perfection.[90] However, as the argument goes in the mentioned controversy, the Theravādins are not prepared to concede that Gautama Buddha, in one of his former births, became a disciple of Kassapa Buddha.

'ENTERING THE PATH OF ASSURANCE'

The next discussion on Assurance controversy seeks to dispute the point that 'one who is morally certain of salvation has entered the Path of Assurance'.[91] We gather from the commentary that the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas advocated this thesis.[92]

In this connection, the Theravādins ask the proponents whether they imply that the so-called 'Assured' enters the True Path of Assurance (*sammattaniyāma*) when assured of immediate retribution and upon the False Path of Assurance (*micchattaniyāma*), when assured of final salvation?[93] According to Buddhaghosa, the question is asked to show that there can be no other assurance except the above two.[94]

In the present controversy, the central argument of the

Theravāda school is that it is illogical to speak of a *niyata śrāvaka* or Bodhisatta as becoming a *sammatta*.[95] According to Buddhaghosa, *niyāma* or Assurance is of two kinds according as it is in the right or wrong direction, i.e., *sammattaniyāma* and *micchattaniyāma* respectively. The former is the practice of *brahmacariya* (purity in conduct) and *ariyamagga* (path of sanctification) and the latter the commission of heinous crimes (*anantariyakamma*) leading to immediate retribution, i.e., hell without delay.[96] All other mental phenomena happening in the three planes of being are not of the invariably fixed order.[97] Buddhas, by the force of their foresight, used to prophecy: 'Such a one will in future attain to *Bodhi* (Buddhahood).' 'This person is a Bodhisatta, who may be called 'Assured' (*niyata*) by reason of the cumulative growth of merit.' But the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas, taking the term 'Assured' without distinction as to direction, assumed that a Bodhisatta was becoming fitted to penetrate the Truths, in his last birth, and therefore held that he was already 'Assured'.[98] It has been suggested that the difference of opinion in this controversy really rests on the interpretation given to the word *niyata* in Mahāyāna texts as against that given by the *Kathāvatthu* and its commentator.[99]

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

The *Kathāvatthu* maintains its orthodox attitude while disputing the Bodhisatta theses. The authors of the text are in no case prepared to entertain the propositions of other sects, who in their turn seek to focus new facts about the elevation of the concept and nature of a Bodhisatta. They reject, therefore, the Andhaka thesis that for the benefit of animate beings the Bodhisattas adopt a difficult career; they enter into evil doom such as existence in hell, rebirth as men, animals and birds; they perform hard tasks and undertake the practice of penance under alien teachers.[100] For the strictly orthodox Theravādins, there are no Bodhisattas as a class of beings as envisaged in the developed Mahāyāna school.[101] They believed in the humanity of the Buddha and hence the individual who happens to become

the Buddha is said to be a Bodhisatta in his former lives only in order to be distinguished from average persons of the world.[102] The next thesis belonging to the Uttarāpathakas proposes that one endowed with thirty-two marks is a Bodhisatta.[103] The Theravādins seek to refute this view by arguing that an imperial babe is also said to be endowed with the thirty-two marks. Their objections, however, appear to misrepresent the proponents' point of view as they only wish to emphasize that it is necessary to be possessed of those marks for one to become a Bodhisatta. They never imply thereby that an imperial babe does not possess these marks.

Another Andhaka thesis about *niyāma* of the Bodhisatta, founded on a certain *sutta* that the Sākyamuni entered the Path of Assurance (*niyāma*) under the dispensation of the Buddha Kassapa, is also rejected by the Theravādins.[104] It is argued that if this were true, then he must have been a disciple of Kassapa and this contradicts the essential nature of a Buddha which consists in his being self-developed. By calling one a Bodhisatta, the Theravādins do not attribute to him spiritual predestination for Buddhahood on any special virtues unattainable by the *śrāvakas*. In fact, by *niyāma*, the Theravādins mean either *sammattaniyāma* or *micchattaniyāma*.[105] The Theravādins maintain that Gautama in his Bodhisatta existence did not become a disciple (*śrāvaka*) of Kassapa Buddha. They quote the words of the Buddha where he disowns any teacher for him.[106] The Andhakas, however, affirm that he did become a *śrāvaka* of Kassapa Buddha and entered the Path of Assurance. They quote a passage from the *Majjhima Nikāya* to support their proposition.[107] The Andhakas as a matter of fact appear to stress two important points in their propositions, viz., that (1) Prediction implies predestination and non-discipleship implies non-predestination. The Bodhisattas, prior to their last birth, enter into the Path of Assurance and thus become predestined to achieve Nibbāna and (2) that Bodhisattas are different from the *śrāvakas*. The Bodhisattas are superior because of their extra spiritual accomplishment. The Buddhas are also characterized by such qualities. Their omniscience and compassion, etc., are special spiritual achievements. Otherwise, the spiritual goal is attained with the realization of

Nirvāṇa. For the Theravādins, this last alone is relevant. They are so badly stuck with this belief that they hardly need emulate the extra spiritual accomplishments of the Buddha and the Bodhisattas. As against this, the Andhakas seem to suggest that:

> an individual from the moment he develops *bodhicitta* becomes a Bodhisatta and is destined to become a Buddha. He follows a career which is quite different from that of a *śrāvaka*. The career of a Bodhisatta is marked by an enormous amount of love and compassion for the suffering beings while that of the latter has more of path-culture and *sādhanā*.[108]

In fact, in all these *niyāma* controversies[109] debated in the *Kathāvatthu*, the Theravādins are inhibited by the belief as explained here that there are only two types of *niyāmatās*, viz., *sammattaniyāmatā* (i.e., the right type of assurance) and *micchattaniyāmatā* (i.e., the wrong type of assurance). They naively apply this argument in almost all the *niyāma* controversies. When the problem of *niyāmatā* of the Bodhisatta is raised, they do not agree to this because they do not consider a Bodhisatta in any way superior to a *śrāvaka*. Any *śrāvaka*, by the practice of *brahmacariya* and *ariyamagga*, is set on the path of *sammattaniyāmatā* and so can a Bodhisatta also be.[110] Therefore, it is unnecessary to make a special distinction about the Assurance of the Bodhisattas.

It seems thus that the Theravādins are stuck with their well-set notions and are not prepared to consider the theses of their opponents which for them appear to entertain new explanations for certain things. This new element manifests itself as inklings of Mahāyāna after which the unorthodox sects seem to be groping through their diverse pronouncements.

The two key-notes of the Mahāyāna philosophy consist in the doctrines of emptiness and Bodhisatta. As noted here, with the development of Mahāyāna, the Buddha becomes absolutely transcendental. In the last stage of his perfection, a Bodhisatta becomes verily the same as a Buddha.[111] And prior to this, the only difference between the two is that one is on the move towards a fulfilment which has already been achieved by the other.[112] We have seen that the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools emphasized the extraordinary traits in the character of the Buddha and Bodhisatta. This tendency evolved

fully in the *lokottara* conception as found in the Mahāyāna. It may be noted that the thirty-two characteristic marks of a Bodhisatta about which a proposition is asserted by the Uttarāpathakas in the *Kathāvatthu* were eventually incorporated in Mahāyāna as essential features of the Buddhas and the Bodhisattas.[113]

The most significant of the mentioned theses appears to be the one which seeks to affirm: '*Bodhisatto issariyakarmakārikā-hetu vinipātaṁ gacchatī ti*'. The idea of unbounded compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) forms one of the most significant as also the most attractive doctrines of Mahāyāna; and Bodhisatta is the very incarnation of this *karuṇā*. The most remarkable manifestation of the *karuṇā* of Bodhisatta consists in his voluntary resolve to suffer the torments and agonies of the dreadful purgatories during innumerable aeons, if need be, so that he may lead all beings to perfect Enlightenment.[114] He is utterly grieved to see the sufferings of others.[115] He desires the weal and welfare of the world.[116] He loves all beings as a mother loves her lone child.[117] He seeks for the Enlightenment of others before his own.[118] Later Mahāyāna works, such as, those of Āryaśūra and Śāntideva exalt *karuṇā* above all other factors. In fact, in that stage of Mahāyāna, the element of compassion came to characterize the principal feature of the Bodhisatta perhaps even at the expense of the *bodhi* idea.[119] Maitreya emerges therein as the supreme Bodhisatta.

Undoubted as it is that Mahāyāna Buddhism happened to lay great emphasis on *karuṇā*, the idea perhaps was not altogether new or alien. In fact, the Buddha himself finally decided to preach his *Dhamma* only out of such a motivation.[120] He exhorted his disciples to go round the world and preach the *Dhamma* in order to uplift the suffering mass of humanity[121] The Pāli tradition also compares the *karuṇā* of the Buddha with the unselfish compassion of a mother[122] The idea of the compassion of the Buddha and the Bodhisatta is very well developed in the *Jātaka* literature. The *Jātakas* abound in stories and legends of his charitable and self-sacrificing acts. The story goes that a Bodhisatta threw himself before a hungry tigress, as else, owing to excessive hunger, she was on the verge of devouring her own little cubs.[123] Another story

relates that a Bodhisatta in his birth as King Śivi distributed all his wealth among the people and yet remained dissatisfied to see some small insects for whom he had not done any thing. He thereupon inflicted several wounds on his person and shed his blood to feed those insects.[124] Such stories must have been powerful reminders of the importance of the idea of compassion in the Buddhist tradition. The idea of altruism in the personality of a Bodhisatta is elaborately discussed in the *Abhidharmakośa* also.[125] The discussion starts with the dilemma as to why a Bodhisatta takes such a long course to obtain the supreme Enlightenment. It is because supreme Enlightenment is very difficult to obtain: one needs to accumulate an enormous amount of knowledge and merit, innumerable heroic deeds in the course of three immeasurable *kalpas*. He undertakes infinite labour for the good of others, because he wants to pull others out of the great flood of suffering. The Andhakas, however, when they make a pronouncement as this,[126] are seeking to draw this idea to its farthest limit which was eventually arrived at in the development of Mahāyāna. The speciality of Mahāyāna in this connection is that the 'idea of paramount compassion of Bodhisatta was made an ideal valid for all'.[127]

Now coming to the *niyāma*, i.e., Assurance controversies on the Bodhisatta, we witness a similar line of development. The idea of *niyāma* of the Bodhisatta is fully developed in the Mahāyāna. It is said that the Bodhisatta can come to know even at the very first state of his mind that he will become the Buddha. In the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*[128] and *Sūtrālaṅkāra* of Asaṅga and other works[128a] it is said again and again that by the development of *bodhicitta*[129] a person becomes an assured (*niyata*) Bodhisatta, that is to say, through the fulfilment of *pāramīs* and practice of the various forms of asceticism, he is assured of becoming a Buddha ultimately. As a matter of fact, it is this accomplishment of the Bodhisattas in *pāramitās* which makes them superior to Arahants and *Pratyeka-Buddhas*.[130] It is believed that Siddhārtha Gautama in one of his previous births as Jotipāla-mānava did in fact develop *bodhicitta* during the time of Kassapa Buddha and enter the Path of Assurance. Thereupon in the course of

several births, he fulfilled the *pāramīs* and undertook all possible spiritual work whether Buddhistic or non-Buddhistic, and finally attained perfection.[131] As is well-known, he even underwent the discipleship of Āḷāra Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra whose doctrines are treated as heretical in the Buddhist tradition.[132] We have noted here that *Mahāvastu* contains fairly elaborate discussion about the faring of a Bodhisatta through the fulfilment of the *pāramitās* and *bhūmis*. It may be that the Andhakas made a thesis about the Assurance of the Bodhisatta perhaps in the same sense of *niyāma* as it emerged in the Mahāyāna.

The Theravādins would not obviously accept the Andhaka theses because they cannot entertain all the new tinge that was being given to the person of a Bodhisatta. They are not prepared to accept in any way the superiority of a Bodhisatta as compared to a *śrāvaka*. This is in fact the crux of the entire problem. The Theravādins are stuck with their own cherished ideal of a *śrāvaka* or an Arahant. On the contrary, the newly-emerged unorthodox schools consider the *śrāvaka* or Arahant ideal as thoroughly insufficient and selfish in view of the average persons of the world. Apparently, they are, thus, trying to counteract the Arahant or *śrāvaka* ideal by a far more befitting ideal of the Bodhisatta. The superiority of Bodhisattas over the *śrāvakas* is affirmed in the Mahāyāna works in very interesting terms.[134] It is given to understand that the *śrāvakas* loath and fear the course of birth and death On hearing that the individual is *śūnya*, devoid of substance, and on hearing the teaching of the Four Noble Truths, viz., that all that is composite is impermanent, painful, etc., they abstain from giving rise to imaginative constructions in regard to things. Like the deer that is besieged and hit by poisonous arrow, they just grow anxious and seek quickly to get rid of all things; they do not entertain any other thought But as to the Bodhisatta, even though he has distaste for old-age, disease and death, he still has the ability to comprehend the true nature of all things; enters straight into the comprehension of non-ultimacy of the basic elements of existence, and enters the limitless *dharmadhātu*. He is like the elephant of the higher kind, the king of elephants, that has entered the hunters net. Although it is hit with the arrow it looks at the hunter with kindness

and affection, and remains absolutely free from fear. It has the ability even then to lead its herd to the camp, moving forth in peaceful gait.[135]

The Buddhist system, however, really seems to suggest a duality in the ideal of way-faring right from its inception On the one hand is inculcated the idea of destruction of the *āśravas* or fetters (*malina-vāsanā-kṣaya*) which ultimately leads to Nibbāna and on the other is the idea of purification of the *āśravas* (*vāsanā-śodhana*). It gives rise to the development of pure *āśravas* and the personality gets purified. The purified being can embark upon the well-being of the people of the world. The two notions are certainly wide apart from each other. These two seem to differentiate the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna systems respectively. *Śrāvakas* aspire for the destruction of their own fetters and hence seek their personal salvation only, whereas a truly perfect ideal is much higher than this. This is the ideal of Buddhahood which consists in the acquisition of perfection requiring the purification of *āśravas*. And this ideal can be attained by none else but a Bodhisatta. Pure *āśravas* (*śuddha-vāsanā*) are in fact *parārthavāsanā*. Bodhisatta, motivated with the pure *āśravas*, fares gradually on the path of perfection. The idea was however not unavailing in the early Buddhist tradition. The ideal of Buddhahood was very much there and also the notion that for the attainment of Enlightenment a farer has to be a Bodhisatta and gradually accomplish the *bhūmis* through its various stages.[136]

It is, thus, quite possible to trace some of the important Mahāyāna notions about its Bodhisatta ideal in the *Kathāvatthu* theses on that subject. The Mahāsaṁghika group of schools appear to make such hypothetical pronouncements which developed later as important tenets of the Mahāyāna. Here again, as mentioned, the Mahāsaṁghika theses appear to represent a transition from the strictly Hīnayāna stage to that of the Mahāyāna.

The Mahāsaṁghikas were not however absolute innovators in every sense. As we have occasionally shown, some seeds of these developments were already there in the early Buddhist tradition itself. The Mahāsaṁghikas, or for that matter, the Mahāyānists made a mark by picking up those threads and elaborating them into full-fledged doctrines.

REFERENCES

1. Pāli Bodhisatta is equivalent to Sanskrit Bodhisattva. While '*Bodhi*' certainly means 'enlightenment', different explanations have been offered for the term '*Satva*', e.g., 'Character', 'Essence', 'Nature', 'True Essence', 'Any living', or 'Sentient Being', 'Spirit', 'Mind', 'Sense', 'Consciousness', 'Intelligence', 'Satta', 'Sakta', 'Strength', 'Energy—'Vigour', 'Power', 'Courage' and so on. Dr. Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 4-9, has critically examined all these interpretations. He, however, suggests that the safest way is to go back to the Pāli notion of the term. There, Bodhisatta is a term for '*bodhi*-being'. But *Satta* does not merely denote an ordinary creature. It is related with the Vedic *Satvan* which means a strong or valiant man, hero or warrior. Thus, the Pāli Bodhisatta would be interpreted as 'heroic being'—spiritual warrior.

   It seems, however, that in the old Pāli literature the term 'Bodhisatta' has been used in the sense of 'future Buddha'. The following clause recurs frequently in the *Majjhima Nikāya*—"In the days before my enlightenment when as yet I was only a Bodhisatta, etc., cf., e.g., I, pp. 23, 153, 212. The word also seems to be used only in connection with a Buddha's last life in the *Mahāpadāna sutta, Dīgha Nikāya*, II, pp. 13ff; *Acchariyabbhutadhamma sutta, Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 184. Apparently, the earliest references of Bodhisatta occur to denote the lives of one who eventually attained *Sammā Sambodhi* as Gautama Sākyamuni. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the idea of heroism or courage and dedication or attachment to *bodhi* or in other words the emphasis on *bodhi* came to be attached to Bodhisatta with the development of his later conception intimations of which we get in the *Kathāvatthu*.
2. See supra Chapter III.
3. See supra Chapter IV.
4. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 21ff; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 173-74, 193, 196.
5. See infra.
6. *Kathāvatthu*, IV. 7.
7. Ibid., XXIII. 3.
8. Ibid., IV. 8.
9. On the factors which helped the growth of the Bodhisatta ideal, see Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 10ff.
10. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 19-20; Walleser, op. cit., p. 26.
11. Masuda, op. cit., p. 21; Cf. *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 145.
12. Cf. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 173, 174.
13. See *Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 1-2.
14. *Nidānakathā* is a part of the *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā* of Buddhaghosa, Cf. Malalasekera, *DPPN*, Vol. II, p. 73.
15. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 13ff.

16. *Mahāvastu*, p. 145.
17. Cf. ibid., p. 214.
18. Ibid., p. 148.
19. Cf. ibid., I, 147.
20. Editions R.L. Mitra, 1877; Lefmann, 1902, 1909; P.L. Vaidya, 1958.
21. Cf. *Lalitavistara*, pp. 181-84 and *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 299-302.
22. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, III, p. 200.
23. *Lalitavistara*, p. 51; Cf. also *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 214.
24. Masuda, op. cit., p. 21.
25. Ibid., p. 21.
26. See Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 295-96, see also Keith, *Indian Mythology*, p. 195; Cf. Masuda, op. cit., p. 21.
27. Masuda, op. cit., p. 21.
28. Ibid., pp. 21, 38; see also Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, pp. 240-41, 248; see also infra.
29. Cf. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, pp. 173-74, 193, 196.
30. Winternitz, *Some Problems of Indian Literature*, p. 63.
31. Kern, op. cit., p. 122.
32. Senart, *Origines Bouddhiques*, p. 24.
33. Saunders, *The Gospel for Asia*, p. 59.
34. Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'histoire de la Dogmatique*, pp. 21-22.
35. Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 31ff.
36. Cf. Winternitz, *History of Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 431ff.
37. See supra, p. 7f.
38. Cf. H.C. Raychaudhary, *The Early History of the Vaishṇava Sect*, pp. 18ff; R.G. Bhandarkar, *Vaishṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, pp. 13ff.
39. Cf. Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 34ff.
40. *Issariyakāmakārikādikathā:* this compound is not found elsewhere; Cf. *Debates Commentary*, p. 243n.
41. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197.
42. *Bodhisatto issariyakāmakārikāhetu vinipātaṁ gacchatī ti? Kathāvatthu*, XXIII.3.
43. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 536.
44. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 536.
45. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 367n. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197.
46. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 536-37.
47. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197.
48. Masuda, op. cit., p. 21; Walleser, op. cit., p. 25.
49. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, p. 241.
50. Ibid., Pt. II, p. 174.
51. See Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., pp. 307ff.
52. Walleser, op. cit., p. 25.
53. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197; see also supra, p. 155.
54. Masuda, op. cit., p. 38; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhi-*

ques, Pt. I, p. 248.

55. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 196.
56. *Kathāvatthu*, XXIII.4; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197.
57. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 21; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, pp. 240-41; II, p. 174.
58. There are three Chinese recensions of Vasumitra's treatise, viz., *Samayabhedoparcanacakra*.
    (*a*) '*Shi-pa-pu-lu*' or a' treatise on the eighteen schools'. This translation is ascribed to Kumārajīva by some and to Paramārtha by others.
    (*b*) '*Pu-chi-i-lun*' or 'a treatise on the differences of the views of the schools'. This translation was done by Paramārtha.
    (*c*) '*I-pu-tsung-lun*' or 'a treatise (called) the wheel of doctrines of different schools'. This is the Yuan Chwang version and is supposed to be the best of all.

    See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 1-6; Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, Introduction.
59. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. I, p. 248.
60. Ibid., Pt. I, p. 248n.
61. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 196.
62. See supra chapter on the Buddhist Sects and Schools.
63. *Lakkhaṇasamannāgato Bodhisatto ti? Kathāvatthu*, IV.7.
64. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 77.
65. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya* II, pp. 14ff; III, p. 112.
66. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya* II, *Mahāpadāna-sutta*, p. 13; *Majjhima Nikayā*, III, *Acchariya-abbhutadhamma sutta*, p. 187.
67. *Attamanā devi hohi, mahesakkho te putto uppanno ti?* See *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 13; *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 187; see also *Mahāvastu*, I, 150; *Lalita Vistara*, 53ff.
68. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 254-55.
69. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 77.
70. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, p. 112.
71. See supra Cnapter II.
72. See supra p. 75.
73. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 14ff; III, pp. 110ff; *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 382ff; For a fully enumerated list see *Lalita Vistara*, pp. 74-5.
74. Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 172.
75. *Abhidharmakośa*; IV, pp. 220-21.
76. On the rendering of *niyāma*, as Assurance. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, Appendix 6 (A).
77. *Bodhisatto Kassapassa bhagavato pavacane ekkantaniyāmo caritabrahmacariyo ti? Kathāvatthu*, IV,8.
78. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 78.
79. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 256.
80. Pāli equivalent of Sanskrit *Svayambhū*.
81. Cf. *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. 109.
82. Cf. *Majjhima Nikayā*, I, pp. 112-13, 303-4.

83. See *Kathavātthu*, pp. 257-58.
84. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 169n.
85. Cf. *Mahāvagga*, p. 11; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 221.
86. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV, pp. 361-62.
87. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 260.
88. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 271ff.
89. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 78.
90. Cf. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, pp. 82-3.
91. *Niyato Niyāmaṁ okkamatī ti? Kathāvatthu*, XIII. 4,
92. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 143.
93. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 416.
94. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 143.
95. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 143.
96. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 143.
97. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 143.
98. See ibid., p. 143; see also *Debates Commentary*, pp. 175-76.
99. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 83.
100. See *Kathāvatthu*, XXIII. 3; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197f. see also supra, pp. 155ff.
101. See Hardayal op. cit., pp. 9ff; Cf. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 66.6; *Sukhāvatī-vyūha*, 15.10ff; *Aṣṭa-sāhaśrikā Prajñā-pāramitā*, 375. 14ff; *Śāntideva's Śikṣā-samuccaya*, 14. 8.
102. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 84.
103. *Kathāvatthu*, IV. 7; see also supra, pp. 158ff.
104. *Kathāvatthu*, IV. 8; see also supra, pp. 160ff.
105. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 143.
106. See *Mahāvagga*, p. 11, *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 221.
107. See *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, p. 280.
108. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 84; Cf. Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 58-62.
109. *Kathāvatthu*, IV 8; XIII. 4; also XII. 5. 6.
110. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 78, 143.
111. *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Śāstra*, 419b-c, quoted Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., p. 310.
112. Ibid., 719b, quoted Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., p. 311.
113. Cf. Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 300ff.
114. See Hardayal, op. cit., p. 178; Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., pp. 315-16.
115. *Jātaka Māla*, 41.1.
116. *Lalitavistara*, pp. 130-31.
117. *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, 244. 8; *Avadāna Śataka*, I. 184.12; I.209.12; *Lalitavistara*, pp. 130ff.
118. *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, 146.10.
119. Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 178ff.
120. Cf. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 6-10.
121. Ibid., p. 23; *Lalitavistara*, p. 301.
122. *Sutta-Nipāta*, p. 291.

123. *Jātakamālā*, Iff, *Avadānakalpalatā*, II, 95ff; II. 907.
124. See *Jātakamālā*, 6ff; *Avādānaśataka*, I, 182ff; *Avadānakalpalatā*, II. 831ff.
125. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, VII, pp. 77ff.
126. *Kathavātthu*, XXIII. 3.
127. Conze, *Buddhism*, p. 126.
128. Cf. *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, p. 46, verse 106; p. 158, verse 38.
128a. Cf. *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, 2. 4-5, 287.14, 228.1-5; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, IV, 15, 16, 20; IX, 163 etc.
129. Cf. *Bodhi-cit-otpāda*; Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 58-64.
130. Hardayal, op. cit., p. 170; Cf. *Aṣṭa-sāhaśrikā Prajñā-Pāramitā*, 396, 15ff; *Laṅkavatārasūtra*, p. 29, verse 62; *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, 109. 16; 166. 18.
131. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 271ff; *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 256ff; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 78.
132. Cf. *Brahmajāla* and *Sāmaññphala suttas* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*.
133. See on this point G.N. Kaviraj, Introduction, *Bauddha-dharma-darśana* by Narendradeo.
134. Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., pp. 298-99.
135. G.N. Kaviraj, Introduction, *Bauddha-dharma-darśana* by Narendradeo.

6

Spiritual Stages and Hierarchy

The way that the Lord Buddha is said to have devised for the attainment of Nirvāṇa, consisted in the accomplishment of three cardinal virtues, viz., *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā*. Thus, *samādhi*, which was a full-length process of mindfulness, concentration, contemplation, etc., formed the stepping-stone of *paññā*, i.e., wisdom or *vimutti*, i.e., emancipation. While in search of the Truth, when the Buddha decided to abandon asceticism, he is said to have fallen back to his childhood practice of *jhāna*, and it was owing to this that he was led to success.[1]

The *Kathāvatthu* contains a number of controversies relating to diverse problems of the Path and its factors. We have theses laying down unique notions of the Path, e.g., (1) The Path can be attained by exclamations, such as, *idaṁ dukkhaṁ*;[2] (2) Four-fold fruition of religious life may be acquired by one single Path,[3] or (3) The Path is five-fold.[4] There are others concerning the assurance (*niyāma*)[5] or the possibilities of penetrating the truth[6] and attaining Arahanthood.[7] The two key aspects of spiritual way-faring, viz., contemplation and insight also command a keen attention of the early Buddhist sects with the result that a considerable number of controversies

are related to these problems. The elements or aspects of *jhāna* were sought to be reclassified.[8] The nature of *samādhi* was also explored.[9] Similarly, the nature of *nirodha* was also sought to be determined whether it is worldly (*lokiya*) or extra-worldly (*lokottara*).[10] There are also controversies about *vimutti* or emancipation.[11]

As we scrutinize the different theses about the Path, discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*, we generally notice a basic agreement among the sects about the major points on the subject. Some of these theses are, however, still significant in so far as they touch some important issues. The theses, such as, about entering the Path with exclamation or about the attainments in a dream or a womb acquire significance by the very nature of the point they want to make. In all these controversies what is almost uniformly true is that different theses are affirmed on the basis af Canonical passages attributed to the Buddha. The Theravādins emerge as the orthodox defendants and they seek to dispute these assertions on varions grounds, mostly on the basis of their own interpretations of the *Buddha-vacana*. In short, the present group of controversies again highlight the prevailing tendency to question existing beliefs and tenets.

THESES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

ENTRANCE INTO THE PATH AND 'DUKKHA'

The following set of four controversies in the *Kathāvatthu* reminds us of the older controversy raised by Mahādeva.

ARTICULATE UTTERANCE DURING ECSTACY

The debated issue is as to whether or not there is 'articulate utterance' on the part of one who has entered into *jhāna*.[12] Buddhaghosa offers the information that a thesis was current among the Pubbaseliyas and others that one who has entered into first *jhāna*, at the moment of attaining the (first or) stream-winner's way, utters the truth: 'Sorrow'.[13] Thus, according to the Pubbaseliyas and some others an adept while in the first

jhāna (meditation) and on the point of attainment of the *sotāpattimagga*, in some cases, gives out an exclamation like '*aho dukkhan ti*'.[14]

The Theravādins argue in this connection that all physical activities of a meditator are set at rest and hence it is impossible that he should utter such an exclamation.[15] The central argument, however, that the proponents adduce for their thesis is that in the first *jhāna* (*dhyāna*) there is *vitakkavicāra* and because of this there is *vacīsaṁkhāra*. In other words, discursive and discriminating thoughts cause vocal activity, hence there is the possibility that in the first *jhāna* a meditator utters the word *dukkha*.[16]

HEARING IN JHĀNA (DHYANA)

Another thesis of the Pubbaseliyas[17] discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*, is closely linked with the preceding. Here they contend that one who has attained *jhāna* hears sound.[18]

The Theravādins argue that if this be the case, then it should be equally correct to say that the meditator in the course of *jhāna* can also see, smell, taste and touch objects.[19] The proponents, however, account for the thesis by quoting the same passage as the one mentioned. They observe that as it has been said by the Buddha that sound is a hindrance to the first *jhāna*[20] and that one rises from the first *jhāna* by an external sound, therefore, it may be said, one hears sound in meditation. It seems that the second proposition of the Pubbaseliyas emerges as a natural corollary of the first proposition for if it is granted that when one makes an utterance while in a state of *jhāna*, it would follow that he also hears a sound.

Vasumitra mentions in his treatise two doctrines which correspond to the present thesis. According to Vasumitra, (1) the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools upheld that even in the state of being *samāhita* one can utter words;[21] and (2) the Haimavata school holds that the Path is realized by utterance.[22] The Mahāsaṁghikas uphold that one can utter words even when in the *samāhita* stage or *dhyāna* because the mind in the state of *dhyāna* is not altogether unconscious of the external world. The stimuli which came from the external world are still

perceptible even in the state of *dhyāna* and afford opportunity to the mind to ponder over them. On the contrary, the Sarvāstivāda group of schools took the state of *samāhita* to be of total unconsciousness of the external world, the senses being withdrawn altogether from the external world.[23]

Attention may be drawn to an interesting controversy with reference to this point. Once Maudgalyāyana is said to have sat in *akincanyāyatana-samādhi*. As he sat, he heard the bellow of an elephant and, owing to this, he emerged from the abstract meditation. According to the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools, he heard the bellow in the state of the *samādhi*, whereas the Sarvāstivādins interpreted that he heard the sound when he came out of the *samādhi*, because there is no ear-consciousness in that state.[24]

INDUCING INSIGHT BY SAYING 'SORROW'

The thesis belongs to the Pubbaseliyas[25] again that induction of insight by repeating 'sorrow', is a factor included in the Path of salvation.[26]

The Theravādins put the simple argument that there are many people who utter that word but they cannot all be supposed to be practising the Path.[27] However, the proponents seek to apply this thesis to those only who are qualified to win insight (*vipassanā*).[28]

THE UTTERANCE 'THIS IS PAIN AND SORROW'

The thesis was held by some like the Andhakas[29] that from the words, 'this is Ill'; insight into the nature of Ill is set working,[30] that is to say, this befalls at the moment of his entering into the Path.

According to the Theravādins, if this be the case, then a similar result should ensue on the utterance of the other three Truths. They further question whether the insight issues from every syllable of the formula—'*idaṁ du-kkhaṁ*'? The proponents do not, however, concede that insight issues from each syllable.[31]

According to Vasumitra, the Mahāsaṁghikas[32] believed that (1) the words of suffering can help the process of realization

of the Path; (2) suffering leads a man to Path; (3) suffering also is a kind of food (āhāra); and (4) through the instrumentality (*prayoga*) of wisdom (*prajñā*) suffering is destroyed and final beatitude (*sukha*) is obtained.

It may be observed that the Mahāsaṁghikas of Vasumitra are, perhaps, the same whom Buddhaghosa mentions more specifically as Pubbaseliyas and Andhakas. These sects seek to lay down that when a meditator is led to believe that the world is a heap of cinders full of suffering, he utters the exclamation '*aho vata dukkhaṁ*' and at the very moment that his insight penetrates into the first truth '*idaṁ dukkhaṁ ti*' and, as a result, he attains the *sotāpattimagga.* So *dukkhaṁ* may be said to be an *āhāra* as regards the realization of the Path as also an '*aṅga*' (limb) of *sotāpattimagga.*[33] Masuda has observed on the fourth doctrine, attributed to the Mahāsaṁghikas by Vasumitra, that *dukkha* can be removed not by means of the observance of moral precepts (*sīlas*) and practise of meditation (*samādhi*) but by knowledge of the truth, causal law, and *anatta* of the things of the world.[34]

It may be recalled that the five famous propositions of Mahādeva[35] contain an assertion which appears to remind one of this thesis. In this particular assertion, Mahādeva had laid down that Path is attained by an exclamation as '*aho*'. As discussed, we have four theses in the *Kathāvatthu* of a similar nature: (1) One who has entered into the first *jhāna* makes an articulate utterance. (2) One who has attained *jhāna* hears sound. (3) Induction of insight by repeating 'sorrow' is a factor included in the Path of salvation. (4) From the words, 'this is Ill' ('*idaṁ dukkhaṁ*'), insight into the nature of Ill is set working. It seems that the original proposition of Mahādeva has been analytically split up to arrive at its logical conclusion. Thus, the initial assertion is made that in the state of *jhāna* one makes an articulate utterance. With a view, perhaps, to rationalizing this statement, it is laid down that one also hears a sound while in *jhāna*. The logic behind such an utterance and hearing in *jhāna* is that induction of insight through this utterance is a factor included in the Path of salvation. And finally, from this utterance, viz., '*idaṁ dukkhaṁ*' insight into the nature of Ill is set working, which is verily the same as the original thesis of Mahādeva that the

Path is attained by an exclamation such as '*aho*'.

We have noted that there seems to be reason behind the tradition that the Śaila schools originated within the Mahāsaṁghikas owing to a second Mahādeva.[36] It is apparent from some of the theses of the Śaila schools that they became radical advocates of the very same theses which had been formulated originally by Mahādeva. It seems that the emphasis they happened to lay on these points was likely to lead others to describe them as the followers of a second Mahādeva.

THE PATH AND ITS ACQUISITIONS

THE IDEA OF THE UNIQUE PATH

The disputed thesis is that the four-fold fruition of the religious life is realized by one Path only.[37] The commentary of Buddhaghosa informs us that the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas, owing to an indiscriminate affection for the Buddha, subscribed to the belief that he realized all the four Fruits, i.e., stream-winner, once-returner, never-returner and Arahantship by one single Ariyan Path and not in the four distinct stages, each called a Path.[38]

The Theravāda argument in this connection is that an adept can attain the *phalas* of the corresponding *maggas* only, that is to say, a *sotāpanna* gets rid of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, but he cannot attain the *phalas* of the *sakadāgāmī* or *anāgāmī magga*, i.e., elimination of *rāga*, *dosa* and *moha*. They refer to the statements of the Buddha where he spoke of the specific fetters being removed in specific stages of the Path and thereby challenge the proposition. The proponents do not, however, concede on this point as they think that if the Exalted One developed each Path in succession, he should be called a stream-winner and so on.[39]

Two other controversies are linked with this by the very nature of their content. Also, the advoeates of the theses in question are the same.

RETAINING OF DISTINCTIVE ENDOWMENTS

The present thesis lays down that one who realizes a fruition retains the attributes thereof after realizing a higher fruition.[40] Buddhaghosa observes that there are in fact two kinds of spiritual acquisitions, viz., acquisition at the present moment and acquisition accruing at rebirth hereafter. As against this, the Uttarāpathakas subscribe to a third one also, viz., holding of past acquisitions as permanent acquisition (*patti-dhammo*) in some *rūpa* or *arūpa* heaven. According to them, this acquisition can be retained as long as the jhānic achievement does not spend its force. The Theravāda school disputes the possibility of any such quality over and above the two spiritual acquisitions. Contrary to the present thesis of the Uttarāpathakas, the Theravādins thus hold that all personal endowments are only held, as distinct acquisitions, until they are cancelled by other acquisitions.[41]

The next controversy centres round a more specific assertion of the same view as stated before. Here it is said that a person, who is practising to realize Arahantship, possesses, as a persistent distinct endowment, the preceding three fruitions.[42] Buddhaghosa says that the view was shared by the Andhakas that a person holds the three fruitions as an acquired quality (*patta-dhamma-vasena*).[43] Thus, on the basis of these two theses, the Uttarāpathakas seek to lay down that even after the realization of a higher fruition, one continues to retain the acquisitions of the preceding fruition. They cite the stock example of the Arahant, who, they think, possesses all the *phalas*. As against this, the Theravādins hold that in the stage of the Arahant, only Arahantphala is acquired and held.

THE PATH AS FIVE-FOLD ONLY

The *Kathāvatthu* records a unique debate on the *aṭṭhaṅgika-magga*. The Mahīśāsakas[44] hold, contrary to the general opinion, that speech, action and livelihood ought to be purified before the Ariyan Path is held to commence and hence the Path is really five-fold.[45] This is based partly on a Canonical statement,[46] wich is nto traceable; and partly on the consideration

that speech, action and livelihood are not states of consciousness like the other five. It is possible that the Mahīśāsaka view harks back to a time when the authority of the Eightfold Path was not yet fully established.[47] It also incidentally confirms the antiquity of the Mahīśāsaka sect.

ASSURANCE AND INSIGHT

LEARNER'S INSIGHT

The present dispute arises from the assertion that a learner has the insight of an adept.[48] The Uttarāpathakas were the exponents of this thesis.[49]

The Theravādins do not accept this opinion for the reason that a learner and an adept are not identical in their accomplishments.[50] The knowledge of an adept cannot be imputed to a learner and hence this thesis is untenable. The proponents, however, seek to make their point by citing an example. According to them, if the present suggestion is incorrect, how could Ananda, only a learner, know about the sublimity of the Buddha and his illustrious disciples as Sāriputta and Mogallāna.[51]

It may be noted here that another thesis, belonging to the Andhakas,[52] which lays down that a disciple can have knowledge about fruition,[53] also tends to bridge the distance between the *śrāvakas* and the Buddha.

The Sammatīyas are said to hold that the *puthujjana* (average being) renounces *kāmacchanda* and *vyāpāda*, which is against the orthodox view of their complete renunciation occurring gradually in the Path.[54] The Sammatīyas relied on the fact that the Canon refers to virtuous men of the past who were born in the *Brahmaloka* after death. They are said to have been freed from the bonds of sense-desire, though they had not entered the Path.[55]

PATH OF ASSURANCE AND THE AVERAGE BEINGS

The Uttarāpathakas proposed two interesting theses relating to the Path of Assurance and the average beings. (1) That one, who has not gained Assurance (i.e., *aniyata*), may have

the insight (*ñāṇa*) to enter the Path of Assurance.[56] (2) That the average man may possess final Assurance.[57] According to Buddhaghosa,[58] this sect is led to uphold the first thesis on the basis of certain statements of the Buddha who predicted for certain *puthujjanas* (average beings) that they would realize the truth ultimately, e.g., in the case of Aṅgulimāla. The Buddha had said that the person who enters the right way of Assurance (*sammatta-niyāma*) is capable of penetrating the *Dhamma*.[59] As regards the second thesis, the Uttarāpathakas based it on the *sutta*-passage--'once immersed is so once for all'.[60] The Theravādins do not agree to either of the propositions and engage their advocates in a lengthy argumentation. The proponents, however, stick to their views that the *puthujjanas* who are *aniyata* (not definitely destined to attain Nibbāna) or who are doers of evil acts may ultimately become *niyata* and realize the truth.[61]

SEVEN REBIRTHS' LIMIT

Closely related to this is another thesis of the Uttarāpathakas who lay down that the persons who have to take seven more births to attain Nibbāna (*sattakkhattuparama*) can reach the goal after seven births and not earlier or later.[62]

The Uttarāpathakas[63] base their thesis on a statement of the Buddha that a certain person is liable to seven rebirths only.[64]

The Theravādins would not agree to this by reasoning that such persons may quicken the pace of their progress by greater exertion or retard the same by performing evil deeds.

Initiating the debate, the Theravādins argue as to whether such an assured person is capable of murdering his mother, father, or an Arahant, or capable, with a malign heart,[65] of shedding the blood of the Tathāgata or of creating schism in the Order. Buddhaghosa explains this by saying that there are two fixed orders (*niyāma*), the right order (*sammatta niyāma*) and the wrong order (*micchattaniyāma*). The right order is that of the Ariyan Way which assures a man that he is not liable to fall (*avinipātadhammo*) and that he is destined to attain the fruits (*phalappatti*). The wrong order is that of acts that find retribution in the very next existence. Now the

seven-rebirths'-limit person is destined by the stream-winner's way not to undergo punishment in purgatory and to attain the fruits. But as he does not follow the second order, he is incapable of doing things which entail inevitable retribution in the very next existence. There is, therefore, no *niyāma* by which his rebirths may be limited only to seven births.[66]

According to Buddhaghosa, the Uttarāpathaka argument is unconvincing because the Buddha when he said—'This person, after going through this number of becomings, will utterly pass away'—specified, 'this number' by his own power of insight, and he did not assign thereby any fixed number of becomings to a man of the seven-births'-limit.[67]

The next controversy given as a sequel to the foregoing[68] is more an offshoot of the above, the upholders being the same, i.e., the Uttarāpathakas.[69] They observe that if the Theravādins maintain that it is wrong to say that the *Kolaṅkola* (farer from family)[70] or one ranking in the First Path next above him of the seven-rebirths'-limit is assured of salvation by his rank, does not his rank itself guarantee that he shall attain? And does not the next higher rank in the First Path, that of the *eka-bijin*, or 'one-seeder', also guarantee final salvation? Buddhaghosa however remarks in the same strain that the Buddha did not assign any order of becomings to a man of the seven-births'-limit, either in the next higher rank in the First way (*Kolaṅkola*), or in that of 'one-seeder' (*eka-bijin*).[71]

In this debate, the Uttarāpathakas simply propose that a person who has been able to restrict his further births to a limit of seven at the most is assured of final salvation at the end of exactly seven births. The Theravādins, however, argue that such an assured person may be capable of attaining the insight during the interval. At the same time, while the *sammattaniyāma* does not fix the exact number of rebirths for such a person, there is no other *niyāma* left except the *micchattaniyāma* which is obviously irrelevant. There is a similar thesis which affirms that for a person in the seventh rebirth evil tendencies are eliminated.[72]

SENSUOUS AND SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE

PATH CULTURE AND THE SENSES

Here the disputed thesis is that one may develop the Path while enjoying the five-fold cognitions of sense.[73] According to Buddhaghosa, this thesis is advocated by the Mahāsaṁghikas[74] on the basis of a sutta-passage—'When he sees an object with the eye, he does not grasp at it in idea'.[75] The Theravādins argue in this connection that if this be the case, then either the Path developed is of a worldly nature, or the practiser's sense-experience must be of the nature of the Path. But neither is possible, because the sense-cognition is worldly, and has not Nibbāna as its object.[76]

The five cognitions do not include *manoviññāṇa* which alone is relevant for *maggabhāvanā*. But the mahāsaṁghika does not speak of the six *viññāṇas*.[77] There is, besides, a great gulf which separates the nature of sensuous perception and its object, on the one hand, from the mental awareness of the Paths and their nature, on the other. How then can the two be joined together in any relevant unity? Against these arguments of the Theravādin, the Mahāsaṁghikas apparently rely on the injunction to perceive the unsubstantiality of perceptible things without clinging to them. According to the Theravādin, however, this does not refer to the comprehension of Nirvaṇa as *śūnyatā*. It refers only to the Path of a worldly nature.[78]

HIGHER LIFE AMONG THE DEVAS

Here the disputed assertion is that there is no higher life among the Devas.[79] Buddhaghosa offers the explanation in his commentary that the higher life is of two-fold improt: path-culture and renunciation of the world. No deva practises the latter. But the former is not forbidden to them, except to those of the unconscious plane. But some, for instance the Sammitīyas, do not believe in any path-culture among the higher devas of the *kāmaloka*, and beyond them of the *rūpaloka*.[80] They support their assertion on the basis of a *sutta*-passage where the Buddha had said that in three respects the people of India excel those of North Kuru and the Three and Thirty gods—in courage, in

mindfulness and in the religious life.[81]

There is an unattributed thesis which affirms that there is self-control among the Devas. The simple logic of this thesis as presented in the *Kathāvatthu* is that if the Devas were devoid of self-control they would be thieves and murderers.[82] The Andhakas also proposed a thesis that *rūparāga* and *arūparāga* are elements in *rūpadhātu* and *arūpadhātu*.[83]

THE EIGHTH MAN

The eighth man is the rendering of the Pāli term *aṭṭhama-ko* which is a term for a person who has entered the stream. This is the lowest stage of the Four Paths and Four Fruitions and hence the eighth from Arahantship. It is this state which is arrived first in the course of the Buddhist way-faring. There are two assertions made about the person of this stage, which the orthodox section seeks to dispute.

(1) The first thesis is laid down by the Andhakas and Sammatīyas[84] that for the person in the eighth stage, outbursts of wrong views and of doubts are put away.[85] What they mean thereby is that at the moment of entering on the Path, after qualification and adoption, two of the (ten) corruptions no longer break out in the eighth man. The simple argument that they apply is that since the outburst of the two things, i.e., wrong views and doubt, is not liable to arise in a person of that stage, so one can very well say that their outburst has been put away.[89] The Theravādins, however, argue that one cannot put away specific fetters without practising the specific stages of the Path. If, as the proponents suggest, the eighth man has checked the possibility of wrong views and doubt, he should be then described as a stream-winner.[87] The proponents do not concede the idea of identifying the eighth man with a stream-winner, though they stick to their proposition.

(2) The second debate about the eighth man arises over the assertion that the 'five controlling powers[88] are absent in a person of the eighth stage'.[89] According to Buddhaghosa, a belief is current among the Andhakas that at the moment of entering the first stage of the Path, the 'eighth man' is in process of acquiring, but has not yet attained to these powers.[90] The Theravādins point out the contradiction involved in

the porponents' thesis that the eighth man has faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and reason and yet he is devoid of the controlling powers of each of these respectively. They also refer to a certain statement of the Buddha who observed that the completion and perfection of the five controlling powers make one an Arahant and this accomplishment in respect of the controlling powers is held in all the lower Path stages in a corresponding lower degree. The person who is completely bereft of this achievement is an average person.[91] Now the Andhaka argument would be that the eighth man not being the same as an average man, it must not be said that the five controlling powers are absent in him.[92]

CAPABILITIES OF AN EMBRYO AND A DREAMER IN THE PATH-CULTURE

The present controversy revolves round a series of interesting assertions made by some of the Uttarāpathakas.[93] They laid down four theses of a similar nature : (1) That an 'embryo is down capable of penetrating the truth',[94] (2) That an 'embryo is capable of attaining Arahantship',[95] (3) That a 'dreamer is capable of penetrating the truth',[96] (4) That a 'dreamer is capable of attaining Arahantship'.[97] As regards their first assertion, the Uttarāpathakas assumed that a way-farer who was a stream-winner in his previous birth and remained so, must be able to grasp the Truth while an embryo. The Theravādins argue in this connection that there are only two avenues open towards the growth of right views for a person, viz., (a) listening to other's voice and (b) intelligent attention. Obviously, an embryo is incapable of doing either. And, therefore, an embryo cannot penetrate the truth. It has been observed that the Uttarāpathakas were perhaps feeling out a theory of 'heredity'.[98] There is, however, nothing in their assertion to warrant the idea of heredity. In fact, their present proposition is in keeping with some of their earlier assertions regarding the holding of past acquisitions as permanent acquisitions.[99] It is on the simple logic of the law of action that they seem to be claiming an embryo's capability penetrating the truth.

The Uttarāpathakas are led to hold the second thesis on the basis of such legends where some very young stream-winners

were supposed to have attained Arahantship. There goes the story, for example, that a seven-year-old son of a certain lay disciple Suppavāsā was able to attain Arahantship.[100] Thus, the Uttarāpathakas happened to believe in anti-natal attainment of Arahantship, that is to say, they thought that the embryonic consciousness carries the force of previous birth and the attainment of Arahantship is an effect culminating from his past actions. The central argument of the Theravādins against all these propositions is that the penetration of Truth is not possible for a person who is asleep, or languid *(pamatta)* or blurred in intelligence (*muṭṭhasatissa*) or one who is unreflective (*asampajāna*).[101] The present set of theses seem to be in line with the tenet that the Buddha preaches while in the womb.[102]

TWO ASPECTS OF SPIRITUAL WAYFARING—CONTEMPLATION AND INSIGHT

JHĀNA AND SAMĀDHI

It has been suggested that *jhāna* was the characteristic mean which Buddha advocated for spiritual realization.[103] It stood for the stilling of the mind which led to its purification and illumination. The mind was compared to a pool or mirror, which, when tranquilled or polished, became transparent and clear. When the mind is purified through the subsidence of the *kilesas*, the *nīvaraṇas* it becomes luminous as a result of *jhānic* practice. When the mind is perturbed, its cognitions are rendered defective by the working of passions and verbal habits and intellectual distractions. It is only after it has been stilled and purified by *jhāna* that it is capable of emerging into the still and silent synoptic vision of truth. It is this vision whichs is *paññā* properly so called. This entire process from the cultivation of *jhāna* to the attainment of the Buddhist beatific vision has been repeatedly and diversely described in early texts and in fact this description forms a stereotype.

In the Nikayic descriptions four *jhānas* have been mentioned.[108] The first *jhāna* has five elements—*vitakka*, *vicāra*, *sukhasomanassa*, *pīti-passaddhi*, *ekaggatā*. In the second *jhāna*, the first two, in the third, the third element and in the fourth, the

fourth element subsides. The desire for logical arrangement soon led to a reclassification of this process into five stages,[105] in each of which only one more element subsided. The Mahīśāsakas held that the passage from one *jhāna* to another did not require any intermediate stages.[106] Buddhaghosa takes this to be a denial of the need of any preparatory stages (*upacāra*).[107] Perhaps the thesis is really intended to uphold the scheme of four *jhānas* as against that of five *jhānas*. In contrast to this thesis of *jhāna-saṁkamati*, there is the thesis advocated by the Sammatīyas which proposes intermediate stages (*jhānantarika*).[108] Buddhaghosa, however, distinguishes this view from the Theravāda view of the five *jhānas*.[109]

The standard formula for the four *jhānas* refers to *vītakka* and *vicāra* as elements of the first *jhāna*. They have been explained by Buddhaghosa as initial and sustained applications of the mind.[110] It may be noted that the *Yogasūtras* apparently attach a different meaning to these words.[111] In the *Kathāvatthu*, the Uttarāpathakas seem to assert that *vitakka* or attending to is a universal feature of psychic states.[112] This is questioned on the obvious ground that there are jhānic states which are Canonically described *avitakka*. In view of this, it would seem that the Uttarāpathakas, perhaps, used the word *vitakka* in a more general sense too than the usual one, for example, they might have meant either the mere fact of the mind attending to its object, which is universally true, or they might have meant that there is a discursive element in all consciousness which would, by implication, be transcended only with the transcendence (*nirodha*) of the mind.[113]

An interesting Andhaka thesis asserts that *jhāna* is enjoyed (*assādeti*) and that it is the object of a desire (*nikkanti*) for itself.[114] The assertion of *assāda* and *nikkanti* for *jhāna* finds some Canonical support.[115] What is more, in the first three *jhānas*, the elements of *pīti* and *sukha* being there, how can enjoyment and proclivity be denied. The Theravāda refutation, therefore, is only concerned with determining the ultimately instrumental status of *jhāna*. There is, however, no doubt that contemplation and the world corresponding to it were given in early Buddhism a status of value and considerable enthusiasm was expressed for them. According to Schayer, in pre-Canonical Buddhism, the elements of *rūpa* alone were

considered impermanent.[116] This almost Platonic exaltation of a contemplative consciousness appears to have come in for some relative depreciation in the *Abhidharma* which has place only for analysis, supernormal powers and the transcendent.[117]

The profoundest problem concerning *jhāna* has been touched in a thesis which discusses the nature of *samādhi*?[118] The orthodox opinion discovers the meaning of *samādhi* in *ekaggatā*,[119] that is to say, if a moment of thought is both moral as well as concentrated on a single object, then we have *samādhi*. The Sabbatthivādins and the Uttarāpathakas criticize this on the score that one-pointedness is a universal feature of the mind on account of its momentariness. *Samādhi*, therefore, must mean a continuous flow of the mind (*cittasantatisamādhī ti*). This apparently rational way of seeking the essence of *samādhi* as a feature characterizing a sequence rather than a moment of the mind is dismissed by the Theravādins on the score that the past and the future cannot be collected together into a set.[120]

Several theses (XV.7-XV.9) relate to the elucidation of the highly obscure topic of *nirodha*. Two theses raise the issue whether *ṣaññāvedayitanirodha* is worldly (*lokiya*) or supramundane (*lokottara*).[121] The Hetuvāda thesis that *nirodha* conduces to rebirth among the *asaññisattā*,[122] however, really implies that the *nirodha* is worldly or *lokiya* in its nature. The orthodox view refuses to categorize *nirodha* as either *lokiya* or *lokottara* and regards it as a mere negative state, the suppression of four mental *khandhas*. However, the Rājagirikas have been attributed the thesis that, since there is no law about dying, a person may die even in a state of *ṣaññāvedayitanirodha*. The Theravādins observe that death implies the operation of relevant causal factors and events in the mind which in such a case is complete abeyance. The Rājagirikas insist on repeating their inconvenient query—is there a rule governing the occurrence of death? The Theravādins can only say—'*niyāme āsante pi maraṇasamayen' eva marati na asamayenāti*.'[123]

Since the *jhāna* (concentration) over a physical object is gradually transformed into the contemplation of an idea, the Andhakas asserted that such *jhāna* produces hallucination.[124] This opinion really is an important philosophical question. If the Andhaka[125] view were logically pressed it would reduce

all conceptual and judgemental knowledge to error—a position which finds much support in Mahāyāna.[126] This may be compared with the more outspoken and radical thesis attributed to the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas[127] who assert the impossibility of grouping together different things under generic concepts.[128] They argue that things are not like cattle to be tied together by a yoke. They are essentially different and there are no real universals. This is an example of extreme nominalism.

SPIRITUAL INSIGHT (YĀNA AND PAṬISAṀBIDĀ)

In early Buddhist texts, cognitive phenomena have been classified in several ways. We have thus the distinction between sensation (*pañca viññāṇa*) and ideation (*mano viññāṇa*), perception (*viññāṇa*) and conception (*saññā*), popular belief (*sammuti*) and ultimate or transcendental knowledge.[129] Supernormal knowledge or insight such as clairvoyance or telepathy was designated *abhiññā*[130] while spiritual insight arising from meditation (in the original sense) and contemplation was called *abhisamaya* and *paṭisaṁbhidā* or *vipassanā*.[131] It appears to have been believed that worldly knowledge, whether commonsense or science, arose from a mixture of sensation and conception and while it had a practical value, it rested on presupposition of *avidyā* and functioned within its realm. The comprehension of the three marks paved the way for the advance of knowledge to the plane of spiritual vision. In this advance were left behind not only sensations but also ultimately conceptions arising from and leading to the use of words, logical dichotomies and antinomies, in short, the discursive mode of knowledge. Thus, knowledge progressed from the pragmatic beliefs of common people embodying relative truth to the intuitive comprehension of the ultimate spiritual truth (*paramattha*).

The Andhakas appear to question this general dichotomy. They assert that all knowledge is *paṭisaṁbidā*[132] and that popular knowledge too should be deemed to have truth for its object.[133] These propositions serve to highlight the prevailing Andhaka tendency to question existing beliefs and distinctions. The first of these two assertions implies the

wider question of the relationship of spiritual insight to the ordinary knowledge within the psyche of the Arahant. The Mahāsaṁghikas held that one who has removed spiritual ignorance by insight into the Path cannot simultaneously be experiencing ordinary sensuous cognition.[134] The Pubbaseliyas proposed further that spiritual insight and ordinary conciousness, pertaining to the Arahant, must be quite independent mutually.[135] To the same problem the Andhakas propose another solution—when the Arahant has sensuous cognition, at that time his spiritual insight may be deemed to be objectless.[136] The Pubbaseliyas also suggest that the knowledge of the twelve aspects of the four truths constitutes a twelve-fold supramundane insight (*lokottara yāna*).[137] This seems to stress minor distinctions more than the basic unity of such knowledge. The Hetuvādins question the division of insight (*yāna*) into worldly (*lokiya*) and extra-worldly (*lokottara*).[138] They suggest that only the insight into the spiritual truth ought to be regarded as insight. This is tantamount to questioning the possibility of intuitive knowledge concerning significant truths at the level of ordinary worldly experience. The Theravādins seek to refute it by drawing the gratuitous conclusion that the thesis in question is intended to deny the powers of reasoning and reflection to the ordinary man. What is really denied is intuition.

Several theses (viz. V.7-10; III.9) relate to supernormal knowledge. Several of these raise the problem—what is the exact object of an intuitive knowledge concerning another's mind? Is such knowledge simply the knowledge of another's mental state or also of the objects of the latter. That this is a relevant doubt is shown by the fact that the *Yogasūtras* expressly deny this latter possibility.[139] Buddhaghosa's interpretation, however, explains that the Andhakas in V.7, mean to assert only the knowledge of bare *citta* or *viññāṇa* denying the *saṁpayutta dhammas* of the *citta* as falling within the ken of telepathy.[140] This reduces the Andhaka thesis to complete insignificance if not to a palpable error. In V.8, the question of the possibility of knowing the future is raised.[141] In view of the Buddha's well-known prediction, the Andhakas seem to be obviously in the right, but the Theravādins raise the difficulty of knowing the proximate future for some reason

which is wholly obscure. They seem to think that the immediate future cannot be predicated, (*anantare ekanten' eva ñāṇaṁ natthi*), because the knowledge of the relevant causes and conditions for doing so would not be available.[142] The Theravādins seem to be appealing to a kind of rational probabilistic knowledge which is uncertain for immediate instances and acquires certainty only over a long range. Their opponents, however, seem to have an intuitive knowledge in mind. The debate in V.9 seems to turn over the possibility of direct introspection.[143] The Andhakas assert that insight being itself an impermanent phenomenon ought to be an object of insight.

EMANCIPATION

The Andhakas hold that it is only the mind with *rāga* that gets emancipated (*sarāgaṁ cittaṁ sarāgato vimutti*).[144] In orthodox theory, a distinction is made between the subsidence or *rāga* which occurs at an earlier stage and emancipation which is the last stage and means freedom from rebirth. The Andhaka thesis does not seem to have the technical distinction between the *anāgāmī* and an Arahant. Their thesis is simply and picturesquely stated—emancipation is the removal of passion from the mind like dirt from a cloth. There is similar import of two other theses according to which obstructions (*nīvaraṇas*) and fetters (*saṁyojanas*) are cast off only by those who are bound by them.[145]

It is also proposed that there is a continuous process between the *vikkhaṁbhan-vimutti* accomplished by jhāna and the *samuccheda-vimutti* accomplished by the *maggakhaṇa*.[146] On the orthodox view, the former is simply a preparation of the mind while the latter is entering the Path and undergoing a critical and reversible change approaching emancipation. Here again it is clear that the thesis considers the whole matter in a simple and non-technical way.[147]

We have another thesis of the Andhakas which asserts that the 'knowledge of emancipation has itself the quality of emanciption'.[148] Buddhaghosa points out that the *vimuttiñāṇa* refers to four *ñāṇas—vipassanā, magga, phala* and *paccavekkhaṇa*. Of these *vipassanā* is *vimuttiñāṇa* or free because it is free from

the sense of a permanent object. *Mārga* is a severance from evils and hence has *samuccaheda vimutti*. *Phala* is peaceful repose and it has *paṭipassaddhi-vimutti*. *Paccavekkhaṇa* is the reflective knowledge of *vimutti* and hence deemed free of these four types of *vimutti-ñāṇas*. Only the *phalañāṇa* is to be really called *vimutta* in the real sense of the word (*nippariyāyena*). The Andhakas do not make these distinctions but refer to all the *vimuttiñāṇa* as *vimutta* or emancipated.[149] As in the case of the previous thesis on *vimutti*, so here the view controverted by the Theravādins gives the impression of being simpler and more archaic.

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3. Ibid., XVIII. 5.
4. Ibid., XX. 5.
5. See ibid., I. 5; V. 2, 4, 10; IX. 7; XII. 5.
6. Ibid., XXII. 4.
7. Ibid., XXII. 5.
8. Ibid., XVIII, 6-7.
9. Ibid., XI. 6.
10. Ibid., XV. 7-8.
11. Ibid., III. 3-4; V. 1; XIII. 5-6.
12. *Samāpannass atthi vacībhedo 'ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, II. 5; cf. also IX. 9, Masuda, op. cit., p. 33.
13. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 55.
14. Cf. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 18-19.
15. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 179f.
16. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 372.
17. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 175.
18. *Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 8; cf. also IX. 8.
19. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 493.
20. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, IV, pp. 205-7.
21. Masuda, op. cit., p. 23.
22. Ibid., p. 52.
23. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 23n.
24. Ibid., loc. cit.
25. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 56.
26. *Dukkhāhāro maggaṅgaṁ maggapariyāpannan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, II. 6.
27. Ibid., p. 187.
28. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 56-7.
29. Ibid., p. 130.
30. '*Idam dukkhan ti' vācaṁ bhāsato*, '*idam dukkhan ti ñānaṁ pavattatīti*', *Kathāvatthu*, XI. 6.
31. See ibid., pp. 394-6.
32. Masuda, op. cit., pp, 24-5.
33. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 56-7.
34. Masuda, op. cit., p. 24n.
35. See supra, pp. 50 ff.
36. See supra, pp. 65 ff.
37. *Ekena ariyamaggena cattāri sāmaññaphalāni sacchikarotī ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 5.
38. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 172-3.
39. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 486-7.
40. *Arahā catūhi phalehi samannāgato ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, IV. 4.

41. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 74-5.
42. *Arahattasacchikiriyāya paṭipanno puggalo tīhi phalehi samannāgato ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, IV. 9.
43. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 77, 79.
44. Ibid., p. 186.
45. *Pañcaṅgiko maggoti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XX. 5.
46. See ibid., p. 516; see also *Points of Controversy*, p. 348.
47. Cf. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 516ff; C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *What Was the Original Gospel?* p. 60; *Sākya*, p. 89; see also *JRAS*, 1935, p. 723.
48. *Sekhassa asekhaṁ ñāṇaṁ atthīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, V. 2.
49. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 80-81.
50. Cf. Ten *Asekkhā dhammā*, *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, pp. 209, 240.
51. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 271-2.
52. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 87.
53. *Sāvakassa phale ñāṇaṁ atthīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, V. 10.
54. See *Kathāvatthu*, I. 5; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 42-3.
55. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 335-6.
56. *Aniyatassa niyāmagamanāya atthi ñāṇanti*, *Kathāvatthu*, V. 4.
57. *Atthi puthujjanassa accantaniyāmatā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIX. 7.
58. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 82-3.
59. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 439.
60. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, p. 159; *Puggala Paññatti*, pp. 104ff.
61. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 180-1.
62. *Sattakkhattuparamo puggalo sattakkhattuparamatā niyato ti?* *Kathāvatthu*, XII. 5.
63. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 137.
64. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 214-15.
65. *Duṭṭhena-cittena.*
66. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 137.
67. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 137-8; see also *Debates Commentary*, p. 170.
68. *Kathāvatthu*, XIII. 6, *Kolaṅkolakathā*.
69. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 138.
70. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, pp. 77n, 269n.
71. See *Debates Commentary*, pp. 169-70; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*,' pp. 137-8.
72. *Na vattabbaṁ 'sattamabhavikassa puggalassa pahīnā duggatīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XII. 10.
73. *Pañcaviññāṇasmaṅgissa atthi maggabhāvanā ti?* *Kathāvatthu*, X. 3.
74. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 123.
75. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 103-4.
76. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 371-3.
77. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 125.
78. See ibid., pp. 123-5.
79. *N'atthi devesu brahmacariyavāso ti?* *Kathāvatthu*, I.3.

80. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 39-40.
81. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, IV, p. 38.
82. See *Kathāvatthu*, III, 10; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 71.
83. *Kathāvatthu*, XVI. 10.
84. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 67.
85. *Aṭṭhamakassa puggalassa diṭṭhipariyuṭṭhānaṁ pahīnan ti? Kathāvatthu*, III. 5.
86. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 222-3.
87. Ibid., pp. 220ff.
88. The five controlling powers or spiritual sense-faculties are faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, reason or understanding. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV, pp. 174-5.
89. *Aṭṭhamakassa puggalassa natthi saddhindriyan ti, Kathāvatthu*, III. 6.
90. *Kaṭhāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 67-8.
91. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV, pp. 174-5.
92. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 226.
93. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 194-5.
94. *Atthi gabbhaseyyāya dhammābhisamayo ti? Kathāvatthu*, XXII. 4; also XIV. 2, where the Pubbaseliyas assert that the sense-mechanism of the embryo starts at the moment of conception.
95. *Atthi gabbhaseyyāya arahattappattiti?* Ibid., XXII. 5.
96. *Atthi supiṅagatassa dhammābhisamayo ti?* ibid., p. 530.
97. *Atthi supinagatassa aṛahattappattiti?* Ibid., p. 530.
98. *Points of Controversy*, p. 360n.
99. See above.
100. See *Pss. of the Brethren*, lxx. 'Sīvali', the child saint in question; *Udāna*, pp. 79ff.
101. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 529-30.
102. See supra, p. 153.
103. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 198; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 408; III, pp. 74-5, 337-8.
104. See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 533. Cf. *Visudddhimagga*, pp. 57, 95ff; see also *Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva*; 195.15; *Yogasūtras*, I. 17.
105. See *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, pp. 48-51.
106. *Jhānā jhānaṁ saṁkamatīti, Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 6.
107. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 173.
108. *Atthi jhānantarikā ti, Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 7.
109. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 174-5.
110. *Visuddhimagga*, p. 95.
111. *Yogasūtras*, I, 42-4.
112. *Sabbaṁ cittaṁ vitakkānupatitan ti, Kathāvatthu*, IX.7; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 118-19.
113. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 361-2.
114. *Samāpanno, assādeti jhānanikanti jhānārammaṇā ti, Kathāvatthu*, XII. 7; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 144-5.

115. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 131-2.
116. Cf. *IHQ*, XII. 1936.
117. See *Yogasūtras*, IV. 51, wherein *saṅga* is mentioned as a danger for the *yogis*.
118. *Cittasantati samādhīti, Kathāvatthu*, XI. 6; cf. E. Conze, *Buddhist Meditation*, pp. 20-1, 113-18.
119. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 132.
120. In the *Yogasūtras*, *samādhi* is essentially a flow of mind; see *Yogasūtras*, II. 3; III. 11.
121. *Saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti lokuttarā ti, Kathāvatthu*, XV.7; *Saññāvedayitanirodha samāpatti lokiya ti*, ibid., XV. 8.
122. *Saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti asaññasattupikā ti, Kathāvatthu*, XV.10; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 155-6.
123. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 155.
124. *Pathavikasiṇasamāpattiṁ samāpannassa viparīte ñāṇaṁ ti, Kathāvatthu*, V. 3.
125. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 81.
126. See T.R.V. Murti, op. cit., pp. 165ff; Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., pp. 70ff.
127. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 94.
128. *N'atthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi saṁgahītā ti, Kathāvatthu*, VII. 1.
129. Cf. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*, pp. 183ff. *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, Introductory essays, VII; L.A. Govind, *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy*, Chapter VI; H.V. Gunther, *Philosophy and Psychology of Abhidharma*, Chap. II; K N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 434-6; Nyayaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, pp. 28-9.
130. See PTS. Dictionary, s.v. Abhiññā; cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. p. 47; see also K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 438-40.
131. See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 537-8.
132. *Sabbaṁ ñāṇaṁ paṭisaṁbhidā ti, Kathāvatthu*, V. 5.
133. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭthakathā*, p. 84.
134. *Aññāne vigate ñāṇavippayutte citte vattamāne na vattabbaṁ 'ñāṇīti', Kathāvatthu*, XI. 4.
135. *Ñāṇaṁ cittavippayuttan ti, Kathāvatthu*, XI. 3.
136. *Ñāṇaṁ an ārammaṇaṁ ti, Kathāvatthu*, IX. 5.
137. *Dvādasavatthukaṁ ñāṇam lokuttaran ti, Kathāvatthu*. XX. 6.
138. *N'atthi puthujjanassa ñāṇān ti, Kathāvatthu*, XX. 2.
139. See *Yogasūtras*, IV. 20.
140. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakāthā*, pp. 84-5.
141. *Anāgate ñāṇaṁ atthīti, Kathāvatthu*, V. 8.
142. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 85.
143. *Paccuppanne ñāṇaṁ atthīti, Kathāvatthu*, V. 9.
144. See *Kathāvatthu*, III. 3; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 65.

145. *Nivuto nīvaraṇaṁ jahatīti, Kathāvatthu*, XIII. 5; *Sammukhībhūto saññojanaṁ jahatīti*, ibid., XIII. 6.
146. *Vimuttaṁ vimuccamānaṁ ti, Kathāvtthu*, III. 4.
147. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 65-7.
148. *Vimuttiñāṇaṁ vimuttaṁ ti, Kathāvatthu*, V. 1.
149. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 80.

7

The Buddhist Saṁgha—Its Spiritual Interpretation

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The fact that the Saṁgha occupies a very important position in Buddhism is amply evident as it constitutes the Three Jewels (*triratna*) of the Buddhists, viz., Buddha, *Dhamma* and Saṁgha. The great practical achievement of the Buddha was to found a religious Order which has lasted to the present day. It is chiefly to this institution that the performance of his religion is due.[1] It seems that the very nature of his *Dhamma* required for its successful propagation the help of some organized and well trained Saṁgha. It is observed that the inclusion of Saṁgha in the *Tisaraṇa* formula was done under the express order of the Buddha himself.[2] A person seeking to opt for the Buddhist way of life has to seek refuge in all the three with, perhaps, an equal amount of urgency and dedication to each one of them. From the beginning the monks were the Buddhists *par excellence* who could go up to emancipation and on whom was laid the duty of preaching the doctrine and guiding the laity. A special organization was created by the Buddha for the monks and the patronage of laity led to its material

prosperity. It was again the Saṁgha which naturally claimed to be the rightful body for interpreting the *Dhamma.*[3] For these reasons, the continued growth of the Saṁgha was natural in the centuries following the Buddha.

In the wake of the growing tendency of difference and debate over various tenets of Buddhism, the Saṁgha was inevitably involved. With doubts and scepticism regarding the nature of the Buddha and the elements of his doctrine, the concept of the Saṁgha also fell a prey to the upsurge. Consequently, some assertions were made by certain sects with regard to the Saṁgha seeking to emphasize an ideal and abstract nature for it as against the hard fact of its visible and factual reality. This was something alien to the orthodox Theravādins who perhaps formed the major bulk of its numerical strength. Granting the new propositions was against their notion of the Saṁgha as a living body of monks. The *Kathāvatthu* has taken up some of the interesting assertions for debate and shown their untenability from the Theravāda point of view.

THESES AND ARGUMENTS

AS AN ABSTRACT NOTION THE ORDER (SAṀGHA) CANNOT ACCEPT GIFTS

The present issue of debate seeks to discuss as to whether the Order can accept gifts or not?[4] According to the commentary of Buddhaghosa, that section of the Vetulyakas, which is known as Mahāsuññatāvādins, believes that in the metaphysical sense (*paramattha*) of the word, the Order means the Paths and the Fruits which being abstract notions cannot be said to accept gifts.[5]

The Theravādins, however, maintain that the Order, as the supreme field of merit in the world, is worthy of offerings (*āhuneyya*), hospitality (*pāhuneyya*), gifts (*dakkhiṇeyya*), salutations (*añjalīkaraṇīya*).[6] Besides this, the Buddha laid down that four pairs of men and eight classes of individuals[7] are worthy of gifts, as also that there are people who offer gifts to them. Finally, the Theravādins quote a certain utterance of the Buddha that the Order accepts gifts.[8] Thus, the Theravādins would

maintain that the Order accepts gifts, a position diametrically opposed to the one suggested by the above thesis.

The advocates of the proposed thesis, however, argue that the Path and the Fruition cannot accept gifts and since, the Order stands for nothing but the preceding two, it cannot be said to accept gifts.[9] It may be mentioned that the nature of what constitutes a gift or its results or its purification were matters themselves subjected to abstract debate in which the Rājagirikas, the Siddharthikas and the Uttarāpathakas played an important part.[10]

OR PURIFY THE SAME

Again, the same section of the Vetulyakas, i.e., the Mahāsuññatāvādins uphold, as a corollary to the previously mentioned[11] that the Order as an abstract notion constituted of the Path and its Fruition, cannot be supposed to purify the gifts.[12]

The Theravādins put forth similar arguments as in the preceding debate.[13] They however make an additional point that there are people who offer gifts to the Order as well as make their offerings effective.[14]

OR SHARE IN DAILY LIFE

Another thesis, belonging to the Mahāsuññatāvādins[15] with regard to the Order, seeks to lay down that it is incorrect to say that the Order enjoys (*bhuñjati*), eats (*khādati*) and drinks (*pivati*).[16]

But the Theravādins observe that it has to be admitted that there are people who partake of the meals of the Order, both daily as well as on special occasions. The Theravādins also bring in the reference of such utterances of Buddha where he spoke of (*gaṇabhojana*) 'meals taken in company', (*paramparabhojana*) 'in turn', (*atirittabhojana*) 'of food left over', and (*anatirittabhojana*) 'not left over',[17] as also of eight kinds of drinks.[18]

OR CONFER GREAT MERIT

The last of the present set of theses again belongs to the

Mahāsuññatāvādins,[19] who seek to lay down that it should not be said that 'a thing given to the Order brings great reward'.[20]

The basic objection of the Therāvādins against this thesis is the same as in the previous controversies. They strengthen their argument by citing such *sutta* passages wherein the importance of giving to the Order is laid down. They quote the word of the Buddha who asked the lady of the Gotamas to give to the Order and thereby render honour to him as well as to the Saṁgha.[21] Elsewhere, it is simply said that one who makes a gift to the Order reaps a great reward.[22]

The *Kathāvatthu* contains a corresponding set of controversies wherein problems like the nature, content and efficacy of gifts are under dispute.

NATURE OF GIFT

The first controversy of this set rests over the assertion that giving or *dāna* is a mental state.[23] According to Buddhaghosa, the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas (Siddharthikas) recognized only the mental attitude in giving.[24]

The Theravādins argue in this connection that *dāna* cannot be a mental state, otherwise it should be possible for one to give away his mental state to others.

The proponents, i.e., the Rājagirikas and the Siddharthikas, however, observe that the act of giving does not result into undesirable or disagreeable consequences,[25] rather, its opposite is true. Thus, *dāna* is a mental state merely.

The Theravādins further argue that, granting the fact that *dāna* was pronounced by the Buddha, it cannot be yet maintained that giving a robe or alms food, etc. directly brings about desirable results.[26]

In turn, the proponents quote from the utterances of Buddha where he speaks of meritorious giving[27] and five great *dānas*[28] as supreme. They maintain thereby that giving is a mental state.

The Theravādins also quote the words of Buddha[29] to reiterate their view that *dāna* is a thing to be given and not a mental state as the proponents affirm.

The Buddha had clearly laid down that *karman* or moral action consisted in will (*cetanā*) and volitional acts (*cetayitvā*).[30] As Nāgārjuna also states, '*cetanā cetayitvā ca karmoktaṁ*

paramarṣinā'.[31] The Theravādins seem to consider *dāna* exclusively under the second heading, i.e., they regard giving and what is given as constituting *dāna* in virtue of their being in consequence to volitional acts. The Rājagirikas and the Siddharthikas, on the other hand, seem to have in mind only that psychic factor which invests *dāna* with a moral value. It may be recalled that already in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, *dāna* is one of the three cardinal virtues.[32] But here we have a subtle attempt at analyzing its notion which seeks to spiritualise it, emphasizing its psychic rather than its material components. The effect of such a notion of *dāna* tends to be parallel to the Vetulyaka denial of the spiritual relevance of material gifts to the Saṁgha.

UTILITY AS THE MEASURE OF MERIT

The next discussion rests on the assertion that merit increases with utility.[33] Buddhaghosa attributes the view to sects like the Rājagirikas, the Siddharthikas and the Sammatīyas.[34]

The Theravādins argue that this assertion would imply that other mental experiences are increasing quantities, that is to say contact, feeling, perception, volition, etc., can each keep growing, since merit is held to be nothing except certain moral psychic factors.[35] The proponents would deny this. They would also deny that merit keeps growing just as a creeper, or a tree, etc., keeps growing.

The Theravādins argue further that the proponents must also admit that a giver acquires merit when, having given his gift, he does not consider it further? The proponents would admit this.[36] But then it would imply that merit accrues to one who does not consciously reflect upon an aim. But is not the case the opposite of this? The proponents concede this.[37] Then it would be wrong to say that merit goes on growing with utility.

Again the proponents ought to admit that such a giver may also acquire merit who, on giving a gift, entertains, sensual, malevolent, or cruel thoughts, but then, we have a combination of two opposite contacts, feelings, perceptions, etc. The Theravādins now quote the words of Buddha that the norm of the good and the wicked are far apart from each

other,[38] and, hence, it is wrong to say that good and bad mental states co-exist side by side in anyone. Now it is the proponents' turn to quote the words of Buddha to reiterate their thesis that merit grows with utility.[39] The Theravādins wind up the discussion with the observation that supposing the acceptor of the gift throws it away or someone takes it away, how can merit then increase there being no utility of the gift? Thus, merit is not dependent on utility.[40]

The *Kathāvatthu* and its commentary both leave the debate in considerable obscurity, the principal cause of which is their obstinacy to crucify the proponents on conceptual process of entirely their own making. On the Theravādin concept of merit (*puñña*), the proponents' thesis is simply absurd. They are unable to give any coherent account of any actual arguments which the proponents used. This shows that unlike some of the other debates, e.g., the one relating to Puggala, in this case the Theravādins did not possess any accurate knowledge of the point of view which they were criticizing.

It seems to us that the present thesis should be connected with the former where it has been maintained that a gift is a psychic factor. Here, the other side of the gift appears to be considered. The utility of the gift made appears also to be considered as a factor in the accruing of merit while the gift as a psychic resolve confers a fixed merit. The same gift, considered as a utilization in time, may be held to confer increasing merit. In these two theses, thus, we have complete psychological analysis of *dāna*. It consists, on the one hand, of a meritorious resolve on the part of a donor and, on the other, it consists of a series of utilizations by the donee. From the second of the two there accrues an increasing merit to the donor. Socially, this would suggest that a proper gift ought to be highly and continuously useful for as long a period as possible.

With this may be connected the Mahāsaṁghika thesis which asserts that virtue grows through observance (*samādāna hetukaṁ sīlaṁ vaḍḍhati*).[41] The thesis refers to the Canonical statement to the increase of merit 'by planting pleasant parks and groves, etc.'. Buddhaghosa explains that the increase of virtue here does not refer to a psychic factor (*cittavippayutta silopacayaṁ*).[42]

EFFECT OF GIVING

The present discussion rests over the assertion that what is given here sustains elsewhere.[43] Buddhaghosa attributes this thesis to the Rājagirikas and the Siddharthikas.[44]

The Theravādins challenge the view on the ground that the proposition commits one to the further statement that robes, alms-food, etc., are enjoyed in the after-life. It implies further that one person is the agent for another, that is to say, one acts and someone else experiences the consequences.

The proponents bring the example of the *petas*,[45] for they are supposed to be thankful to those who give gifts which appease the hearts of those *petas*.[46] Similarly, they quote another reference from the utterances of the Buddha that parents contemplate about their incoming children that they would serve them in many ways.[47]

That gifts made here in some sense avail in the after-life has been a perennial notion in India That some Buddhist sects thought it fit to defend this popular notion shows perhaps the change coming over Buddhism. We know in fact that gifts were made by Buddhists for the welfare and merit of their relations.[48] It is in this context that we should interpret this effort at accommodating the popular view.

SANCTIFICATION OF THE GIFT

Next discussion centres round the view that a gift is sanctified by the giver only, and not by the recipient.[49] Buddhaghosa has associated the Uttarāpathakas with this view.[50]

The Theravādins in their bid to refute the view draw the attention of the proponents to those personages for whom the Buddha had himself made pronouncements that they are worthy of gifts. As against this the Uttarāpathakas point out that if the suggestion of the Theravādins were to be accepted, it would mean that the recipient can be the agent for quite a different person.[51] In that case, a certain person can work out the misery or happiness of the other, that is to say, one would sow and another reap.[52]

The Theravādins quote the utterance of the Buddha on the Four-fold Way for the sanctification of the gift according to

which the recipient is also said to be capable of sanctifying the gift.[53] Thus, the Theravādins conclude that it is wrong to say that a gift is sanctified only by the giver, not by the recipient.[54] It may be noted that this debate is especially relevant with the Vetulyaka view that the Saṁgha cannot sanctify any gifts.[55]

CREATION OF THE DOCTRINE (SĀSANA)[56] ANEW, i.e., ITS REFORMATION

The present debate analyzes an interesting proposition of the Uttarāpathakas[57] that the religion (*sāsana*) is, has been and may again be reformed (*navakataṁ*), i.e., made new.[58]

The Theravādins argue in this connection as to which aspect of the religion has been reformed or made new? Is it the applications in mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhānā*) or supreme efforts (*sammapadhānā*), or steps to *iddhi* (*iddhipādā*), or moral controls (*indriyā*) or moral forces (*balā*) or seven branches of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅgā*)? Similarly, does the proposition imply that some thing that had been bad in the past has been made good? Or does it mean that something which was allied with vicious things--intoxicants (*sāsavaṁ*), fetters (*saññojaniyaṁ*), ties (*gandhaniyaṁ*), floods (*oghaniyaṁ*), yokes (*yoganiyaṁ*), hindrances (*nīvarṇiyaṁ*), infections (*parāmaṭṭhaṁ*), graspings (*upādāniyaṁ*), corruptions (*saṁkilesikaṁ*)--has been freed from them? The proponents are not prepared to grant the points raised by the Theravādins, but the latter emphasize that these propositions must imply either of these points. The Theravādins further argue that if these stated facts of the religion were not reformed what after all is there in the doctrine that admits of reformation?[59]

SCHISMATICS AND THEIR PUNISHMENT

The Rājagirikas hold that a schismatic is to be tormented for the entire *kappa* (*kalpa*).[60] The Uttarāpathakas suggest that such a person has absolutely no chance of acquiring any virtue even though he might give all kinds of gifts to the Saṁgha.[61] The *Kathāvatthu* gives an account of the kinds of gifts contemplated.[62] The Theravādins interestingly adopt a milder view

which held out some hope for the schismatic in case he gave gifts, etc., to the Order. Similar is the thesis of the Uttarāpathakas that the 'abettor of a cardinal crime' (*antarāyutta*) is incapable of entering the 'True Path of Assurance' even if he had only occasionally abbetted.[63] The Theravādins, however, hold hope for this class.

Schism arose from speculative opinion (*diṭṭhi*) and in the early texts *diṭṭhi* receives emphatic condemnation. It is, therefore, highly significant to find that the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas maintained that such opinions are ethically neutral (*diṭṭhigataṁ abyākataṁ*).[64]

From the Theravāda point of view, this was a highly erroneous opinion which was at the same time immoral. Buddhaghosa points out that only four categories of objects are ethically neutral—*vipāl a*, *kiriyā*, *rūpa* and Nibbāna.[65] Similar is the thesis which asserts that '*diṭṭhigataṁ apariyāpannaṁ*'.[66] The argument is that since, a *puthujjana* though passionless is not free from *diṭṭhi*, *diṭṭhi* may be considered *apariyāpanna*—a status reserved for those qualifying in the Path.

Another problem discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* is as to whether or not unintentionally committed (*asañcicca*) cardinal sins (*anantariyas*) involve immediate retribution after death?[67] The Uttarāpathakas take the sterner view. Its implications are especially interesting on the question of *saṁghabheda*. If, for example, a schismatic thinks that his opinion is right, will his schismatic activity, unintentionally committed, lead him to a dire doom after death? The Theravādins think not and quote a passage from the *Vinaya* which distinguishes between the curable and the incurable schismatics.[68]

A couple of controversies are concerned with the extent to which the possible degradation of a person with right views (*diṭṭhisampannopuggalo*)[69] may extend. We have an opinion later held by the Pubbaseliyas that such a person may intentionally commit murder since he has not entirely put away the seed of enmity from his heart.[70] To the Uttarāpathakas is attributed the thesis that for such a person *duggati* is excluded[71] since, by the virtue of his sound views, he cannot be reborn in the purgatory. The Uttarāpathakas have been attributed another thesis asserting that 'the average man may possess final Assurance'.[72]

SIGNS OF LAXITY

The *Kathavatthu* contains a significant controversy related to the assertion that sexual relations may be entered upon with a unified resolve.[73] It has been attributed to the Andhakas and the Vetulyakas.[74] The text of the controversy is, however, extremely obscure, except that the Theravādins raise two problems in the course of the debate, viz., (1) for whom is it meant? and (2) what is the nature of the resolve?[75] Buddhaghosa explains (2) as *kāruñña* or the resolve to be together in *saṁsāra*, but he is not clear on the first point.[76]

The thesis would be quite innocuous if it refers to husband and wife, though its implicit promise would be attraction to the laity. On the other hand, if it has any application to other categories of persons especially to the members of the Order, it would be an extraordinary thesis comparable only to some of the more schocking dicta of the Tantra. It might thus indicate Tantric beginnings as well as moral laxity in the Order. Buddhaghosa's use of the word *kāruñña* makes one recall the story of the Bodhisatta who broke his vow of continence out of compassion for a woman.[77] We seem to have here more a Mahāyānic than a Vajrayānic anticipation.

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

The small set of controversies that occurs in the *Kathāvatthu* is remarkably significant in the sense that it involves discussion on the most significant issue as to the nature of the Saṁgha. The formulations that are laid down by certain sects are incompatible with the notion of the Saṁgha as cherished by the orthodox sections and hence unacceptable to the latter. To be specific, the Vetulyakas or Mahāsuññatāvādins seek to idealize the notion of the Saṁgha and put it on a spiritual plane. For them the Saṁgha, in the metaphysical sense, means Paths and the Fruits, identical respectively with *magga* and *maggaphala*, and hence it is an abstract notion.[78] This being so, the Saṁgha cannot be supposed to do all those things which one ordinarily associates with it such as accepting gifts, or purifying the same and so on. They apparently distinguish the Saṁgha from individuals without conceding to it any corporate personality. The Order for

them is simply the order of spiritual progress. This is a remarkably abstract conception. It is like identifying the University with the processes and stages of higher education.

The Theravādins, however, hold fast to the belief that the Saṁgha is an organization of the monks who have attained *magga* and *phala*. For them it is not an abstract notion but a factual assembly of individuals.[79] The two opinions reflect amply upon the two divergent tendencies to which different sects were pulling powerfully, viz., the real and the ideal, the rational and the metaphysical, the human and the superhuman which ultimately resulted in the crystallization of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. It would be in the fitness of things, therefore, to trace the historical growth of the Saṁgha as a result of which new conceptions gained ground against current beliefs and predilections.

THE HISTORICAL GROWTH OF THE BUDDHIST SAṀGHA

Although the Buddhist monastic system is characterized by special features in so far as it developed on distinct lines and specific principles, yet it is true to say that religious mendicancy and loose assemblages of such mendicants was very well-known in India when the Buddha set the wheel of Law rolling.[80] There were wandering ascetics, viz., *Munis*, *Śramaṇas*, *Yatis*, *Parivrājakas*, etc., whom Jacobi traced to the Brahmanical institution of the Fourth Āśrama,[81] but who seem to represent a pre-Vedic and non-Aryan tradition in their beliefs such as asceticism, atheism, pluralism and realism.[82] There were also Brāhmanic mendicants dwelling in hermitages (*āśramas*) with a vow to observe *brahmacarya*.[83] Early Buddhist texts testify to the existence of a number of sects of the *Parivrājakas* referred to as *gaṇa* or *saṁgha*.[84] The general appellation for them is given as *Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇas*.[85] There were some common features at the basis of all such *Parivrājaka gaṇas*. Their members renounced the worldly life in the quest of enlightenment, lived an austere and saintly life and observed such ceremonies as *Uposatha* and *Varṣāvāsa*. It was in such details as food and dress that these sects differed widely from each other. We know something about the monastic system and code of the Jains and the

Ājīvakas.[86]

It seems that the Buddha was conversant with the rules and regulations followed among the contemporary sects as he sought to frame the code of rules for his own disciples on the principle of his salient doctrine *majjhimā-patipadā* which appeared as a golden mean between the two extreme forms of life, viz., (1) the rigorous asceticism of the Nigaṇṭhas and (2) the easy-going life of the materialists and rich Brāhmaṇas.[87] It is also likely that, to begin with, the Buddha adopted suitable rules and regulations of code and conduct prevalent among the Vedic and non-Vedic recluses of the time.

It has been suggested that the Buddha hardly intended to form a Saṁgha and that the idea of the Saṁgha was thrust upon him.[88] This hypothesis apparently depends on the legend that the Buddha was at first hesitant to preach the *Dhamma*.[89] Once, however, he decided to preach it was quite natural that a number of disciples should flock around him and form a *gaṇa* or Saṁgha. There is hardly anything to suggest that the Buddha was opposed to the idea of Saṁgha.

In fact, the possibility of the growth of a Saṁgha was something inherent in the way of his teaching and was bound to come in course of time. The idea of any hesitation regarding the formation of a Saṁgha on the part of the Buddha is cut at the very root by the fact that the Saṁgha constitutes the triple jewel of Buddhism,[90] without which one could not be initiated as a Buddhist monk. The beginning of the Buddhist Saṁgha should be thus assigned to the time of the delivery of the very first sermon by the Lord at Sārnāth.

The *Vinaya* has recorded the tradition of the growth of the early Saṁgha.[91] The first to be converted by the Buddha were the same five brāhmins who had deserted his company earlier on his giving up severe penance and asceticism, viz., Aññāta-koṇḍañña, Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji.[92]

Their initiation into the Order was a simple affair. They sought admission by saying: '*labheyyāmā mayaṁ, bhante, bhagavato santike pabbajjaṁ, labheyyāma upasampadan ti*'.[93] The Buddha admitted them thus: '*ehi bhikkhu*'. Very soon, the number of disciples increased to sixty who were all Arahants.[94] The Buddha asked them to go to different places for preaching the *Dhamma*.[95] The process went on, and the number of

disciples kept on multiplying at a fast pace as may be gleaned from the *Vinaya*.

Obviously, the Buddhist Saṁgha was growing in shape and size in a remarkable way. On the one hand, people, irrespective of any *varṇa* and caste, were joining it in large numbers and, on the other, powerful states were providing royal patronage; and a wealthy commercial section of the society was forthcoming with charitable gestures.[96]

With the growth of the numerical strength of the Saṁgha and its spread to distant places may be observed a process of transformation and change in its complexion which was there at work from the very beginning. These changes were many-sided and quite a few of them had a very significant bearing on the course of Buddhist history.

The initial change was effected by the Buddha himself as he delegated the authority of ordination to his disciples.[97] Prior to this, he himself used to initiate a new entrant into the Order which entailed a sufficient amount of difficulty as experienced in the *Vinaya*.[98] It facilitated greatly the process of ordination of new members in the Saṁgha. While empowering his disciples to confer ordination, the Buddha laid down detailed rules of ordination[99] as against the simple and informal way in which he himself used to initiate by saying—'*ehi bhikkhu*'. Some bars were also enjoined for certain categories of persons to become a member of the Saṁgha,[100] and certain people were totally debarred from it.[101] The ordination process was very much formalized in so far as two ceremonies began to be performed in this connection, viz., *pabajjā* and *upasampadā*. Elaborate rules were laid down regarding the mutual duties and obligations of the teacher and his disciple.[102]

Significant changes took place in the way of living and residence of the monks. In the beginning, the ideal living that was prescribed for a Bhikkhu seems to have been of an extremely unsocial and secluded type. The Buddha insisted that his first missionaries move alone.[103] Elsewhere, he said that as long as the Bhikkhus delight in forest-living, so long they may be expected not to decline, but to prosper.[104] The *Khaggavisāṇasutta* of the *Sutta-Nipāta* is devoted to extolling the solitary life of a Bhikkhu. There the Bhikkhu is likened to a rhinoceros and it is said that he should wander like it,

all alone.[105] Similarly, there are passages in the *Dhammapada* and *Theragāthā* which sing the glory of aloofness. Curiously enough, this eremitical ideal of early days gave way to the cenobitical ideal. It was still a riddle for the Greek king Milinda in the second century B.C.[106] as to which of the two ideals the Lord Buddha really subscribed to.[107] It seems that under the changing circumstances, the Buddha permitted to the Saṁgha a considerably comfortable type of living. Residence under the trees[108] was the initial rule for the residence of the monks, but such dwelling places as *aḍḍhayoga*, *pāsāda*, *hammiya* and *guhā* were later allowed as *atirekalābha*.[109] The Buddha was also persuaded to accept the gift of *Veluvanavihāra*[110] which resulted in the sanction of *ārāmas* for the dwelling of monks. This was an incident of singular importance as it marked the starting point of almost a settled life for the monks. The rich *seṭṭhis* of Rājagaha readily came forward to build several *vihāras*, *aḍḍhayogas*, *pāsādas*, *hammiyas* and *guhās* for the monks.[111] Anāthapiṇḍaka, one of the richest persons of the time, built an illustrious monastery, Jetavana at Sāvatthi. Such monasteries consisted of dwelling rooms (*vihāra*), cells (*pariveṇa*), gate-chambers (*Koṭṭhaka*), service-halls (*upaṭṭhānasālā*), halls with fire-places (*aggisālā*), store-homes (*kappiyakuṭī*), closets (*vaccakuṭī*), cloisters (*caṅkama*) rooms for walking exercises (*caṅkamasālā*), wells (*udapāna*), sheds for the wells (*udapānasālā*), bathing places (*jantāghara*), bath-rooms (*jantāgharasālā*), tanks (*pokkharaṇi*), pavilions (*maṇḍapa*).[112]

With the growth of comfortable dwelling-places, the Buddha seems to have granted a great deal of latitude as regards the articles of daily usage of the monks such as furniture and dresses. They were allowed to have as their seats or beds benches built against the walls, bedsteads with short removable legs, arm-chairs, sofas, cushioned chairs, carpets, pillows, bolsters stuffed with wool, cotton grass, etc.[113] Monks of certain areas, such as, Avantidakkhiṇāpatha were also allowed to use animal skin for seats or beds.[114] In view of the numerical growth of the monks and shortage of accommodation, rules were framed for ascertaining the claim of priority and office-bearers such as *senāsanapaññāpaka* were appointed to regulate the accommodation of the *Bhikkhus*.[115]

As regards the dress of the monks, they were supposed to

wear *paṁsukulacīvara*, but linen (*khomaṁ*), cotton (*kappāsikaṁ*), silk (*koseyyaṁ*), woollen rug (*kaṁbalaṁ*), coarse cloth (*sānaṁ*), hempen (*bhaṅgaṁ*), were permitted as extra concessions.[116] The story goes that at the instance of Jīvaka Komārabhacca, the Buddha allowed the monks to accept gifts of robes (*cīvara*) made of the mentioned materials.[117] Besides *cīvaras*, they were also allowed to accept mantles (*pāvara*), blankets (*kaṁbala*), towels (*mukhapuñchaka colaka*), bags (*parikkhāracolaka*), bathing clothes (*udakasāṭika*) and bandages for itches, wounds, etc., (*kaṇḍupaticchādi*).[118] Shoes were also allowed.[119]

With regard to food and drinks also, the rules were much relaxed. Initially, the monks were asked to live on alms, but they were subsequently allowed to accept invitations in groups or individually. Further came the sanction of *kappiya-bhūmi* for the storage of food. It is said that the Bhikkhus undertaking a journey were permitted even to receive gold through the *kappiyakaraka* and purchase the necessities of life.[120] For medical usage, the monks were originally enjoined to use urine, etc., (*putimuttabhesajjaṁ*) but later on butter (*sappi*), cream (*navanīta*), oil (*tela*), honey (*madhu*), molasses (*phānita*) were allowed.[121] Not only sick but healthy monks were allowed to take sugar-water, or other sweet-drinks, fruits, meat and fish under certain conditions.

With the increasing relaxations in the day-to-day life of the Saṁgha, a number of rules were laid down for regulating the organization which, however, tended to formalize it more and more. Some of the informal get-togethers of the early days crystallized into fundamental ceremonies of the Saṁgha.

The Buddha had introduced the system of a fortnightly sitting of monks to hold discussions about the *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* and to recite the rules of *Pātimokkha*.[123] This fortnightly assembly was known as the *Uposatha*[124] ceremony. Weekly or fortnightly meetings were already known in some form to the Brāhmins and *Parivrājakas*.[125] Bimbisāra is said to have requested the Buddha to make some such arrangement in the Buddhist Saṁgha also and thus came the *Uposatha*.[126] Gradually, however, the ceremony assumed a technical shape since it implied a number of formalities to be completed such as quorum, selection of place of the assembly and selection of monks who would put and answer questions and so on.

The necessity of quorum implied a jurisdiction of the Saṁgha, and hence rules were framed to define its limits. Various rules and regulations, major and minor, were laid down with regard to the *Uposatha* ceremony and the recitation of *Pātimokkha*.[127] It was laid down that the recitation of *Pātimokkha* could be made only in an assembly in which the members had declared their *parisuddhi* and in which there were no nuns (*Bhikkhuṇīs*), *sāmaṇeras, samaṇerīs*, or a Bhikkhu undergoing punishment, or persons not admissible to the Saṁgha.[128]

The practice of *Vassāvāsa* was another system which the Buddhist monks started observing at an early date. Even now, the geographical conditions of eastern U.P. and northern Bihar are such that travelling sometimes becomes difficult during the rainy season because of the floods in that area. To avoid the inconvenience of travelling in the rains and the chance of injuring sprouts and insects, it was laid down as a rule that the Bhikkhus should stay at one place (*āvāsa*) during three months of the rains.[129]

It was only in cases of urgent calls, such as, for the benefit of the Saṁgha or of the lay-devotees or sick persons, or for some particular business of the Saṁgha, or else if there was danger to life of the monks through beasts, snakes, robbers, fire, schism, etc., that the Bhikkhus were allowed to leave the *āvāsa* and that too only for seven days,[130] in all other cases excepting the last. The ceremony of *Pavāraṇā* marked the end of the *Vassāvāsa* every year. The object of this ceremony was to confess all sins of omission and commission[131] that might have been committed during the *Vassāvāsa*. Elaborate rules were framed towards the procedure of the *Pavāraṇā* ceremony.

Another ceremony on the termination of rain-resort was *Kaṭhina*[132] at which robes were made for the monks out of the gifts of cloth received from the laity. Certain Bhikkhus were selected and entrusted with this job and they were allowed certain privileges regarding food, dress, etc. Rules were laid down with regard to the distribution of the robes once they were ready after the *Kaṭhina* ceremony.[133]

Another significant development in the history of the Buddhist Saṁgha was the formation of *Bhikkhuṇī* Saṁgha. The Buddha was definitely opposed to this idea and he had rejected such a request of Mahāprajāpati Gautamī at Kapilavatthu.[134]

Ānanda was, however, able to persuade him to grant its formation.[135] A number of rules and restrictions were imposed upon the Bhikkhuṇīs.[136]

Apart from the various rules and regulations regarding the habitation, food, dress, practices and ceremonies, elaborate regulations were enjoined for ecclesiastical rules and for the punishment of offending monks. These rules were framed for maintaining the internal polity of the Saṁgha. It has been observed that the laws of polity by which the early Buddhist Saṁghas were governed betray a remarkable maturity of development.[137]

As we go into the details of the growth of the Buddhist Saṁgha, we observe a two-way traffic in its process. On the one hand, it was growing in strength and prosperity and, on the other, it was inheriting a number of rules, regulations, formalities and ceremonies.

These had significant implications in the near future. The numerical growth in membership of the Saṁgha was in itself sufficiently responsible for dispute and debate over the various aspects of the doctrine and discipline.

Similarly, it has been shown that there was difference of opinion among the Bhikkhus from very early times as to the various rules, regulations and formalities. A certain section pleaded for more stringent rules than were in vogue and there was also a group which wanted more and more laxity in the life of the Saṁgha.[138] What is important, however, to note is the economic growth of the Saṁgha.

The sixth century B.C. marks a very important period in Indian history from the economic point of view just as it marked an epoch from the political, religious and philosophical point of view.[139] The age is characterized by the growth of town and commerce and the organization of trade and crafts into guilds.[140] And above all came the all-important evolution of Indian coinage which is now generally believed to belong to this period.[141] This must have revolutionized the entire complexion of contemporary economy.

We hear traditions of the fabulous wealth of merchants like Anāthapiṇḍaka of Śrāvastī and Ghoṣaka of Kauśāmbī. This was the economic background of North India when the magnetic personality of the Buddha emerged on the scene. The Buddhist

Canon bears ample testimony to the effect that many powerful princes and big merchants of the time became greatly devoted to the Buddha. The princes craved for his visits to their kingdom and readily offered their patronage to the new faith. The business magnates, on the other hand, vied with each other to render maximum service to the Buddha and his Saṁgha in the form of boarding and lodging arrangements at different places. The story goes that Anāthapiṇḍaka, the business magnate and High Treasurer of the kingdom of Kośala wanted to dedicate a monastery at Jetavana garden to the Saṁgha. The garden belonged to a certain prince, Jeta, on whose demand Anāthapiṇḍaka paid him as many gold pieces (*hirañña*) as would be sufficient to cover the entire field of the garden.[142] This dedication is recorded in an inscription appended to the depiction of the scene at Bharhut thus: 'Anāthapiṇḍaka dedicates Jetavana purchased with a layer of crores'.[143] Ghoṣaka of Kauśāmbī had built a similar monastery known as Ghoṣitārāma at Kauśāmbī of which the remains have been discovered during recent excavations.[144] There are many others referred to in the literature who built *vihāras* and invited the Bhikkhus for meals and offered them the gifts of alms and robes. At an early stage, specific rules were laid down with regard to the priority of accommodation in a *vihāra*, accepting an invitation from the lay-devotees and distribution of the robes, etc., gifted to the Saṁgha. In laying down such rules the Buddha seems to have anticipated difficulties in these matters. The dispute at the Second Council arose with the acceptance of 'gold and silver' by the Vajjian Bhikkhus.[145] This is a token of the range of economic change which had occurred in the course of a century and threatened to render the old rules about the acceptance of gifts obsolete. Before the Third Council, again, we are told that some had entered the Saṁgha merely to share in its material gains.[146] Thus, the issue of the appropriate mode of gifts to the Order assumed importance and with it the more radical sects appear to have raised the more fundamental question of the metaphysical nature of the Saṁgha and of the spiritual significance of gifts to it. Thus, a certain section of the monks came to entertain such fundamental doubts as (1) whether or not the Saṁgha could accept gifts at all? (2) whether or not the Saṁgha could purify the gifts? (3) whether

or not the Saṁgha could enjoy the gifts given to it? and (4) whether or not the gifts given to the Saṁgha brought any rewards? The Vetulyakas or Mahāsuññatāvādins came out with the suggestion that the Saṁgha should not be supposed to do any of these things.[147]

We have noted that some of the Mahāsaṁghika group of schools were tending more and more towards an idealist and absolutist conception which ultimately received its final manifestation in the emergence of Mahāyāna. The nature of the Buddha was raised above humanity and absolutized and idealized by them.[148] So was the ideal of the Bodhisatta against the ideal of the Arahant.[149] These developments later form the cardinal points of the Mahāyāna system in which the Vetulyakas or Mahāsuññatāvādins seem to have contributed significantly. They might aptly be regarded as the precursors of Mahāyāna. It was in conformity with their other doctrines that the Vetulyakas sought to idealize the notion of the Saṁgha. They did not subscribe to the notion that the Saṁgha was a body of individuals. For them, behind the apparent assembly of the *Bhikkhus* and *Bhikkhuṇīs*, there is an abstract and ideal notion of Saṁgha which makes it a conceptual and not an actual entity as the Theravādins believe. The acceptance of such a radical notion would doubtless have had a disastrous effect, materially speaking, on the Saṁgha and the monks. If the Order cannot accept gifts, or if even when a gift is made to the Saṁgha it cannot purify it or pay back any spiritual reward to the person who makes the gift, and if it is a mistake to think that the Saṁgha enjoys the gift in any sense, who would make an utterly empty sacrifice by way of any gifts to the Order? That such a thesis should then have been put forward leads seriously to the suspicion that its propounders were more than indifferent to the problems of the authorities of the Saṁgha who ran it, materially speaking.

As regards the thesis, viz., the *sāsana* has been and can be renovated, it may be observed that this is an unusual opinion of the Uttarāpathakas based on the simple logic that the religion had been actually reformed from time to time in the course of various Councils and hence it can very well be said that the Order can be reformed and renewed. Taking note of history, this thesis implies a conception of progress in religion,

which can, perhaps, be reconciled with the Master's own suggestion that adjustments could be made in the Doctrine,[150] but which was anathema to established authority. Such a principle would obviously justify innovation and would support the radical sects.

It is difficult to maintain that the Vetulyaka theses regarding the Saṁgha emerged simply because of their imaginative capacity. In fact, the points which they try to make through these propositions do not lack a basis. There would hardly be a difference of opinion even among the Buddhists themselves that the Saṁgha at least stood for the practice of the Buddhist Path and obtaining the fruits thereof. This was the basic ideal, the essential nature of the Order and of course the higher and abstract notion underlying its obvious reality. It was very much open for any one to presume that this side alone should be taken into account as against its real form as a body of individuals. It may be observed here that an intimation of the ideality of the Saṁgha peeps through a certain statement of the Buddha. It is recorded that once Assaji was asked as to who was his religious guru and he replied, 'I accepted religious mendicancy under the guidance of Lord Buddha'.[151] This statement clearly indicates that in the beginning the Buddha was regarded as the head of his Saṁgha. A position totally inconsistent with this is met with in an episode described in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*. Therein, Ananda expresses the hope that the Lord will not pass into *Parinirvāṇa* till he has said something concerning the *Bhikkhu* Saṁgha. The Buddha, however, refused to say anything and observed that he never thinks that he should lead the Saṁgha or that it is under his guidance.[152] This statement of the Buddha seems to imply an ideal form of the Saṁgha for which he thinks there can be no *sāstā* or head.

It is interesting to note that '*cātuddisa Bhikkhu Saṁgha*', i.e., 'the Saṁgha of the four quarters' has been said to represent the ideal concept of the Buddhist Saṁgha.[153] The Pāli Canon frequently refers to the Buddhist Saṁgha as '*āgatānāgata cātuddisa Bhikkhu Saṁgha*'.[154] The phrase also occurs in many donatory inscriptions, the earliest occurring in an inscription from Ceylon datable to third century B.C.[155] There has been a difference of opinion among the scholars as to the real

significance of this phrase. M. Senart suggested that:

> "the Monastic community may be classified in two respects, viz., according to their residence and according to the sect to which they belong. This double restriction is excluded in principle by the mention of the *cātuddisa Saṁgha*, though in some cases and, according to the disposition of the donor, it may mean specially one or the other."[156]

S. Dutt, however, rejects this interpretation and observes that:

> "in the Buddha's life time had grown up a community of his followers, a Saṁgha founded by him and described by him as the Saṁgha of the Four Quarters. Admission to it was open without limitation of caste (such as was recognized by Tridaṇḍins or Brahmanical Sanyāsins) or of locality. As time went on, the original Saṁgha underwent divisions and sub-divisions, but it began at the same time to be idealized. The Saṁgha of the Four Quarters meant latterly an ideal confederation, which at one time had an historical reality. A Saṁgha in later times simply meant a body of resident monks at a particular monastery, but *cātuddisa Saṁgha* meant an ideal confederation, and it was to this ideal entity that donations were formally made."[157]

S. Dutt seems to imagine far more than there is really in the phrase in question. The sole argument that he puts forward in support of his hypothesis is a reference in the Nasika cave inscription where a certain donor gives a cave to the *cātuddisa Saṁgha* and an endowment of 100 *Kahāpaṇas* in the hand of the Saṁgha.[158] Thus he points out the difference between the two. It seems to us that the difference between *sammukha Saṁgha* and *cātuddisa Saṁgha* is not that of real and ideal but that of the local and the universal Saṁgha, i.e., the Buddhist Order in its entirety which had spread far and wide by the third century B.C. The Nasika cave inscription clearly says that the *vihāra* is donated to the *cātuddisa Saṁgha*, i.e., monks from all quarters could come and stay there, whereas the hard cash of 100 *Kahāpaṇas* is meant for the sustenance of the monks living there at that time. The complete phrase,

'*āgatānāgata cātuddisa Bhikkhu-Saṁgha*' simpy means 'Saṁgha of four quarters including all who had become or were to become Bhikkhus in future'. The strongest objection that comes in the way of Dutt's hypothesis is that this phrase occurs most frequentlyin the Pāli Canon which would imply thereby that the Pāli or Theravāda school upheld the ideality of the Saṁgha. We have seen, however, on the testimony of the *Kathāvatthu* that the Theravāda was diametrically opposed to such notions and it upheld the idea of Saṁgha merely as a body of individuals. They severely criticized and condemned those who wanted to idealize the concept of Saṁgha.

It may be further pointed out that this phrase appears to start occurring with the growth of a process of erecting and dedicating the *vihāras*. The phrase does not occur in connection with Bimbisāra's dedication of the Veluvana-*ārāma*.[159] It occurs first when the Jetavana-*vihāra* is gifted.[160] In fact, the coining and laying down of such a phrase became a historical necessity in view of the spread of Buddhist monks and their establishments at far-off places as also its growing prosperity owing to rich gifts coming from the lay devotees. Thus, at the time of dedicating and gifting something to the Saṁgha, it might be necessary to emphasize the point that it was shareable and thus a common property of the entire Buddhist community and was not meant only for the Bhikkhus present at the moment. Thus, although *cātuddisa Saṁgha* contrasted with the *sammukha Saṁgha*, is not limited in space or time like a local community or parish which has a definite *sīmā*, nevertheless, it stands for a community of persons, not for the abstract idea of Buddhist spiritual practices (*magga*) and experiences (*phala*). Hence, on the whole, the thesis here attributed to the Vetulyakas must be held to be a genuine conceptual innovation of which the practical need can only be conjectured in the background of a prospering Saṁgha with a rebellious sect of idealists.

REFERENCES

1. See Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. I, p. 237; Vol. II, pp. 175, 211; see also Satkari Mookerjee in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. I, (2nd ed.), p. 587; cf. K.P. Jayaswal, *Hindu Polity*, pp. 40-2.
2. G.D. De, *Democracy in Early Buddhist Saṁgha*, Preface, p. xi.
3. Cf. G.D. De, op. cit., Preface, pp. xi-xv.
4. *Na vattabbaṁ Saṁgho dakkhiṇaṁ paṭigaṇhātīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 6.
5. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 167.
6. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 475.
7. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, p. 196.
8. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 318n.
9. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 475.
10. Cf. *Kathāvatthu* VII. 4-6; XVII. 11; see infra, pp. 202ff.
11. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 168.
12. *Na vattabbaṁ 'Saṁgho dakkhiṇaṁ visodhetī ti'*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 7.
13. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 476.
14. '*Nanu atthi keci Saṁghassa dānaṁ datvā dakkhiṇaṁ ārādhentī ti*; *Kathāvatthu*, p. 476
15. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 168.
16. *Na vattabbaṁ Saṁgho bhuñjati pivati khādati sāyatī ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVII.8.
17. See *Vinaya Texts*, I, 38f.
18. Cf. *Mahāvagga*, p. 260; see also *Points of Controversy*, p. 319; *Vinaya Piṭaka*, Trans. Rāhula Sāṅkrityāyana, p. 251.
19. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 169.
20. *Na vattabbaṁ 'Saṁghassa dinnaṁ mahapphalaṁ ti*, *Kathāvatthu* XVII. 9.
21. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 339.
22. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, pp. 234-5.
23. *Cetasiko dhammo dānaṁ ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VII. 4.
24. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 95-6.
25. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 96.
26. It may be remarked that the Theravādins, elsewhere, maintain the opposite point of view, i.e., a *dāna* brings about *mahāphala*, see *Kathāvatthu* p. 478.
27. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, pp. 236-7.
28. Ibid., III, pp, 244-5.
29. See ibid., III, p. 239; *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, pp. 199-200.
30. Cf. '*Cetnāhaṁ bhikkhave kammaṁ vadāni*; *cetayitvā kammaṁ kāroti kāyena, vācāya, manasā*, *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 39-40; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 157-8.
31. *Mādhyamaka Kārikā*, XVII. 2-3.
32. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, V. 2-2.

33. *Paribhogamayaṁ puññaṁ vaḍḍhatī ti, Kathāvatthu*, VII. 5.
34. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 97.
35. Cf. '*Phassādayo kusalā dhammā na tato aññaṁ....*', ibid., loc. cit.
36. According to Buddhaghosa the proponents admit this because '*paṭiggāhakānaṁ paribhogena purimacetanā pavaḍḍhati, evaṁ taṁ hoti puññaṁ*', *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 97.
37. Cf. '*dāyakassa cāgacetanaṁ taṁ saṁdhāya....*', ibid., loc. cit.
38. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 52-3.
39. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 31.
40. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 307.
41. *Kathāvatthu*, X. 9.
42. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 127.
43. *Ito dinnena tattha yāpentīti, Kathāvatthu*, VII. 6.
44. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 99.
45. On *petas* (*pretas*) see Childers, s.v. *Petas;* cf. Spence Hardy, *Buddhism*, p. 59.
46. *Khuddakapāṭha*, (PTS ed.) 6 (vii).
47. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, p. 43.
48. See e.g., *EI*, XX, pp. 16, 18-21.
49. *Dāyakato va dānaṁ visujjhati, no paṭiggāhakato ti, Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 11.
50. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 170.
51. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 322n. 2.
52. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, I. 1, p. 55f; XVI, 1-5, pp. 454-60.
53. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 342f; *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, p. 180f.
54. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 170.
55. See supra, p. 201.
56. Modern terminology aptly reders the term *Sāsana* into Buddhism. See S.Dutt, *The Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 123.
57. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 188
58. *Sāsanaṁ navaṁ kataṁ ti, Kathāvatthu*, XXI. 1.
59. Ibid., pp. 519-20.
60. *Kappaṭṭho Kappaṁ tiṭṭheyyāti, Kathāvatthu*, XIII.1; cf. *Itivuttaka*. p. 190; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 140.
61. *Kappaṭṭho kusalaṁ cittaṁ na paṭilābheyyāti, Kathāvatthu*, XIII. 2. cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 141.
62. Viz., *cīvara* (robe), *piṇḍapāta* (alms) *senāsana* (food), *gilānapaccayabhesajjaparikhāra* (medicines), *khādanīyaṁ, bhojanīyaṁ, pānīyaṁ* (various kinds of food and drink, etc.)
63. *Anantarāpayutto puggalo sammattaniyāmaṁ okkameyyāti, Kathāvatthu* XIII.3.
64. *Kathāvatthu*, XIV. 8.
65. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 151.
66. *Kathāvatthu*, XIV. 9; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 151.
67. *Asañcicca mātaraṁ jīvitā voropetvā ānantariko hotīti, Kathāvatthu*, XX. I; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 183-4.
68. Cf. *Cullavagga*, pp. 307-9.

69. This is a technical term for religious life, wherein the word *diṭṭhi* does not mean erroneous opinion. '*Diṭṭhisampanno puggalo*' is no doubt a learner but he is supposed to have put away all but the last fetters, see *Points of Controversy*, p. 269n.
70. *Diṭṭhisampanno puggalo sañcicca pānaṁ jīvitāvoropeyyāti*, *Katthāvatthu*, XII. 8; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 138.
71. *Diṭṭhisampannassa puggalassa pahīnā duggatīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XII.9; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 138-9.
72. *Atthi puthujjanassa accantaniyāmatā, ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIX. 7; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 180.
73. *Ekādhippāyena methuno dhammo patisevitabho ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XXIII. 1.
74. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197.
75. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 535.
76. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 197.
77. *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 93.
78. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 167f.
79. Cf. *Milindapañha*, (Milindapañha)p. 235; *Abhidharmakośa*, IV, p. 76f.
80. See S.B. Deo. *History of Jain Monachism*, pp. 44-7; S. Dutt. *EBM*, pp. 30ff.
81. See *SBE*, XXII, pp. xxiii-xxx.
82. See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, Chapters VIII & IX.
83. See N.Dutt, *EMB*. I, p. 247; see also Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, p. 74; Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 73f.
84. See supra, Chapter I.
85. See e.g., *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 400-1.
86. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 132; see also S.B. Deo, op. cit., Appendix I.
87. See *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 17. 21; see also M.M. Vidhushekhara Shastri in *M.M. Ganganatha Jha Commemoration Volume*, pp. 85ff.
88. N.Dutt, *EMB*, I, p. 278; cf. I.B. Horner, *Books of Discipline*, Pt. I, p. vii; A.M. Shastri, *An outline of Early Buddhism*, p. 115; see supra, p. 16f.
89. *Mahāvagga*, p. 6; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 217.
90. See supra, p. 199.
91. Cf. *Mahāvagga*, p. 10ff.
92. Ibid., pp. 10-16; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 220f; cf. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha*, p. 80.
93. *Mahāvagga*, p. 15.
94. Cf. *Mahāvagga*, p. 23.
95. Ibid., p. 23; see N.Dutt, *EMB*, I, pp. 278-9; cf. S. Dutt, *EBM*, pp. 91-2.
96. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 11.
97. *Mahāvagga*, p. 24.
98. Ibid., pp. 23-4.

99. Ibid. pp. 24, 52-5, 57ff., etc.
100. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 73ff.
101. Ibid., pp. 89ff.
102. Ibid., pp. 42ff; *Cullavagga*, pp. 328-36.
103. *Mā ekena dve agamittha*, *Cullavagga*, p. 23.
104. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, p. 62.
105. *Sutta-Nipāta*, pp. 274-80.
106. See H.C. Raychaudhari, *PHAI*, p. 381; W.W. Tarm, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, pp. 225f; A.K. Narain, *Indo-Greeks*, p. 74f.
107. *Milindapañha*, p. 93.
108. *Rukkhamulasenāsanaṁ*, *Mahāvagga*, p. 55.
109. *Mahāvagga*, p. 55.
110. Ibid., p. 38.
111. See *Cullavagga*, pp. 239-40.
112. *Cullvvagga*, pp. 208ff.
113. See ibid., pp. 241ff.
114. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 214-17, on Avanti see M.R. Singh, *A Critical Study of the Geographical Data in the Early Purānas*, pp. 349ff.
115. *Cullavagga*, pp. 273ff.
116. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 55, 100.
117. Ibid., p. 298f.
118. Ibid., pp. 312ff.
119. Ibid., pp. 204ff.
120. Ibid., pp. 258-59.
121. Ibid., pp. 55, 100, 218.
122. Ibid., pp. 242ff.
123. *Majjhima Nikāya*. III, p. 71.
124. On *Uposatha* see, J.Przyluski in *Journal of Buddhist India*, (1927), pp. 304ff; S. Dutt, EBM, pp. 76ff.
125. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 143.
126. *Mahāvagga*, p. 105.
127. See G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, pp. 145-50; see also S. Dutt, EBM, pp. 72ff; Kern, op. cit., pp. 85-8; G.S.P. Misra, *The Age of Vinaya*, pp. 12, 19, 29, 32-33.
128. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 141-2.
129. Ibid., pp. 144ff.
130. Ibid., pp. 155ff.
131. *Diṭṭhena vā sutena vā parisaṅkāya vā*, see *Mahāvagga*, p. 167.
132. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 266ff.
133. Ibid., pp. 299ff.
134. *Cullavagga*, p. 373f.
135. Ibid., p. 374.
136. Ibid., pp. 374ff.
137. S. Dutt, *EBM*, p. 113; cf. K.P. Jayaswal, op. cit., pp. 40-2.
138. See supra, pp. 43-4, 48ff.
139. See T.W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, pp. 1ff; G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 310ff; cf. also V.S. Agrawal

India As Known to Pāṇini; B.C. Law, *India As Described in Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism*; J.C. Jain, *Life in Ancient India as Depicted in the Jain Canon*; A.S. Altekar, *State and Government in Ancient India*; R.C. Majumdar, *Corporate Life in Ancient India*; R.S. Shārma, *Light on Early Indian Society and Economy;* Bridget and Raymond Allchin, *The Birth of Indian Civilization*; Romila Thapar, *A History of India*, Vol. I, etc.

140. See N.C. Bandopadhyaya, *Economic Life and Progress in Ancient India*, pp. 240ff; *Cambridge History of India*, I, pp. 205ff.
141. Cf. S.K. Chakrabortty, *Ancient Indian Numismatics*, pp. 16ff.; D.R. Bhandarkar, *Ancient Indian Numismatics*, pp. 37ff.
142. *Cullavagga*, p. 253.
143. '*Jetavana Anāthapeḍiko deti Koṭisamthatena ketā*'—B.M. Barua and G. Sinha, *Bharhut Inscriptions*, p. 59; Cunningham, *Stupa of Bharhut*, pp. 85ff.; Cf. *Jātakaṭṭhakathā*, I, pp. 66-7; see also *CII*, II, Pt. II: *Bharhut Inscription* (Luders), Waldschmidt, Mehendale, pp. 105-7; It is curious to observe that the '*hirañña*' of texts seems to correspond to the representation of *Kārṣāpaṇas* at Bharhut.
144. G.R. Sharma, *Excavations at Kauśāmbī*, p. 26; see also *IA*, 1953-54, p. 9; 1954-55, p. 16; 1955-56, p. 20; 1956-57, pp. 28-9.
145. *Cullavagga*, pp. 416ff.; see also supra, pp. 80ff.
146. See *Dīpavaṁsa*, Chapter VII, *Mahāvaṁsa*, Ch. V; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 5f.
147. See supra, pp. 200ff.
148. See supra, Chapter IV.
149. See supra, Chapter V.
150. See *Cullavagga*, pp. 409-10.
151. *Mahāvagga*, p. 39.
152. Cf. '*Tathāgatassa kho Ānandan a evaṁ hoti, ahaṁ bhikkhu saṅghaṁ pariharissāmīti vā maṁ uddesiko bhikkhu saṅgho ti vā*, *Dīgha Nikāya*; II, p. 80.
153. S. Dutt, *EBM*, pp. 67ff.
154. *Mahāvagga*, p. 319; *Cullavagga*, p. 259.
155. See, *IA*, I, 1872, pp. 139-141; see also A.M. Shastri, op. cit., p. 145; S. Dutt, *EBM*, p. 67.
156. *EI*, VIII, No. 8, pp. 59-60.
157. S. Dutt, *EBM*, p. 69.
158. Ibid., p. 69.
159. *Mahāvagga*, p. 38.
160. *Cullavagga*, p. 259.
161. The observation that it is apparent from the *Kathāvatthu* that the Theravāda Buddhists conceived the Saṁgha merely as a body of individuals and were diametrically opposed to the attempts being made by a section of the Buddhists to idealize the notion of the Saṁgha and our suggestion that the phrase '*āgatānāgata cātuddisa Bhikkhu Saṁgha*' stands for the entire community of Buddhist monks

precluding all restrictions of space and time (see my article 'The Notion of Early Buddhist Saṁgha', *Jijñāsā*, Vol. I, Nos. 1-2, 1974) have evoked instant, though misplaced, remarks from G.S.P. Misra. Writing in the subsequent issue of *Jiñāsā* (Vol. I, Nos 3-4, pp. 7-8) he has offered a four-point comment as below (in italics):

(1) "*The issue in question is not the difference between the Saṁgha and the Cātuddisa Saṁgha as the author has said but one between the Sammukho Saṁgha and Cātuddisa Saṁgha*".

It seems Dr. Misra has not bothered to read my article carefully wherein (p. 34) I have said, "although the *cātuddisa Saṁgha*, contrasted with *sammukha Saṁgha*, is not limited in space or time like a local community or parish which has a definite *sīmā*, nevertheless, it stands for a community of persons not for the abstract idea of Buddhist spiritual practices (*magga*) and experiences (*phala*)."

(2) "*That which is universal is not opposed to being abstract and ideal*".

Nowhere in my article it has been suggested that anything universal is opposed to being abstract and ideal. One cannot, however, agree with the sweeping generalisation that something universal must necessarily be abstract and ideal.

(3) "*The author seems to imply that the notion and use of the term cātuddisa Saṁgha dates later than the economic changes belonging to the Second Council and 3rd century B.C.*"

My article, curiously enough, reads (p. 32), "The Pali Canon frequently refers to the Buddhist Saṁgha as '*āgatānāgata cātuddisa Saṁgha*'. The term also occurs in many donatory inscriptions, the earliest occurring in an inscription from Ceylon datable to 3rd century B.C.".

(4) "*The very term anāgata in the compound points to the Saṁgha as an idealized entity and not as a body of individuals, at least in its early phase.*"

It is precisely this fallacy which we have sought to remove through the article, in question, on the basis of detailed references and not mere *reflections*.

It may be noted from the article that the earliest references to the phrase *āgatānāgata*, etc., occur in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* and the donations, mentioned therein, are made to Buddha himself. I am afraid if there can be a phase earlier than this. It may further be noted that there are instances of donations to the Buddhist Saṁgha where the phrase, in question, is conspicuous by its absence but in such cases donations have been made to some specific sect or monks of a locality. Obviously, the mention of this phrase in the case of various other donations is intended to explicitly exclude all such limitations.

The *Vinaya Piṭaka* contains detailed lists of functionaries of the Saṁgha, e.g., regulator of the lodgings (*Senāsanapaññāpaka*),

apportioner of food (*Bhattuddesaka*), keeper of stores (*Bhaṇḍāgārika*), recipient of robes (*Cīvarapaṭiggāhaka*), distributor of robes (*Cīvarabhājaka*), of rice gruel (*Yāgubhājaka*), of fruits (*Phalabhājaka*), of voting tickets(*Salākāgahāpaka*), and so on (*Cullavagga*, IV. 4; VI, 21). Similarly there were detailed rules for receiving stranger monks (*Āgantukas*) and providing them hospitality and accommodation (*Cullavagga*, VIII, 2). In fact the *Vinaya Piṭaka* is full with rules and regulations enjoined upon the monks and nuns as members of a living organisation and not an abstract or idealized body. These detailed rules and regulations might have been considered necessary for a democratic functioning of the Saṁgha governed by a constitution adopted, perhaps, from the contemporary republican states.

Even the phrase, in question, *āgatānāgata*, etc., was pronounced by Buddha as the formula of donation to be uttered by a donor. In laying down this formula, Buddha was, probably, trying to ward off possibilities of dissensions in the Saṁgha which may arise in future due to the occupation of particular monastery by a group of monks for a long time. Donating something, thus, to the Saṁgha, 'present and future' (*āgatānāgata*), the Saṁgha 'of the four quarters' (*cātuddisa*), is fully in accordance with the democratic spirit and structure of the Saṁgha. To suggest that the idea of an idealized entity underlies or overlies the obvious reality of the Saṁgha, *at least in its early phase*, is to shroud it with too far-fetched an interpretation.

Surprisingly, G.S.P. Misra's own work, *The Age of Vinaya*, which "*aims both at explaining the salient features of the Vinaya and the Saṁgha*" does not throw any light on the phrase, in question, or on the so-called ideality of the Saṁgha.

Section C

Controversies Reflecting Philosophical Development and the Beginnings of New Schools

8

Controversy over the Soul Theory ('Pudgalavāda')

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Of all the issues of debate, the one on the existence of Pudgala or Person (soul)[1] seems to have occasioned probably the biggest controversy among the early Buddhists. The issue forms the subject-matter of the first controversy in the *Kathāvatthu*. It is borne out by the testimony of subsequent texts that later also some eminent Buddhist masters made it a point to refute the assertion about the existence of Person.[2] The Buddhists who advocated this thesis are known as the Pudgalavādins or 'Personalists'. It is tempting to think that the controversy on Person in the *Kathāvatthu* may be taken as the oldest, though Tārānātha refers to an earlier controversy arising from the theory of soul propagated by Vatsa Brāhmaṇa in Kashmir which, according to him, resulted in a schism in the Order.[3] This reference to some earlier Personalists cannot, however, be sustained in the light of evidence available so far. In fact, the very introduction of Buddhism in Kashmir is not datable to a period earlier than that of Aśoka.[4]

The advocates of the existence of Person, referred to in the *Kathāvatthu*, thus, appear to be the first champions of this theory.[5] Almost unanimously the Buddhist Personalists have been identified with a group of schools known as Vātsīputrīya-

Sammatīyas.[6] It is not unlikely that Tārānātha may have been led to associate the name Vatsa Brāhmaṇa with Pudgalavāda deriving the same from the Vātsīputrīyas (Vātsīputrīya-Vātsīputra).

On the testimony of *Kathāvatthu*, its commentary and some other works the origin of Vātsīputrīyas has to be ascribed to the second century after the Nirvāṇa, that is to say, prior to the Third Buddhist Council.[7] After some time, there developed four sects out of the Vātsīputrīyas, viz., the Dharmottarīya, the Bhadrayānīya, the Sammatīya and the Sannagarika. Out of these the Sammatīyas became the most important and formed the famous group, viz., the Vātsīputrīya-Sammatīyas. The Vātsīputrīya-Sammatīyas appear to have been the most widespread Buddhists as late as the time of Harṣavardhana (A.D. 606-647) when Yuan Chwang visited India. He came across sixty-six thousand Personalist monks out of a total number of 2,54,000 in the whole of the country.[8] Yuan Chwang carried away fifteen treatises of this sect to China.[9]

The *Kathāvatthu* presents the detailed dialogue that transpired between the Theravādins and Pudgalavādins and finally lays down the unsoundness and refutability of the Pudgala thesis.[10] The details of the Sarvāstivāda[11] and Mādhyamika[12] criticism of this thesis are also extant in the treatises of the two respective schools.

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS

Despite all the difference of opinion among the Buddhist sects as evinced by the controversies preserved in the *Kathāvatthu*, it is interesting to note that there are some common assumptions shared by all of them. The Pudgalavādins, the most controversial sect, also appear to be anxious to register their conformity with the essential principles of Buddhism.

It is a basic tenet of Buddhism that all conditioned things, that is to say, all the factors of our normal experience are marked by impermanence. In its simple, untechnical meaning the doctrine of impermanence always stood for the fact that everything changed all the time. And this formulation of '*Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā*, etc.',[13] was shared commonly by all the Buddhist schools. The tenure of existence, of course, was supposed by the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins to consist of a few

moments whereas the Sautrāntikas believed in just one instant (*kṣaṇa*).[14] Nevertheless, the basic assumption implied in the doctrine of impermanence was a common legacy of all the sects, the Pudgalavādins included. For Stcherbatsky, 'instantaneous being is the fundamental doctrine by which all the Buddhist system is established at one stroke', (*eka prahārena eva*).[15]

Closely associated with the doctrine of impermanence (*anityatā*) is the Buddhist rejection of two extreme views, viz., Eternalism and Annihilationism. Buddha outrightly rejected the two theories, so very widespread among the thinkers of his age.[16] The Theravādins and the Pudgalavādins alike subscribe to this disposition of the Buddhist thought. In the course of the debate between the two, as we have it in the *Kathāvatthu*, the Pudgalavādins make their stand clear in unambiguous terms. They would not put the Pudgala either in the category of the conditioned or the unconditioned but would call it as undefinable in every respect.[17]

Curiously enough, the Pudgalavādins also preserve the essence of the *anattā* doctrine, apart from their assertion that the Pudgala exists. The Pudgalavādins were careful enough to define the relation of the Pudgala to the *skandhas* in such a way that an erroneous belief in a self was put aside. They made it categorically clear that the Person is neither identical with the *skandhas* nor different from them, nor is he in the *skandhas* nor outside them.[18] The Pudgalavādins thus, preserve the essence of the Buddha's teachings on *anattā*, *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, *viprayāsas*, etc.

In the line of common assumptions, yet another link is provided by the Pudgalavādins holding fast to common scriptures. Most of the passages cited by the Pudgalavādins, in support of their view, may be found in the Pāli Canon. It is quite likely that the *Sutta Piṭaka* of the Pudgalavādins was substantially the same as that of Pāli.[19] I-tsing, however, informs us that they had a separate *Vinaya*.[20]

The only work exclusively referred to as belonging to this school is the *Sammitīya Śāstra* or *Sammitīyanikāyaśāstra* which is extant in Chinese translation[21] and contains the tenets of this school. The Pudgalavādins, however, acknowledged the authority of the Buddhist scriptures, although they had their own ideas about what constituted the 'Buddha-word'.

THE PUDGALAVĀDA THEORY—ITS CLASSICAL FORM

The Pudgala theory was certainly the most fundamental doctrine propounded by them is clear from the fact that they received the name Pudgalavādins on that count. Through this doctrine they laid down that, in addition to the impersonal *dharmas*, there is still a Person to be reckoned with. This Person can be got at (*upalabbhati*) as a reality in the ultimate sense (*paramatthena*) and it can become the object of true experience (*sacchikaṭṭha*).[22] Further, the Person was neither identical with nor different from the khandhas.[23] The relationship between the two was held indescribable (*avaktavya*). The Person is a kind of substance which provides a common ground for the successive processes occurring in a self-identical individual. According to the Pudgalavādins, the idea of this Person is evidently clear in the events of one life from birth to death.

It also extends over many lives, and not only is it the same Person, who reappears again in every new birth, but it is also the same Person who is first an ordinary man and then, at the end, totally transformed by Nirvāṇa.[24] They emphasized, therefore, the identity of the man who had won salvation with the man who had sought it. To support their theory, the Pudgalavādins quoted the Buddha, who is reported to have, at times, expressed himself in such terms which would lend support to a Personalist construction. For example, the Buddha had said: 'This sage Sunetra, who existed in the past, that Sunetra was I'.[25] Similarly, the Buddha said: 'In the past I have had such a body'.[26] Here the word 'I' can refer only to the 'Person'. Further in the opinion of the Pudgalavādins, transmigration is inconceivable without a Person. It is the Person who wanders from one existence to another in the sense that he gives up the old *skandhas*, and takes up or acquires new ones. The Buddha had himself said: 'He rejects one body and takes up another.'[27] The existence of Person as upheld by the Pudgalavādins is formulated as an identity-in-difference that is to say a unity in combination with the diversity of states. It is the Person which exists and survives the change in psycho-physical elements. The Person is thought out as a mechanical and organic whole.

The Pudgalavādins pointed out that in each individual there

are a number of factors which appear to survive the fleeting moments, e.g., memory. How is it possible for a thought-moment which has instantly perished to be remembered later; how can it remember and how can it recognize? 'If the self is not real who then remembers, who recognizes things, who recites and memorises the books, who repeats the texts?' 'There must be an "I" which first experiences and then remembers what it has done. If there were none, how could one possibly remember what one has done?'[28] A similar reasoning is also applied to *karman* and its retribution.[29] Moreover, a Person or Pudgala is needed to provide an agent or instrument for the activities of an individual. It is the Person who sees, the eye being merely the instrument.[30]

Then again, if there were no Persons, the practice of friendliness would be unthinkable.[31] Is it possible to be friendly to a conglomeration of impersonal and unsubstantial elements? The Pudgalavādins seem to reiterate the commonsense standpoint which in this context is so very evident as the hard fact of life. It was their emphatic argument that the denial of appearance requires reason. And for them, Pudgala is such an appearance whose denial is difficult to be substantiated by cogent reasons. It is in this strain that they argue that if Pudgala were not there, who indeed would fare through the 'beginningless *Saṁsāra*'?[32]

Lastly, the Pudgalavādins draw attention to such Canonical references which seem to support their theory of Person or self. They frequently quote: 'One Person (*eka-pudgala*) when he is born in the world is born for the weal of the many.'[33] Who is that one Person? It is the Tāthāgata.[34] Similarly, we have: 'After he has been reborn seven times at the most, a Person puts an end to suffering, and becomes one who has severed all bonds.'[35] Then there were some *suttas* classifying the Pudgalas. Even in the *Abhidharma* the eight types of saints were generally known as the 'eight personages' (Pudgala).[36] Special attention is also drawn to the *Bhārahārasūtra*[37] which provided the Pudgalavādins their strongest argument. It is interesting to note that this passage finds mention in the Brahmanical texts also, for instance, the *Nyāya Vārttika* refers to it.[38] The passage in question of the *Bhārahārasūtra* lends sufficient support to the Pudgalavāda thesis for the reason that the Person here is clearly distinguished from the five *skandhas*. The Pudgalavādins observed

that if Person and *skandhas* were identical then the burden would carry itself, which is absurd to assume.[39]

The Pudgalavādins also adduced some positive arguments of a philosophical character. If there were no Pudgala how can the omniscience of Buddha be explained?[40] If all acts of knowledge were instantaneous, none could know all things. A lasting personality, on the other hand, would provide a possible basis for omniscience.[41]

It is pointed out that if the Pudgala is only a word to designate the five *skandhas*, then why did Buddha not identify *jīva* with *sarīra*?[42] Similarly, why did Buddha declare Pudgala as indeterminate (*avyākṛta*)? If it did not exist, then why did the Lord not say in clear terms that Pudgala does not exist at all?[43] Curiously enough, the orthodox sections admitted these passages but maintained that they do not mean what they say. On the contrary, the orthodox sects cited such passages which went against the Pudgala theory. According to the Pudgalavādins, however, these were unauthentic texts, since, they were not found in their *Piṭaka*.[44]

The Pudgalavādins' assertion about the existence of Pudgala, in addition to the impersonal *dharmas*, caused a great stir in the Buddhist community. It was only natural for the various sects to get entangled into a prolonged controversy with the advocates of the thesis which, according to them, was out and out an alien and heterodox view. We, however, preserve only the dialogue that occurred between the Theravādins and the Pudgalavādins[45] and that between the Sarvāstivādins and the Pudgalavādins,[46] as also the Mādhyamika criticism of the Pudgalavāda doctrine.[47] The debate on this issue assumed such proportions that the Pudgalavādins have been described by other Buddhists as heretics or 'outsiders in their midst'[48] and pseudo-Buddhists.[49] The Pudgalavādins have been subjected to a 'ceaseless polemics' in the history of Buddhism.[50]

THESIS AND ARGUMENTS

THERAVĀDA REFUTATION

The debate commences with the attempt of the two opposite

camps, viz., the Pudgalavādins and the Theravādins seeking to refute each other's basic stand on Pudgala by different methods.[51] The former hold that the Pudgala exists.[52]

The Theravādins put the most crucial question as to whether or not the Pudgala is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate thing such as Nibbāna or *rūpa*?[53] The Theravādins also want to ascertain whether the Pudgalavādins admit of the existence of Pudgala either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like Nibbāna, or as constituted[54] object like *rūpa*, or regard it as false as a mirage[55] or look upon it simply as hearsay? The Pudgalavādins deny all the four possible categories but they maintain that the Pudgala is known as real and ultimate fact. Now these two positions taken by the Pudgalavādins appear contradictory to the Theravādins and they claim the refutability of the former.[56]

At this, the Pudgalavādins come forward with a four-fold rejoinder. They counter-question the Theravādins as to whether they admit that the Pudgala is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? For the Theravādins it is not known in the above sense.[57] They are now put to another question, viz., is the Pudgala not known in the same way as any real and ultimate is known? The Theravādins reply in the negative.[58] Just as the Theravādins had charged the Pudgalavādins with contradiction in their statements the latter also charge them for contradictory statements.[59]

The Theravādins put forward some straight questions instead of seeking for logical contradictions in the statements of the proponents. They ask accordingly – is Pudgala a *paramattha-sacca* or not, i.e., whether or not the Pudgala is known in the same way as the real and ultimate everywhere (*sabbttha*),[60] always (*sabbadā*)[61] and in everything (*sabbesu*)?[62] According to the Pudgalavādins, the Pudgala is not to be regarded as real in the highest sense, i.e., as existing everywhere, always and in everything as observed by the Theravādins. This is a discrepancy in the Pudgalavāda thesis according to the Theravādins and it is sufficient for their refutations.[63] The proponents, however, come out with a similar rejoinder and make a counter-claim that their thesis has not been refuted convincingly.[64]

In the section that follows, the hypothetical reality of

Pudgala is sought to be controverted on the basis of its comparison with other reals, viz., *khandhas*, *āyatanas*, *dhātus* and *indriyas*.[65]

The Theravādins question the Pudgalavādins as to whether the Pudgala is to be regarded as existing like any of the fifty-seven elements, i.e., the five *skandhas*, viz., *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṁkhāra*, *viññāṇa*, twelve sense factors, (*āyatanas*), eighteen *dhātus* and twenty-two controlling powers? The Pudgalavādins admit the existence of Pudgala just as the existence of other reals is accepted. They refuse to admit, however, another point raised by the Theravādins, viz., whether the Pudgala is different from these elements?[66] The Pudgalavādins deny this meaning thereby that they do not admit of Pudgala as an element apart from fifty-seven elements.[67] They also quote a *Nikāya* passage: '*atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno*',[68] i.e., 'there is the Person who works for his own good', which seems to imply that the Pudgala exists but not apart from the elements. This is a position which appears illogical to the Theravādins. To say that the Pudgala and *rūpa* (material quality), *vedanā* (feeling), etc. are known in the sense of real and ultimate fact and that they are not mutually distinct from each other (i.e., Pudgala and *rūpa* or Pudgala and *vedanā* and so on) is contradictory and hence the Theravādins claim to refute the Pudgalavādins.[69]

Now the Pudgalavādins put a counter question to the Theravādins. The Theravādins also do not grant that the Pudgala, whose conventional (*sammuti*) reality they accept, is different from the elements.[70] According to Buddhaghosa, the questions of the Pudgalavādins have a mixture of *sammuti* and *paramattha* truths and as such the Theravādins have no alternative but to leave them unanswered.[71]

The controversy about Person on the basis of its comparison with the elements is continued further by way of analogy. The following section dilates on the above question, comparing it with the fifty-seven elements.[72]

Next, the comparative analysis of the Person is initiated by the Theravādins by a four-fold method.[73] They want the Pudgalavādins to agree to either of the two views, i.e., *Ucchedavāda* (Annihilationism) or *Sassatavāda* (Eternalism).[74] They question the Pudgalavādins as to whether the Person is identical with

rūpa, or different from *rūpa*, or is in *rūpa*, or *rūpa* is in the Person? The Pudgalavādins reject all the four propositions, since, they know that these views imply either *Ucchedavāda* or *Sassatavāda*.[75] Although the Pudgalavādins suppose that the Person is of the same nature[76] as *rūpa* and other elements, they would not grant that Person is an element separate from and independent of the fifty-seven elements.

Next, the Theravādins seek to controvert their opponents' position by questioning on the *lakkhaṇas* of the Person.[77] They question whether the Person is *sappaccaya* (caused) and *saṁkhata* (constituted) like *rūpa* or is *appaccaya* (uncaused) and *asaṁkhata* (unconstituted)[78] like Nibbāna? Is it eternal or is it temporal? The Pudgalavādins refuse to put the Person in either of the two categories of reals. Instead, they repeat the words of the Buddha where he had said: '*atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipannoti*', i.e., 'there is the Person who works for his own good', and question the Theravādins whether the Person referred to in this passage is *sappaccaya* and *saṁkhata* or *appaccaya* and *asaṁkhata*? The Theravādins also deny both the positions as, in their opinion, the term Pudgala is only a *sammutisacca*, i.e., conventional truth.[79]

Next, the problem of Person as percipient is raised. The Theravādins question the Pudgalavādins as to whether the Person is known and whether that which is known is the Person?[80] According to Buddhaghosa, through this argument, the Theravādins mean to enquire whether the statement 'Pudgala perceives' is the same as the statement 'that which perceives is Pudgala'? In other words, are these two statements identical as *citta* is with *mano* or they are different as *rūpa* is from *vedanā*?[81] The Pudgalavādins' reply to this query is that the Person is known and of that which is known some is Person and some is not and similarly the Person perceives but not everything that perceives is Person.[82] According to Buddhaghosa, the Pudgalavādins hold that the Pudgala perceives but not everything that perceives is Pudgala, e.g., *rūpa*, *vedanā*, etc., are not Pudgala.[83] As the argument goes, the Pudgalavādins, however, rely on the already quoted statement of Buddha: '*atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno ti*', and affirm their proposition. The Theravādins counteract this argument by referring to a statement of

the Buddha in which he is reported to have said: '*suññato lokaṁ avekkhassu*', etc.,[84] i.e., 'the world is empty of soul'.

The Theravādins put three further questions to the Pudgalavādins to examine the description (*paññatti*) of the Person as assumed by the Pudgalavādins.[85] They want to know as to whether or not the Pudgala of the *rūpadhātu*[86] is *rūpī*, of the *kāmadhātu* is *kāmī* and likewise of the *arūpadhātu* is *arūpī*? The Pudgalavādins admit the first and the third propositions but not the second. According to Buddhaghosa, the Pudgalavādins admit the first point because the material body comes to be, and so there is a concept of actuality. They deny the second because a Person may come to be in a passionless sphere, and so there is not actuality of the concept of material quality. They admit the third point again because a Person may come to be in the sphere of the immaterial, and so there is again a concept of actuality.[87] They argue that Pudgala=*satta*=*jīva* and *kāya*=*sarīra*. Though the Pudgalavādins do not admit either the identity of, or difference between, *jīva* and *sarīra*, they hold, however, that *kāya* must be different from Pudgala as there are such statements as '*so kāye kāyānupassī viharati*' and so forth,[88] i.e., 'he contemplates body in the body', in which '*so*', i.e., 'he', cannot but refer to Pudgala.[89]

The next discussion relates to the problem of rebirth and transmigration of the Person.[90] The Pudgalavādins affirm that the Person transmigrates from this world to another but it is neither the self-same Person nor a different Person. Such an assertion obviously saves the Pudgalavādins from the charge of upholding either the *Sassatavāda* or *Ucchedavāda*. The Theravādins would, however, make a similar assertion about the passing of the *khandhas*. The Pudgalavādins further claim that their assumption is based upon the Canonical testimony as it said: 'a person transmigrates but seven times at the most'.[91]

On this suggestion of the Pudgalavādins, the Theravādins observe that some form of Pudgala as referred to in the mentioned passages does pass from one existence to another. This Pudgala can then have no death, it once becomes a man and then a god and so forth, which is absurd. In their reply, the Pudgalavādins point out that *sotāpanna-manussa* is known to take rebirth as a *sotāpanna-deva* and question the Theravādins, how

this *sotāpanna* can pass from this existence to another unless there exists some form of Pudgala to carry the qualities?

The Theravādins cross-question whether the passing Pudgala remains identical in every respect[92] and does not lose any of its qualities?[93] The Pudgalavādins first deny this on the ground that a man does not continue to be a man in the *deva-loka*. But on second thought they affirm it in view of the fact that the carrier of certain qualities from one existence to another is a Pudgala, an *antarābhavapudgala*.[94]

The Pudgalavādins are careful enough not to show the slightest inclination to either of the two extreme views: '*taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīraṁ and aññaṁ jivaṁ aññaṁ sarīraṁ*.'[95] Buddhaghosa has offered the explanation that the Pudgalavādins seek to lay down that the transformed *khandhas* and Pudgala and not the identical *khandhas* and Pudgala pass from one existence to another, since, the *khandhas* are not to be taken as permanent, while the Pudgala is not so. However, the Pudgala also is not permanent and unconstituted in the absolute sense. Without *khandha*, *āyatana*, *dhātu*, *indriya* and *citta* Pudgala cannot be, but for that reason the colour and other qualities of the *khandha*, *āyatana*, etc., do not affect the Pudgala. The Pudgalavādins hold this because they would not admit the identity of Person with blue-green colour and its pluralistic state in the individual organism by way of varigated colours like blue-green, etc.[96] Yet, the Pudgala is not a mere shadow of the *khandhas*.[97] On the question whether Pudgala is perceivable in every momentary thought,[98] the Pudgalavādins answer in the affirmative but they would not accept the implication of the Theravādins that the Pudgala should thus have momentary existence (*khaṇika-bhāvaṁ*).[99]

The Pudgalavādins ask the Theravādins whether they would admit that one who sees something by means of an organ of sense is the Pudgala or not?[100] The Theravādins affirm this as a conventional truth. They put the same question to the proponents, however, in a different form thus: One who does not see anything by means of an organ of sense, is he not a Pudgala? The proponents quote from the Canon where the Buddha is reported to have said, 'I see, by means of my divine eyes,[101] beings appearing and disappearing' and so forth, and, thus,

they infer that the seer in question is the Pudgala.[102]

The following argument relates to *puruṣakāra* or human action.[103] The Theravādins do not admit any doer, so they question the proponents as to whether they also subscribe to the same view or not? On the denial of the latter, the Theravādins ask whether the Pudgalavādins would admit the existence of the doer and a creator of the doer, which, however, the Pudgalavādins have to refuse on account of the heretical doctrine of *issaranimmāṇa*,[104] but subsequently they accept it in view of the fact that the parents, teachers, etc., are also in a sense the makers of a Person.[105] The Theravādins, however, point out that such a state of things, i. e., a doer and a deed implies not just a deed but also a doer. This leads to the conclusion that so long as there is action there is its doer also and hence there can be no end to *Pudgalaparamparā* and that would falsify the fact that, by the stoppage of the wheel of actions, *dukkha* can be brought to an end. In that case Nibbāna, *mahāpathavī*, etc., must also have a doer. The Pudgalavādins reject all the inferences drawn by the Theravādins. Thus, the Pudgalavādins deny that the deed and the doer can be distinct, just to avoid admitting the heresy that the Pudgala has mental properties or coefficients (*saṁkhāra*).[106]

Next follows a discussion over the identity of the doer of a deed with the enjoyer of its fruits.[107] In the opinion of the Theravādins there does not exist a feeler or enjoyer of action apart from *vipākapavatti* (i.e., the sequence of fruition). As against this, the Pudgalavādins hold that *paṭisaṁveditabba* is *vipāka* (result) but the Pudgala is not *vipāka*. According to them Nibbāna, *mahāpathavī*, *mahāsamudda*, etc., are not *vipāka* like divine happiness (*dibba-sukha*) or human happiness (*manussasukha*), so none of them is an object of enjoyment of the Pudgala. Also, the Pudgalavādins do not admit that *sukha* is distinct from *sukha*-enjoyer. The Theravādins, in fact, logically wanted to make the Pudgalavādins admit that there must be not only an enjoyer of a fruit but also an enjoyer of the enjoyer of the fruit and so on an endless chain.[108]

The Theravādins put the crucial question whether the doer of a deed is identical with, or different from, the enjoyer of its fruit? The proponents first deny both the possibilities in view of the Buddha's words: '*sayaṁ kataṁ paraṁ kataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ*',[109]

etc., but on second thought, in view of their theory that there is a common element keeping the link between the present and the future life, they admit that there is a *kāraka* (doer) and *vedaka* (feeler or enjoyer) of a deed but the two are neither identical nor different, neither both identical and different, nor not both identical and different.[110]

The Pudgalavādins next reiterate the Pudgala thesis by referring to *abhiññā*.[111] (supernormal powers), *ñāti*[112] (relatives) and *phala*[113] (attainments). According to the Pudgalavādins,

1. How can a person perform miracles keeping his organs of sense, etc., inert and inactive unless there is something else as Pudgala? By implication they mean that a soul or Pudgala can achieve magical efficacy (*iddhi*) only with respect to such matter as is bound up with human power of control.[114]
2. How can one accept the existence of parents, etc., without implying the existence of a Pudgala?[115]
3. How can a *phalastha* continue to be the same in his subsequent births, unless the existence of a Pudgala is admitted?[116]

The Theravādins merely evade these arguments by putting the counter-questions that one who cannot perform miarcles is he not a Pudgala and so on.

The next problem posed by the Theravādins seeks to ascertain whether Pudgala is conditioned (*saṁkhata*), unconditioned or neither conditioned nor unconditioned (*n'eva saṁkhato nāsaṁkhato*).[117] The Pudgalavādins assent to the last alternative. They state that the Pudgala has certain aspects of *saṁkhata*, in so far as it is subject to *sukha-dukha* and so forth. Also, it has certain aspects of *asaṁkhata*, for the reason that it is not subject to birth, old age and death (*jāti, jarā* and *maraṇa*).

On the next query of the Theravādins, as to whether a *parinibbūto* Pudgala exists in Nibbāna or not?[118] the Pudgalavādins negative both as the affirmation of either would associate them with *Sassatavāda* or *Ucchedavāda* respectively.[119]

To support their thesis, the Pudgalavādins further point out that at times one says that he is feeling happy or unhappy and

so forth; how can a person say so unless he is a Pudgala and not a mere conglomeration of separate *khandhas*?[120] The Theravādins put a counter-question: well, if a Person does not feel happiness or unhappiness should it be taken to mean that there is no Pudgala?[121] The Theravādins further ask whether the proponents would treat *sukha* and Pudgala as something separate and distinct? The Pudgalavādins also avoid a direct answer and question the Theravādins instead: when a Pudgala is said to be '*kāye kāyānupassī viharati*', does it not affirm the existence of a Pudgala?

Finally, the two debating sects take recourse to the citation of several passages from the *Nikāyas*.[122] The Theravādins refer only to such passages in which the doctrine of *anatta* is expressed explicitly or implicitly. On the contrary, the Pudgalavādins quote such passages where terms such as '*puggala*', '*attahita*', '*so*', etc., are mentioned.

As would appear from the discussion, the Theravādins' point of view is the same as the Buddhist doctrine of *anatta* which consists in the denial that there is, in the physical or mental realms, anything which may properly be called one's 'self'.[123] The Theravādins and for that matter, all other sects denied the existence of a 'self' which might run like a single thread through a string of pearls. For them, there are pearls only and no thread to hold them together.[124] This, according to the orthodox sections, was laid down by the Buddha in the very first sermon delivered at Banaras.[125] Matter cannot be the self, for if it were, then the body would not be subject to disease and one would be able to control one's body at pleasure; feeling, perceptions, dispositions, and intellect, none can be equated with self either.[126] There are several other passages in the *Nikāyas*[127] which lead to the conclusion that one ought to lay aside the false views of the self. The doctrine forms the subject of an interesting deliberation in the *Milindapañha*, where the king is instructed by means of the parallel of the chariot and it is pointed out that the name Nāgasena denotes no soul, but is merely an appellation of the five aggregates which constitute the empirical individual.[128] Buddhaghosa also affirms that he who believes in a living entity must assume that this living entity will either perish or not perish. If he assumes the former, he falls into the heresy of annihilation

or extinction and if he assumes the latter he is struck against the heresy of Persistence of Existence (*Sassatavāda*).[129] Similarly, it is pointed out by Anuruddhācariya[130] that because of the continuity of temporary selves, men under that blinding influence of ignorance (*avijjā*) mistake similarity for identity, and are apt to think of all this river of life as one enduring, abiding soul or ego, even as they take the river of yesterday identical with that of to-day.[131] Accordingly, the human being as also the whole of the Cosmos is explained in the Buddhist theory of existence as constituted of Name and Form. The belief in *ātman*, *Jīvā* or soul is thus replaced by a doctrine of the *dhammas*.

The various *dhammas* or elements into which the world-order including the subject and the object is sought to be resolved are divided into two categories, i.e., constituted (*saṁskṛta*) and unconstituted (*asaṁskṛta*).[132] *Rūpa* and Nirvāṇa, for example, represent the two categories respectively. The Theravāda standpoint consists in the fact that anything given would be either identical with a certain element or class of elements or it would be different from that, since, there are various but classified elements only. In the course of the Pudgala controversy, they make repeated efforts to make the Pudgalavādins accept one of the two alternatives. That is to say, the latter should either identify the Pudgala with the *skandhas* or else they must distinguish it from the same. Similarly, when the Pudgalavādins affirm that the Pudgala is known or got at as real, the Theravādins want to know whether it is real in the same way as Nirvāṇa is real, that is, whether or not it is *sacchikaṭṭhaparamaatthena*? As against this the Pudgalavādins do not admit either the difference of, or the identity between *jīva* and *sarīra*. Again, in case of transmigration of Pudgala, the Theravādins insist on knowing the position of their adversaries as to whether the same Pudgala passes on to the other world or a different one. Similarly, they enquire about the identity of the doer of a deed and its enjoyer, that is to say, whether or not they are identifiable?

However, the Theravāda insistence on establishing either identity or difference between the Pudgala and *skandhas*, on the one hand, and Pudgala and Nirvāṇa, on the other, is not in itself a valid argument as becomes clear when the Mādhyamika

system takes up this issue. In fact, it is difficult to formulate any conceivable relationship—identity or difference or both between the *ātman* (Pudgala) and the states (*upādāna*, i.e., *skandhas*). Does the *ātman* (Pudgala) exist before, after or simultaneously with the states? If before, how is it apprehended at all without the states,[133] without the difference of mental content? If the *ātman* (Pudgala) could exist without the states, the states too could exist without the *ātman*?[134] The *ātman* (Pudgala) cannot be posterior to the states, as this would mean that the states could exist without the direction of the agent (self or Pudgala).[135] Nor are the two simultaneous; for, only those two are simultaneous which can exist apart from each other.[136] Nāgārjuna thus concludes: "The self is not different from the states, nor identical with them; there is no self without the states; nor is it to be considered non-existent.[137] This is not, however, the final Mādhyamika verdict on the Pudgala theory for the reason that in the ultimate analysis their dialectic leads to the 'critical' (middle) position, according to which, there are no states without the self, nor is there the self without the states, and therefore both are unreal, being relative, that is to say, reality belongs to neither.

The Pudgalavāda doctrine is also recorded in the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva. They all attribute this doctrine unanimously to the Vātsīputrīya-Sammatīyas.

According to Vasumitra, the Vātsīputrīyas or Sāmmatīyas upheld the Pudgala thesis thus:

1. The Pudgalas are neither the same as *skandhas* nor different from the *skandhas*. The name Pudgala is provisionally given to an aggregate of *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*.[138]
2. Things (*dhammas or dharmas*) cannot transmigrate from one world to the other apart from Pudgala. They can be said to transmigrate along with Pudgala.[139]

According to Bhavya, the Vātsīputrīyas believed that the *dharmas* do not transmigrate from this world to another.[140] The Person or individual (Pudgala) having grasped (*upādāya*) the five aggregates, transmigrates.[141] Similarly, he sums up the Sammatīya views thus: What must exist (*bhavanīya*) and

that which exists (*bhava*) and that which must be stopped (*niroddhavya*) and that which has stopped (*niruddha*) and that which must be born (*janitavya*) and that which is born (*jāti*), that which must die (*maraṇīya*) and that which is dead (*mṛta*), that which must be done (*kṛtya*) and that which is done (*kṛta*), that which must be freed (*muktavya*) and that which is freed (*mukta*), that which must go (*gantavya*) and that which goes (*gāmin*), that which must be understood (*vijñeya*) and the consciousness (*vijñāna*), (all) exist.[142]

Vinītadeva also records that the Ārya-Sammatīyas and their sub-sects held the view that the Person is not really identical with the aggregates (*skandhas*). It is not in the aggregates. It does not exist out of the aggregates.[143]

SARVĀSTIVĀDA REFUTATION

According to the Sarvāstivāda standpoint the stock disproof of the Pudgala consists in terms of *anupalabdhi*.[144] For them, there is nothing existent which cannot be got at (*'nāsti anupalabdhiḥ'*). The self is a mere fiction. For the non-Pudgalavādins, the 'Person' belongs to conventional, and not to ultimate reality (*paramattha*); it cannot be got at (*upalabhyate*) for the simple reason that there is nothing there to be perceived as real.[145] Prolonged meditation on *dharma*, it is pointed out, would easily dispel the misconceived notion of the Person or Self.[146]

An interesting detail of the debate between the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and the Vātsīputrīya-Sammatīyas on the issue is preserved in the ninth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa* under the caption *'Pudgala-viniścaya'*. Ācārya Vasubandhu examines the Pudgala thesis by putting to its advocates a number of intricate questions. Vaibhāsika criticism and point of view emerge through the course of this polemic.

As noted previously, the *Abhidharmakośa* debate starts with the dilemma as to whether the Vātsīputrīyas are Buddhists at all and entitled to attain emancipation or not?[147]

Vasubandhu puts the most crucial question thus: Is the Pudgala of the Vātsīputrīyas real (*dravya*) or only conventional (*prajñapti*)?[148] The real (*dravya*) existence in the early Buddhist (*Abhidhārmika*) context denotes the existence of

elements like *rūpa* and such other, whereas the conventional (*prajñapti*) stands for an element like 'milk', which is a mere name having no separate existence of its own apart from the constituent.[149] Now, if the Pudgala is of the former category (*dravya*), it would be different from the *skandhas* as *vedanā* is from *rūpa*. In that case, it should be *saṁskṛta* (constituted), or *asaṁskṛta* (unconstituted). But it cannot be the latter for it implies the heretical *śāśvata* view.[150] On the other hand, if the Pudgala is said to be of the second category (*prajñapti*), its existence should depend on the *skandhas*. Since it has no independent existence of its own, it cannot be said to exist.[151]

According to the Vātsīputrīyas, Pudgala is undoubtedly real (*dravya*) but it is neither identical with, nor different from the *skandhas* as fire is to fuel.[152] Fire exists so long as there is fuel. Similarly, the Pudgala exists as long as there are *skandhas*.

Vasubandhu however argues that fuel and fire appear at different times (*bhinnakāla*) like seed and sprout. Hence, fire is impermanent, and the difference between fuel and fire is one of time and characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), and again, one is the cause of the other. Further, according to the proponents, fuel is constituted of three *mahābhūtas* while fire is of the fourth (*tejas*) only. That means fire is different from fuel.[153]

At this, the Vātsīputrīyas point out that fire and fuel are co-existent and the latter is in fact a complementary of the former (*āśritya*), and that one is not wholly different from the other (*sahabhāva*) for fuel is not totally devoid of the element of fire. Similarly, the Pudgala should be distinguished from *skandhas*. Vasubandhu, however, cites the example of a burning log of wood and argues that it represents both fire and fuel and hence identical (*ananya*).[154]

Instead, the Vātsīputrīyas hold that the Pudgala is neither to be described as *anitya*, which is sub-divided into past (*atīta*), present (*pratyutpanna*) and future (*anāgata*), nor *nitya*, eternal It is *avaktavya*, indeterminable, inexplicable. It is not among the constituents of a being but is perceived only when all the constituents are present.[155]

Vasubandhu puts the next question as to whether the Pudgala can be cognized by any sense-organ (*indriya*), if so, by which?[156] According to the Vātsīputriyas, it is cognized

by all the six sense-organs.[157] They point out that eyes do not see *rūpa* (object) unless the mind (*mana-indriya*) co-operates. Similarly, none of the five sense-organs can function in its respective sphere independent of the mind. In fact, all the sense-organs suggest to the mind indirectly that there is a Pudgala. According to Vasubandhu, if *rūpa* also is the cause of Pudgala's cognition, one should not say that *rūpa* and Pudgala are different; and if cognition of *rūpa* leads at once to the cognition of Pudgala, one should say that *rūpa* and Pudgala are identical.[158] The Vātsīputrīyas, however, neither regard the perception of *rūpa* as identical with the perception of Pudgala nor look upon them as different.[159]

Next follows the argument of Vasubandhu that if Pudgala be an entity, it should be either material (*rūpa*) or non-material (*nāma*). But the Buddha is on record to have stated that *rūpa*, or *vedanā* or *saṁjñā* or *saṁsāra* or *vijñāna* are not self[160]—all *dharmas* are without self—there is no Pudgala.[161] Also he clearly mentioned that *sattva*, *jīva* or Pudgala is a *prajñapti* (designation) applied to the false notion of a self cherished by the average people.[162]

But the Vātsīputrīyas do not accept the authenticity of these so-called utterances of the Buddha for they are wanting in their own Canon.[163] Instead, they would refer to such statements in which the Buddha speaks of a Person's past existence, or recognizes *pubbenivāsañāṇa* as one of the higher acquisitions of an adept, and asks, who is that which remembers? Is it Pudgala or the *skandhas*?[164] Further, if the Buddha is to be regarded as omniscient, this must mean that there is a continuity of something, i.e., there is a Pudgala.[165] Similarly, unless there were some form of Pudgala, why should the disciples be instructed to avoid assuming thus: '*rūpavān ahaṁ babhūvātītedhvani*', i.e., in the past I possessed a body and so forth.[166] Vasubandhu, however, contends that this is merely a conventional usage of the terms Pudgala which refers only to *skandha-santāna*.[167]

The Vātsīputrīyas now cite the reference from the all-important *Bhārahārasūtra*, and suggest that by *bhāra* is meant here the *skandhas* and by *bhārahāra* the individual (Pudgala); the two are distinguished here and hence the Pudgala exists apart from the *skandhas*.[168]

In reply to this, Vasubandhu observes that the *sūtra* in question undoubtedly says that the Five Groups (*pañcopādāna-skandhāḥ*) are the burden, attachment to them is carrying of the burden, detachment from them is laying down of the burden and the burden-bearer is the individual. But the individual spoken of in the passage is only the empirical individual. It was merely for conforming to the prevalent usage of the word that the Buddha used it and hence one should not speak of Pudgala as an entity.[169]

The Vātsīputrīyas admit the existence of *anaupapādika* beings and *anatarābhava*, and prove thereby the existence of Pudgala. They quote such passages as '*ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahujanahitāya*' and hence there is Pudgala besides the *skandhas*.[170] According to Vasubandhu, the sense of the *sūtra*, as derived by the Pudgalavādins, is far-fetched. Instead, he draws the proponents' attention to such texts as *Parmārtha-śūnyatāsūtra* where the Buddha is supposed to have said that there is action, there is retribution, but no agent. Similarly, he refers to *Phālgunasūtra* etc., and rejects the Pudgalavāda view-point.[171]

The Vātsīputrīyas further argue that if the Pudgala is only a word meant to designate the five *skandhas*, then why did Buddha not identify *jīva* with *sarīra*? If the individual is the same as the elements, he is composed of, and nothing else, why did the Lord decline to decide the question, whether the living being is identical with the body or not?[172]

Vasubandhu recounts an earlier discussion on this question and points out that the Budhha declined because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner. The latter asked about the existence of the soul as a real living unit, controlling our actions from within. But as such, since a soul is absolutely non-existing, how could the Buddha have decided whether it did or did not differ from the body?[173]

Vātsīputrīyas put the further question: And why did not the Lord declare that it does not exist at all?[174] Again, Vasubandhu would point out that the Lord did not do so because he took into consideration the questioner's state of mind. The latter could have misunderstood it to mean that the present living being (*jīva*) is identical with the past in the sense that the *skandhas* are permanent as the continuing elements of a life

(and that this continuity) is also derived. He would thus have fallen into a wrong doctrine, (the doctrine of Nihilism).[175]

The Vātsīputrīyas observe, however, that to state that 'Ātmā' does not exist in reality (*satyataḥ sthititaḥ*) is a wrong view', is indirectly to imply the admission of the existence of Pudgala.[176]

The next argument of the Vātsīputrīyas is that if Pudgala does not exist, who fares through Saṁsāra? If only the elements exist, how to explain the statement of the Buddha, 'I was at that time the master Sunetra', and in that statement why is the 'I' of the past identified with the 'I' of the present; does it indicate that the elements of the past are the elements of the present?[177] Vasubandhu seeks to refute it by saying that just as fire passes from wood to wood, the fire never remaining the same, so the elements pass from one existence to another, nothing remaining identical.[178]

The Vātsīputrīyas next ask, how can memory be explained without the existence of Pudgala? Who is it that remembers?[179] Vasubandhu answers that it is *saṁjñā* that remembers.[180] 'Remembrance is a new state of consciousness directed to the same object, conditioned as it is by the previous states.'[181]

The Vātsīputrīyas further observe that there must be an agent, a doer, a proprietor of the memory. There must be a cognizing agent, an action must have a doer. 'Devadatta walks', implies the existence of a certain individual.[182] According to Vasubandhu, it is not so. Just as when fire traverses from one forest to another, no question of individuality arises, even so Devadatta is a *prajñapti* (like fire) applied to a conglomeration of elements passing from one existence to another, and has no individuality.[183]

Instead of scholastic argumentation, the Sarvāstivādins come down to more practical grounds while criticizing this theory in the *Vijñānakāya*. They observe that even if Pudgala exists, it does not help in the search for salvation, does not promote welfare, or dharma, or the religious life, produces no superknowledge, enlightenment or Nirvāṇa. Because there is no use for him, therefore, he does not exist.[184]

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSY

The *Kathāvatthu* controversy on soul, when contrasted with that of the *Abhidharmakośa*, seems to be characterized by a simplicity of its own. The Theravādins put to the proponents pairs of questions and seek to find contradiction in the standpoint of the latter as they are not prepared to admit the same thing about one which they affirm in the case of the other.[185] On the contrary, the *Abhidharmakośa* debate is marked by a scholastic approach to the issue. The arguments and counter-arguments are given a deeper treatment in this text. The versatile genius of Vasubandhu is manifest throughout the criticism he lashes out at the Pudgalavādins. It seems that the nature and style of debating in the *Kathāvatthu* conforms to its early date in comparison with which the *Abhidharmakośa* belongs to a later and more scholastic phase of Buddhism.

As regards the respective standpoints of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins that emerge through the two debates, we may briefly sum them up as follows. In the context of the Pudgala controversy, the Theravādins seek to lay down that the use of such terms as 'Pudgala', 'being', etc., in their conventional sense, as was done by the Buddha while preaching the laity, by no means confers upon the transient aggregates, designated by the same terms collectively, any ultimate or philosophical reality. Given bodily and mental aggregates, it is customary to speak of a being in terms of a name, family, etc. In popular convention, this means a 'Person'. But the Buddha laid down clearly that there are 'merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world'.[186] The existence of the Person, as assumed by the Pudgalavādins, is simply untenable for the reason that it cannot be classed in any of the categories of reals.

The Sarvāstivādins did not deny the reality of the empirical individual.[187] But whatsoever be designated by such terms as personality, ego, self, individual, etc., the underlying idea within all these is not that of a real and ultimate fact. They all denote a mere name for a multitude of inter-connected facts.[188] With the development of *Abhidharma* resulting in a deep and complex psychological analysis, this idea was sought to be carried to its logical end. Man came to be conceived as

just an aggregate of causally connected elements and the analysis rendered him threadbare into *khandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*. The entire process of the events and experiences of the world has to be understood in terms of various elements or *dharmas* which constitute the world. There is no soul apart from feelings, ideas, volitions, etc. It is emphasized that for the self, only the unsubstantial elements have to be accounted. The Theravādins also upheld this point as may be seen from the comments of Buddhaghosa.[189]

These explanations appear unconvincing to the Vātsīputrīya-Sammatīyas. They seek to lay down that the five *khandhas* which are distinct from one another cannot give rise to the consciousness of I-ness as a unity. They affirm therefore the existence of a sixth mental property and call it Pudgala which can remain along with the *khandhas* and disappears when the *khandhas* disappear in Nibbāna.[190] This mental property or Pudgala, not being momentary (*kṣaṇika*) like the *khandhas*, it has not all the properties of *saṁkhata* (constituted object) and similarly as it is not also unchanging and ever existing like Nibbāna, so it is not *asaṁkhata*. And hence the Pudgala must be held as neither *saṁkhata* nor *asaṁkhata*. A similar view is referred to in the *Tarkajvāla*. There it is said that the Vātsīputrīya-Sammatīyas, etc., admitted the reality of an 'individual' which is something inexpressible being neither identical with the five groups of elements nor different from them.[191]

Despite all the debate with a view to refuting the Pudgala thesis, it is doubtful if Vātsīputrīya-Sammatīyas were at all convinced and dissociated from their original stand. They firmly held to their essential thesis that the ego or empirical self-consciousness is an undeniable entity, though it is never found apart from the stream of mental life. That they survived these sectarian onslaughts is proved by the fact that the Mādhyamikas had to contend with the upholders of Pudgalavāda.[192] Centuries later, Yuan Chwang found them the most prosperous sect in the seventh century A.D. According to Tārānātha, Vātsīputrīyas existed as a sect even in the time of Pāla kings, i.e., in the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D.[193] At the end of the controversy, however, one finds himself in an absorbing dilemma as to the origin and *raison d'etre* of the Pudgala doctrine.

ORIGINS OF PUDGALAVĀDA

The origin and rationale of the Pudgala doctrine seems to pose a complex problem involving exegetical, historical and philosophical issues. Exegetical issues relate to the interpretative side of the original gospel. And this seems to be of prime importance referring to the Buddhist controversy on Person or *Jīva*. An analysis of the *Nikāya* data would clearly indicate that the Buddha did not perhaps deny the 'self' in every sense in absolutely clear terms. When asked directly, he is reported to have refused to answer the question about the existence of the ātman either positively or negatively.[194] He carefully avoided a categorical answer to the question 'Does the Attā exist'? Or 'Does it not exist'?[195] Instead, the problem of 'soul' or *jīva* was left over as inexpressible or indeterminate (*avyākta*)[196] by the Buddha.[197] On the contrary, there are such texts which preserve unambiguous reference to a doctrine of *anatta*. The doctrine lays down that there is nothing in the physical or mental realms which may properly be called one's self.[198] This of itself does not, however, mean the denial of all self whatever, but only of the phenomenality of the self. What is meant here is that any of the *khandhas* may be mistaken for the *attā* and not perhaps the denial of the existence of *attā* as such. Added to this there occur in the *Nikāyas* such compound terms for *attā* as *ajjhatta*, *paccatta*, *attabhāva*, *pahitatta* and *bhāvitatta* which seem to be used in a sense different from that of a man as a complex of body and mind only.[199] Similarly, Pudgala is of frequent occurrence in the *Nikāyas*.[200] As a result of this, the possibilities were wide open for a diversity of interpretations. It is, therefore, not very surprising to note that some of the Buddha's contemporary monks were sometimes confused on this issue.[201] Later, we note that Gopā Arahant, a contemporary of Devaśarman is said to have insisted on the existence of *ātman*.[202] Gopā Arahant, the author of the *Abhidharma-vijñānakāya-pāda*, is supposed to have existed a hundred years after the Sākyamuni.[203] It is obvious, therefore, that the interpreters were confronted with a difficult situation when they analyzed the Canonical data on Pudgala, *jīva* or soul. Curiously enough, the difficulty in the Buddhist Canon has also kept the modern scholarship

divided on this issue. Although a number of modern scholars have upheld the view that a clear and unambiguous *anatta* doctrine was preached by the Buddha,[204] there is a significant section of eminent Buddhist scholars who dispute this assumption and lay down that the Buddha did not deny the existence of *attā*, and that the *anatta* doctrine originated owing to the scholastic tendencies of the later monks.[205] Mrs. Rhys Davids has enthusiastically championed this view.

It seems that the growth of the *Abhidharma* system meant a rigorous analysis of *anicca* and *anatta* doctrines. With the development of *Abhidharma*, the essentials of the Buddha's teaching appear to have been reduced to *dharma* theory as it emerged in its most uncompromising form. The Abhidharmists, by insisting that only isolated momentary events are real, held on to processes to the exclusion of all substance, and gloried in denying the relative unity.[206] It is not unlikely that the Pudgalavādins in their insistence on the existence of Pudgala appear to represent a reaction against the depersonalizing tendencies of the Abhidharmists. The Abhidharmists, as we know, advocated the *Pudgala-nairātmya* withg reater vehemence and fervour.[207]

Above all, the utter denial of all self was bound to give rise to grave philosophical difficulties, especially about the nature of the Buddha and memory.[208] Similarly, if there is no soul, ego, or *jīva* at all, how is the theory of transmigration, which is one of the other important doctrines of Buddhism, to be accounted for.[209] The Theravādins, Sarvāstivādins, etc., insisted that *citta* and *caitasika dharmas* perish at every moment; in that case, what is that which retains mental experience?[210] Further: the facts that a person acts or thinks as one and not as many separate things, that in many passages Buddha does actually use the word 'so', *attā* and *puggala* and that a person's attainment like *sotāpannahood* continues to be the same in different births, that one speaks of his past births and so forth, all these do lead to the conclusion that beside the five *khandhas* there exists some mental property which forms the basis of I-ness and maintains the continuity of *karman* from one existence to another.[211] The Vātsīputrīyas came to uphold the existence of Pudgala in order, perhaps, to meet the afore-

said difficulties. Their notion of the ego or self is, however, altogether different from the Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika and other Bāhmanical systems as also from the worldly Pudgalas of the Sarvāstivāda.[212] They seem to have divided the earlier and contemporary theories of *ātman* or Pudgala into two categories, viz., (1) Pudgala as identical with the *skandhas* and (2) Pudgala as different from the *skandhas*. They rejected these two and established their own category of Pudgalas according to which a Pudgala is neither identical with the *skandhas* nor different from the *skandhas*. In fact, these difficulties, which, we think, led to the development of Pudgalavāda, were realized by some other sects also and they had to offer one explanation or the other in order to remove the pitfall enjoined in the *anatta* doctrine.[213]

REFERENCES

1. The term *ātman* (soul), *jīva* (individual or living being), *sattva* (substance), *pudgala* (person) are synonyms. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, p. 838; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 8. However, the Vātsiputrīyas made some distinction between *Pudgala* and *ātman*. They were *Pudgalavādins* and not *Ātmavādins*. See Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 21, n. 76. See also *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 228-9.
2. Cf. *Abhidharmakosa*, Chap. IX; *Vājñānākāya* (Nanjio 1281), II, *Pudgalaskandhaka*, trans. *Etudės Asiatiques*, 1925, pp. 358-76; *Mādhyamika Kārikas*, Chaps. IX, X; *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, VIII, 92-103 *Prasannpāda*, Chapters IX, X, XVIII; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, IX 57ff.
3. Tārānātha (Trans., Schiefner), pp. 53-5.
4. G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, p. 184; cf. Watters, op. cit., I, p. 239.
5. Cf. Masuda, op. cit., p. 53n.
6. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 8; see also *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 227, 232n.
7. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 2-3; Masuda, op. cit., pp. 16-17; see also Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp. 33, 114.
8. See Watters, op. cit., I, pp. 227, 331, 333, 359, 373; II, pp. 1, 47, 191, 242, 247, 252, 256, 258-259; cf. Takakusu, *I-tsing*, p. xxiv n.
9. See P.V. Bapat, *2500 years of Buddhism*, p. 245.
10. *Kathāvatthu*, I. 1.
11. *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter IX.
12. *Mādhyamika Kārikās*. Chapters IX-X.
13. *Cullavagga*, p. 39.
14. *Abhidharmakośa*, IV, pp. 5ff.
15. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 554.
16. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 13-16, 30-2; *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 390, 398.
17. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 3ff.
18. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 12ff.
19. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 175.
20. Takakusu, *I-tsing*, pp. 7, 66, 140.
21. Cf. *Nanjio's Catalogue*, No. 1272; translated, Viśvabhārati Annals, Vol. V, 1952.
22. *Puggalo upalabhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti*, *Kathāvatthu*, p. 3; *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 230.
23. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 12ff; *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 231.
24. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvaṇa*, p. 31 n.
25. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 23; *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 271.
26. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 253.
27. Ibid., V, pp. 259-60; cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III, p. 56.
28. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 271.
29. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 33ff; *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 271.
30. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 243ff.

31. *Vijñanakāya*, cf. *Etudés Asiatiques*, 1925, pp. 366-7. (*Vijñānakāya*, is one of the seven treatises of the Sarvāstivāda school). See also *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 11; Buston, *History of Buddhism*, Vol. I, pp. 49-50.
32. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 271.
33. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, p. 22.
34. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 259.
35. Here the reference is to the stream-winner who is supposed to have seven births limit, Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, XII, 5. 9.
36. These eight are: stream-winner, once-returner, never-returner, and Arahant, as well as the candidates to each of these.
37. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III, pp. 261-2; The passage is quoted differently in the *Abhidharmakośa*. IX, p. 256.
38. *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 342.
39. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 257.
40. Ibid., IX, p. 254f.
41. Ibid., IX, p. 254f.
42. Ibid., IX, p. 262f.
43. Ibid., IX, pp. 264ff.
44. Cf. *na kilaitad buddhavacanam iti*, *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 251.
45. *Kathāvatthu*, I. 1.
46. *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter IX.
47. *Mādhyamika Kārikas*, Chapters IX-X.
48. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 8; *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 232n; Śantideva calls them '*Antascaratīrthika*' see *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, IX. 60.
49. Śantideva also calls them '*Saugatammanya*', see *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, IX. 60; cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 228.
50. Cf. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, p. 673n.
51. Cf. '*Suddhasacchikaṭṭho*', *Kathāvatthu*, p. 3.
52. *Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā ti*. *Kathāvatthu*, I. 1.
53. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 3ff, cf. *Saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā, ti etha Saccikatho 'ti māyāmarīci-ādayo viya abhūtākārena agahetabbo bhūtattho. Paramattho 'ti anussavādivasena agahetabbo*, *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 8.
54. '*Sapaccaya-saṁkhato*', *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 8.
55. '*Māyāmarīci-viya*, Ibid., p. 8.
56. *Kathāvatthu* pp. 4-6.
57. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 10.
58. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 10-11.
59. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 6.
60. Ibid., p. 9; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 14.
61. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 10; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhākathā*, p. 15.
62. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 10-11; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 14.
63. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 9-11.
64. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 11-20; see also *Debates Commentary*, pp. 18-19.
65. Cf. '*Suddhika-saṁsandanaṁ*', *Kathāvatthu*, p. 12.
66. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 12-15.

67. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 16. Cf. *Debates Commentary*, p. 20n.
68. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, p. 181, *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 5, 89, etc.
69. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 17.
70. Ibid., pp. 15ff; cf. also *Kathāvatthu*, XXI. 2.
71. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 16.
72. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 17ff.
73. '*Catukkanaya-saṁsandanaṁ*', *Kathāvatthu*, p. 25.
74. *Ucchedavāda* and *Sassatavāda*, see supra, pp. 14-15.
75. See *Points of Controversy*, pp. 19n, 44n, 45n, cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 18.
76. '*Ekadhammo*' *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 18.
77. '*Lakkhanayutti*', *Kathāvatthu*, p. 29.
78. Ibid., pp. 29-30; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 8, 19.
79. See, *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 29-30.
80. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 30.
81. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 19-20.
82. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 30.
83. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 20.
84. Cf. *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 437; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 21.
85. *Paññattānuyogo*, *Kathāvatthu*, p. 31.
86. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 23n.
87. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 21.
88. *Satisaṭṭhāna* formula.
89. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 21.
90. '*Gatianuyogo*', *Kathāvatthu*, p. 33.
91. Cf. *Itivuttaka*, (PTS. Ed.) 24.
92. *Sabbākārena ekasadiso*, i.e., *anañño*, *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 23.
93. '*Ekena pi ākārenā avigato*, *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 23.
94. Ibid., p. 23.
95. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 38ff.
96. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 24-5.
97. Ibid., 25-6.
98. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 45ff.
99. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 26-7.
100. Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 46-8.
101. i.e., clairvoyance or *dibbena caksuṇā*, see *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 27.
102. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, p. 174.
103. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 48-50.
104. According to this doctrine god is the creator of the world. See *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, 160-1; *Vibhaṅga*, p. 439.
105. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 28.
106. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 29-30; cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 280; *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, p. 257f.
107. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 50-8.
108. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 30.

109. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 19-20.
110. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 30-1.
111. *Abhiññā*, i.e., psychic power or gift; also *iddhi*, i.e., super-normal, or superintellectual power; cf. *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 61; *Paṭisaṁbidāmagga*, pp. 472-3; *Visuddhimagga*, Chapter XII.
112. *Ñāti*, i.e., relatives; also *jāti*, i.e., rank; see *Debates Commentary*, p. 38n.
113. *Phala*, i.e., fruitions of four paths, see *Points of Controversy*, p. 53n.
114. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 58-9; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 31.
115. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 59-60; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 31-2.
116. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 60-1; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 32.
117. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 62ff.
118. Ibid., pp. 63-4.
119. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 32.
120. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 64; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 32.
121. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 65.
122. For the quoted passages see the texts of *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 66-71.
123. Cf. *Sabbe dhammā anattā*. See *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 280; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 352.
124. *Bhagavad-gītā*, VII. 7.
125. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 16-18.
126. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, pp. 51ff.
127. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāva*, I, pp. 183-4; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, pp. 132-3, 135-6; *Mahāvagga*, pp. 16-18.
128. *Milindapañha*, pp. 27ff.
129. *Visuddhimagga*, *Khaṇḍaniddessa*, pp. 304ff.
130. Cf. *Encylopaedia of Buddhism*, s.v. Anuruddha.
131. *Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha*, pp. 174ff.
132. For detailed classification, see Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, op. cit., pp. 5ff.
133. '*Darśanaśravanādibhyo vedanādibhya eva ca; yah prāg vyavasthito bhāvaḥ kena prajñapyate' tha saḥ*', *Mādhyāmika*, *Kārikās*, IX, 3.
134. *Mādhyamika Kārikās*, IX, 4.
135. Ibid., IX, 10.
136. Ibid., IX, 12; *Mādhyamika Kārikās Vṛtti*, p. 199.
137. *Mādhyamika Kārikās*, XXVII, 8.
138. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 53-4.
139. Ibid., p. 55.
140. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 183.
141. '*La personne* (*Pudgala*) *ayant saisi* (*upādāya*) *les cing aggregats* (*skandha*), *transmigre* (*saṁkramati*) ibid., Pt. II, p. 183.
142. Ibid., Pt. II, p. 184.
143. Ibid., Pt. II, p. 200.
144. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 231-2; cf. *Pratyakṣam ity upalabhdī viśeṣaṇaṁ*, *Abhidharmakośa*, *Vyākhyā*, p. 697.
145. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 4.
146. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 134-7.

147. '*Na hi Vātsīputrīyāṇāṁ muktir niṣyate bauddhatvāt*' *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp 228, 232a; *Abhidharmakośa, Vyākhyā*, p. 699.
148. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 232.
149. Ibid., IX, p. 232.
150. Cf. '*Rūpādivad bhāvāntaram ced dravyataḥ kṣīrādivat samudayaś cet prajñaptitaḥ....Tīrthikadṛṣṭiprasaṅgaḥ*', ibid., p. 233; cf. *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 699.
151. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 233.
152. See *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 234; cf. *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 700.
153. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 235-6; *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, pp. 700-701.
154. Ibid., IX, p. 236.
155. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, 237-8; cf. Stcherbatsky, *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, p. 832.
156. Ibid., IX, p. 238.
157. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 238.
158. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 239-40.
159. Ibid., IX, pp. 240ff.
160. '*Rūpaṁ anātmā....vijñānaṁ anātmā*', *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 241.
161. '*Sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ*', see *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p 252.
162. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 241ff, 253ff.
163. '*Na kilaitad buddhavacanam iti*', ibid., IX, p. 251; cf. '*kenāpyadhyāropitāny etāni sūtrānity abhiprāyaḥ*, *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 705.
164. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 252-3.
165. Ibid., IX, pp. 254-5.
166. Ibid., IX, p. 153.
167. Cf. ibid., pp. 249-51.
168. Ibid., p. 256.
169. Ibid., pp. 256-7; cf. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 82.
170. Ibid., IX, pp. 258-9.
171. Ibid., pp. 259-61.
172. Ibid., IX, pp. 262-3; cf. *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 708; see also Stcherbatsky, *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, pp. 846ff.
173. *Pūrvakair eveti—Sathavira Nāgasenādibhiḥ*, *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 708; see *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 263.
174. *Itara aha—yadi nāvaktavyah kasmān nokto nāsti eveti*, *Abhidharmakośa-Vyākhyā*, p. 708; *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 264.
175. See *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 264-5.
176. Ibid., IX, p. 270.
177. See *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 272; see also *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 710.
178. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 272; see also *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā* p. 710.
179. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 273-4.
180. Ibid., see also *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, pp. 710-11.
181. Stcherbatsky, *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, pp. 452-3, cf *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 711.
182. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, p. 279; cf. *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 712.

183. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX, pp. 280-1.
184. See *Etudés Asiatiques*, 1925, pp. 368-9.
185. Cf. supra, pp. 234ff.
186. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, 263; cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 134-7, 156ff.
187. See Masuda, p. 50.
188. See Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 21-2.
189. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 33.
190. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 193.
191. See Obermiller, *Analysis of the Abhisamayālaṁkāra*, III, p. 380.
192. See supra, pp. 229ff.
193. Tārānātha, (Trans. Schiefner), p. 274.
194. See *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III, pp. 322ff, IV, p. 400.
195. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 111-13.
196. Or *avyākṛtavastu*.
197. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 134-7, 156-7; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, *Abyākata Saṁyutta*.
198. *Dīga Nikāya*, II, pp. 51ff; *Majjhima Nikāyā*, I, pp. 280ff; III, pp. 81ff.
199. See C A.F. Rhys Davids, *Sakya*, p. 189f, cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, pp. 95, 98, 126, 297, 380.
200. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. pp. 35, 50; II, pp. 89, 137, 415.
201. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, p. 155.
202. Masuda, op. cit., p. 53n.4.
203. Ibid., p. 53n. 5.
204. See T.W. Rhys Davids, *American Lectures* pp. 36-41; *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 29; E.J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 209; Vidhushekhar Bhattacarya, *Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 64ff; Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conceptian of Buddhism*, p. 73, Kern, op. cit., pp. 49ff; S. Mookerjee, *Buddhist Phllosophy of Universal Flux*, pp. 260-5; Bhikshu Sangharakshita, op. cit., pp. 176-7.
205. See Schrader, op. cit., pp. 4-6; C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *What was the Original Gospel*; *Sakya*, pp. 183ff; *The Birth of Indian Psychology*; Commarsway, *Living Thoughts of Buddha*, Introduction, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, pp. 57-69; Yamakami Sogen, op. cit., pp. 16ff; Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 382ff.
206. E. Conze *Buddhist Thought*, p. 130.
207. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 2ff; C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, Introduction, pp. xxxvii-xl; L.A. Govind, *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 37ff.
208. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 492; see supra.
209. Cf. Kern, op. cit , pp. 49-50.
210. Masuda, op. cit., p. 53n.
211. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 193.
212. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 53-4n; E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought*, pp. 127-8.
213. Cf. E. Conze, ibid., pp. 131-4.

9

Existence and other Modes of Conditioned Reality

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The last message of Buddha is said to have been that all conditioned things are impermanent (*vaidhammā saṁkhārā*).[1] While the *Upaniṣads* had emphasized the reality in which the finite and impermanent things are grounded,[2] the Buddha viewed the world as a phenomenal procession exhibiting the law which governs them. Actual things are devoid of any lasting or substantial reality.[3] They are merely passing phenomena, empty but orderly. The Buddha thus put forward the following three characteristics or marks of conditioned reality (*saṅkhata dhamma lakkhaṇaṁ*)—*anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta*.[4] The governing law of these phenomena (*dhammā*) is stated to be in terms of their dependent origination (*Paṭiccasamuppāda*)[5] which formulates the fixed regularities that sequence the phenomena exhibit. In the course of time, all these concepts, the three *lakkhaṇas* as well as *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, underwent development through diverse interpretations.

The doctrine of impermanence has naturally to meet the strong challenge posed by the common-sense as well as the eternalist thoughts. For common-sense, change implies an unchanging reality. In other words, common-sense seeks to join

permanence with impermanence in things. Eternalist philosophies, whether Vedānta or Sāṁkhya or Jainism, tend to stress the permanent and changing aspects of the things.[6] It is, therefore, interesting to observe the emergence of an opinion within Buddhism which sought to reintroduce from the back door, as it were, the concept of existence through time.

In the history of Buddhist Schools, the Sarvāstivāda occupies a prominent place just as some others like the Mahāsaṁghika, the Theravāda and the Vātsīputrīya did. Some of the basic assertions of the Sarvāstivāda have contributed a great deal towards the unceasing doctrinal controversies in early Buddhism.

The principal point of difference between others and the Sarvāstivādins consists in the fact that the latter maintain the existence of five *dharmas*, in their subtlest form, at all times, whether past, present or future, while almost all other sects deny any such existence.[7] Although the Sarvāstivādins accept all the basic tenets of Buddhist doctrine, viz., *anatta* (non-substantiality), and *anicca* (impermanence of all worldly things),[8] they believe, however, that the things constituted out of the *dharmas* are subject to disintegration but not the *dharmas* themselves, which always exist in their essential state. For example, *vedanā* may be *kusala*, *akusala* or *avyākṛta* at a given moment and place, but *vedanā* as such exists at all times.[9]

According to the Sarvāstivādins, *dharmas* can be considered either in their actual being or phenomena or in their essential being or noumena. They manifest themselves only at the moment of their activity, but essentially they existed in the past and would exist in the future also.[10]

This theory seems to have taken account of the ancient tradition that a *dharma* is something long-lasting and infinite. The Sarvāstivādins might be trying to hold fast to the tradition of the Brāhmaṇas 'which considered all factors, which constitute the individual, as participating in something transcendental'.[11] They adduced four reasons for their thesis in question:[12] (1) The Buddha has clearly taught it.[13] (2) Mind-knowledge arises from the contact between mind and its object, and if one were to believe that the past and future *dharmas* did not exist, there cannot be any mind consciousness about object.[14] (3) Without an object no knowledge can arise, and all our knowledge would be restricted to the present only. (4) If the

past does not exist, how can a good or bad action produce a fruit in the future? For, at the moment when the fruit is produced, the cause of the retribution is said to have vanished. This pan-realism of the Sarvāstivādins seeks to establish that: becoming and arising of *dharmas* is not a real arising and disappearing, but a wandering of always existent entities from one period of time to another. Entities which seem to have newly arisen, in fact, wander from future into the present and, when they perish, they are transferred into the past.[15] During the fourth Buddhist council held at the time of Kaniṣka, four interpretations were offered by different scholars of the Sarvāstivāda school regarding their fundamental tenet.[16]

1. *Bhāvānyathātva* was the explanation of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta. According to him past, present and future have to be differentiated on account of the non-identity of *bhāva* and not of *dravya* (object). For example, supposing a vase of gold is broken and transformed into a figure of gold, the colour of the gold remains the same. Even so, when a future *dharma* is changed to present, the *anāgatabhāva* only is abandoned and the *vartamāna bhāva* is acquired, *dravya* remaining the same.[17]
2. *Lakṣaṇāyathātva* was upheld by Bhadanta Ghoṣaka. He maintains that the *dharmas* in their transition from past to present, and present to future, manifest changes in characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) only. A *dharma*, when it is past, is associated (*yukta*) with the *lakṣaṇas* of the past, but it is not dissociated (*aviyukta*) with the *lakṣaṇas* of the present and future, so also a future *dharma* is associated (*yukta*) with the *lakṣaṇas* of the future but not dissociated from the *lakṣaṇas* of the present and past. The same can be said about the present. To cite an example, it is said that when a man is attached (*rakta*) to a woman, he is not detached to (*avirakta*) from other women.[18]
3. *Avasthānyathātva* was the explanation offered by Bhadanta Vasumitra and others. According to him, the past, present and future of a *dharma* is shown by the difference

in condition. If in a certain state (*avasthā*), a *dharma* is not active, it is future (*anāgata*), if the *dharma* is active, it is present (*vartamāna*), and if the *dharma* has ceased after being active, it is past. It would thus mean that there is only a change of states (*avasthāntara*) and not a change of objects (*dravyāntara*).[19]

4. *Anyonyathātva* was the view of Bhadanta Buddhadeva. According to him, past, present and future are so described in view of relativity.[20] Future is established relatively (*apekṣayā*) to past and present; the past relatively to present and future and the present relatively to past and future.[21] For example, the same woman may be a daughter and mother in relation to her mother and daughter respectively. Thus, there is actually no change in a *dhamma*.

The *Abhidharmakośa* discusses the four explanations offered on the Sarvāstivāda thesis by its scholars. Therein, the first explanation is rejected as being similar to Sāṅkhyan *Pariṇāmavāda*, i.e., the theory of transformation.[22] The second opinion is criticized as being characterized by confusion of time because the *lakṣaṇas* (characteristics) of past, present and future are made to be always present. According to the fourth explanation, all the three past, present and future exist at the same time and hence this too is unacceptable. Thus, the opinion of Vasumitra, i.e., *avasthānyathātva* is approved by Vasubandhu.[23]

The Sarvāstivādins eventually divided into two groups, i.e., the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, all things have two components, viz., ideal essence and actuality. All things (*dharmas*) permanently exist in their ideal essence (*dravyasat*) in past, present and future.[24] However, owing to the association of *saṁskṛta lakṣaṇas*, this permanence is vitiated.[25] Sautrāntikas were not prepared to accept this theory. According to them, it is foolish to believe that the *svabhāva* (nature) of the *dharmas* is permanent and their *bhāva* (actuality) is impermanent.[26] They would, instead, affirm that the so-called ideal nature is simply a name, i.e., (*prajñapti*).

The Sarvāstivāda thesis of 'pan-realism' provided an occasion for bitter criticism and debate among the early Buddhist

sects. It was as alien an assertion as the one made by the Vātsīputrīyas postulating the existence of Pudgala. The Theravādins and the Mahāsaṁghikas were both equally critical of this thesis. Reality is cognized either as actuality or as ideality, i.e., existence and essence respectively. The Theravādins could not reconcile to the Sarvāstivāda thesis due to their belief that all things with a conceptualizable essence have only an impermanent temporal reality. And the Mahāsaṁghikas in their turn laid emphasis on the ideal or perfect reality and, hence, were opposed to the Sarvāstivāda view. This emphasis on the ideal or perfect reality by the Mahāsaṁghikas paved the way for the relegation of actualities to the realm of illusion in the Mahāyāna.

THESES AND ARGUMENTS

THE PERSISTENT EXISTENCE OF THE DHAMMAS (DHARMAS)

The main controversy on existence obviously centres round the view that everything exists,[27] which is the well-known theory of the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism.[28] The Theravādins initiate a lengthy discussion with the remark that the proposition that 'all'[29] exists involves further admissions that all exists everywhere (*sabbattha*), always (*sabbadā*), in every way (*sabbena*) in all things (*sabbesu*) not in a combined state (*ayogantikatva*). Also, the non-existent exists and both *micchādiṭṭhi* and *sammādiṭṭhi* exist together.[30]

Again, in terms of time, how can the proponents maintain their thesis since the past has already ceased (*atītaṁ niruddhaṁ vigataṁ*), and the future has yet to come to be (*anāgataṁ ajātaṁabhūtaṁ*). Just as they affirm about the present as something which has not yet ceased, they must similarly affirm about the past that it has not ceased if at all they have to maintain their thesis. Similar arguments are advanced with regard to present and future.[31] The Sarvāstivādins refuse to accept the implications as suggested by the Theravādins.

It would appear from this that the Sarvāstivādins maintain that all *dharmas* exist but not always and everywhere and in

the same form as suggested by the Theravādins. They do not similarly concede the point raised by the Theravādins, viz., whether *khandhas*, which are all different by nature, exist uncombined (*ayogaṁ*). The Theravādins, however, seek to pinpoint a fallacy that if this be the case, then both *micchādiṭṭhi* and *sammādiṭṭhi* should be taken to exist together. The Theravādins also point out that if past and future exist, then their existence should be predicated in the same way as it is predicated of the present. The Sarvāstivādins deny this owing to their belief that past and future exist but not exactly in the same way as one would speak of the present.[32]

Next, the Theravādins raise the question whether past material qualities (*atītaṁ rūpaṁ*) exist? The proponents' reply would be in the positive. But then if the past is something that has ceased, as aforesaid, how can the proponents maintain that past material qualities exist? Similarly, about future material qualities, if the future is not yet born, how can the same be said to exist?[33]

Similarly, the other more general admissions stated, apply also to material qualities in particular. For example, if by saying that the 'present material qualities' (*paccuppannaṁ rūpaṁ*) exist, it is meant that they have not ceased to be, then the same must be said about the past if its existence has to be affirmed. And if, by saying that the 'present material qualities' exist, it is meant that they are born and have come to be, then the same must be said about future material qualities (*anāgataṁ rūpaṁ*), if its existence is to be upheld. Similarly, if by saying that 'past material qualities' exist, one means that they have ceased or departed, then the same ought to be affirmed for 'present material qualities'. And if, by saying 'future material qualities' exist, one means that they are not yet born, it must similarly be affirmed for 'present material qualities' in order to maintain the hypothesis of their existence.[34]

All these arguments are equally applicable to each of the other four aggregates, i.e., feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*) 'mental coefficients' (*saṁkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*).[35]

According to the Theravādins, taking for example, the expression 'present material-aggregate', if one chooses to say that the present material-aggregate, on ceasing, gives up its present

state, he must also admit that material-aggregate gives up its materiality. Otherwise, if he says that present material-aggregate on ceasing does not give up its materiality, he must also admit that it does not give up its present state.[36]

According to the Sarvāstivādins, however, taking for example an expression, 'white cloth' (*odātaṁ*), if it is said that the 'white cloth when it is being dyed loses its whiteness', one must also admit that it loses its clothness. In case one chooses to affirm that 'white cloth when it is being dyed does not give up its clothness', he must also admit that it does not give up its whiteness.[37]

The Theravādins further point out that should the material aggregate retain its materiality as suggested by the proponents, they must also assume that the same is permanent and eternal just as Nibbāna is permanent and eternal.[38]

In the second set of arguments, as presented here, the Theravādins taking an example of the 'present material aggregate'[39] as one inseparable object, observe that, at a certain point of time, this material aggregate becomes past, i.e., gives up its presentness[40] to which the Sarvāstivādins agree. Now, the Theravādins argue that in the same way it can be said that the material aggregate also gives up its materiality.[41] The Sarvāstivādins reject this implication by putting a counter-argument thus—taking a piece of white cloth, for example, as one inseparable object, if this cloth were dyed it would give up its whiteness but does it give up its clothness also? The Theravādins, however, resort to *suddhikanaya* (pure logic) and observe that if the material (*rūpa*) does not give up its materiality (*rūpabhāva*), then *rūpa* becomes permanent, something as eternally existing like Nibbāna. The Sarvāstivādins refuse to accept this conclusion as, according to them, *rūpabhāva* is different from *Nibbānabhāva*.[42]

The Theravādins argue next that if the proponents in their statement 'the past exists' mean that it retains its pastness then, in order to affirm that 'the future exists', they ought to imply that it retains its futurity. Similarly, in their statement 'the present exists', they ought to mean that it retains its presentness. In other words, each of these assertions involves a similar implication regarding the other two divisions of time.[43]

If the past exists and retains its pastness (*atītabhāva*), then it must be permanent, persistent, eternal and so on; but this is denied by the proponents. All the foregoing arguments of the Theravādins are equally applicable to the particular past, future, and present things called 'the five aggregates'.[44]

The Theravādins further ask—is the past a non-existent thing? If the proponents admit this, they must reject their view that the past exists. That is to say, if 'the non-past exists', then to say there exists a past is equally wrong. Similarly, about the future the same argument is put forth.[45]

The Theravādins ask next: does that, which has been future, become present? If they assent, they must admit that something, which was future at a certain point of time, is the same as that which is now present. If they admit this, they must admit that anything, which having been future, is present will in turn, become once more present.[46] The series of dilemmas is also applicable to present and past.

In this set of arguments, the basic question raised by the Theravādins is whether past (*atīta*) gives up its pastness (*atītabhāva*)? The Sarvāstivādins refuse to accept this, but they are careful enough to observe that when they say that *atītabhāva* exists they mean that *anāgatabhāva* (futurity) and *paccuppannabhāva* (presentness) do not exist like the *atītabhāva*, and similarly when they predicate existence of *anāgatabhāva*, they mean *atītabhāva* and *paccuppannabhāva* do not exist, like *anāgatabhāva*. The same is shown to be valid in the case of each of the *khandhas*. The Theravādins conclude the discussion by their usual *suddhikanaya* saying that *atīta* or *atītabhāva* then would be the same as Nibbāna or *Nibbānabhāva*, a conclusion rejected by the Sarvāstivādins. The Theravādins finally take recourse to *vacanasodhana* and observe that (1) if the existence of past (*atīta*) and non-past (*nvātīta*), as also, future (*anāgata*) and non-future (*nvānāgata*) is denied then the Sarvāstivādins should not say that past and future exist; so also (2) if they do not accept the identity of *atīta*, *paccuppanna* and *anāgata*, they cannot maintain that *atīta* and *anāgata* exist.[47]

The Theravādins further point out that if the proponents, i.e., the Sarvāstivādins, admit that *paccuppannañāṇa* (present cognition) exists and its function is to know things then why

should the *atītañāṇa* and *anāgatañāṇa*, (the existence of which is affirmed by the Sarvāstivādins) not have the function of knowing things like that of *paccuppannañāṇa*?[48]

The Theravādins next illustrate the examples of the Arahants, *anāgāmīs* etc., and observe that as the Sarvāstivādins state that *atīta rāga* exists in the Arahant, *atīta byāpāda* exists in an *anāgāmī* and so forth, an Arahant should be then supposed to be *sarāgo*, an *anāgāmī byāpannacitto* and so on. This inference is, however, rejected by the Sarvāstivādins.[49]

Next, the Theravādins raise a crucial point that if the existence of *atīta*, *paccuppanna* and *anāgata khandhas*, *dhātus*, *āyatanas*, be admitted, then the Sarvāstivādins should affirm that there are in all 15 *khandhas*, 54 *dhātus* and 36 *āyatanas*. The Sarvāstivādins, however, reject this on the ground that *atīta* or *anāgata* exists from one standpoint and does not exist from another standpoint.[50] This is reminiscent of Jain *Syādavāda*.[51] The Theravādins once again bring in the *suddhikanaya* argument by citing the example of Nibbāna and thus seek to establish the untenability of the Sarvāstivāda thesis.[52]

Lastly, in order to substantiate their contention, the two debating groups cite Canonical passages having a favourable bearing on their respective standpoints.

The Sarvāstivādins refer to a discourse of the Buddha that material quality, whether past, future or present is called the material aggregate. Similarly about the feeling, whether past, future or present is termed as the aggregate of feeling. Even so are the other three aggregates.[53]

The Theravādins, however, quote another statement of the Buddha that three modes of speaking and naming have always been distinct. The three categories respectively are 'has been', 'exists' and 'will be'.[54] They also quote two dialogues in which the Buddha is said to have spoken to Phagguna and Nandaka that none of the senses is capable of revealing facts about the past Buddhas nor do hate and dullness of the past exist.[55] Thus, the Theravādins lay down that the Sarvāstivāda thesis, in question, viz., '*sabbaṁ atthi*' is contradicted by the Canonical passages. The proponents, however, further quote from the *Saṁyutta Nikāya*[56] to affirm their thesis. Thus, the present controversy makes a thorough analysis of the basic tenet of

the Sarvāstivādins.

The popularity and importance gained by the Sarvāstivāda school is evident from the fact that in some of the early texts their essential doctrines are laid down in sufficient detail. The *Abhidharmakośa*,[57] thus, contains a detailed exposition of the Sarvāstivāda view. Among other works, *Milindapañha*,[58] and the treatises of Vasumitra,[59] Bhavya,[60] Vinītadeva,[61] etc., may be mentioned. According to Vasumitra, the Sarvāstivādins believed that the so-called things (*dharmas*), which exist, are divided in two classes: the first *nāma* and the second *rūpa*. The substances of things are also things which really exist. All the *dharmāyatanas* can be known, can also be understood and can be at tained.[62]

One might observe that the Sarvāstivāda theory is an attempt to solve the problem of time. Professor Stcherbatsky, however, suggests that the principle 'everything exists' is set forth in order to affirm that nothing but the twelve bases of cognition (*āyatana*) are existent. An object, which cannot be viewed as a separate object of cognition or a separate faculty of cognition, is unreal as, e.g., the soul, or the personality. Being a congery of separate elements, it is declared to be a name and not a *dharma*.[63] This interpretation does not seem to conform with what we have in the *Kathāvatthu* about the Sarvāstivāda doctrine. It makes the problem not the problem of the nature of time, but of the reality of certain concepts as they come within the scheme of the 'bases of cognition', the *āyatanas*.[64]

Like the scheme of the *khandhas*, the idea of twelve *āyatanas*[65] is set forth in view of classifying everything. 'Everything' is classified under the six channels of knowledge and their objects. However, in whatever way everything is classed, the essential question is how it exists. The Theravādins mention it in their argument to mean that the Sarvāstivādins asserted that the past exists, the future exists, the present exists.[66] Rosenberg's remarksb ecome relevant here when he says that the name of the school means the view which says that everything is, in which 'everything' does not refer to all *dharmas* in the sense of the *dharmas* of every kind, but to *dharmas* of all the three times.[67]

According to E.J. Thomas, we have here two distinct interpretations of the scriptural utterance, *sarvaṁ asti*.

As the *āyatanas* or bases of cognition form a classification of everything knowable grouped under the separate senses, the statement asserts that everything which really exists must come under one of the senses and it implies that anything which cannot be so included is unreal. This is the sense in which it is taken by Stcherbatsky, and hence does not refer to the problem of time. But there were Sarvāstivādins who asserted the existence of past, present and future as real things (*dravyataḥ*). This is the sense which is rejected by the *Kathāvatthu*. Both views are discussed in the *Abhidharmakośa* and there the former interpretation is called the good Sarvāstivāda doctrine. It is in fact a doctrine in which all Buddhists agreed, but it does not solve the problem of time raised by the second interpretation.[68]

M.M. Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj also thinks that the Sarvāstivāda thesis is evidently associated with the implications of the doctrine of *Trikālavāda* on which there was a great controversy in ancient India not only in the Buddhist school but also among some of the Hindu systems of philosophy such as Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa, Sāṁkhya-Yoga and others.[69]

In fact, we have to remember that in the *Kathāvatthu*, the two theses XV.3 and XV.4 which are directly concerned with time—whether its epochs are real (*parinipphanna*) or conventional (*paññatti*)—are dealt with very perfunctorily.[70]

It may be observed, thus, that essentially the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of '*sarvaṁ asti*' consists in the assertion that everything exists everywhere, at all times and in every way. What they mean thereby is that (1) all elements are real for they hold firmly their own essences which they never give up and (2) that all elements, all fundamental essences always exist.[71] In their opinion, for the essences there is no arising or perishing; the arising and perishing are of their functions. Whether the elements rise to function or not, they are there all the same and they are real.[72]

One may compare here the thesis (XXI.7), according to which, all things are by nature immutable (*niyata*).[73] This has been attributed to the Andhakas and some of the Uttarāpathakas.[74] The principal argument here is that one kind of

substance such as matter or mind remains ever fixed as such and cannot be changed to another. It would be noticed that this is the opposite of what *Sāṁkhya* believes where one indeterminate stuff forms the permanent substratum of manifest things.[75] It is reminiscent of the doctrine of seven immutables held by Pakudha Kaccāyana in the Buddha's time.[76]

The thesis in I.10 has been attributed to the Andhakas, the Pubbaseliyas, etc.[77] It asserts that things exist so (*evatthi*) and not otherwise.[78] It is taken to mean that the past, present and future exist only as past, present and future and not otherwise. This seems to predicate both existence and non-existence to the same thing which is the ground on which it has been criticized by the Theravādins. The contrasted views of *hevatthi* and *hevanatthi* of the Andhakas and *sevatthi* and *sevanatthi* of the Theravādins rightly recalls the *Saptbhaṅgīnaya* of the Jains as pointed out by Barua.[79]

Apart from the main controversy on Existence arising from the Sarvāstivāda views, as detailed here, we may discuss some allied problems also.

NATURE OF THE PAST

Another controversy, recorded in the *Kathāvatthu*, seeks to analyze the nature of one's past. It is laid down that one's past consists in bodily and mental aggregates.[80] Curiously enough, we notice a deviation in the present debate in so far as this thesis does not belong to any of the so-called unorthodox sects. The entire process is reversed in this case. The thesis is laid down by the Theravādins and is disputed by a sect, which has not been identified by Buddhaghosa.[81]

It is argued in the case of this thesis that since the Theravādins affirm that one's past consisted in aggregates, they must also admit that the past exists, which the Theravādins deny. This is also the position in the case of the organs and objects of sense, the elements or all the three taken together. Similarly the argument goes in the case of future. Further, since the Theravādins admit that one's present consists in aggregates and that it exists, they must also admit that one's past, which consisted in aggregates, exists.[82]

And if they admit, a past consisting of aggregates or other

factors, e.g., sense-organs, etc., does not exist now, they must admit that the present, consisting in aggregates, etc., no longer exists.[38]

Again if they admit that material qualities in the past formed one's aggregates, sense-organs and objects, elements or all these taken together, then they must also admit that the past material qualities exist. Similarly about the future material qualities. This is also valid if they affirm that the present exists and that material qualities in the present form one's bodily aggregates and the other factors. The same argument may be applied for future instead of past 'material quality'.[84] The Theravādins quote from the *Niruttipatha sutta*[85] to affirm that past and future do not exist. The proponents, however, also quote from the *Nikāyas* to prove that one's past and future consist in aggregates and that they exist.[86]

Apparently, both groups agree on the point that past and future consist in bodily and mental aggregates. The basic difference between the two lies in the fact that the Theravāda regards the past and future as non-existing, whereas the opposing sect takes both of them as existent. The latter affirm this because they believe that aggregates and other factors of one's experience retain their state as a sort of complex self.[37]

SOME OF THE PAST AND FUTURE AS STILL EXISTING

The next controversy centres around the assertion that some of the past, as also, some of the future exists, but some of the two does not exist.[88] Buddhaghosa has attributed the thesis to the Kassapikas,[89] which is the only thesis of this school discussed in the text.

The Theravādins argue that if some of the past exists and some does not, one must admit that some of it has ceased and departed and some has not yet ceased or departed. All this is denied by the proponents.[90]

Again, the Theravādins put a direct question as to which of the past exists, which does not? According to the Kassapikas, such past things of which the effect is yet to mature exist and those past things of which the effect has matured do not exist.[91]

The Theravādins observe that if the proponents admit the

existence of the former part they must also admit the existence of the latter, and also the existence of those past things that are without effect. This argument is further elongated in various forms.[92]

It is now the Kassapikas' turn to put a crucial question—'is it not correct to say that past things, the effect of which is yet to mature, will mature sometime and will yield its effect'?[93] The Theravādins have to concede this point. According to the advocates of the thesis, then it is surely in agreement with their basic assertion that past things, yet immature in their effect, exist. The Theravādins, however, refuse to admit the thesis.[94] Similar argumentation may be noted in the case of future (*anāgata*).[95]

Vasumitra also records some of the doctrines of the Kassapikas. One of the doctrines is the same as the preceding one.[96] It is believed that the Kassapikas seceded from their parent body, i.e., the Sarvāstivādins, on some significant difference of opinion.[97] This difference is, perhaps, contained in the present thesis which seeks to modify the most important doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins.

PAST OR FUTURE EXPERIENCE

The controversy here relates to an assertion that a past or future experience is actually possessed.[98] Buddhaghosa attributes the view to the Andhakas.[99] According to the Theravādins, however, the past is extinct and the future still unborn. Further, one, who possesses a present material aggregate, cannot also possess the past and a future bodily aggregate. If he is said to possess all the three, one must admit three bodily aggregates. Thus, he should actually possess five past and five future as well as five present bodily and mental aggregates, which position would raise the number of the aggregates to fifteen. A similar argument applies to the organs and objects of sense to the eighteen elements, to the twenty-two controlling powers.[100]

According to the Andhakas, on the other hand, since there are such persons who, 'meditating on the eight stages of emancipation, can induce the four *jhānas* at their pleasure', it is right to say that one can have actual present possession of past and future things?[101]

Buddhaghosa, defending the orthodox position, says that in

this connection we must distinguish between actual and potential possession. The former is of the present moment. But for a man who has acquired the 'Eight Attainments' in *jhāna*, the possession of them is potentially present, though not of all at once. According to him, the Andhakas do not make this distinction.[102]

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

In the present set of controversies, the most significant problem is the one posed by the Sarvāstivādins in their assertion that everything exists (*sarvaṁ asti*). The Sarvāstivādins derive their name from this very doctrine which lays down the ultimate nature of the fundamental elements, entities or essences (*dharmāḥ*).[103] The doctrine of the timeless and underived character of the specific essences is unique to the Sarvāstivādins and here we find an extreme form of emphasis on the analysis and definition of elements. *Abhidharma*, according to the Sarvāstivādins, means a thorough analysis of the fundamental elements, in order to understand their nature clearly, so that there may not be any further illusion.[104]

Like other unorthodox sects such as the Vātsīputrīyas, Sammatīyas, etc., the Sarvāstivādins were also quite keen to conform to the basic gospel of the Buddha. Except for the significant deviation in the formulation of the doctrine of '*sarvaṁ asti*', of which the import was undoubtedly bound to create a stir in the Buddhist organisation, the Sarvāstivādins subscribed to the main tenets of Buddhism, viz., *anitya*, *anātma*, *dukkha* and so on. They interpreted them in a way, however, so as to bring about an agreement with their new thesis.

They admitted *śūnyatā*, which meant for them that among the basic elements of existence there is no *ātman*, no substantial entity called 'I'. Also the middle way they interpreted in accordance with their doctrine, i.e., the avoidance of extremes is only in regard to the nature of constituted things and this means that in regard to the constituted things, there is no possibility of such views as absolutely existent and absolutely non-existent; this is to reveal the nature of existence as a series of arising and perishing events. But in this the

question of the basic elements does not arise. According to them, the reality of basic elements does not violate the principle of the middle way since the domain of the former is different from that of the latter and the two doctrines, the dependent origination of events, and the self-existence of the basic elements, are bound together. The Sarvāstivādins thus seek to distinguish themselves from the eternalists who hold that the extinction of things means their latency and the production of things means their manifestation.[105]

However, what the Sarvāstivādins came to contribute as their own in the history of Buddhist thought appeared as something uncompromising with its essentials and as a departure from the main line of thinking. It seems that the formulation of the doctrine of momentariness or instantaneousness of *dharmas* in its extreme and uncompromising form was beset with some insurmountable difficulties which the monks were bound to feel after the demise of the Buddha. The foremost difficulty was realized with regard to the doctrine of *karman* and its result. How can a *dharma* cause an effect after it has itself vanished from the scene?[106] Secondly, the saints and wayfarers are said to acquire and accomplish a number of possessions which seem to survive even after the moment of their acquisition.

Also there are mental states which seem to last longer than one moment, e.g., *saṁskāras* or *anuśayas* of a particular individual.[107] It seems to have led to the apprehension that not only actualities but also potentialities are real. In view of these difficulties, enquiries were made to find out the exact duration of an event, i.e., how long it lasts. A difference of opinion arose among the Sarvāstivādins, the Therāvādins and the Sautrāntikas as the first two sects upheld that an event lasts for three, four or even more moments, whereas the last sect upheld the persistence of an event for just one moment.[108] According to the Sarvāstivādins, each single conditioned event must go through four moments, i.e., (1) birth or origination (*utpatti*), (2) subsistence (*sthiti*), (3) decay (*jarā*), (4) destruction (*maraṇa*).[109] These inevitable four *lakṣaṇas* are, however, held to be compatible both with momentariness as well as with *sarvāstivāda*.

Gradually, thus, when the difficulties of the doctrine of momentaries were realized, it was necessary to introduce new

concepts to make amends in that. Curiously enough, just as the dogmatic assertion of the non-existence of a 'self' had to be supplemented by some 'pseudo-selves', so the dogmatic assertion of impermanence could be made credible only by introducing certain 'pseudo-permanencies'. It is suggested that three doctrines originated through the desire to nullify those implications of the doctrine of instantaneousness which threaten the fruitfulness of the spiritual life.[110] They are as under: (1) the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of '*sarvaṁ asti*', (2) the doctrine of possession (*prāpti*) and dispossession (*a-prāpti*),[111] and (3) the Sautrāntika doctrine of germs (*bīja*) suffusions (*vāsanā*) and kindred concepts.

Thus, developed the 'pan-realism' of the Sarvāstivādins in the course of reinterpreting and readjusting the original teachings of the Buddha. As a natural corollary to this development, there arose an uncompromising debate among the monks of different dispositions. The Sarvāstivāda assertion became a target of bitter condemnation at the hands of the Theravādins[112] and others. It was pointed out that the Sarvāstivāda tended to a kind of eternalism, the absolute self-being of the multiple specific elements, and that with this they fail to conform to the doctrine of change or becoming[113] which was said by the Buddha to be the original nature of things.[114] The Sautrāntikas were equally critical of the Sarvāstivāda thesis.[115] According to them, the Sarvāstivādins fail to distinguish between the essence which they take as non-temporal and the function which is temporal, and consequently fail to distinguish between composite and incomposite. They mistake the continuation of the past to mean its everlastingness and hence its self-being. Further, they mistake the fact-hood of the object of cognition to mean its substantiality and self-being (*svabhāva*) and fail to draw a clear line of distinction between existence and non-existence. They also fail to provide for negation and error or illusion and mistake relative existence to mean absolute self-being.[116]

OTHER MODES OF CONDITIONED REALITY

DUKKHA (SUFFERING)

In the *Nikāyas*, all conditioned things have been repeatedly

declared to be *dukkha*.[117] It was, therefore, not at all surprising that some monks, more lugubrious than others, should have concluded that everything is absolutely *dukkha*, the world a mere heap of ashes.[118] This is the thesis which the commentary attributes to the Gokulikas.[119] The Theravādins argue that there are many references which admit the facts of pleasure and happiness in the course of worldly as well as spiritual experience. How then can everything be called *dukkha* in an unqualified manner. The proponents easily cite passages from the scriptures which make such unconditional statements.[120]

The *Kathāvatthu* in its debate on this thesis has not been able to advance beyond sheer contradictions. The *Abhidharmakośa* presents us with a more detailed and profound discussion on the nature of *dukkha* which distinguishes between *dukkha* and *dukkhasatya* as well as between three different senses of *dukkha*—*dukkha-dukkhatā*, *pariṇāma-dukkhatā* and *saṁskāra-dukkhatā*.[121] The feeling of pain (*dukkha-dukkhatā*) is not universal, but the feeling of pleasure is beset by its changing character and all experiences and things share the common characteristic of being in commotion. It is in this sense that *dukkha* is universal. One may suggest that it was the insistence of the Gokulikas on a strict interpretation of *dukkha*, which, by threatening a *reductio ad absurdum*, perhaps, led to a subtler analysis of the whole matter.[122]

Another thesis relating to *dukkha* belongs to the Hetuvādins,[123] who assert that the *dukkha*, for the destruction of which one undertakes spiritual life, is only the experienced unhappiness.[124] They seem to ignore the larger sense of *dukkha* by which even insentient things are called *dukkha*, since they become causal factors in it in various ways. According to Buddhaghosa, *dukkha* is of two kinds, (1) *dukkha* as bound up with the *indriyas* and (2) *dukkha* as not bound up with the *indriyas*. The Hetuvādins, however, do not distinguish between the two.[125]

If *indriyabaddha dukkha* means simply the sensation of pain, then obviously the thesis is faulty and does not comprehend the full or even the essential meaning of *dukkha*. On the other hand, if it means experienced unhappiness of whatever kind

as distinguished from those material things which may also indirectly be called *dukkha*, it would grasp the essential though not the full meaning of the word.[126]

The Hetuvādins[127] are also associated with the thesis that except the *Ariya-magga* all other *saṁkhata dhammas* may be called *dukkha*.[128] It may be recalled the four nobel truths, *sāmaññaphala*, *Nirodhasamāpatti*, etc., were declared to be *asaṁkhata*, i.e., unconditioned.[129]

The Uttarāpathakas and the Hetuvādins[130] hold, on the basis of the famous verses of the nun Vajjira[131] that it is *dukkha* alone which arises and passes and hence, excepting *dukkha*, all the *khandhas*, *dhātus* and *indriyas* are *aparinipphanna*.[132] It has been interpreted in the text to mean that only *dukkha* is caused whereas all the other things are uncaused.[133] It might, however, be interpreted to mean that *dukkha* alone is the constant, the absolute element in experience whereas all the other things are variable.

PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA

The early Buddhist texts are distinguished by their attention to causal analysis.[134] *Hetu*, *paccaya* and *nidāna* were the general terms used in this context. *Paṭiccasamuppāda* was the general law enunciated for the purpose, its general form being—*imasmiṁ sati idaṁ bhavati, imassa uppādā idaṁ uppajjati*, etc.[135] Its application to particular psychic phenomena was expressed in chains of causes and effects of which the most famous is the chain of twelve *nidānas*. To the Abhidhammika analysts, however, it became clear that the interrelations of things are multiform.[136] Consequently, an attempt was made to discover the basic forms of the *hetus* and *paccayas*. The Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* works gave elaborate though not identical results. In view of this tendency, it is not surprising to find that some of the theses in the *Kathāvatthu* are connected with the notion of *paccaya* or causal relations.

Thus, we have the Mahāsaṁghika thesis[137]—*paccayatā vavaṭṭhitā*[138]—meaning thereby that causal relations are fixed or constant. The *Kathāvatthu* takes this to mean that a particular thing can be connected with another only through one kind of a *paccaya* relation. If it is a *samanantara paccaya*, it cannot be

an *ārammaṇa paccaya.*[139] The way in which the *Kathāvatthu* interprets the principle makes it palpably erroneous. If we take the thesis to refer to the constancy and distinctness of the relations rather than to the fact that a particular, in relation to another, may enter only one of these distinct patterns of relationship, the thesis would acquire sense and plausibility. We would then be saying that the relation of succession, for example, should not be confused with the relation of objectivity. We would be proposing a system of relationships comprising distinct elements. These elements (relations) would be constant and fixed but their elements or things would be merely variables, the actual value of which, in terms of the natural world, would be a matter of factual propriety. A constant relationship would be defined in terms of variables.

Another thesis, belonging to the Mahāsaṁghikas,[140] denies the reversibility of relations.[141] If *avidyā* is the cause of *saṁskāra* we cannot assert that *saṁskāra* is the cause of *avidyā*. This is the interpretation given in the *Kathāvatthu* and, according to Buddhaghosa, the thesis asserts that the *paccayas* cannot be symmetric (*aññamañña*).[142] However, if we take *paccaya* in a strictly causal sense, then the thesis would appear plausible, but if we dilute the meaning of *paccaya* to include co-operative factors or substitute individuals from the classes of causes and effects, this would not be true. For example, while a seed cannot be the effect of particular tree which it produces, it can very well be the effect of another tree. The same logic might well apply to such instances as a relationship between *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* or ignorance and actions. Here the relationship is mutual between classes but hardly between strictly particular instances.

Another thesis, attributed to the Uttarāpathakas, lays down that, since, all things are momentary, nothing can be a cause by way of repeated action[143] and hence there is no such thing as *āsevana paccayatā.*[144] This appears a logical conclusion to have been drawn from the doctrine of momentariness. It also reduces to shreds the Abhidharmika doctrine of *āsevana paccaya.* Unfortunately, it would also appear to free men from the dangers, as well as, the advantages which accrue from habit and this is the score on which it has been criticized.[145]

CLASSIFICATION OF THE 'DHAMMAS'—MATTER

Buddhism emerges as a doctrine based essentially on the fundamental principle that existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle and ultimate elements.

The earliest classification of the elements of existence appears to have been into *nāma* and *rūpa*, *kāya* and *viññāṇa*, *rūpa* and *citta* or *rūpa* and *dhamma*.[146] Later, the classification into five *skandhas* comes into being. This changed the division into *rūpa citta*, *caitta* (including the three *arūpa skandhas*) and *citta-viprayukta saṁskāras*.[147]

The *Kathāvatthu* presents us with several controversies relating to *rūpa*. There is a thesis of the Andhakas holding the four elements to be visible.[148] According to the Andhakas, since things like earth, stone, mountain, etc., are actually seen, therefore, they may be said to be visible. They also hold that the *rūpa-dhātu* is constituted by material elements.[149] They also postulated that in the *rūpa-dhātu*, beings have all the six senses.[150] And finally they went on to assert the existence of matter in the *arūpa-dhātu*.[151] Similar is the import of another Andhaka thesis, i.e., XVI.9 which lays down that, since matter which is the product of action done in the world of sense-desires, belongs to that world, therefore, if it be the product of actions done in the material or immaterial heavens, it belongs equally to these worlds.[152]

Against these views, the Theravādins hold that there is only subtle matter in the *rūpa-dhātu* and none in the *arūpa-dhātu*. The Andhaka view appears to have arisen from the interpretation of some Canonical statements which seems to have suggested that a being in the *rūpa-dhātu* has all the senses and thus even the gross matter of smell, taste and touch.[153] The word *rūpi* in this passage is, however, ambiguous. The famous phrase—*viññāṇa paccayānāma rūpaṁ*[154]—suggested that some kind of matter ought to be accompanying *viññāṇa* even in the *arūpa-dhātu*.

The Uttarāpathakas held that matter might be subjective as well as objective.[155] That matter (*rūpa*) is *sārammaṇa* in some sense is admitted on all hands. The Theravādins hold that while matter may be an object it cannot have an object. The Uttarāpathakas do not make such a distinction.[156]

The Uttarāpathakas assert that matter (*rūpa*) is a *hetu*.[157] Now *hetu*, if interpreted in the sense of a cause in general, i.e., as *paccayahetu*, this thesis would be unexceptionable. But this is supposed to use *hetu* also in the sense of one of the three *mūlas*—*lobha*, *dosa* and *moha*. The possibility of matter being *ahetu* in this sense implies that matter may be held good or bad which is the thesis, VIII.9, and matter being able to act like a mental impulse which has an object, i.e., matters may have a purpose. Now this we have seen was an explicit thesis of the Uttarāpathakas– (cf. IX.3—*rūpaṁ sārammaṇaṁ*). *Rūpa* as *kusalākusala*, *hetu* and *sārammaṇa* form one complex assertion.

Another variant of XVI.5 is XVI.6. Instead of matter being called a hetu, it is here said to be accompanied by moral condition (*sahetuka*). The Andhakas asserted that *rūpa* is *vipāka* (XVI.8). The Uttarāpathakas asserted (XIV.4) that the speech and action of the Ariyans are (*ariyarūpa*) material.

All these theses, which seek to invest matter with moral status, origin and results, appear to have arisen from two considerations—(1) the feeling that the law of *karman* is ubiquitous and unexceptional; (2) that physical actions and speech, although in their nature only material movements, are still morally significant. If the law of *karman* is to prevail in the universe how can there be any part of it radically amoral and indifferent to it. The law of *karman* operating naturally must be a law of nature. This tendency thus has a powerful philosophical dialectic behind it which found its full expression in Vijñānavāda where the environments in which different beings find themselves are nothing but dream-like products of the mind, appropriate to its particular actions and tendencies.

REFERENCES

1. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 119.
2. Cf. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, III, 1; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III, 14, 1; *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II, 2.15.
3. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 280; III, p. 81.
4. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 280; see also II, p. 196; III, pp. 81, 144.
5. Cf. *Mahāvagga*, p. 39.
6. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, III, pp. 56-7, 82; see also Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 157-159, 279-80, 364, 405-6; S.N. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 188f, 238f, 477f; Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, pp. 308ff; II, pp. 283ff, 475ff.
7. Two exceptions are the Vibhajyavādi Sarvāstivādins and the Kāśyapīyas, both offshoots of the Sarvāstivāda school. According to them not all but some of the past and future *dharmas* exist, see *Kathāvatthu*, I, 8; *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 52; cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du petit Véhicule*, p. 168.
8. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 17.
9. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 137; see also *Points of Controversy*, Appendix 3, pp. 375-377.
10. *Abhidharmakośa*, V. p. 50.
11. E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, p. 667; cf. J. Takakusu, *On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins*, *JPTS*, 1905, pp. 67ff.
12. *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 50; E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Buddhisme Indien*, p. 666.
13. See *Saṁyuktāgama*, III, 14; see also *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 51n.
14. See *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 51.
15. E.Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, pp. 140-1; see Conze, *Buddhist Thought*, p. 139.
16. See *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 52.
17. Ibid., V, p. 53.
18. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 470; see also *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 53.
19. *Abhidharmakośa*, V, pp. 53-54.
20. See *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 470; see also *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 54.
21. See *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, pp. 470-1.
22. Cf. *Vyāsa on Yogasūtras*, II, 15.
23. *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 55.
24. Cf. *Yogasūtra*, IV, 12.
25. *Abhidharmakośa*, V, p. 50; cf. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 33f.
26. See *Abhidharmakośa*, V, pp. 56-7; see also Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 10, 20.

27. *Sabbaṁ atthīti. Kathāvatthu*, I, 6.
28. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 43.
29. On the rendering of *sabbaṁ* as 'all' see *Points of Controversy*, p. 85n; Appendix 3, pp. 375-7; cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 5-6.
30. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 113; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 43.
31. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 113-14.
32. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 43-4.
33. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 114.
34. Ibid., p. 115.
35. Ibid., pp. 115-16.
36. Ibid., p. 116; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 44.
37. Ibid., pp. 116-17; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 44.
38. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 117.
39. *Paccuppanna-rūpa*, see Ibid., p. 118.
40. *Paccuppannabhāva*, ibid., p. 117.
41. *Rūpa-bhāva*, ibid., p. 117.
42. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 44-5
43. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 117.
44. See ibid., pp. 118-20.
45. Ibid., p. 121.
46. Ibid., pp. 121-2; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 45.
47. Cf. *Katthāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 45-8.
48. Cf. ibid., pp. 48-9.
49. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 126-30; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 49.
50. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 133-4.
51. Cf. Jacobi, *Jain Sūtras*, 45, xxvii-xxviii; see also Dasgupta, op. cit., I, pp. 179-81.
52. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 134.
53. See ibid., p. 135; cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 79; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 278-9.
54. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 135-6; cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 299-300.
55. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 136-7; cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III, p. 49; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 179ff.
56. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 86-7.
57. See *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter V.
58. Cf. *Milindapañha*, pp. 55-6.
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61. Cf. ibid., Pt. II, p. 196.
62. Masuda, op. cit., p. 39; Walleser, op. cit., pp. 38-9.
63. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 4ff; cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, III, pp. 56-7.
64. See E.J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 164.
65. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, pp. 18ff.

66. See supra, p. 265f.
67. Rosenberg, *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie*, p. 249.
68. E J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 164ff.
69. Quoted A.C. Banerji, *Sarvāstivāda Literature*, p. 8; cf. Narendra Deo, *Abhidharmakośa*, Introduction, pp. 13-16; *Bauddha-Dharma-Darshana*, pp. 314ff.
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71. See *Abhidharmakośa*, V, pp. 50ff.
72. See *Abhidharmakośa*, V, pp. 51ff; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 43.
73. *Sabbe dhammā niyatā ti*, *Katthāvatthu*, pp. 523-4.
74. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 191.
75. Cf. *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, pp. 9-10.
76. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, pp. 49-50; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 248, 308.
77. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 53.
78. *Atītaṁ atthīti? H'ev'atthi h'eva n'atthti. S'ev'atthi s'eva n'atthīti? Na h'evaṁ vattabbe-pe-s'ev'atthi s'eva n'atthīti? Kathāvatthu*, p. 150.
79. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 110n; see also H. Jacobi, *Jain Sūtras*, XLV, pp. xxvin.
80. *Atītaṁ Khandhā ti? Kathāvatthu*, I, 7.
81. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 50.
82. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 138-9.
83. Ibid., p. 139.
84. Ibid., p. 140.
85. Ibid., p. 143; cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III, p. 71.
86. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 143; cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 278-9.
87. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 50.
88. *Atītaṁ ekaccaṁ atthi ekaccaṁ natthīti*; *Anāgataṁ ekaccaṁ atthi, ekaccaṁ natthīti. Kathāvatthu*, I, 8.
89. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 50.
90. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 143.
91. Ibid., pp. 143-4.
92. Ibid., pp. 144-5.
93. '. . . *Atītā avipakkavipākā dhammā te atthīti? Nanu atītā avipakkavipākā dhammā vipaccissantīti? Kathāvatthu*, p. 145.
94. Ibid., p. 145; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 50-1.
95. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 145-7.
96. Masuda, op. cit., p. 64.
97. See supra, p. 17.
98. *Atītena samannāgato ti; anāgatena samannāgato ti*; *Kathāvatthu*, IX. 12.
99. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 120-1.
100. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 365-366.
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102. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 120-1.
103. See also Stcherbatsky, *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, p. 943.
104. See *Abhidharmakośa*, I, p. 1.
105. *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra*, quoted, Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., p. 60; cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, III, pp. 56-7; also Chapter IX.
106. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 122-6.
107. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 126ff.
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112. See supra.
113. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 112ff.
114. See *Mahāvagga*, p. 39.
115. See *Abhidharmakośa*, V, pp. 55ff; *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, p. 476f; see also Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, Appendix I, pp. 69-80.
116. See also *Sammatīya Nikāya Śāstra*, *Viśvabhāratī Annals*, Vol. V, p. 187; see also Masuda, op. cit., pp. 54-5.
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118. *Sabbe saṁkhārā anodhikatvā kukkulāti*, *Kathāvatthu*, II, 8.
119. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 57-8.
120. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 191-4.
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122. See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 400-7; cf. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *What was the Original Gospel*, pp. 52-8; and Appendix, *Sakya*, pp. 16-17; *JRAS*, 1935, p. 723.
123. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 165-6.
124. *Indriyabadhañ ñeva dukkhaṁ ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 4.
125. See *Debates Commentary*, p. 204; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 165-6.
126. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 472-3.
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128. *Thapetvā ariyamaggaṁ avasesā saṁkhārā dukkhā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 5.
129. See infra, Chapter X.
130. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 198.
131. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, pp. 135-6.
132. *Rūpaṁ aparinipphannan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XXIII. 5.
133. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 538-9; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 198-9.
134. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 30; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 217-18; II, p. 332; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 136; II, p. 30, etc., for various

interpretations of *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, cf. *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 362-5; *Abhidharmakośa*, II, pp. 78-80; Jacobi, *ZDMG*, 52, p. 1ff; Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 106f; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, p. 42f; C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Sākya*, pp. 138-62; Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, p. 80; Oldenberg, *Buddha*, pp. 286, 289; Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 28-29; G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 407ff. K.N. Jayatilleke, op cit., pp. 445, 447. David J. Kalupahan, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.

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139. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 440-2; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 152.
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142. See ib.d., pp. 242-3; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 152.
143. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 195.
144. *Kathāvatthu*, XXII. 7.
145. Cf. Herakleitos on Universal Flux.
146. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, p. 190; II, pp. 26-7, 45, 50; III, p. 169, 211; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 71-2; III, p. 127; *Mahāvagga*, p. 3, etc.
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148. *Pathavīdhātu sanidassanā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VI.8; see *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 93.
149. *Rūpino dhammā rūpadhātu ti*, *Kathāvatthu* VIII.5; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 109.
150. *Saḷāyataniko attabhāvo rūpadhātuyāti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VIII. 7; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 110.
151. *Atthi rūpaṁ arūpesūti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VIII.8; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 111.
152. *Atthi rūpaṁ rūpāvacāran ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVI.9; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 161; *Debates Commentary*, p. 200.
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155. *Rūpaṁ sārammaṇan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, IX. 3.
156. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 117.
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10

The Problem of the Unconditioned

THE NATURE OF NIBBĀNA

There are two concise but highly significant controversies on Nibbāna[1] (Nirvāṇa) in the *Kathāvatthu.* As a matter of fact, from the earliest times there has been a remarkable difference of opinion over the nature of Nibbāna as taught by the Buddha. It seems to us that such controversies have primarily arisen from two basic paradoxes—1(a) on the one hand, the denial of a permanent self seems to imply that Nibbāna should be the extinction of personal life; (b) on the other, if Nibbāna is simply an extinction, this would, like *Ucchedavāda*, tend to discourage spiritual life. Who would make such a Nibbāna the goal of spiritual effort? 2, Similarly, if impermanence is a *necessary* mark of the real, if the efficient or causally efficacious and hence the changing and transitory phenomena alone are real, what would be the status of Nibbāna which is held to be unchanging and eternal? Diverse pronouncements were made about Nibbāna in the early or *Nikāya* texts. And yet it was labelled as indescribable and ineffable, indeterminate and inexpressible,[2] which makes the notion more mystical and more elusive, almost as if all conceptions of Nibbāna were misconceptions. However, it was never meant to debar the

elders and monks of the Buddhist community from reflecting and interpreting the notion of Nibbāna.[3]

THESES AND ARGUMENTS

NIBBĀNA OR AMBROSIAL (AMATA)[4] AS CONDUCIVE TO FETTER (SAÑÑOJANA)

The first dispute over Nibbāna rests on the problem as to whether or not the Ambrosial, as an object of thought, is a fetter?[5] According to Buddhaghosa, the thesis belongs to the Pubbaseliyas who make this assertion due to a careless inference from such passages as 'he fancies things about Nibbāna'.[6]

The Theravādins initiate a discussion that by assuming the preceding, the proponents must also admit that the Ambrosial is the object of consciousness accompanied by 'Fetters', 'Ties', 'Floods', etc.[7] On the contrary, this is supposed to be an object accompanied by the very opposite. Further, if the thesis were to be maintained it would mean that the Ambrosial (*amata*) itself conduces to occasions for all these things? According to Buddhaghosa, the proponents deny all of them for fear of contradicting the *suttas*.[9]

At this stage the proponents quote a *sutta*-passage wherein the Buddha is reported to have said—'he perceives Nibbāna as such, and having perceived it, he imagines things about Nibbāna . .'[10] Buddhaghosa, however, points out that the term Nibbāna in the present *sutta*-passage stands only for temporal well-being and hence the argument carries no weight.[11]

NIBBĀNA AS MORALLY GOOD

The next controversy discusses as to whether or not the 'element or sphere) of Nibbāna' (*Nibbānadhātu*) is good.[12] According (o Buddhaghosa, a mental state is said to be good either because, as something faultless, it ensures a desirable result (*vipāka*), or because it is free from corruptions in being faultless. This is universally true except in the case of immoral states. The Andhakas however do not discriminate between good, bad and indifferent states, and call Nibbāna 'good' just because it is a faultless state[13]

The Theravādins argue that by proposing this one ought to imply that Nibbāna is a mental process capable of adverting, reflecting, co-ordinating, attending, etc., which would be something against the very nature of Nibbāna. One could easily predicate these things about all morally good mental states, e.g., *alobha, adosa, amoha, saddhā, viriya, samādhi, paññā*. But one cannot equally predicate about Nibbāna, and hence *Nibbānadhātu* cannot be said to be morally good.[14]

Finally, the Andhakas lay down that the *Nibbānadhātu* is said to be faultless to which even the Theravādins assent. The Nibbāna not being immoral must be said to be moral.[15]

THE CONCEPT OF TWO NIRODHAS (CESSATIONS)

The present controversy centres round the assertion that there are two cessations (*nirodhas*) of sorrow.[16] It is attributed by Buddhaghosa to the Mahīśāsakas and the Andhakas.[17]

The Theravāda argument is that if this duality is accepted with respect to the third noble truth, i.e., the 'cessation of ill' the same must be maintained about the other three, viz., 'nature of ill', 'its cause' and the 'path leading to the cessation of ill' Further, one must admit that there are two shelters, two refuges, two nibbānas, etc.[18] According to the proponents, cessation is two-fold simply because it is possible (1) on the basis of deep reflection and (2) as also without. The Theravādins, however, point out that this does not involve two cessations.

It seems that the *Kathāvatthu* as well as its commentator have not been able to give any clear exposition of the concepts of *Apaṭisaṁkhānirodha* and *Paṭisaṁkhānirodha*. The *Kathāvatthu* merely argues that such a distinction would lead to two Nirvāṇas and that, in any case, whatever be the means to *nirodha, nirodha* itself must be one. Buddhaghosa points out in his commentary: *Tattha yesaṁ appaṭisaṁkhā nirodhañ ca paṭisaṁkhā nirodhañ ca dve pi ekato katvā nirodhasaccan 'ti laddhi. Seyyathāpi etarahi Mahiṁsāsakānañ c' eva Andhakānañ ca....Appaṭisaṁkhā niruddhe 'ti ye paṭisaṁkhāya lokuttarena ñānena aniruddhā suddhapakatikattā vā uddesaparipucchādīnaṁ*

vā vasena samudācaraṇato niruddhā' ti vuccanti.[19] In this last statement the reference to *'suddhapakatikattā'* and *'uddesa-paripuccahādīnaṁ vā vasena'* shows clearly that Buddha-ghosa has not fully understood the meaning of *'Apaṭisaṁkhā-nirodha'*.[20] It is also a clear instance of an apparently faulty attribution. The doctrine of three *nirodhas*, viz., *Pratiṣamkhyā-nirodha*, *Apratisaṁkhyāniroddha* and *Anityatānirodha* is a well-known Vaibhāṣika doctrine.[21] The first is attained by wisdom and comprehension of the four noble truths. It is difined as a *dharma* which brings about the possession of disjunction (*visaṁyoga*) from all impure *dharmas*, this disjunction itself being eternal and not produced by causes.[22] *Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha* renders abslutety impossible, in him who possesses it, the birth of this or that *dharma* and it prevents the rising of future *dharmas*, not through wisdom, but because the condition thereof have been rendered insufficient.[23] While the first two are said to be *asaṁskṛta*, the third one is said to be *saṁskṛta*. By this *nirodha*, one attains to a state wherein the activity of the *saṅkhāras* comes to an end.[24] Thus, the present thesis, belong-ing to the Andhakas, appears as a reminiscent of the Vaibhā-ṣika doctrine of *Praṭisaṁkhyānirodha* and *Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha.*

THE VOID (SUÑÑATĀ)

One of the controversies in the *Kathāvatthu* seeks to discuss the problem as to whether or not 'the void is included in the aggregate of mental co-efficients (*saṅkhārakhandha*)'.[25] Accord-ing to Buddhaghosa, some, like the Andhakas, indiscriminately uphold this tenet.[26] The Andhakas, however, point out that their thesis is based on the statement of the Buddha that *saṅkhāra* is devoid of 'soul or what belongs to soul'.[27] The Theravādins contradict the thesis in the usual manner that if this assertion be correct, then *animitta* and *apaṇihita* should also be said to be included in the *saṅkhārakhandha*.[28] Buddha-ghosa has offered the explanation on the issue that *suññatā* stands for two things—(1) absence of soul, which is the very nature of aggregates (*nāmarūpa*) and (2) Nibbāna itself. As regards (1) some marks of no-soul (*anatta*) may be included under the fourth aggregate (*saṅkhārakhandha*) but Nibbāna

is not included in it. The Andhakas, according to him, fail to make this distinction.[29]

Buddhaghosa seems to have misunderstood the point of the Andhakas. As the thesis is debated in the *Kathāvatthu* it seems to mean that there is no *suññatā* outside *saṅkhārakhandha*. The Theravādins distinguish two senses of *suññatā*—(1) *anatta* applying to the conditioned things and (2) an absolute sense of *suññatā* unique to Nibbāna. It is well-known that in the Mahāyāna, there is only one *suññatā* (*śūnyatā*) wherein both the senses are fused. The *Prajñā sūtras*, thus, say *rūpaṁ śūnyatā*, *śūnyatā rūpaṁ*, etc.[30] Although it is tempting to connect the Andhaka attempt to replace the two-fold by a single *suññatā* with this later development, nevertheless, their placing *suññatā* within *saṅkhārakhandha* shows that this view is still very far from the Mahāyānic concept of '*śūnyatā*.

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

Attention has been drawn to some Nāgārjunīkoṇḍa inscriptions where there are incidental references to Buddha and Nirvāṇa and the conceptions thereof have been attributed to the Pūrvaśailas or Caityakas.[31] Buddha is described here[32] as *jita-rāga-dosa-moha*, i.e., one who has conquered attachment, ill-will and delusion and *dhātuvaraparigahita*, i.e., possessed of excellent *dhātu*. In return, the donor expects transferable merits which may be passed off to the relatives and friends also. He expects (1) religious merits for himself, his relatives and friends bringing happiness in this as well as the other world,[33] and (2) *nivāṇa-sampati* (attainment of Nibbāna) for himself. In the opinion of N. Dutt, the idea that the gifts may bring happiness to all, but Nrivāṇa only to oneself deserves careful consideration. The compassionate attitude in seeking the good of the relatives and friends comes as an article of faith generally unrecognized in the Pāli works where *attadīpā* and *attasaraṇā* is the maxim. And secondly the distinction drawn in the two fruits expected is rather uncommon and has not been made even in the inscription recording the gifts of the Queen of Vanavāsi to the Mahīśāsakas[34] or in the long inscription of the Sinhalese donor.[35] Further, the expressions *dhātuvara-parigahita* or *nivāṇa-sampati*

—*sampādaka* raise the presumption that the Andhaka conception of Nirvāṇa was different from that of the Theravādins or their sub-sect, the Mahīśasakas.

It is evidently clear from the two controversies on Nibbāna, discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*, that the Pubbaseliya and Andhaka conception was different from that of the Theravādins. But that the difference lies where it has been suggested by N. Dutt, lseems to be open to doubt. According to him, "the Pubbaseiyas or the Andhakas conceived of Nibbāna, as a 'positive faultless state'—a conception which can hardly be accepted by the Theravādins, who speak of realizing Nibbāna within one's self (*paccatam veditabbo viññūhi*) and not of grasping the same as some object producing pure happiness".[36] We agree with him in so far as the preceding points are contained in the views expressed by the rival sects in connection with the Nirvāṇa controversies but his surmise that the conception of Nirvāṇa as a positive faultless state was unacceptable to the Theravādins may not be sustained as such. In fact, we have reason to believe that the Theravādins neither discredited a positive notion of Nibbāna nor were they opposed to the idea of its being faultless. What they were trying to contest in the two controversies was something more implied by the Pubbaseliyas and the Andhakas through their respective propositions.

It seems to us that throughout its long history, the Theravādins cherished a positive notion of Nibbāna. The unconditioned Nibbāna may be explained as the opposite of the conditioned reality characterized by three marks.[37] Thus it is (1) deathless, (2) at peace and (3) secure.[38] Contrary to the worldly nature, Nibbāna is emancipation (*mokṣa*), liberation (*vimukti*), stopping of becoming (*nirodha*),[39] supramundane, the only (*kevalaṁ*) the end of the world,[40] unconditioned, not made (*a-kataṁ*), invisible (*anidassanaṁ*), hard to see, astonishing (*āścaryaṁ*), wonderful (*adbhutaṁ*), subtle, ineffable,[41] immeasurable or incomparable. It is Real Truth, true being, true reality in the ultimate sense.[42] It is the supreme goal, supreme good, final release. For one who has attained it, steadfast is his thought, gained is deliverance.[43] There are many more epithets, in the *Nikāyas* alone, to describe Nibbāna. Confronted with this wealth of epithets an absolute distinction between the positive and negative can hardly be drawn. Still in a statement like

this—'there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, uncompounded; for if there were not this unborn, unbecome, unmade, uncompounded, there would be apparently no escape from this here that is born, become, made and compounded'.[44] One might say the features here are negative, the 'is' is positive. In fact, conceptual determination is negation. Thus, although Nibbāṇa is a conceptually negative state in the sense that no attribute can be predicated of it, nevertheless, inasmuch as it constitutes the very basis of the possibility of emancipation from phenomenal existence it may be described as spiritually positive in the sense of being the definite goal of religious life

The Theravādins seem to be obsessed with this difficulty for quite some time as may be seen even in some of the subsequent works. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* describes the *asaṅkhatadhātu*, i.e., Nibbāna as ethically '*abyākata*', 'void of the working of conception of thought discursive', infinite (*appamāna*), nor a cause nor associated with one, invisible and non-impinging, without material form, supramundane, not of intellect, not derived, not joyous, unaccompanied by joy, ease or disinterestness, and something having no beyond.[45] It is contrasted with all form (*sabbaṁ rūpaṁ*)[46] and distinguished from Arahant by 'neither pertaining nor not pertaining to studentship'.[47] The description of Nibbāna in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* seems to be still in line with the *Nikāya* texts though it certainly reflects the concern of the authors to arrive at precision and unambiguity. Gradually, these notions on different subjects got more and more crystallized. Thus, in the *Kathāvatthu*, the Theravādins rigorously insist on the oneness of Nibbāna which came to be conceived as '*niccaṁ dhuvaṁ sassataṁ avipariṇāmadhammaṁ*',[48] *anārammaṇa*,[49] *cittavippayutta*.[50]

The Milindapañho makes the matter clear.[51] It is stated there that Nirvāṇa is not the result of a cause (*a-hetu-jam*). There is no cause for the production of Nirvāṇa, but there is a Path which leads to its realization. It is considered to be something positive,[52] non-temporally eternal[53] and supremely beatific.[54] It can be experienced[55] though not described.[56] Buddhaghosa rejects the idea that Nibbāna is a mere absence or annihilation of the passion, etc.[57] Similarly, Anuruddhacariya describes Nibbāna as eternal, transcendental, supreme, realizable and unique. It is the *ārammaṇa* of the

maggaphalas.[58] Apparently, throughout its long history, the Theravāda school considered Nibbāna to be positive, experienceable, indescribable and supreme, i.e., the most worthwhile.

So far as the question of the faultlessness or Nibbāna is concerned it is absolutely clear from the discussion in the *Kathāvatthu* itself that the Theravādins could not but describe it as faultless in the most unequivocal terms. That it is faultless, according to the Theravādins, may be clearly seen in the standpoint put forth in the first controversy where they argue that 'Ambrosial' (*amatapada*) is an object accompanied by the very opposite of things of the sort of fetters. As a matter of fact, the attainment of Nibbāna is preceded by a destruction of the very fetters[59] which is the essential idea underlying the notion of Nibbāna in its early references.[60] How can Nibbāna, the supreme goal, be accompanied by fetters which is really the negation of the latter. On the contrary, it is the proponents who should, by there proposition - that *amatapada* is an object of thought of a person not yet free from bondage,— imply that *amatapada* conduces to occasion for fetters to arise.[61] The Theravādins seek to refute the idea of fancying things about Nibbāna, which is the basis of the proponents' belief as incorporated in their argument. This is, however, a non-Buddhist approach to Nibbāna,[62] an approach of the unskilled in the *Dhamma* who takes delight in fancying things about Nibbāna. The Theravādins have a ready-at-hand argument to offer.[63]

In course of the second controversy, the Theravādins do not subscribe to the idea of grasping Nibbāna as some object producing pure happiness. It may be noted, however, that even here the Theravādins affirm the faultlessness of Nibbāna. It is faultless for them in the sense that it is free from the corruptions. It is not faultless, however, in the sense in which the Andhakas take it as a mental process of adverting, willing, desiring, aiming, etc., that is to say, it ensures a desired *vipāka*.

It is tempting to deduce that a large number of the *Kathāvatthu* controversies are actually grounded in the *suttas* of the Pāli Canon. In the first controversy, for example, the Pubbaseliyas quote from the *Majjhima Nikāya*. However,

as the *sutta*-passage, quoted by them, refers to a non-Buddhist view of Nibbāna, their argument is rendered ineffective.[64] In the second controversy, the Theravādins take the stand that the idea of grasping Nibbāna as some object involving a mental process of adverting, reflecting, etc., cannot be sustained. In fact Nibbāna is peace, the stilling of all mind-activity.[65] One may observe, however,that even the The ravādins do not eschew the idea of blissfulness or pure happiness as characterizing the nature of Nibbāna. Curiously enough, instead of a denial, they have maintained this idea in unambiguous terms. Nibbāna is peace, cool and bliss; one who sees it in sorrow cannot attain liberation.[66] Similarly, it is said: health is the highest gain, Nibbāna the highest bliss.[67] Buddha is an experiencer of highest bliss.[68] In the *Milindapañha*, it is described as *paramaṁ sukhaṁ, ekanta sukhaṁ*.[69] Nevertheless, as we have it in the *Kathāvatthu*, the Theravādins seek to controvert the Andhaka thesis that Nibbāna is morally good (*kusala*).[70] The Theravāda stand-point is, perhaps, properly represented when they say that Nibbāna is ethically (*avyākṛta*), i.e., indeterminate,[71] or that Nibbāna is neither black nor white,[72] i.e., it involves the transcendence of merit and demerit. One the other hand, the Andhakas too do not lack Canonical support, e.g., Nibbāna is the destruction of attachment, aversion and confusion, i.e., a state of mind devoid of *akusala* roots.[73] On may quite logically assume that whatever is devoid of *akusala* must be said to be *kusala*. It is interesting to note that the Sarvāstivādins have to make a specific mention of this fact that Nirvāṇa is *kusala*.[74]

It seems that difference of opinion on the conception of Nibbāna did not cease with the occasional debates among the Andhakas and the Theravādins. The issue was yet hotly discussed among the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. One of the issues debated centred over the fact whether the unconditioned Nibbāna has a course and an effect or none. However, the central controversy continued to be over the relation of Nirvāṇa to the categories of 'existence' and 'non-existence'. The difference of opinion between the Sarvāstivādins, the Theravādins and the Mahīśāsakas, on the one side, and the Sautrāntikas, on the other, led to prolonged controversy as to whether Nirvāṇa is existent (*dravya*) or non-existent (*abhāva*).[75]

The Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahīśāsakas hold fast to the former idea while the Sautrāntikas subscribed to the latter. According to the Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika conception, Nirvāṇa is real and eternal. It is the *dharmasvabhāva* which remains on the cessation of *dharmalakṣaṇa*. It is impersonal and inexplicable.[76] We have noted the similar idea of Nibbāna as contained in the *Milindapañha*, according to which, Nirvāṇa is, it is discerned by a pure and exalted mind; the holy disciple who has progressed rightly actually sees Nirvāṇa.[77] The Sautrāntika view is diametrically opposed to this and asserts that Nirvāṇa is not a real and distinct entity but the mere absence of one.[78] It is the mere non-existence of the five *skandhas*, and, thus, one cannot attribute a separate existence to this non-existence.[79] May one not suggest at this juncture that the Sautrāntikas' negative conception of Nirvāṇa was, perhaps, derived from such utterances in the *suttas* where its references would appear to reflect a character of just nothing—whatever (*akiñcanaṁ*).[80] Perhaps an additional incentive and the more recent one for the opposite pronouncements was provided by the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins themselves through their Abhidharmist endeavour to define the miraculous in strictly rational terms which was giving rise to a deadlock and landing thought into insuperable difficulties. The Sautrāntikas admittedly represent a reaction to the commentorial tradition which under the Vaibhāṣikas appeared to be acquiring a 'Sāṅkhyan', 'eternalist' flavour. The Sautrāntikas, on the contrary, adopted a very critical philosophical attitude and, applying *Occam's Razor* ruthlessly, reduced many of the accepted *dharmas* to mere names and abstractions (*prajñapti*).

It appears, thus, that for a greater part the controversies on Nirvāṇa, such as about its nature, whether it is positive or negative, may be taken to emerge from the profound suggestiveness of the early texts. We have tried to show that some of these views, which came to be upheld by the different schools of early Buddhism, may be said to be clearly grounded in the *Nikāya* texts. Also, there cannot be a denying of the fact that these originals were subjected for long to a universal tendency of interpretation and reflection. It was only natural that in this process of interpretation, the interpreter, while

determining the unexpressed meanings and implications of the texts, should have added a bit of his own philosophy on the subject in question.

OTHER THINGS AS UNCONDITIONED (ASAṀKHATA)

In the *suttas* of the Buddhist Canon, the Absolute, in its impersonal form, occurs as the 'unconditioned' or Nirvāṇa. There the transcendence of Nirvāṇa is spoken in deeply felt poetical terms and language.[81] The bulk of the *Abhidharma* literature is, on the other hand, concerned mainly with an analysis of the conditioned.[82] It is only with the Mahāyāna that interest definitely shifts to the unconditioned which becomes the almost exclusive topic of discussion. However, in the course of this development from the original Buddhism to Hīnayāna and then to Mahāyāna, there was the growth of a distinct tendency of divergent interpretations and theoris on Nirvāṇa as on other important subjects of the Buddhist doctrine. Apart from the controversies on the one accepted unconditioned, there was a growth of the notion of several unconditioneds. These new unconditioned items were propounded by sects generally of the Mahāsaṁghika group. But the Theravādins, the orthodox defendants of Buddhism, are not able to reconcile themselves with the new hypotheses and hence we have a series of polemics on the so-called unconditioneds. Except for the last two sections, the entire sixth book of the *Kathāvatthu* is devoted to them. Besides, some others are treated in the nineteenth book. We have thus discussions on Assurance (*niyāma*), causal genesis (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), Four Truths, Four Immaterial spheres (*arūppas*), Attaining to Cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), etc , which are all advocated by one or the other sect to be unconditioned and challenged by the Theravādins.

ASSURANCE OF SALVATION (NIYĀMA)

We have a controversy as to whether Assurance is unconditioned or not [83] According to Buddhaghosa, the Andhakas hold that Assurance is unconditioned in the sense of being eternal (*nicca*).[84] The Theravādins argue that if the present thesis were true, then *niyāma* should be of the same nature as Nibbāna,

the shelter (*tāṇaṁ*), the cave (*leṇaṁ*), the refuge (*saraṇaṁ*), the goal (*parāyanaṁ*), etc.[85] Also, there must be two kinds of unconditioned. A denial of this would contradict the proposed thesis and, if the proponents choose to assent, then they would be admitting two Nibbānas. The proponents do not, however, concede the points raised by the Theravādins. Further, the Theravādins point out that there may be some people who may claim to enter into and attain Assurance (*niyāma*), cause it to arise and so on, but this is not applicable to that which is unconditioned. Further, if the Path is conditioned how can Assurance be unconditioned? If all the four stages of Assurance be unconditioned, as also Nibbāna be, there would be five kinds of unconditioned things. Lastly, the Theravādins enquire whether the false Assurance[86] is also unconditioned? The Andhakas refuse to admit the objections raised by the Theravādins.[87]

Now it is the turn of the Andhakas to put their argument. According to them, once the state of Assurance is attained by anyone, it does not cease and the person concerned is sure to achieve his salvation. The Assurance, therefore, must be unconditioned, i.e., it cannot begin and cease.[88] The Theravādins, however, argue that the same logic of the proponents can be applied to false Assurance also.[89]

Thus, the central argument put forward by the Theravādins consists in the question whether Assurance as an *asaṁskṛta* is of the same nature as Nibbāna or not? The proponents do not accept this identity but they stick to their thesis that, Assurance being eternal, it is unconditioned.

CAUSAL GENESIS (PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA)

The next controversy is as to whether or not the 'elements in the law of causal genesis' are unconditioned.[90] According to Buddhaghosa, some of the Pubbaseliyas and the Mahīśāsakas upheld the view that the 'elements of the law of causal genesis' are unconditioned.[91]

The Theravādins start the debate with a similar argument as in the preceding controversy. Further, they point out that if the proposed thesis is granted it should also imply that any single term in each clause of the formula of causal genesis refers to something unconditioned, for instance, 'ignorance', or

'*karman*', in the clause 'because of ignorance, *karman*', etc.[92]

The Pubbaseliyas and the Mahīśāsakas cite a *sutta*-passage wherein the Buddha is supposed to have said that the law of 'causal genesis' is immutable irrespective of everything else, e.g., whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise in this world.[93] Thus they affirm that the causal element in that law is unconditioned.

The Theravādins argue further that if each factor in the law of causal genesis were to be taken as unconditioned, there would be in all twelve unconditioned things. Since the proponents cannot maintain this, their thesis is declared to be untenable.[94]

It may be noted that Vasumitra[95] and Vinītadeva[96] have also attributed to the Mahīśāsakas the thesis in question.

The problem that is posed in the debate lies in the riddle: Does the law refer to an ideality over and above the reals? The basic argument of the Theravādins is just the same. For them, *Pratītyasamutpada* is identical with *saṁskṛtadharmas* since the elements therein are real rather than ideal. As against this, the Pubbaseliyas and Mahīśāsakas declared it to be *asaṁskṛta* by which they do not mean the links separately but the unchangeable law (1) of the origin of a thing through a cause, and (2) of the unchangeable nature of *dhammas*, undisturbed by appearance (*uppāda*) or non-appearance (*anuppāda*) or continuity (*ṭhiti*).[97] One might be tempted to observe that in case the advocates of this thesis imply the unchangeability in the order of a certain effect coming out of a certain cause such as *saṁskāra* emerging from ignorance and so on, then it is well to describe the law as permanent and unchangeable. But if they mean to suggest through their contention that there is a permanent, *asaṁskṛta* dharma in the form of *Pratītyasamutpāda*, then it would hardly carry any conviction. Production, i.e., *utpāda* is a perennial feature of the conditioned *dharmas*. How can a thing be both *pratītya-samutpanna* and *nitya*, i.e., permanent?

It may be noted, however, that an early tendency is reflected in Buddhist thought to the dialectical annulment of the distinction between the phenomenal and the transcendent.[98] An interesting reference occurs in the *Saṁyutta Nikāya*[99] as also in the *Saṁyukta Āgama*[100] to show that *Pratītyasamutpāda* was

at times described as independent, self-subsistent and eternal reality (*dhammadhātu*, *dharmṇāṁ-dharmatā*). In some ancient texts, the principle is said to be 'deep, difficult to see, difficult to awake, beyond the realm of thought'.[101] *Lalitavistara* seems to put it at par with Nirvāṇa.[102] Mahāyāna would interpret it as though the two have not been differentiated here. We know it, for example, that the Mādhyamikas finally made *Pratītyasamutpāda* not only the 'principle of phenomenal unreality but also of transcendent reality'.[103]

Paṭiccasamuppāda has been described in the Canon as the ultimate law determining phenomena. It has been stated to be, in a famous passage, an impersonal norm independent of the rising and passing away of the Tathāgatas[104] and it has been described as *dhammaṭṭhitatā* and *dhammaniyāmatā*.[105] These two expressions seem to be equivalent to the nature of the *dhammas* and the order or the law of the *dhammas* respectively. In another passage, *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is placed by the side of Nibbāna as *dhamma*.[106] Thus, it seems to have been believed that *Paṭiccasamuppāda* itself was something constant and changeless.

We have a thesis in the *Kathāvatthu*, attributed to the Andhakas,[107] which describes *dhammaṭṭhitatā* as *parinipphanna*[108] which has been explained in the Pāli tradition as predetermined and, thus, an obvious charge of a vicious *regressus ad infinitum* has been levelled against the thesis.[109] It seems to us, however, that the expression *parinipphanna* may have been used in a different sense, i.e., in the sense of principle which is itself unproduced and independent. We may recall that in Mahāyāna, *parinispanna lakṣaṇa* is contrasted with *paratantra lakṣaṇa*. In this sense *parinispanna* would be contrasted with *parinispātya*, something existing by itself or pre-existing, contrasted with the things which are produced and ordered under its aegis. Such a view will naturally cohere with the thesis that *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is *asaṁkhat*. This way of understanding this thesis and connecting them with some of the Nikāyic passages, alluded to previously, will also tend to connect them with the later Mahāyānic conception of *dharmadhātu* and *dharmakāya*. It is well-known how Nāgārjuna explicitly identifies *Pratītyasamutpāda* with *śūnyatā*[110] which tends to become the absolute. Unfortunately, in Hīnayāna, whether of the Theravāda variety,

which Buddhaghosa and the translators of the *Kathāvatthu* have in mind, or Sarvāstivāda, which Stcherbatsky always has in mind,[111] *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is identified with the particular elements arising and perishing and is no more than an abstraction of their contingency. Those who asserted *Paṭiccasamuppāda* to be *asaṅkhata* or *parinipphanna* could not possibly have had such a view in mind. They were not without justification in the Canon.

We have another Andhaka[112] thesis that impermanence is *parinipphanna.*[113] It is obvious here that the meaning which the Theravādins attach to *parinipphanna* would not enable us to understand this thesis. Nowhere does the Buddha ever speak of impermanence as due to any causes. The impermanence of things is natural. The later Brahmanical works consider this a cardinal principle of the Buddhists that they hold the destruction of things to be spontaneous and causeless. We might thus render the thesis, impermanence is absolute, that is to say, it is not itself a derivative from any other principle.

THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS

We have another controversy in the *Kathāvatthu* which discusses the problem as to whether or not the Four Noble Truths are unconditioned.[114] According to Buddhaghosa, Pubbaseliyas upheld these truths as unconditioned.[115]

The Theravāda argument is that by holding the Four Truths to be unconditioned the proponents ought to admit four Nibbānas. And if it is so, they must also point out the difference and dividing line that may be drawn between them.[116]

However, as the proponents affirm that each Truth is unconditioned, the Theravādins take for illustration the First Truth, i.e., about the fact and nature (*lakkhaṇa sacca*) of Ill (suffering), and enquire whether Ill itself is unconditioned. The proponents have to deny this because Ill of various kinds are apparently conditioned. Similarly, about the Second Truth, i.e., on the cause of Ill, the Theravadins enquire whether the cause is unconditioned and so on. All these the proponents have to deny. According to the Theravādins, the proponents, thus, admit that Ill, its cause, the Path are conditioned, and all the factors of those facts are conditioned but they deny that the

abstract statement of each fact as a 'Truth' is conditioned. This is untenable according to the Theravādins.[117]

In their turn, the Pubbaseliyas argue that if their proposition is wrong why did the Buddha lay down that four things, viz., Ill, the cause of Ill, the cessation of Ill and the course leading to the cessation of Ill are constant, immutable.[118] The Four Truths must therefore be held as unconditioned.[119]

In this controversy, again the Theravādins put the argument that it is only Nibbāna which is unconditioned. For the proponents, however, all the Four Truths are unconditioned in the sense that they are stable and constant as described by Buddha.[120] Lest they are landed in a logical difficulty, the Pubbaseliyas draw, however, a distinction between a 'fact' and a 'truth' considering that the former is conditioned, the latter unconditioned.[121]

THE FOUR IMMATERIAL SPHERES (ĀRUPPAS)

Next follows the controversy whether the sphere of infinite space is unconditioned or not.[122] According to Buddhaghosa, the four *āruppas* were held to be unconditioned because of a certain passage which refers to the four *āruppas*.[123] Vasumitra associates this thesis with the Mahāsaṁghikas in general.[124] Vinītadeva associates the Lokottaravādins with this view.[125]

The Theravādins seek to know whether it is thereby implied that the sphere of infinite space is identical with Nibbāna? If the proponents deny this identity they cannot classify the *āruppas* as unconditioned. In case they affirm it, then one would have two unconditioneds, and two Nibbānas, which is absurd. Further, the sphere of the *āruppas* is a kind of rebirth but something which is unconditioned cannot be so described. Moreover, it is owing to *karman* that rebirth takes place in that sphere; then it should be *karman* to bring about rebirth in the unconditioned. This is something which even the proponents would deny.

At last, the proponents finally lay down that the Buddha did declare 'the four immaterial spheres to be imperturable'.[126] Surely then, one may call them unconditioned. Buddhaghosa, however, comments that since the *sutta*-passage in question has been put without discerning its real significance, it is not possible

to concede the proponents' point.[127]

The Theravādins seek to refute the proponents' assertion by pointing out the distinction between Nibbāna and the four immaterial spheres.[128] Since they are unlike Nibbāna which is the only unconditioned, the four immaterials cannot be unconditioned. According to the proponents, however, the four immaterials, having been described as imperturable by the Buddha, are also unconditioned.

THE ATTAINING TO CESSATION (NIRODHASAMĀPATTI)

Next follows the controversy as to whether or not the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) is unconditioned?[129] According to Buddhaghosa, the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) is here meant for the non-functioning (*appavatti*) of the four (mental) aggregates, i.e., the suspension of conscious activity in *jhāna*. As something done and attained, it is called accomplished (*nippannā*), but it cannot be spoken of as conditioned, or unconditioned, since the features of neither of the two states are present. However, some of the sects as the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas, hold that, because it is not conditioned, it is therefore, unconditioned.[130]

The Theravādins raise similar arguments as in some of the earlier debates. They ask whether the proposition implies that this state (i.e., attaining to cessation) is identical with Nibbāna. The proponents deny this. According to the Theravādins, then there must be two unconditioneds—two Nibbānas. Further, are there any who attain to cessation, and thus by their acquiring it cause it to rise? If so, can the proponents speak similarly about the unconditioned?[131] This is apparently not possible for anyone to affirm. Buddhaghosa points out that there are persons who produce the material and other qualities which are conditioned, but there are none who similarly attain to the unconditioned.[132] Moreover, is there apparent such a thing as purification through and emerging from[133] cessation? If so, is there the same from the unconditioned? The proponents cannot affirm this. The next argument is that in attaining cessation, first speech, then action, then consciousness ceases. And in emerging from cessation, first consciousness, then action, then speech occurs. Could one so speak of attaining the unconditioned or emerging

from the unconditioned.

The proponents, i.e., the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas argue that if their proposition as such is wrong, they would like to know if cessation is conditioned? Since the Theravādins cannot accept this it must be unconditioned.

SPACE (ĀKĀSA)

Space is the next item on which a controversy takes place—as to whether it is unconditioned or not.[134] According to the Commentary, *ākāsa* is of three modes: as spatial form which is confined or delimited, as 'abstracted from object' (or possibly as the meditative object so called) and as empty or inane. Of these, the first is conditioned; the other two are mere abstract ideas. But some, like the Uttarāpathakas and the Mahīśāsakas, hold that the two latter modes are also unconditioned.[135]

As in the preceding controversies, the Theravādins again put a set of four arguments to refute the present thesis. They observe that, if space is unconditioned, as the proponents affirm, then they must class it with Nibbāna or otherwise they must affirm two sorts of unconditioned and so two Nibbānas also. Further, they ask if anyone could make space where there has been none. That would mean that one could convert conditioned into unconditioned.[136] The proponents come forward with the same argument, viz., if it is wrong to say space is unconditioned, is it conditioned? Since the Theravādins deny this, they conclude that it must be taken as unconditioned.[137] It is interesting to note that this doctrine is recorded in the treatise of Vasumitra[138] and therein it is attributed to the Mahāsaṁghikas and the Mahīśāsakas.

It may be recalled that the significance of *ākāsa* as an ultimate principle has been asserted more than once in the Upaniṣads[139] and there is also reference to an ancient Buddhist *sūtra*[140] which speaks of it in the same manner. The Sarvāstivādins also maintained *ākāsa*, as an *asaṁskṛta*. The present thesis appears then to continue an ancient tradition.

THE FRUIT OF SPIRITUAL LIFE (SĀMAÑÑAPHALA)

The next controverted thesis is as to whether or not the fruit

of recluseship is unconditioned.[141] Buddhaghosa remarks that our doctrine has judged that the term 'fruits of spiritual life' means the resultant mental state from the practice of the Path (*ariyamaggassa vipākacittaṁ*), whether during the *maggavīthi* or during the *phalasamāpatti*. But there are some, like the Pubbaseliyas, who, taking it otherwise, mean by it just the putting away of corruptions (*kilesappahāṇaṁ*) or attaining the Fruits (*Phalappatti*).[142]

The Theravādins argue in a stereotype manner that the proponents must then identify 'fruit' with Nibbāna. Otherwise, there should be two 'unconditioneds'. The proponents deny both alternatives. It is unconditioned for them because it is uncaused and unproduced by the four conditions—*karman*, mind, food, or physical environment.[143] Thus, in fact, they would have in these four and Nibbāna, five 'unconditioneds'. Or if they identify the four with Nibbāna, they then get five sorts of Nibbānas.[144]

Contrary to this, however, the Pubbaseliyas regard as *asaṁskṛta* the *sāmaññaphalas* identifying them with the removal of afflictions (*kilesapahāṇaṁ*) and the attainment (*patti*) of the *phalas*. This has been interpreted by N. Dutt to mean that the attainment, rather than the *maggas* or *phalas*, is *asaṁskṛta*, for it is manifested by the removal of some mental properties (*kilesas*).[145] Vasumitra seems to corroborate this by using the term *mārgāṅgikatva*, i.e., *prāpti* of a *mārga*, and not simply *mārga*.[146] This would be significant, however, only if a special theory of *prāpti* were implied. If we take the thesis to be the same as held by the Vaibhāṣikas, it would have to be explained as N. Dutt has done.[147] The difficulty is one of attribution here. It may be noted that Poussin has taken the '*asaṁskṛta śrāmaṇyaphala*' as *pratisaṁkhyānirodha*.[148] It may be noted here that the Andhakas hold that there is no *vipāka* for the *ariyadhamma*.[149] Buddhaghosa explains that the Andhakas consider the *sāmaññaphala* to be simply *kilesapahāṇa* and not mental states—(*cittacetasikā dhamma*).[150] This thesis, like the earlier one making *sāmaññaphala asaṁkhata*, would also become intelligible if *sāmaññaphala* and *kilesapahāṇa* are taken to be technically equivalent to *paṭisaṁkhyānirodha* or Nibbāna which would be both *asaṁkhata* and have no *vipāka*.

ATTAINMENT (PATTI)

Next follows the controversy on Attainment i.e., *Patti* (*Prāpti*)—as to whether or not this is unconditioned.[151] According to Buddhaghosa, some, like the Pubbaseliyas again upheld the view that the winning of any acquisition is itself unconditioned.[152]

The Theravādins, however, argue that the proponents ought to imply thereby that the winning of raiment, alms-food, etc., is also unconditioned? But if so, the same difficulty arises as in the case of attainment in general. In fact, they would have in these four and Nibbāna, five 'unconditioneds'. A similar argument is used for the winning of any of the *Rūpa Jhānas*, or of *Arūpa Jhānas* or of the Four Paths and Four Fruits. And, thus, in fact, they would have in these eight and Nibbāna, nine 'unconditioneds'.

The Pubbaseliyas, however, lay down that if the present proposition is wrong, could the Theravādins identify *Patti* with any one of the five aggregates, bodily or mental? If not, then, it is unconditioned.

It is doubtful if the Theravādins' criticism of the thesis can be considered very reliable. By understanding *Prāpti* in a wholly non-technical sense, they have managed to reduce their opponents to a ridiculous position. Probably, *Prāpti* either stood for a spiritual attainment (*samāpatti*) or for some philosophical principle such as the *Prāpti* of the Sarvāstivādins.[153] It could hardly be 'any gain' (*paṭilābha*) as Buddhaghosa interprets it. But even he feels the need of a denial—*na hi patti nāma koci dhammo*[154]—which would be uncalled for and meaningless if no philosophical counter-assertion were in view.

THUSNESS (TATHATĀ)

Next follows a controversy on 'Thusness'. Here again, it is disputed as to whether or not the fundamental characteristics of all things (*sabba-dhammā*) are unconditioned?[155] According to Buddhaghosa, some like the Uttarāpathakas, held that there is an immutable something called thusness (suchness) in the very nature of all things, material or otherwise (taken as a whole). And because this thusness is not itself included in the (particular) conditioned matter, etc., therefore, it is

unconditioned.[156]

The Theravādins come forward with the same old arguments as in the previous controversies. They observe that assuming a materiality (*rūpatā*) of matter or body, is not materiality unconditioned? The proponents assent and hence the same old difficulties and arguments may be raised. This objection is equally applicable in the case of other aggregates, viz., feeling, perception, etc. At last, the Uttarāpathakas argue, is the 'thusness' of all things the five aggregates (taken together)? The Theravādins affirm this. Then that 'thusness' of all things is unconditioned. For the Theravādins, however, there is only one unconditioned and that is Nibbāna.[157]

It is remarkable, however, that *Kathāvatthu* records this interesting controversy on *Tathatā*. We are aware of the importance that came to be ascribed to 'thusness' or 'suchness' by certain of the Mahāyānists.[158] It has been pointed out that *Tathatā* does not occur again throughout the *Piṭakas* and the Commentary of Buddhaghosa does not attach any special interest or importance to the term and the argument in the text is exactly like that in other controversies on the so-called unconditioned.[159] This surmise however seems to be unsound. There is reference to *dhammatā*, *dhammaṭṭhitatā* in the *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, where it has been said whether Tathāgatas arise or not, the law of *dhammatā* is constant.[160] As a matter of fact, Buddhaghosa appears to identify *Tathatā* with the Sarvāstivāda conception of *dharmasvabhāva* which, perhaps, misses the mark alto gether. *Tathatā* should mean not the ultimate character of each element (*dharmāḥ*) but the ultimate character of their ordering principle, *Dhamma* with a capital D. One could point out that even in the *Upaniṣads*, *Dhamma* occurs in the sense of a fixed order[161] and in the *Nikāyas* there is a famous passage which speaks of the immutable *Dhammatā* and which is echoed in later Mahāyāna writings.[162]

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

Nirvāṇa is the one universally accepted unconditioned in Buddhism. It is established in opposition to all that is conditioned. The conditioned (*saṅkhata*) is, in the Buddhist tradition, what

has been prepared, brought about by something else, made, has come together by conditions Anything that springs into being through a cause, is necessarily conditioned. One of the characteristic marks of the conditioned is impermanence. As against this, the unconditioned[163] is (1) deathless, (2) at peace and (3) secure. The *asaṅkhatadhātu* is described in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* as ethically '*abyākata*', 'void of the working of conception of thought discursive', infinite (*appamāṇa*) etc.[164] It is something as opposed to all form (*sabbaṁ rūpaṁ*)[165] and distinguished from Arahant by 'neither pertaining nor not pertaining to studentship'.[166] Commentarial tradition identifies the *asaṁkhatadhātu* of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* with Nibbāna. Mrs. Rhys Davids, however, observes that this represents a later development.[167] In fact, the word 'Nibbāna' occurs but once in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and that too in its closing sentences where Nibbāna is called one of the two kinds of *Vimutti*.[168] It has been suggested, however, that the *asaṅkhata* and Nibbāna of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* are the same thing viewed in two ways.[169] In fact, the *Milindapañha* puts the essence of the matter quite clearly. It is stated there that Nibbāna is not the result of a cause (*a-hetu-jam*). There is no cause for the production of Nibbāna, but there is a Path which leads to its realization. Nibbāna itself is unproducible (*anuppādanīya*) because it is 'made by nothing at all'. One cannot say of it that it has been produced or not produced, or that it can be produced, or that it is past, future or present.[170] Vasubandhu also says that the unconditioned has no cause or fruit (effect) but it is both cause[171] and fruit.[172] It has no fruit because it is outside the three periods of time. No cause can produce it, and as inactive it can produce no effect. Thus, there is almost a complete unanimity in different traditions about the *asaṁkhata*-hood of Nibbāna. Vaibhāṣikas, however, distinguished three kinds of *Nirodhas*, i.e., *Pratisaṁkhyānirodha*, *Apratisaṁkhyānirodha* and *Anityatānirodha*.[173] The first two are *asaṁskṛta* while the third is *saṁskṛta*.

The first *Nirodha* is termed Nirvāna which is *asādhāraṇa* in the sense that all do not acquire it simultaneously and *asabhāga* in the sense that it has no *sabhāga-hetu*.[174]

Apart from Nibbāna, *akāsa* also is often given a closely resembling treatment so much so that certain sects reckon it among the unconditioned *dharmas*, while some others do not. It is interesting to note that even some Pāli texts[175] occasionally compare the attributes of Nibbāna and Space. Both are unobstructed, supportless and infinite, without origin, life or death, rise or fall. Curiously enough, the Theravādins, as is the position taken by them in the *Kathāvatthu*,[176] did not take Space as an unconditioned and so did the Vātsīputrīyas.[177] As against this, the Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṁghikas, Mahīśāsakas and Uttarāpathakas regarded it as unconditioned.[178]

In course of time, there developed a tendency to raise several items on the pedestal of the unconditioned. As recorded in the *Kathāvatthu* and occasionally attested by the traditions of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva, the number of these so-called unconditioneds is gradually multiplied from that state of the Buddhist Canon where Nibbāna is the only unconditioned recognised. The Andhakas increased the number to nine and included the four *aruppas* and *āryamārgāṅgikatva.* Similarly, the Mahīśāsakas upheld the theory of nine *asaṁkhatas* although their items slightly differ from that of the Andhakas. Some other sub-sects of the Mahāsaṁghika group such as the Pubbaseliyas and the Uttarāpathakas also recognised several unconditioneds. The Theravādins, on the other hand, who do not agree to the theories of these *asaṁkhatas*, seek to refute the alien views in the manner as detailed here. Their central argument is whether each of these *asaṁkhatas* is of the same nature as Nibbāna, if not, it must be a *saṁkhata* item. The point of view of the proponents is, however, different from that of the Theravādins. According to them, the *asaṁkhata* is that which is unchangeable (*añenja*). In regard to the causal law, they rely on Buddha's statement[179] and point out that by the *asaṁkhata* they do not mean the links separately but the unchangeable law of the origin of a thing through a cause. The crux of the entire problem lies in the fact whether the law implies an ideality over and above the reals. Whereas the proponents would have us believe that the law refers to ideality by the very nature of its consistency and unchangeability in a world of constant flux, the Theravādins would emphasize only the reality of the law and the

reals lying therein. They identify the Law and the elements ordered by it. In the ordered relationship of cause and effect, the Mahāsaṁghikas, however, see an ideal order. Similarly with regard to the relationship of concept and terms of the Four Truths and the facts thereof. That is to say, apart from the particular relationship of cause and effect, there is an ideal order of this type which signifies the general pattern of such an order. One might observe, however, that in case the proponents imply the unchangeability in the order of a certain effect coming out of a certain cause such as *saṁskāra* issuing from ignorance and so on, then it may well be said that the law is unalterable, unchangeable or permanent. But if they mean to suggest through their contention that there is a permanent *asaṁskṛta dharma* in the form of *Pratītyasamutpāda*, then it would hardly carry conviction. Production, i.e., *utpāda* is a perennial feature of the conditioned *dharmas*. How can a thing be both *pratītyasamutpanna* and *nitya*. Similarly, in the case of Assurance of salvation, etc., the two warring camps are stuck on two different points. According to the Theravāda point of view, that, which can be brought into being, cannot be said to be unconditioned. In fact, that, which can be made to arise, must also cease to be at a certain point of time. But the question is whether this argument is valid in the case of negative entities also such as cessation which is *abhāva rūpa*? Moreover, it may also be observed that in the case of Assurance or Path or Four Truths, etc:, they are not, as a matter of fact, brought into being but there is growth in them. Synoptically viewed and designated as a whole, they appear to be static structures or fixed orders, while in terms of contexts they refer to processes of spiritual growth. On the contrary, the Mahāsaṁghikas are stuck to the other end of the same fact. According to them, that which does not have the property to cease, cannot be anything but unconditioned.

As far as the *āryamārgāṅgikatva* is concerned, the Pubbaseliyas regard as *asaṁkhata* the fact of attainment (*patti*) of a *magga* or *phala* or the removal of certain mental impurities (*kilesapahāṇaṁ*) and not the *maggas* or *phalas* by themselves. It may be thus observed, on the basis of the discussion on the unconditioned, that it is mainly owing to interpretative difficulties that these controversies arise. A set of unconditioneds

came to be propounded because of a certain likeness among their attributes and that of Nibbāna the one undisputed unconditioned of Buddhism. The proponents, though they are not able to associate all the sublime attributes of Nibbāna to these so-called unconditioned items, still, however, they generally derived their hypotheses from some of the epithets and attributes of Nibbāna such as *añenja*, i.e., unchangeability as also from occasional Canonical utterances about at least some of the entities like *ākāsa*, *Dhammaṭṭhitatā*, *Dhammaniyāmatā*, *Samāpatti*, *Āruppas*, etc. The central point of difference between the two sections, however, is that according to the Theravādins, that, which can be made to arise, must also cease to exist and, hence, anything, which is so made to arise, cannot be unconditioned. But this argument does not appear to be valid in the case of negative entities such as cessation. Besides, ideal principles or patterns are also immutable, though not identifiable with a principle like Nibbāna, which constitutes ultimate spiritual value. Further, in case of Assurance or Path or Four Truths, etc., we have in fact ordered processes of growth which are not reducible to the rising and perishing of particular reals.

It is thus clear that we have 'immutabilities' of various kinds—of negative entities (e.g., *Nirodha* or *ākāsa*), of ideal principles (e.g., *Tathatā*), of ordered spiritual processes (e.g., *Niyāmatā* or *Sāmaññaphala*) and finally of Nirvāṇa. The Theravādins define the last as *asaṁskṛta*, the rest as either *saṁskṛta dharmas* cum *prajñapti* or as neither *saṁskṛta* nor *asaṁskṛta*.[180] The Mahāsaṁghikas, on the other hand, dichotomize all entities into *saṁskṛta* and *asaṁskṛta* and hence place all these into the latter category.

REFERENCES

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2. *Milindapañha*, pp. 309-10; *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 306ff; *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, pp. 368-9; see N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 198; see also G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 445.
3. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 438-9.
4. *Amata* and Nibbāna are more or less equivalent in the Buddhist tradition, see I.B. Horner, *Middle Length Savings*, I, Introduction, p. xviii.
5. *Amatārammaṇaṁ Saññojanan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, IX.2.
6. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 116.
7. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 352.
8. *Kathāvatthu*. pp. 352-3.
9. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 116.
10. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 354; cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 6; see also *Points of Controversy*, p. 233n.
11. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 116.
12. *Nibbānadhātu Kusalā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIX. 6.
13. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 179-80.
14. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 503-4.
15. Ibid., p. 504; cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, IV, pp. 33-4.
16. *Dve nirodhā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, II, 11.
17. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 60.
18. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 205.
19. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 60.
20. N. Dutt follows Buddhaghosa in his explanation of the distinction, *Early Monastic Buddhism* (1960), pp. 276-7.
21. See Poussin, *Bulletin de' L'école Francaise d'Extrême Orient*, 1930, p. 1.
22. Ibid., pp. 2, 6; cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, I, pp. 8-9.
23. See *Abhidharmakośa*, I, p. 10; see also Sogen, op. cit., 164-5.
24. N. Dutt (*EMB*, II, p. 102) has pointed out that the three *asaṁskṛtas* are accepted in the Pāli works as well. It is difficult to agree with his observation. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* recognizes only one unconditioned and that is Nibbāna. Granted that *ākāsa* is described even in the Pāli works in almost as high terms as Nibbāna, yet *Kathāvatthu*, vigorously combats the view which seeks to hold *ākāsa* as an unconditioned; see *Kathāvatthu*, VI. 6.
25. *Suññatā saṁkhārakhandhapariyāpannā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIX. 2.
26. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 177.
27. Cf. '*suññaṁ idaṁ, Bhikkhave saṁkhārā attena vā attaniyena vā ti*', *Kathāvatthu*, p. 499; see also *Points of Controversy*, p. 336n.
28. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 497-8.
29. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 177.

30. See G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, pp, 336ff.
31. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 106.
32. See *EI*, Vol. XX, pp. 16, 18, 19, 20, 21.
33. i.e., *ubhaya-loka hita-sukhāvahananāya.*
34. *EI*, Vol. XX, p. 24.
35. Ibid., p. 22.
36. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 107.
37. See supra, Chapter IX. Cf. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 120.
38. *Visuddhimagga*, p. 342.
39. See *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, IV, p. 106; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 99ff.
40. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 59.
41. *Milindapañha*, pp. 309-10; *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 306ff.
42. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, IV, p. 367.
43. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, pp. 89-90.
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45. *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, pp. 368-9; cf. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, pp. 294ff.
46. *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, p. 166, n. 1.
47. Ibid., pp. 264-5.
48. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 117.
49. Ibid., p. 358.
50. Ibid., p. 413.
51. *Milindapañha*, pp. 72, 263ff; cf. Conze, *Buddhist Texts*, pp. 97-100.
52. *Milindapañha*, p. 265.
53. Ibid., pp. 264, 316.
54. Ibid., pp. 72, 306, 317.
55. Ibid., pp. 263, 265.
56. Ibid., pp. 309-10.
57. *Visuddhimagga*, p. 355.
58. *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho* (ed. Kosambi), pp. 124-5.
59. See *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p, 37; II, p. 100; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 483-4.
60. Cf. Kindred Sayings, V. p. 7.
61. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, IX, 2.
62. The *Mūlapariyāyasutta* (*Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 6) from which the proponents have cited a passage in support of their thesis really deals with the views of the average persons unskilled in Dhamma. Buddhaghosa in his commentaries both on the *Kathāvatthu* as well as the *Majjhima Nikāya*, specifically makes a mention of this fact and suggests thereby in the former that the proponents' views are untenable.
63. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 116.
64. See supra.
65. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 123-4; III, p. 378.
66. Cf. ibid., IV, pp. 77-8.
67. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 452ff.
68. Ibid., II, p. 4f.
69. *Milindapañha*, pp. 72, 308, 317.
70. See supra.
71. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, pp. 294ff.

72. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, pp, 146-7; IV, p. 16.
73. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III, p. 223.
74. Poussin, *Bulletin de l'E'cole Francaise d'Extrême Orient*, 1930, pp. 8-9; cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, IV, pp. 33-4.
75. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, II, pp. 278-87.
76. Stcherbatsky aptly compares it to the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhyas, see *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 27-8.
77. *Milindapañha*, pp. 309-310.
78. *Abhidharmakośa*, II, pp. 278-87; cf. *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, *Mélanges Chinoises et Bouddhiques*, V, 1936-37, pp. 208-10.
79. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, p. 138.
80. Cf. *Sutta Nipāta*, pp. 366-7.
81. Cf. e.g., *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, pp. 436-7; III, pp. 133-4, 330.
82. See Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 2f.
83. *Niyāmo asaṁkhato ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VI. 1.
84. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 89.
85. Cf. *Nibbānaṁ tāṇaṁ leṇaṁ saraṇaṁ parāyanaṁ accutaṁ amatan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, p. 283.
86. i.e., *Micchatta-niyāma*, which is assurance in the wrong direction applied to the five kinds of heinous crimes, see *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 89.
87. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 283-4.
88. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 284.
89. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 89.
90. *Paṭiccasamuppādo asaṁkhato ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VI. 2.
91. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 90.
92. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 285-6; cf. *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 173ff.
93. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 24.
94. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 286-7.
95. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 61.
96. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 198.
97. On *ṭhiti* see, *Points of Controversy*, Appendix 7.
98. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 414.
99. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 24f.
100. See *Abhidharmakośa*, II, p. 77.
101. *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 36; *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 136; *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Suttas 26 and 85.
102. *Lalitavistara*, p. 286.
103. See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 415, 427-428.
104. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 24.
105. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 399; see also G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 424; cf. *ERE*, IX, p. 805.
106. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 105-106.
107. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 132-3.
108. *Dhammaṭṭhitā parinipphannāti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XI. 9.
109. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 399-400; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 132-3.
110. *Mādhyamika Kārikā*, XXIV. 18.

111. See Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 23ff.
112. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 130.
113. *Aniccatā parinipphannāti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XI. 10
114. *Cattāri saccāni asaṁkhatānī ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VI. 3.
115. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 90.
116. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 287.
117. Ibid., pp. 287-9.
118. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV. pp. 368-9.
119. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 289.
120. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 90-1.
121. See Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 100.
122. *Ākāsānañcāyatanaṁ asaṁkhatan ti? Kathāvatthu*, VI. 4.
123. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 91; cf. *Tattha yesaṁ cattāro āruppā anekajā tivacanaṁ nissāya sabbe pi te dhammā asaṁkhatā ti*. The translator, Dr. B.C. Law, appears to have amended *anekajā* to *aneñjā*. See *Debates Commentary*, p. 113.
124. Masuda, op. cit., p. 29.
125. Bareau, *Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques*, Pt. II, p. 194.
126. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, p. 196.
127. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 91.
128. The four immaterials are: (i) *Ākāsānañcāyatana*, (ii) *Vijñānānantyāyatana*, (iii) *Ākiñcanyāyatana*, (iv) *Naivasaṁjñā-nāsaṁjñāyatana*.
129. *Nirodhasamāpatti asaṁkhatāti? Kathāvatthu*, VI. 5.
130. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 91-2.
131. *Kathāvātthu*, p. 291.
132. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 92.
133. According to Buddhaghosa these two terms viz. (a) *Nirodhavadānaṁ* (b) *Vutthānaṁ* refer to the attainment of Fruition after emergence. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā* p. 92.
134. *Ākāso asaṁkhato ti? Kathāvatthu*, VI. 6.
135. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 92.
136. See *Kāthāvatthu*, pp. 292-3.
137. Ibid., p. 293.
138. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 29, 61.
139. See, e.g., *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III, 6, 8; IV. 1.
140. Quoted in *Sphutārthā*. p. 17, see also G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 31n.
141. *Sāmaññaphalaṁ asaṁkhatan ti? Kathāvatthu*, XIX. 3.
142. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 178-9.
143. Cf. *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 161.
144. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 499-500.
145. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 103.
146. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 29.
147. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, quoted N. Dutt, *EMB*, (1960), p. 272n.
148. See *Abhidharmakośa*, I, pp. 8-9.
149. *N'atthi ariyadhammavipāko ti? Kathāvatthu*, VII. 9.
150. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 102.
151. *Patti asaṁkhatā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIX, 4.

152. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 179.
153. See *Abhidharmakośa*. II, p. 36.
154. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 179.
155. *Sabbadhammānaṁ tathatā asaṁkhatā ti Kathāvatthu*, XIX. 5.
156. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 179.
157. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 502-3.
158. See Suzuki, *Awakening of Faith*, pp. 53ff.
159. *Points of Controversy*, p. 338, n. 1.
160. *Saṁyutta Nikāya, II*, p. 24; See also *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 241.
161. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniśad*, I, 5.23.
162. See G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 414f.
163. Cf. *Visuddhimagga*, p. 342.
164. *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, pp. 368-9.
165. Ibid., p. 166, n. 1.
166. Ibid., pp. 264-5.
167. Ibid., p. 259 and n. 2. Cf. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 322.
168. Ibid., p. 166, n. 1, 367.
169. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 444.
170. See *Milindapañha*, pp. 268, 271.
171. *Abhidharmakośa*, II, 50.
172. Ibid., II, 57.
173. See Poussin, *Bulletin de l'ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient*, p. If, See also *Abhidharmakośa*, I, pp. 8-9.
174. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p. 446.
175. See, e.g., *Milindapañha*, pp. 268, 271.
176. See, *Kathāvatthu*, VI. 6. contra N. Dutt, *EMB* II, p. 206.
177. See. Conze, *Buddhist Thought*, pp. 163.
178. See *Kathāvatthu*, VI. 6; see also Masuda, op. cit., pp. 29, 61.
179. See *Kathāvatthu*, p. 286; cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 24.
180. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 92. On Nirvāṇa see also Rune E.A. Johansson, *The Psychology of Nirvāṇa*; Guy Richard Welbon, *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and Its Western Interpretations*; A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*; Richard H. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*; R.C. Dwivedi, 'Buddhist Mysticism' *Buddhist Studies in India* (ed. R.C. Pandey). pp. 100ff; David J. Kalupahan, *Buddhist Philosophy—A Historical Analysis*, pp. 69-88.

11

Psycho-Ethical Controversies in the Kathāvatthu

Buddhist philosophy is primarily ethical but at the same time its ethics is inextricably blended with psychology.[1] The true spiritual force of Buddhism lies in its emphasis on immediate experience and the rejection of everything that might make one lose what is essential and supreme in life. The Buddhist analysis of consciousness eliminated the soul-seeking to explain the mental phenomena in terms of the law of dependence which postulated physical objects including the physical body as constituted of *dhammas*.[2] With the development of *Abhidhamma*,[3] the analytical process resulted in the long lists of elementary *dhammas* so as to enable one to see beyond the apparent unity of persons and things which would lead him to altogether dispense with the notion of self. The first book of Pāli *Abhidhamma* begins with a significant remark—'when a healthy conscious attitude, belonging to the world of sensuous relatedness, accompanied by and permeated with serenity and linked with knowledge has arisen . . . .'[4] On the results of psychological analysis, Buddhism sought to base the whole rationale of its practical doctrine and discipline.

> From studying the processes of attention, and the nature of sensation, the range and depth of feeling and the plasticity of will in desire and in control, it organized its system of practical self-culture.[5]

The *Abhidhamma* stage may be aptly described as the rational phase of Buddhism[6] grounded essentially in its psycho-ethical attitude.

The *Kathāvatthu*, another important work of the Pāli *Abhidhamma*, contains a long list of psycho-ethical controversies related to a variety of problems, e.g., consciousness[7]—its duration, structure and functions, *anusayas*,[8] virtues[9] and *kamma*.[10] The text, however, preserves these debates in the most haphazard manner insofar as they are scattered throughout the different sections of the work. The variety of the problems, as also their distribution, makes it increasingly difficult to group them together and to draw their combined significance. We have, however, tried to group them together on the basis of some connection in the import of the different theses and have drawn the significance of individual theses along with their discussion.

THESES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

The following two controversies arise from the attempt to interpret the extent and variation of impermanence in the fundamental Buddhist assertion that all things are impermanent. The first seeks to know—are they equally impermanent? and the second enquires as to what are their ultimate units of duration.

DHAMMAS AND UNITS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

According to the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas,[11] 'all things are momentary conscious units'.[12] They subscribed to this tenet for the simple reason that the conditioned phenomena (*dhammas*) are said to be impermanent and hence they cannot endure for more than one conscious moment.[13]

This, however, is an arbitrary assertion, according to the Theravādins. In their opinion, despite universal impermanence, there is a comparative variation in the duration of different things.[14] They would cite such examples as a mountain or an ocean or trees which do not seem to vanish along the passing away of thought-moments. The Theravādins also provide Canonical testimony to affirm that the organ of sight and

visual cognition do not coincide at the same moment.[15]

DURATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The issue of discussion here is whether a single unit of consciousness lasts for a day.[16] Buddhaghosa attributes this belief to the Andhakas.[17]

The Theravādins point out that the thesis in question implies that one-half of the day belongs to the 'nascent moment' (*uppāda*) and one-half to 'cessant moment' (*vaya* or *bhaṅga*). And a similar admission is involved in affirming that a state of consciousness lasts two days or four days and so on. The Buddha is said to have clearly stated that there is no phenomena so fickle and fluctuating as mind.[18] He compared it with a monkey which catches one branch to jump on some other.[19]

According to Buddhaghosa, the Andhakas, judging by the apparent continuity of consciousness attained through *jhāna* (in the *Arūpaloka*) and of subconsciousness (during the hours of the day), came to hold that a single consciousness lasted for a length of time.[20]

The real origin, however, of the Andhaka thesis might lie in the observation that there is an apparent break of the continuity of consciousness during sleep. We are reminded of the controversy between Descartes and Locke over the apparent discontinuity of consciousness in sleep.[21] In Brāhmaṇical thought day and night corresponded to creation and dissolution, or life and death.[22] Perhaps, the Andhaka reference to the long-lasting consciousness of some gods echoes the notion of Brahmic day.[23] This would represent the other and cosmic pole of the microcosmic momentariness of consciousness towards which the major tendency of Buddhist thought was moving. Even from the point of view of momentariness, it is clear that the 'moment' of mind needs defining and cannot without further ado be identified with the 'moment' of material process as the Theravādins themselves realised later on.[24] If the two 'moments' concur, then as the Sautrāntikas pointed out there can be no direct perception.[25] The Theravādins sought to overcome this difficulty by shortening the mental moment (*cittakkhaṇa*). The Andhakas appear to have lengthened it

which would have the identical effect of making experience possible. In choosing their unit, they seem to have been led by common sense as well as an ancient cosmological parallel.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF A PAST OBJECT

The discussion here rests on the view that consciousness of a past object is without object.[26] According to the Commentary, the Uttarāpathakas are led to hold this view on the ground that past or future mental objects do not really exist at the time of mental recollection and hence the mind recalling these objects is supposed to be without those objects.[27]

According to the Theravādins, in the light of their own admission that there is such a thing as a mental object that is past, how can they make such a self-contradictory statement that the consciousness of a past object is without object.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF A FUTURE IDEA

There is a similar assertion with reference to future that 'a consciousness, having an idea that is future, is without object'.[28] Though the Commentary of Buddhaghosa does not make a separate comment on this discussion, it is obvious, however, that this too was an Uttarāpathaka belief.[29]

The Theravādins repeat this argument verbatim, substituting future for past. Added to this they observe that the proponents admit with reference to present that there can be adverting of mind, ideation and so on, so that consciousness of a present idea has its mental object. They also admit that there can be adverting of mind and so on about the past and also about the future. Yet if in both these cases, mind is without mental object, then why not in the present? It is clear that both these theses intend to assert the unreality of past and future objects even when they are objects of cognition. The argument would really be aimed against the Sarvāstivādins. The Theravādins rightly point out the danger of an idealistic implication in the Uttarāpathaka view—the present may also be treated as unreal! But perhaps the Uttarāpathakas were themselves groping in an idealistic direction.

EMERGENCE OF A FRESH UNIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS[30]

The present debate rests over the assertion that before five aggregates seeking rebirth have ceased, five operative aggregates arise.[31] Buddhaghosa associates the Andhakas with this view.[32] The Theravādins argue that if this were true, there should be a congeries of ten aggregates. There must be then two copies of each aggregate which is an unorthodox position.

The Andhakas were led to uphold this thesis on the score that:

> 'If, before a unit of becoming lapses, another unit of consciousness (*kiriyā*) entitling merit or demerit with its (operative) fourfold aggregate and the material aggregate sprung from it, has not arisen, then becoming being ended, the living continuum must be cut off.'[33]

This problem of the continuity of the stream of consciousness (*santati*)[34] especially from one life to another is the issue here. The more general problems of psychic continuity are debated in another controversy, viz., *anantarapaccayakathā*.[35] The Uttarāpathakas advocated a strictly unbroken flow[36] which the Theravādins contested. The distinction between *Bhavaṅga* and *Kiriyā*, latent and manifest psyche, serves to explain this continuity. The Andhakas only seek to extend the application of this device to the crucial transition at death. The Theravādins themselves had to take the question more seriously later and tended to solve it by identifying the last consciousness of one life with the first of the next.[37] The parallel between *Bhavaṅga* and *Kiriyā* on the one hand and *Ālaya Vijñāna* and *Pravṛtti Vijñāna* on the other may be noted.[38]

ATTENDING TO ALL AT ONCE

The issue of this debate is that one can attend to everything simultaneously.[39] We gather from Buddhaghosa that the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas upheld this thesis.[40]

The Theravādins argue—does the thesis mean to suggest that we know the consciousness by which we so attend? The proponents deny it first because it cannot be subject and object at once.[41] But when questioned a second time, they assent because

one is already aware of the nature of ones thought in general, or because of the thesis advanced.[42] Then the question would be whether the consciousness by which we so attend is known as consciousness? As above, the proponents deny first but assent later, then, is the subject of consciousness the same as its object and so on.[43]

The proponents, however, refer to the words of Buddha that 'all things are impermanent'[44] and hence assert that in generalising one can attend to all things at once.

Buddhaghosa, however, points out that attention (*manasikāra*) arises in two ways; by logical induction (*nayato*) or direct perception (*ārammaṇato*). To infer from the observed transience of one or more phenomena that 'all things are impermanent' illustrates the former. But in attending to past things, we cannot attend to future things. We attend to a certain thing in one of the time relations. This is attention by way of directly perceiving the object of consciousness. Moreover, when we attend to present things, we are not able at the present moment to attend to the consciousness by which they arise. Nevertheless, the concerned thesis is advocated by the mentioned sects. And because they hold that in so doing we must also attend to the consciousness by which we attend, the argument runs as mentioned.[45]

From the exposition of Buddhaghosa, it seems that the Śaila schools were principally concerned with seeking to explain the way in which the subject of a universal proposition comes to be known. The subject here is a universe class as in 'all things are impermanent'. Apparently, corresponding to this judgement, there must be a simultaneous awareness of many objects. To this, Buddhaghosa rightly answers by distinguishing between the simultaneity of perceptions at the psychological level from the logical timelessness of a universal judgement. Whether self-consciousness is simultaneous with object consciousness or merely reflective is another point which is discussed. It seems to us, however, that the real significance of the thesis from the Buddhist point of view has hardly been raised in the Theravāda account of the controversy. In the Mahāsaṁghika sect of which the Śaila schools were a part, Buddha is believed to know all things in one moment.[46] The nature of his omniscience was an object of discussion from the days of the *Nikāyas*.[47] Three views

appear to have developed; the earliest, which the Buddha himself blessed, defined his omniscience merely as the knowledge of spiritual truths; the second held that the Buddha knew one object at one time but could attend to any object he chose; the third explained omniscience as the simultaneous knowledge of all things. The Mahāsaṁghikas and the Mahāyānists tended to emphasize the last.[48]

The Buddhist analysis of consciousness eliminated the soul-seeking to explain the mental phenomena in terms of the law of dependence which postulated physical objects including the physical body. It was obvious, however, that the connection between the mind and the body has a unique aspect which is not covered by its relations with mere objects. This uniqueness is popularly expressed by thinking of body as the seat of life or vitality for the functioning of a mind. The *Upaniṣads* had speculated a lot over this vital force or *prāṇa*. The concept of *jīvitendriye*, i.e., vital power, persistently crops up in Abhidharmika thought also.[49] In the *Kathāvatthu*, we have the radical thesis that vital power is not material nor mental.[50] This might cut a philosophical gordian knot, but forgets the original purpose for which the knot was tied.

CONATIVE AND AFFECTIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In the earlier analysis of the *Nikāyas*, conative and affective functions are collected in the *vedanā* and *saṁskāra skandhas* while *vijñāna* and *saṁjñā* constitute the cognitive functions of the mind. The tendency was to gradually elaborate the *saṁskāra skandha* and to assimilate *saṁjñā*, *vedanā* and *saṁskāra* as various functions dependent on *vijñāna* as co-existing with it. Thus, instead of the four co-ordinate, *skandhas* came to be analyzed into *citta* or *vijñāna* attended by *saṁprayukta dharmas* or *cetasikas*.[51] It is in this context that we can appreciate some of the debates of the *Kathāvatthu*.

Buddhaghosa attributes to the Rājagirikas and the Siddharthikas two theses[52] which attack the concept of the *cetasikas*. In the first,[53] they criticize it on the score that the idea of association (*saṁprayuktatā*) has no meaning since there is no necessary connection between different mental phenomena.[54]

In the second thesis,[55] they deny the existence of the *caitasikas*. They seem here to be asserting that the so-called *cetasikas* have a misleading name. Their mere dependence on the *citta* does not give them a nature contiguous with the *citta*, e.g., something depending on *phassa* may be called *phassika*, but it does not acquire the nature of *phassa*.[56]

Relying on a scriptural statement,[57] the Pubbaseliyas sought to reduce the whole '*Kāmadhātu*' to merely five types of sensuous pleasures.[58] Against this, the Theravādins include in the '*Kāmadhātu*' objects of sense desire (*vatthukāma*) the desires themselves (*kilesakāma*) and the world of desires (*kāmabhava*).[59] The Pubbaseliya thesis has a clearly idealistic and subjective bias which would contract the world of desires to sensations merely. This comes out more clearly in another assertion of the Pubbaseliyas, where the subjective desires and their objects are sought to be identified, i.e., the *āyatanas* are the *kāmas*.[60]

Among the objects of desire there was also held to be a sixth sphere, the *dhammāyatana*. The Pubbaseliyas assert the 'desire for ideas' (*dhammataṇhā*)[61] is unmoral (*abyākata*)[62] and not the cause of *dukkhasamudaya*.[63]

The Uttarāpathakas are reported to assert that there is 'a lusting for what is disagreeable' (*asātarāga*).[64] According to the Theravādins, the Uttarāpathakas derive this view from a misunderstood Canonical utterance.[65] The Uttarāpathakas, however, appear to have reflected over a profound fact of experience, which is that in the fascination that even those objects exert on the mind, on the whole the disagreeable element predominates. The person who is quickly enraged and enters into a brawl would bear testimony to this principle of *asātarāga*.

The Andhakas and the Sammatīyas seek to enlarge the sphere of *rāga* to the *rūpa* and *arūpa* worlds, by conceiving of *rūparāga* and *arūparāga* in parallelism to *kāmarāga*.[66]

The Hetuvādins and Mahīśāsakas distinguish between two sets of *saddhā*, *viriya*, *sati*, *samādhi*, and *paññā*. For them, the ordinary mental factors, designated thus, are not the same as the five *balas* of the same name.[67] It may be noticed that *indriya* originally meant just faculty and this sense is preserved in the Theravāda view.[68] The proponents of the thesis, however, make the *indriyas lokottara*.

PERCEPTION

On the question of perception, the earlier analysis found in the *Nikāyas* reduces it as the resultant function of the contact of particular senses with their specific objects. It had also emphasized the distinctive and co-ordinating role of the sixth *vijñāna*, viz., *manovijñāna* and had postulated for the purpose *mano* and *dhamma*.[69]

In the *Kathāvatthu*, some of the controversies raise the difficult problems of the perception of 'space' and 'substance'. The Andhakas postulated the perceptibility of *ākāsa*[70] (*ākāsa-sanidassano*). They argued for the visibility of empty intervals or interstices between objects. The Theravādins seek to contradict them by pointing to the necessity of a positive object which can only be *rūpa*, i.e., form and colour where visual perception is concerned.[71] Buddhaghosa explains with his later-day psychology that the perception of emptiness results from a mental cognition following a visual cognition which has a different object.[72] It may, however, be pointed out that, despite Mrs. Rhys Davids' commendation of the psychological subtlety of Buddhaghosa,[73] a profound philosophical problem must be held to have been dimly described in the Andhaka assertion, a problem which Buddhaghosa does not even perceive. One needs only to refer to the later controversies over the perception of *abhāva* among the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas, etc.[74] While the later Buddhist schools of philosophy denying any reality to negative things or absences sought to explain their cognition as essentially an intellectual construct, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas took the opposite course of asserting their reality and validating their perception, or else exalting a certain non-perception into a separate means of knowledge. If the Andhaka view were developed consistently, it would depart far from the usual Buddhist attitude, at once nominalistic and idealistic.

Similarly, the Andhakas advocate the common-sense view that the elements earth, air, water, etc., are perceptible.[75] The Theravādins contradict them by alluding to the subtle nature of these elements and pointing out that what is actually is only some coloured surface and form, from which the elements are inferred.[76] Here again a philosophical issue lies hidden.

Later-day Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers argued for the position that 'substances' are perceived not inferred.[77] Such a view implicitly combated the Buddhist attempt to reduce substances to mere constructs. The implications of the Andhaka view, thus, would tend to run counter to the Buddhist emphasis on insubstantiality. In both these theses, the Andhakas advocate a common-sense psychology on the philosophical implications of which would be very heterodox from the Buddhist standpoint.

Another debate arose from the attempt to define the subject of perception, that is to say, is it the eye that perceives or the visual consciousness that perceives.[78] It is interesting to note that neither side defends the common-sense notion of a self that perceives.[79]

RELEASE THROUGH SEEING THE GOOD

The controversy here rests over a thesis that the fetters are put off for one who discerns a blessing in store.[80] Buddhaghosa attributes the view to the Andhakas,[81] who subscribe to an optimistic approach that it is through Nibbāna as a blessing that the fetters are put off.

The Theravādins point out that it is also possible to put off the fetters by realizing the impermanence of the world (*saṅkhārā*). And hence one should not conceive the former possibility alone as the proponents affirm in their proposition.

In fact the proponents also admit that the fetters are put off when the true nature of the world is understood, viz., the world as characterized by disease, canker, etc. But their assertion, as above, makes their position one-sided. The proponents, however, quote the words of Buddha revealing the bliss and ecstacy of Nibbāna[82] and affirm that it is for one who discerns the happy prospect that the fetters are put off. Buddhaghosa offers the explanation that it is clearly laid down that when anyone discerns (1) the world as full of peril, and (2) Nibbāna as blessing, the 'fetters' are put off. But the Andhakas take one of these two alternative statements and say it is only by the latter discernment that the fetters are removed.[83]

A profound psychological point is made—the attachment to the lower is given up when the 'higher' is glimpsed.[84] It should

also be remembered that *avijjā* is not of the *saṁyojanas*. How can *avidyā* go without *vidyā*?

TWO CODES OF MORALS

Next follows the controversy that one who is engaged in the Path is practising a double morality.[85] According to Buddhaghosa, Mahāsaṁghikas advocated this view.[86]

According to the Theravāda argument, in order to assert this, the proponents must also admit that one is possessed of this dual morality with a dual mental contact, dual feeling, dual perception, etc.

The proponents' standpoint, as they put it, is that (1) one actually engaged on the Path practises a worldly morality in the three factors relating to conduct—right speech, right action, right livelihood—but not in the five factors relating to mental life, and that (2) in those three—factors his morals are both worldly and supramundane, but they are only the latter in the other five factors. The Theravādins emphasize that they must admit the same higher morality for all the eight.[87]

It is apparent from the present thesis that the Theravādins try to show that if such a proposition be accepted then each morality would involve two separate sets of mental processes. Buddhaghosa has remarked in his Commentary[88] that the Mahāsaṁghikas came to hold the view that inasmuch as the virtuous person is developing the Path which is not of the world, with a morality that is of the world, he must at the moment of realization, be possessed simultaneously of both a worldly and an unworldly morality. He adds further that this opinion was formulated on the basis of such passages in the Nikāyas as 'when a man is established in virtue he is gifted with wisdom'.[89] In fact, the Mahāsaṁghikas have raised a fundamental problem —the sage working in the world has a dual role and status. He shares in social or worldly morality (*sīla*) and at the same time participates in spiritual vision (*paññā*). Its limiting instance is found in the *Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa* of the Vijñānavād.

THE ETHICS OF SENSES

Here the controversial view is that 'the five kinds of sense—

consciousness are good, i.e., they have positive moral qualities'.[90] The Commentary does not contribute any explanation or note on this discussion. It seems however from the foregoing discussions that the Mahāsaṁghikas advocated the view.[91]

The Theravādins put lengthy arguments, their central objection being that the senses are limited to sense-objects, whereas ethical and intellectual matters are the concerns of will, etc.[92]

The proponents in turn quote the words of Buddha that when a *Bhikkhu* sees an object with the eye, he sometimes grasps, and sometimes does not grasp at the general characters, or the details of it and so on.[93]

The thesis seems to advocate a sane, common-sense view compared to which the Theravāda view is psychologically subtle. The Mahāsaṁghika thesis could only have arisen before the Abhidharmic psychology of the mental process or *cittavīthi* had even rudimentarily been worked out.

VIRTUE

Next follow two discussions on the nature of virtue. It is affirmed by a section of Buddhists that moral conduct is not at all a function of consciousness.[94] Buddhaghosa adds in his Commentary that it was held by some, like the Mahāsaṁghikas, that even when there has been moral conduct, even though it has ceased, there is an accretion of virtue, and hence the doer becomes virtuous.[95]

The central objection against this thesis, as pointed out by the Theravādins, is as follows: (1) Conduct with its moral quality is utterly unlike anything non-mental; (2) Conduct produces a moral resultant—value or disvalue—which cannot be mechanically or naturally produced. As against this, the Mahāsaṁghikas seek to affirm that the moral quality of conduct is a deep and persistent quality.

Another discussion on this subject is preserved in the following section and rests over the assertion that conduct is not constantly parallel to or determined by thought.[96] The Commentary adds that this is merely a pendant to the previous discourse.[97] The arguments are also similar.

The Mahāsaṁghikas point out the fundamental role of character, habit and unconscious tendencies in the appraisal of

moral conduct. All these factors, called *saṁskāra* (= *vāsanā*) in Brahmanical thought, (e.g. Yogasutras or Vaiśeṣika) are recognized there as unconscious. Unlike the quick freedom of conscious will, conduct has an inertial force or habit which is essential for the realization of virtue. To think of *sīla* as *acetasika* is to stress the other side of the truth that *kamma* is *cetanā* (which is *acetasika*). The later cpncept of *avijñapti*[98] may be compared with the Mahāsaṁghika concept, for *avijñapti* is at once moral and non-mental.

ACTS OF INTIMATION AS MORAL

Next we have a discussion on the tenet that acts of intimation are moral acts.[99] Buddhaghosa observes in his Commentary that:

> Some like the Mahāsaṁghikas and Sammatīyas, thinking that bodily intimation is *karma* of deed, vocal intimation is *karma* of speech, believe that such acts have a moral quality. But intimation as gesture or speech is a material matter, while morality or virtuous conduct is not so, but is a deliberate, i.e., mental act of abstinence.[100]

The Theravādins seem to interpret this thesis to mean 'All *Sīla* is *Viññatti*'. The plain meaning, however, is 'All *Viññatti* is *Sīla*', i.e., 'all vocal and physical gestures intimating moral resolve is itself a form of moral conduct'. This latter assertion has a plain rationale. The Brahmanical tradition held that action is threefold—mental, vocal and physical. The Mahāsaṁghikas seek to restore to 'speech' and bodily action the status of moral action universally. The orthodox view treats them, when 'gestures,' as merely physical facts. A consequence of the present thesis is drawn in VIII. 9.[101] Since *viññatti* is moral or immoral and it is material (*rūpa*), it follows that matter can be good (*kusala*) or bad (*akusala*).[102] Elsewhere, even the speech of actions of the *Ariya* are said to be material.[103] This is also a thesis of connected import.

ACTS OF NON-INTIMATION AS IMMORAL

In consonance with this, it was quite natural to hold that acts not intimating a moral purpose are immoral.[104] However, this latter proposition was maintained only by the Mahāsaṁghikas

and not by the Sammatīyas as Buddhaghosa informs us in his Commentary.[105]

The Theravādins argue whether the proponents affirm that the conduct which is immoral such as taking life, theft, etc., are so many modes of non-intimation. Since the proponents deny, therefore, they are intimative, and some immoral acts are hence intimative of moral purpose. Further, if anyone giving in charity has resolved on some evil deed, do his merit and demerit grow thereby? If the proponents assent, they are involved thereby in an anomaly where, good and bad, low and high states of mind should be simultaneously present, whereas the fact is that they are as far apart as earth and sky.[106]

However, the proponents point out that when an evil deed has been resolved, as the Theravādins themselves admit, it is right to say that acts non-intimative of a moral thought behind them are immoral. Buddhaghosa has remarked that this view of the Mahāsaṁghikas is based on the idea of a possible accumulation of demerit in the past, and on the fact that moral precepts may be broken at the dictates of another.[107]

THE 'LATENT BIAS' (ANUSAYA)

The *Kathāvatthu* also preserves debates on a significant problem, viz., 'latent bias' or *anusaya*.[108] According to Buddhaghosa, the Mahāsaṁghikas and the Sammatīyas[109] affirmed that the *anusayas* are *abyākata* (indeterminate), *acetasika* (i.e., without mental object) and *ahetuka* (i.e., without moral or immoral motive).[110]

The Theravāda objections against the *anusaya* being *abyākata* is that in that case *anusaya* should be identifiable with other morally indeterminate phenomena. As against this, the principal argument to establish the *abyākata* character of the *anusayas* is that they can co-exist with moral as well as immoral thoughts. The *hetus* which govern the conscious thoughts do not determine the *anusayas*, hence the second assertion of their being *ahetuka*. The third point of their being *acetasika* follows directly from the earlier thesis which makes them *anārammaṇa*. The third thesis is a logical implication of these. Since *anusaya* is sharply distinguished from conscious thoughts, it has to be distinguished from *pariuṭṭhāna*. All these theses are contiguous

with the earlier thesis about *śīla* not being *cetasika* exclusively.[111] The heterodox schools are really trying to point out the irrationality of the unconscious which tends to make it almost a blind natural tendency. The Theravādins, on the other hand, interpret these primeval impulses as merely the latent side of the psyche which could well become manifest. It is almost as if the Mahāsaṁghikas are speaking of the deep unconscious forever incapable of rising into self-consciousness, though capable of exerting a causal influence. As such, while it has to be reckoned as a relevant factor, it cannot be adjudged moral or immoral. The Theravādins, on the other hand, seem to speak of the sub-conscious.[112]

An interesting debate which has an inner relevance to this one relates to the ethical status of dream-consciousness.[113] The Theravādins consider dream-consciousness as ethically moral or immoral. Since it expresses the process of sub-conscious thought, they consider it practically negligible (*abbohārikā*). Thus, for them there is a continuity between dreaming and waking consciousness though there is a sensible difference of degree.[114]

SELF-RESTRAINT

The controversy here rests over the view that self-restraint is positive action, i.e., *karma*.[115] According to the Commentary, the Mahāsaṁghikas upheld this view.[116] They quote the utterance of the Buddha wherein he said that when one sees an object with the eye he grasps at the general characters thereof and does not grasp at the external appearance, etc.[117] Self-restraint and want of it are, thus, affirmed to be morally effective action, i.e., they amount to overt action or *karma*. It is, however, volition, proceeding by way of deed, word and thought which gets the name of action of body, speech, and mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint proceeding by way of sense-control, would get the name of visual *karmas*, auditory *karmas*, etc. This is not warranted by the *Suttanta* and hence it is inconclusive.[118]

It may be pointed out that the Mahāsaṁghikas[119] assert *saṁvara* to be *kamma*, whereas for the Theravādins, *cetanā* also is active volition, *saṁvara* is restraint of the senses. The

Theravādins seem to regard this restraint as a consequential disposition of the senses and hence not *kamma*. This thesis may be compared with an earlier one where the sensations are credited with *ābhoga*.

THE MUTUAL CONSECUTIVENESS OF GOOD AND EVIL

The next disputed thesis is whether right and wrong thoughts can immediately succeed each other.[120] The thesis is attributed to the Mahāsaṁghikas.[121] According to the orthodox position, in speaking of the right and wrong thoughts, we really mean moment of active aperception called *javana* in later literature. This active moment has to be preceded by the emergence of a moment of attention later called *āvajjana* while the earlier term was *āvaṭṭanā*, from the subconscious flow (*bhavaṅga*). Now, a *kusala citta* cannot have the same preceding *āvajjana* as an *akusala citta*. According to the orthodox position, they have each a different motivation and a different sequence of activation. The Mahāsaṁghikas, on the other hand, stress the patent fact of experience that one can both like and then dislike the same thing.[122] Here again, it will be seen that as against the psychological subtlety of the Theravādin, there is an appeal to obvious common-sense. This point of view seems to belong to a more primitive age than that of a sophisticated *Abhidhamma* analysis.

MORAL REFORM AND TIME

Another important discussion in the present context is preserved on the issue that one may extirpate past, future and present corruptions.[123] Buddhaghosa attributes the thesis to some of the Uttarāpathakas.[124]

According to the Theravāda argument, the thesis, by implication, postulates that even that which has ceased may be stopped, and that one can produce the unborn, something that is non-existent. On the other hand, the proponents suggest that if it be wrong to say that one can put away past, future and present corruptions, it means that there is no extirpation of corruptions, and, hence, the thesis stands.[125]

According to Buddhaghosa, inasmuch as there is the

possibility of putting away corruptions, it must be admitted that one can put away the corruptions of past, etc.[126]

In the extirpation of the *kilesas*, the Uttarāpathakas require it to be done for all the three periods of time as if for them *kilesas* had a reality such as the Sarvāstivādins conceive. Or they simply have in mind that this passion should mean freedom from the influence of passions, past, present and future. The Theravāda conception is subtler philosophically.

KARMAN

It is in the *Bṛhadāraynaka Upaniṣad* that we first hear of *karman* as the determinant of life—as what is left after death and as what serves as the root of fresh life.[127] In the *Nikāyas*, while at some places, such as, *Sutta-Nipāta*, *karman* is described as the principle governing the world,[128] at some other places, *karman* is merely one of the eight causes of things.[129] Between these two is the usual view that it is the principle which determines the future experiences of pain and pleasure. In later Brahmanical tradition, *karman* is supposed to determine *jāti*, *āyus* and *bhoga*.[130] Thus, *karman* determines *vipāka* not everything. *Karman* itself is determined by will (*cetanā*).[131] *Vipāka* is ethically neutral (*abyākata*) while *karman* may be *kusala* or *akusala* or *abyākata*. When the *karman* is *abyākata* it is called *kiriyā*. On this position, sufficient freedom is preserved alongside responsibility.

In the *Kathāvatthu*, we have a thesis that all this is determined by *kamma*.[132] It is attributed to the Rājagirikas and the Siddharthikas.[133] By holding that everything including *kamma* is due to *kamma*, this opinion implies absolute fatalism such as is comparable to the Ājivaka doctrine. Special instances of this thesis are XII.3 and 4, which would make sound and sense organs as *vipāka*.[134] Similar again is the thesis in VII.10, that *vipāka* itself entails other *vipākas*.[135] This seems to assert with respect to the future what is asserted in the earlier thesis XVII.3 with respect to the past.[136] In fact, the two are contiguous. If everything is due to *karman*, everything becomes a *vipāka*. The same thing is *vipāka* with respect to the past and a cause (*hetu*) with respect to the future. In fact taken together these two theses constitute complete determinism

where there is only a distinction of relative position of the sequence but hardly of any qualitative difference between *karman* and *vipāka*. This is hard to distinguish from the Ājivaka position.

The assertion that everything is due to *karman* has an obvious implication. Is matter or the earth also due to *karman*? The Andhakas and the Sammatīyas are stated to hold that material qualities are *vipāka*.[137] They are rebutted by the Theravādins on the ground that matter has no felt qualities such as are essential to *vipāka*. To the Andhakas is attributed the strange sounding thesis that land is a result of action.[138] They argue that since land serves to fulfil the enjoyment of prosperity (*issarīya*) and sovereignty (*adhipacca*) it must be a *kamma vipāka*.[139] The Theravāda criticism appears obvious enough but perhaps the proponents meant something more special by *pathavī* than the common-sense to which the Theravādins allude.[140]

The Andhakas assert that old age and death are a result of action.[141] Here too they are criticized on the ground that old age and death do not have the subjective nature of *vipāka*. It is interesting that the Commentary brings up here the causal functioning of the purely 'physical order (*utu*)'.[142]

The notion of *antarābhava* has been proposed on the ground that if one dies without completing the proper life-span he may have to wait to find the suitable time and occasion for his rebirth.[143] From the *Abhidharmakośa* we know that in this state such a being was called a *gandharva*.[144] The Theravādin rejects it on the score that there are only three well-known *bhavas* and no more.[145]

If the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammatīyas propose a new intermediate *bhava* the Andhakas propose a sixth *gati* to account for the *asuras*.[146] It is clearly in addition to the five *gatis* mentioned in the early texts—*niraya*, *tircchāna*, *peta*, *manussa*, *deva*.[147] In the ancient Brahmanical tradition, *Devas* and *Asuras* are essentially of the same class though opposite in tendency. The orthodox Buddhist tradition also does not regard the *Asuras* as essentially distinct.

The Mahāsaṁghikas maintain that all *karman* leads to *vipāka*.[148] This is a denial of any *abyākata kamma* a *kiriyā*. The implications of this unorthodox thesis are specially hard

in the context of the actions of those who are emancipated—will they be bound further by continuing to act? The Mahāsaṁghikas, thus, if they maintain this thesis, must distinguish the actions of common men from those of Buddhas and Bodhisattas.

Another variety of fatalism appears in another thesis where it is held that all *karmas* are inflexible,[149] that is to say, the *karmas* which cause the experiences of the present life, those which would underlie the next life, and those which would be experienced in later life are all distinctly fixed. The Theravādin is able to rightly point out that in such a case the first and the second would have to belong to the *sammatta* or *micchatta niyāma*.[150] This shows that the thesis is an unorthodox fatalism, which is not clear about the source from which it derives the fixity of the *karmas*.

It is also asserted that while *kamma* is one thing, its *upacaya* another.[151] *Upacaya* normally means accumulation, but here it seems to mean continuation. The Andhakas and the Sammatīyas to whom the thesis is attributed appear to hold that the persistence of karmic energy for its due result has to be distinguished from the *kamma* itself. In contrast with *kamma* the *upacaya* is *cittavippayukta*, *abyākata* and *anārammaṇa*.[152] This concept may be compared with the concept of *adṛṣṭa* which, according to the Mimāṁsā, mediates between action and its result.[153] In Jainism also, the future operation of actions is explained on the basis of *karma* understood as an insentient and persistent entity.[154] The thesis in question thus arises from the attempt to explain the *modus operandi* of action when it operates at a distance in time. The action as a mental function is momentary and ceases. Its effect is produced at a future date. To connect the vanished cause with the unborn effect, the present thesis appears to postulate a distinct fact of persistence, some kind of a cause which survives the moment of act of volition. From the orthodox point of view, however, this would be a misunderstanding of the causal law which does not really require persistent causes. *Karman* and its *upacaya* thus need not be distinguished, nor the doctrine of momentariness impugned.

In relation to *karman*, the prevailing assumption of the Theravādins is that every individual is himself responsible for his

own happiness and unhappiness, even though this contains the principles of moral responsibility as well as the idea of a man being ultimately the captain of his destiny. It has apparently an isolating effect on individual destiny. It is not possible for any one to be really and directly the cause of happiness or unhappiness for another. It is interesting, therefore, to read that according to the Hetuvādins it is possible for one to bestow happiness on another.[155]

Hell and heaven constitute inevitable appendages to the theory of *karman* and there are a couple of interesting debates on the subject in the *Kathāvatthu*.

There is a controversy whether *niraya* has real guards or only *karmas* in the shape of gods[156] which latter is the Andhaka position. This seems to be in keeping with the later Vijñānavāda position.

Another debate discusses seriously whether the animals like *erāvaṇa* mentioned among the *devas* may not be animals reborn there.[157] The Theravādins ask with equal seriousness if along with the elephants and horses one may not also find in heaven[158] stables, fodders, trainers, etc.

REFERENCES

1. Cf. *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, Introductory Essays, p. xvi; L.A. Govind, op. cit., p. 36.
2. Ibid., p. xviif.
3. The study of *Abhidhamma* is said to bring about unending joy and serenity, cf. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 11.
4. Cf. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, p. 18.
5. *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, p. xvii.
6. See E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought*, p. 29.
7. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, II. 7; III. 11-12; IX, 6-7; X. 1; XXII. 10, etc.
8. Cf. ibid., IX. 4; XI. 1; XIV. 5.
9. Cf. ibid., X. 7-8; 10-11;
10. Cf. ibid., VII. 7-8; XII. 1-2; XVI. 8, etc.
11. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 195-6.
12. *Ekacittakkhaṇikā sabbe dhammā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XXII. 10.
13. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 196.
14. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 195-6.
15. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 533; cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 240-1.
16. *Ekaṁ cittaṁ divasaṁ tiṭṭhatīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, II. 7.
17. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 57.
18. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I, p. 10.
19. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 81.
20. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 57.
21. Cf. W.James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 213.
22. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā*, VIII, 17-18.
23. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, III, 11-12.
24. Cf. *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, pp. 64ff.
25. See Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 202.
26. *Atītārammaṇaṁ cittaṁ anārammaṇaṁ ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, IX. 6.
27. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 118.
28. *Anāgatārammaṇaṁ cittaṁ anārammaṇaṁ ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, (PTS ed.), IX. 7; (Nal. ed.) IX. 6, p. 360.
29. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, pp. 237-8. See also *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 359-60; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 118.
30. The text preserves this discussion under the caption 'Cessation' or *Nirodha*, but the heading we have given to it seems to be better warranted by the content as well as the remarks of the commentator.
31. *Upapattesiye pañca khandhe aniruddhe kiriyā pañca khandhā uppajjantīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, X. 1.
32. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 122.
33. See *Debates Commentary*, p. 150; Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 122.
34. It is the sense of the continuity of subjective life which made W.James use the phrase 'streams of consciousness' see W. James, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 239.
35. *Cakkhuviññāṇassa anantarā sotaviññāṇaṁ uppajjatīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIV. 3.

36. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p, 148.
37. See *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, p. 86.
38. Cf. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, pp. 46ff.
39. *Adhigayha manasikarotīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVI. 4.
40. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 159.
41. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, loc. cit.
42. Ibid., loc. cit.
43. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 457-9.
44. '*Sabbe saṁkhārā aniccā ti*', cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 236, 280; see also *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 33.
45. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 159.
46. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 19; cf. *Kathāvatthu*, II. 10.
47. Cf. supra, Chapter IV.
48. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, V, 254; Masuda, op. cit., pp. 19-20; among the Mahāsaṁghikas and connected sects like the Andhakas, an idealistic tendency is clear, e.g., *Kathāvatthu*, I. 9 and VIII. 5-8.
49. Cf. e.g., *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, pp. 64ff.
50. *N'atthi rūpajīvitindriyan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VIII. 10; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 112.
51. See Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 13ff; G.C. Pande, *BDVI*, pp. 239ff; H.V. Gunther, *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma*, pp. 5ff; L.A. Govinda, op. cit., Pt. VI; cf. *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, Introductory Essays, VII; CAF. Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*, pp. 254ff.
52. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 94-95.
53. *N'atthi cetasiko dhammo ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VII. 3.
54. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 94.
55. *Cetasiko dhammo dānan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VII. 4.
56. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 96-7.
57. '*Pañcame, Bhikkhave, Kāmagunā . . .* etc.', cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 119.
58. *Pañc'eva kāmaguṇā kāmadhātu ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VIII. 3.
59. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 107-8.
60. *Pañc'evā yatanā kāmā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VIII. 4; Cf. '*Rūpāyatanādīni pañc evāyatanāni kāma,*' *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 109.
61. Cf. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 439-40.
62. *Dhammataṇhā abyākatā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIII. 9; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 146.
63. *Dhammataṇhā na dukkhasamudayo ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIII. 10; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 146.
64. *Atthi asātarāgo ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIII. 8.
65. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 145.
66. Cf. *Rūparāgo rūpadhātuṁ anuseti rūpadhāturiyāpannoti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIV. 7, XVI. 10; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 150-1, 161-2.
67. *N'atthi lokiyaṁ saddhindriyan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIX 8.
68. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 181-2.

69. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya, Mahāvedallasuttanta*; *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, p. 22; see also C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*, pp. 317ff.
70. *Ākāso sanidassano ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VI. 7.
71. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 292-3.
72. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 93.
73. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 193n.
74. Cf. Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 237ff.
75. *Pathavīdhātu sanidassanāti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VI. 8.
76. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 93,
77. See Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 237ff.
78. *Cakkhunā rūpaṁ passatīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 9.
79. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 176.
80. *Ānisaṁsadassāvissa saññojanānaṁ pahānan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, IX. 1.
81. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 115.
82. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, p. 161.
83. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 115.
84. Cf. *Bhidyate hṛdaya granthiḥ ... tasmindriṣṭe parāvare*, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, II. 28; cf. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II. 6.15.
85. *Maggasamaṅgī dvīhi sīlehi samannāgato ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, X. 6.
86. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 126.
87. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 377-8.
88. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 126.
89. Cf. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I, pp. 14, 164-5.
90. *Pañca viññāṇā kusalā pi akusalā pīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, X. 4.
91. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 123-5; in fact a similar thesis is definitely attributed to the Mahāsaṁghikas—*Pañca viññāṇā sābhogā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, X. 5.
92. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 373-4.
93. See ibid., p, 375; *Vibhaṅga*, (PTS), 307.
94. *Sīlaṁ acetasikan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, X. 7.
95. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 127.
96. *Sīlaṁ na cittānuparivattīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, X. 8.
97. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 127.
98. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, I, pp. 20-2.
99. *Viññatti sīlan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, X. 10.
100. *Debates Commentary*; p. 157; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 127.
101. *Kusalena cittena samuṭṭhitaṁ kāyakammaṁ rūpaṁ kusalan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VIII. 9.
102. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 111.
103. Cf. *Ariyarūpaṁ mahābhūtānaṁ upādāyāti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XIV. 4; Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 149.
104. *Aviññatti dussilyan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, X. 10.
105. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 128.
106. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 384-5.
107. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 128.
108. See *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, p. 195; *Visuddhimagga*, Pt. II. *Visuddhimagga Dīpikā*, pp, 61. 136-7; P.V. Bapat, *Vimuttimagga* and *Visuddhimagga*,

pp. 123, 124n.

109. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 129, 149.
110. See *Anusayā abyākatā ti, Kathāvatthu*, XI. 1; cf, *Anusayā anārammaṇāti*, Ibid., IX. 4; *Añño kāmarāgānusayo aññaṁ kāmarāgapariyuṭṭhānanan ti*, ibid., XIV. 5.
111. See supra.
112. Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, XV. 5 which presents a parallel thesis of the Hetuvādins that the *āsavas* are *anāsava*.
113. *Sabbaṁ supinagatassa cittaṁ abyākatan ti, Kathāvatthu*, XXII. 6.
114. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakatha*. p. 195.
115. *Saṁvaro kamman ti, Kathāvatthu*, XII. 1.
116. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*. p. 135.
117. Cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 18-19; *Dīgha Nikāya*. I, p. 70.
118. *Debates Commentary*, p. 166; cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 135.
119. *Pañca viññāṇā sābhogāti, Kathāvatthu*, X. 5.
120. *Akusalamūlaṁ pāṭisandahati kusalamūlan ti, Kathāvatthu*, XIV. 1.
121. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 147.
122. Cf. *Kathāvatthu- Aṭṭhakathā*, loc. cit.
123. Cf. *Atīte kilese jahatīti, Kathāvatthu*, XIX. 1.
124. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 177.
125. See *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 496-7.
126. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 177.
127. Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III, 2; IV. 4. 1-5.
128. See *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 368; cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 280.
129. *Milindapañha*, p. 137f.
130. Cf. '*Satimule tadvipāko jātyāurbhogā*', *Yogasūtras*, II. 13.
131. See *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 39-40; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, pp. 157-8.
132. *Sabbaṁ idaṁ kammoti, Kathāvatthu*, XVII. 3.
133. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 164.
134. *Saddo vipāko ti, Kathāvatthu*, XII. 3; *Cakkhāyatanaṁ vipāko ti*, ibid., XII. 4.
135. *Vipāko vipākadhammadhammo ti*, ibid., VII. 10.
136. *Sabbaṁ idaṁ kammato ti*, ibid. XVII. 3.
137. *Rupaṁ vipāko ti*, ibid., XVI. 8.
138. *Pathavī kammavipāko ti, Kathāvatthu*, VII. 7.
139. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 99-101.
140. Cf. '*Manusyavatī pṛthvī*. . . etc. *Arthaśāstra*, VII. 11. The Andhaka thesis in question may be an early idea of human control over the resources of nature.
141. *Jarāmaranaṁ vipāko ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, VII.8; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 101-2.
142. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 206.
143. *Atthi antarābhavo ti, Kathāvatthu*, VIII.2; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 106-7.
144. *Abhidharmakośa*.
145. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 106.
146. *Cha gatio ti, Kathāvatthu*, VIII. 1; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 105.

147. See e.g., *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, p. 182; cf. J.R. Haldar, *Early Buddhist Mythology*, pp. 21ff, 139ff.
148. *Sabbaṁ kammaṁ savipākan ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XII.2; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 135-6.
149. *Sabbe kammā niyatā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XXI.8.
150. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 191-2.
151. *Aññaṁ kammaṁ añño kammūpacayo ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XV.11.
152. Cf. *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 156.
153. Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 302ff.
154. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, pp. 359-63.
155. *Paro parassa sukhaṁ anuppadetīti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XVI.3. see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 158-9.
156. *N'atthi nirayesu nirayapālā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, XX.3; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 184-5.
157. *Atthi devesu tiracchānagatā ti*, *Kathāvatthu*. XX.4; see also *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhākathā*, pp. 185-6.
158. Cf. J.R. Haldar, op. cit., pp. 21ff; N.Dutt, *Buddhist Sects in India*.

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**Note* : (i) Only such works are listed in the Bibliography which have been referred to in the preceding pages.
(ii) For the Pāli Tripiṭaka Nālandā-Devanāgarī Pāli Series edited by J. Kashyap and published by the Nava-Nālandā-Mahāvihāra, Nālandā has been utilised, except where stated otherwise.
(iii) Wherever different editions of the same work are used the relevant edition is specified in the footnote.

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